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Reading and Writing with a Tree:
Practising ‘Nature Writing’ as Enquiry

Camilla Nelson

Submitted on 10\textsuperscript{th} August 2012 for the degree of PhD to be awarded by University of the Arts London in collaboration with University College Falmouth.
This thesis reframes, or reforms, ‘nature writing’ (‘Nature Writing Reformed’) through the practical and theoretical recombination of human, tree, and page. Understandings of ‘writing’, ‘nature’, and their phrasal relation in ‘nature writing’, are explored through a sustained enquiry into the reading and writing practices principally undertaken by the author (Camilla Nelson) in relation to one specific apple tree in the walled garden of University College Falmouth’s Tremough Campus, Cornwall. The central claim of this thesis is that composition is always environmentally constructive and constructed: how (the method with which) you read and write, and where (the environment in which) you read and write, i.e. the situation and materials you read and write with, affect not only the composition of the written text but the composition of the human, as well as the other-than-human, entities involved in this practice.

This thesis is explicitly structured as an interweave of variously material (word; page; room; box; walled garden; library; studio; tree) and conceptual (word; page; theory; footnote; hyperlink; field of research) framing devices (and / or environments). The structure of this thesis and that of the orchard and studio installations, which together constitute the final PhD research submission, play on the variety of framing and reframing that occurs in relation to the spatio-temporal specifics of material and conceptual composition (as evidenced in the Media Log). This ‘reform’ of nature writing, as an interweave of human and other-than-human environments (or frames), is developed in relation to Mark Johnson’s expanded theory of ‘mind’ by way of the conceptual and material practice of metaphor (Johnson, 2007). This thesis combines the theories and practices derived from the (princippal) field of ‘Nature Writing’ (as defined in the correspondingly titled chapter), with those suggested by contemporary developments in cognitive philosophy, neuroscience, microbiology, systems theory, and translation studies.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Aspects of this research have been presented as part of informal academic papers within Dartington College of Arts, University College Falmouth and University of the Arts, London (2010-2012). More formal papers have been delivered under the following titles as part of national and international academic conferences: ‘Material Conservation: The Presence of ‘Nature’ in Literature’ as part of Literature and Conservation: Responsibilities: Trinity College, Dublin (2nd-4th September, 2011); ‘Reading & Writing with a Tree: An Enquiry into the Performance of ‘Nature Writing” as part of Emergent Environments: Where Next for the Humanities?; at Queen Mary’s University, London (9th & 10th September, 2011); ‘Reading and Writing with a Tree: Reading Embodied Experience & Embodied Reading Experience’ as part of Interfaces: encounters beyond the page/screen/stage at Exeter University (29th January, 2011); and ‘The Importance of Being There: A Discussion of Alec Finlay’s Mesostic Herbarium and Heidegger’s ‘Dasein’ as part of Cosmopoetics: Mediating a New World Poetics, Durham University (8th-10th September, 2010).

The following material has been published in advance of the formal submission of this research:

‘writIng apple’ and ‘from Written Responses to Photographs and Audio Recordings, Reading and Writing with a Tree, 2010-2012’ (2012) Shearsman Magazine 90 & 91 ed. Tony Frazer.


‘hill snow car speak’ (Spring 2010) The RIALTO, 69. Nathan Hamilton & Michael Mackmin (eds.).

Copies of these works are included in the final pages of this submission.

This research has also developed through a number of public workshops: ‘Reading and Writing with a Tree’ as part of an exhibition of work at Tremough Campus library (University College Falmouth, 6th-7th March 2012); ‘Writing with Nature’ as part of Gather (Goongillings Farm, Cornwall, 24th September 2011); ‘Writing with Trees’ as part of The Haldon Forest Festival (CCANW, 11th September 2011); and ‘Reading and Writing with a Tree: A Geopoetics Workshop’ curated by Alyson Hallett (University College Falmouth, January 2011).

This research has been made possible by the assistance, either online or in person, of a great many people. Thanks go to Elizabeth-Jane Burnett, Emma Bush, Tom and Laurie Clark, Alec Finlay, Alyson Hallett, Jonathan Skinner, Johny Lamb, Marianne Morris, Eleanor Stevens, Christos Polymenakos, Katie Pamment, Natalia Eernstman, Annabel Banks, Gemma Anderson, and, in particular, Alex Metcalf, for their assistance with brainstorming, information retrieval, and workshop development; and to David Garwood and all the gardening team on Tremough Campus for their continued assistance and advice on all things tree-related.

This submission includes recordings (Apple Tree 2 & Apple Tree 3) of the apple tree at Tremough made by Alex Metcalf, using his Tree Listening device (2012); photographs, by Alyson Hallett, of the Geopoetics Brunch, Falmouth (January, 2010); and a video and photographs of the final VIVA exhibition by Natalia Eernstman.

Particular thanks are due to my director of studies, Dr. Mark Leahy, and my second supervisor, Dr. Kym Martindale, for their consistently sound academic advice, close reading, editorial skills and energetic support throughout.

Finally, thank you to all my family and friends for their support in the final stages of this work; and a very special thank you to my mother, Lucy Nelson, for her untiring enthusiasm and confidence; this research would have been a very different experience without you.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE

The USB entitled ‘CN PHD’ is Microsoft Office compatible. You will need access to a Windows PC with Microsoft Office software installed in order for the embedded hyperlinks to successfully activate. You will need access to Microsoft Word, Adobe Acrobat, Microsoft Excel, and suitable audio-visual software in order to access the full contents of this PhD Submission. You will need to be connected to the internet in order to access the hyperlinked websites. Any broken links to web data are the result of the sites being moved or removed from their original web address. All website hyperlinks were active at the time of submission (1/08/12).

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Some hyperlinks within the ‘THESIS’ will lead you directly to a specific image, audio file or written text. It is sufficient to view / read / listen to this document in isolation, but there exists more media (earlier or later versions in the case of some written texts) to either side of the given text and, with regards to the photographs for example, your browser should allow you to scroll to left or right of these documents to get a fuller sense of their context should you wish to explore further.
Other hyperlinks will take you to a file of audio / visual / textual elements that you are invited to investigate for yourself. Still others will open onto files containing the various years, months or days of related work. Again it is for you to navigate these as you wish. There is a large amount of data stored within the ‘PhD Log’ and, although readers are encouraged to explore it as they wish, it is not intended for exhaustive consumption.

Documents as Frames

The ‘THESIS’ provides the principal ‘frame’ within which to navigate these files. Other framings are suggested by the ‘PHD TIMELINE’, ‘APPLE AUDIO LOG’, and ‘PHD PRACTICE LOG’. These documents are hyperlinked to the ‘MEDIA LOG’ which contains a large amount of the audio, visual and textual documentation generated by this research project. The ‘MEDIA LOG’ also contains ‘other appendices’, here you will find (among other things) the ‘through skoulding log’ and corresponding audio and visual files, these should be navigated using the hyperlinked ‘through skoulding log’, when accessing this material other than as prompted by the ‘THESIS’. 
PREFATORY NOTE

This thesis is primarily a digital document. A physical counterpart is provided as part of this submission, but the digital form is to be regarded as the thesis proper, of which the physical articulation of this thesis, as printed pages, provides a partial paper trace. The main text of the thesis is identical in both versions. However, the digital version includes access to the PhD log (included as a digital appendix), that archives the practical progress of this research, providing an expanded, physical framing, by way of audio, visual, and textual documentation, to supplement the theoretical development of my argument. The PhD log can most effectively be navigated by way of the PhD timeline (excel spreadsheet). Alternative ways of accessing this material, as well as further information, are provided by way of the PhD Practice Log and Apple Audio Log (word docs). The PhD Practice Log and Apple Audio logs are informal notes to the practice. These are working documents that are included as alternative means of navigating the material presented in the PhD Timeline, or within the thesis. As with the Media Log, they are not polished documents, but are included as an instance of the draft-making activity of this research, referred to within the thesis. All three of these hyperlinked documents are included within the PhD Log and relate to various sections of the Media Log. Alternatively the Media Log can be accessed manually, without the ‘frames’ of the Timeline/Practice/Apple Audio Logs. The PhD Log is not an appendix that demands exhaustive examination. It is included to give a sense of the expanded life of this research beyond the written argument and provide specific information referred to within the thesis. As such it anticipates the practical manifestation of this interrelation of the framing devices of page, room, walled garden and box, through which the reader/experient makes their way in the final orchard and studio installations, documented at the end of this thesis. This final exhibition of work took place on Tremough Campus, University College Falmouth, Cornwall (21st September, 2012).

The hyperlink manifests a ‘meta’ articulation of this relationship between the ‘framing’ terms that title the central thesis sections and the ecology of ideas that emerge and interweave between these respectively titled sections. This is echoed in the relation between the main body of the thesis and the footnotes, as well as the more limited appendices, included in print. It is part of the project of this thesis to signal the pathways
and potential connections that exceed the immediate frame(s) of this research, in order to acknowledge the concurrent fields, or frames, of research to which this thesis relates. This thesis defines its immediate field, and principal frame, in the first chapter ‘Nature Writing’. However, the thesis argument as a whole develops in relation to research being undertaken in less obviously related fields, such as cognitive philosophy, neuroscience, microbiology, systems theory, and translation. Footnotes are included to provide an expanded sense of these fields (or frames of reference) that exceed those discussed in ‘Nature Writing’. These fields ghost the principal objective of this research as a ‘nature writing’ enterprise. The reciprocal structuring of both thesis and installation has been designed to encourage the reader to enjoy the multiplicity of pathways through these texts.

It should be noted that unless otherwise specified all references to ‘this research’ refer to the research undertaken by Camilla Nelson as part of the PhD, entitled ‘Reading and Writing with a Tree: Practising Nature Writing as Enquiry’, of which this thesis (unless otherwise specified ‘this thesis’ refers to the thesis you are now reading) constitutes the final manifestation (incorporating both material and digital (usb) components). Likewise, unless otherwise specified, all references to ‘this tree’ refer to the apple tree in the Tremough Campus walled garden, specified in the final installations of Camilla Nelson’s PhD submission, and documented in this thesis, in relation to which the final two years of this PhD research has developed.

As is noted in the timeline this research project was initiated at Dartington College of Arts, Devon, in October 2009 and transferred to the Tremough Campus of University College Falmouth as part of the formal merging of these institutions in June 2010.

All material included within this submission, other than Alex Metcalf’s Tree Listening recordings, Natalia Eernstaman’s films and and Alyson Hallett’s photographs, as already acknowledged, is my own work.
INTRODUCTION

This research has developed out of the following series of questions and preconceptions:

How might a tree figure in / as writing without being ‘marginalised’ by the cultural document that is the page, by its ‘other’ bleached, rectangular form, as surface for human writing?

How might nature regain its status as mark, over and against its status as perceived absence, in the majority of human writing, as page?

Is the presence of the tree transformed so utterly into page that it ceases to speak, as tree, altogether?

And, if this is the case, what then does the page say about our relationship with nature in writing? Does alphabetic writing (Bate, 2000) articulate the irrevocable death knell of nature, or might writing be revised, along with its material and conceptual manifestations of page, to reform its relationship with that which is natural, and / or, as in this particular instance, that which is tree?

The key terms, and conceptions, that underlie these questions are writing, nature, human, tree and page. This thesis documents the theoretical and practical investigation of these framing terms in order to answer these questions, through the restatement or reconfiguration of these terms and their relation, as a result of this creative, practical and theoretical research.

This research emphasises the materiality of the word in order to reinforce the material impact that literary processes of composition have on their environment and, vice versa, the impact that (literary) environments have upon both process and product of material composition. The materiality of writing is highlighted in order to develop an understanding of writing as an emergent compositional practice that is not exclusive to human beings, but, on the contrary, that emerges out of and reinforces our relations with the other-than-human organisms with which we relate and rely upon for our existence: our
(human) writing is what it is as a result of our relation with that which is other-than-human. The material relation between writing and the environments, and environmental attitudes, these processes inspire and sustain, should, I argue, be part of any serious investigation into the environment that is literature. This argument emerges as a cumulative proof, dispersed throughout the work, culminating in the final section, ‘Nature Writing Reframed’.

I have undertaken this research in the belief that mind, as reconceived according to Mark Johnson’s theory (2007)¹, is constituted by the habitual relations of brain, body and environment, of which, as a writer, my reading and writing environment constitutes a significant part. By altering this environment, that of writing and reading, and insisting on the development of a reading and writing practice in relation to a tree, I anticipated (and finally effected) a shift in mind, resulting from this readjustment of brain, body and environmental organisation, and supported by the development of a correspondingly adjusted body of cognitive artefacts, expressive of this development (as demonstrated by the final installations). This thesis records my research into how reading and writing environmental behaviours might be conceived as ‘mind-altering’, in relation to Mark Johnson’s expanded theory of mind (2007).

¹ Mark Johnson is an American philosopher working principally in what has been described as the pragmatist tradition. Johnson has co-authored a series of publications with the cognitive linguist George Lakoff (1980;2002) on the role of metaphor in human experience, perception and concept-formation. Both Lakoff and Johnson are engaged in the development of theories of embodied mind. Mark Johnson is currently the Philip H. Knight Professor of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Oregon. Building on his previous research, The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding (2007), the principal of his publications to which this thesis refers, attempts ‘to delve even more deeply into aspects of embodied meaning and cognition that have traditionally been ignored or under-valued in mainstream philosophy […] This attempt to go further into the ways our bodily engagement with our environment makes thought possible has led [him] to pay special attention to what have traditionally been called “aesthetic” dimensions of experience, meaning, and action’ (no date). Most importantly, in relation to this research, Mark Johnson’s 2007 text develops an expanded theory of ‘mind’, in which ‘mind’ is a composite relation of body, brain and environment, where altering any one of these elements alters the formation of ‘mind’. Central to Johnson’s theory is the multi- or cross-modal function of metaphor, whereby one form of functioning (sensorimotor performance, for example) affects the functioning of another area of ‘mind’ (conceptual thought, for instance), suggesting the ‘literal’ (and environmental) function of metaphor, where thinking is doing and doing is thinking (Maturana and Varela, 1992). Johnson’s argument is used in this thesis to support the compositional method of this research (reading and writing with a tree as critical and creative enquiry) where the compositional environment is fundamentally constitutive of the compositional methodology. According to this method the life of the tree, and the organisms that share this environment, influence the form of writing both conceptually and physically, as authorial agency and raw material, within this writing. Altering the environment of writing alters the cognitive structures that arise out of this writing: environmental writing of this kind is thus a form of environmental mind-formation, or environmental mind-reform. The relationship of Johnson’s theory to the argument of my research emerges throughout this thesis.
The first section, ‘Nature Writing’, establishes the use of this term within the thesis. It observes its use in publications such as ISLE and Green Letters and situates it amongst related terms such as ecopoetics, (radical) landscape writing, avant-garde landscape, and environmental writing. The relation between its compositional terms is redefined, within this thesis, with reference to the relationship between ‘performance’ and ‘writing’ as they are understood according to definitions of ‘performance writing’ (Hall, 2006).

The second section, ‘Framing’, establishes an understanding of the ‘frame’ as an abstraction, or ghosting (Ingold, 2007) of its physical counterpart, alongside an introduction to Mark Johnson’s account of ‘edge detection’, as part of his expanded theory of mind (2007) and the relation of these concepts to the page, regarded in this research as playing a particular role in material and conceptual relations, within human and more-than human environmental relations, in writing. Framing, within this thesis, is not regarded as a matter of exclusive definition, bound strictly within the confines of the frame, but rather emerges between, as well as within, these ‘frames’. The frame provides a sufficiently stable structuring device to enable, without impeding, meaning’s evolution. This section argues that the edges of the page form a physical frame, making the page one of the most fundamental physical and conceptual framing structures, in literature.

This section is followed by three sections (‘Human’, ‘Tree’, and ‘Page’) that develop an understanding of each of these terms, as designating a ‘mesh’ (Morton, 2009; 2010) that contribute to the constitution and overlap between each of these ‘frames’. Each term acts as a place-holder for an ecology of ideas that expands / exceeds the boundaries of these terms and their respective sections: the frames overlap and interweave. Each section harnesses a review of current theoretical discussion of the term and harnesses this discussion to the practical discoveries of this research. The interrelation of these terms, as indicative of both physical and conceptual frameworks, performs the groundwork for the revision of ‘nature writing’ that takes place in the final chapter, ‘Nature Writing Reframed’.

This conclusion is arrived at by way of the penultimate section, ‘Metaphor, Metamor, Metamorphosis’ that takes its name from the words of a poem, written in the early stages of this research (January, 2010), that develops by way of the overlapping letter arrangements within these words. This poem also plays on the overlap between word and
image, or other perceptual data, that is characteristic of the argument of this thesis. This section correspondingly turns the emergent frames of human, tree and page, as constitutive of the practical articulation of ‘nature writing’ considered here, over and into each other. Drawing from the work of Maturana and Varela (1992), and Gregory Bateson (1972/1987), who conceive of cognition as a continuity between the various functions of the human body and brain, as well as between the physical structure and behaviour of human and other-than-human organisms, and with recourse to translation theory (Torop, 2003; Petrilli, 2003; Ruthrof, 2000; 2003; Favareau, 2005; 2010), as understood by way of Mark Johnson’s account of metaphor, as a fundamental feature of our perceptual and conceptual processing of the world (2007: cf. 167), the practical aspect of this research is presented as a means of developing this relationship between body, brain and environment by way of the evolution of a writing in relation to a tree. The claim made by this section is that the page, as an element of distributed cognition (Johnson, 2007; Thrift, 1999; Rifkin, 2010), enables and supports the interactive environmental practices of reading and writing. The environment of the page, and the treatment of the page, therefore, is understood to delimit, to a large extent, the environmental scope of literacy. In order to develop a more obviously embodied integration of human and other-than-human organisms, in writing, this section suggests that we should turn to the work of writers such as Alec Finlay, Cutts et al., Diana Lynn Thompson, Tim Knowles and the work of Writers Forum to support the comprehension and practice of writing as a form of more-than-human composition.

The final section of this thesis, ‘Nature Writing Reframed’, returns to an examination of the material and conceptual use of framing within this research. Nature Writing is reconceived here as an amalgam of human and more-than-human materials, physical articulations of page and word mulching, framing and reframing in the liquid environment of rainwater, tree leaf and apple mulch. As with the pages that emerge from this practice of paper-making, any ‘solid’ framing is temporary, a side line or off shoot, from the continuing mulching of materials, perceptions and conceptions that constitute environment. This thesis constitutes one such temporary framing. It details a practice that has contributed to the mulching of ideas, materials and embodied experience in order to present a ‘solid’ frame, but a frame that is, nonetheless, reliant upon the overlay and interweave of other frames, both material and theoretical. This thesis constitutes a frame that is shot through with the voices, words, perceptions, material presence and ideas of others, both human and other-than-human.
This term permeates this research as a series of questions.

This research acknowledges an understanding of nature as associated with ideas of essence\(^2\), the unchanging kernel of, for example, your ‘self’: your ‘true nature’. This research moves away from this perception of nature, towards a consideration of ‘nature’ as a permeable, and malleable, frame of reference or place holder that marks a past, present and future of human association in language. This research questions the definitive properties of nature, and in so doing, enquires into the nature of definition itself. This research acknowledges the identification of nature in opposition to that which is human or man-made. Nature, according to this view, is that which is other-than-human, or more-than-human (Bate, 2000). Human communicational systems, and the social and technological advances that attend the development of human communication, are a fundamental part of human cultural growth. But ‘cultural growth’ becomes a redundant phrase when we realise that the growth of the human, within and by way of her environment, is precisely that of human culture. Writing, as both practice and artefact of human communication, as a form of human mark-making and as a dimension of human language (historically regarded as a marker of human identity), is, in this view, an exemplum of human culture, standing in opposition to ‘nature’.

In contrast to these views, this research understands ‘nature’ as being both other than and continuous with the human. So that human cultural growth occurs, and is made possible, by way of its relation with that which is other-than-human. Man is both natural and man-made: these terms are not exclusive. As such, writing is no more an exclusively human process or product than language. Writing is a construction of human meaning, and a function of human linguistic communication, as mark-making. The human capacity for language is apprehended as the result of our evolution between and among a range of other-than-human environments and organisms. Language is no more self-grounding (Butler, 2005) than the human. The term ‘writing’ is used, here, as a frame (a term that is

\(^2\) The first and ‘earliest sense’ of ‘nature’, given by Raymond Williams in *Keywords*, is ‘(i) the essential quality and character of something’ (1976: 109).
discussed, in detail, in the next section, ‘Framing’) through which to understand the mark-making capacity of language and its relation to the more-than human. Language is a form of communication. Communication is a form of language. What is being communicated, by whom (between which organisms and within which environments) and how, is a subtext of this enquiry into ‘nature writing’.

Whilst observing the history of this term and its cultural relations, this work develops an understanding of ‘nature writing’ as a series of questions in line with those posed to writing as performance, or ‘performance writing’, where, to borrow a phrase from John Hall, ‘the grammatical status of the two words in the term is undecided’ (2006:89). This account of ‘nature writing’ is worked through articulations of ‘performance writing’, as developed by Hall and Allsopp, for example. According to Hall’s entry in Performance Research: A Lexicon (2006), ‘performance writing’, in this context, refers predominantly ‘to a field of practice and enquiry in which both words are seen as in a necessarily troublesome but productive relationship with each other’ (89). My development of the term ‘nature writing’ proceeds according to a similar understanding: both ‘nature’ and ‘writing’ are regarded as being ‘in a necessarily troublesome but productive relationship with each other’. The following questions result:

Is nature writing? Where nature is the subject performing writing as a verb in the continuous present tense.

Is nature writing? Where nature is a noun in a testing of equivalence with another noun (writing) and how much do these nouns overlap / have in common?

How much is nature (n.) writing (n.), or writing (n.) nature (n.), and how much is nature (n.) writing (v.)?

To borrow from John Hall once again, what is it to write with questions regarding nature in play? And, vice versa, how are we to understand nature in the face of questions regarding writing? (90)
The answers to these questions, along with those outlined in the introduction, emerge throughout the progress of the thesis, and are returned to in the conclusion of this thesis, in ‘Nature Writing Reframed’.

Writing

This conception of nature writing regards ‘nature’ and ‘writing’, and their relation within this phrase, as terms in process: ‘nature writing’ is emergent. The business of this research is to reframe an understanding according to these questions, as is demonstrated in the final section of this thesis: ‘Nature Writing Reframed’. My application of ‘writing’, within the phrase ‘nature writing’, is similar in scope to its application within ‘performance writing’. In this research, writing is understood variously ‘as potentially inclusive of any composed trace, without any expectation that this trace need be confined to ink on paper or to alphabetic letter forms’ (Hall, 2006: 91); ‘writing as it performs itself as a graphic, sonic, or physical presence’ (Allsopp, 1999: 48); in relation to performance, as something that is lived through, that is practised or performed; and finally, with reference to Ingold’s brief taxonomy of line (2007) as a possible combination of trace, thread, crease, crack, cut, or ghost and its relationship with surface, understood here as page. This conception of writing is influenced by the work of Bob Cobbing and Lawrence Upton, among others, as part of Writers Forum (1992; 2001). It insists upon the material interface of ‘nature’ and ‘writing’ as a form of engagement that, as Steve McCaffery has phrased it, ‘contests the status of language as a bearer of uncontaminated meaning’ (McCaffery in Perloff, 1991:129). Writing does not communicate only (or even) that which it intends to communicate. Writing is always in excess of itself. This understanding of writing, or language, corresponds with my understanding of the human (explored in the correspondingly titled section): it is not so much that language is ‘hopelessly compromised, contaminated with […] alienness in the very heart’ (Hayles, 1999:288) but that language is only made possible as a result of this ‘otherness’. As such language, but more specifically writing, always has the potential to surprise us, to reveal something other than what we expect. As has been observed of the human, writing is ‘wild inside’ (Woods, 2011). This research understands the physical conditions, and the results, of the making of writing, to be as significant as its syntagmatic arrangement. Robert Sheppard understands
the enterprise of Writers Forum as an ‘irruption of thingness in language’; this, he writes, ‘is the irruption of material historical occasion, of making, validation, and performance of the text, that will unsettle linguistic system, and declare its rooted but excessive presence’ (Sheppard in Cobbing, 1998). It is the aim of this research to demonstrate the irruption of thingness in language as a challenge to the sovereignty of human authorship in writing, in order to establish, and develop, the other-than-human influence within human language formation.

Nature

The framing term of ‘nature’ is one that overlaps with other framing terms, such as ‘landscape’, ‘environment’, ‘ecology’. I have selected the term ‘nature’ as much for what it evokes as for what it does not evoke by way of association.

Timothy Morton is one of the most vocal contemporary critics of the term ‘nature’. He argues that ‘the idea of nature is getting in the way of properly ecological forms of culture, philosophy, politics and art’ (2005:1). This may be true but the ideas that collect under the banner of this term are not intrinsic to the word. This research proposes that in order to alter understandings of this term we must alter the ideas that collect in nature’s name. I

3 Timothy Morton’s background in the scholarship of Romanticism has developed, as with many Romantic scholars, into a study of literature and ecology. Over the last couple of years Morton’s theorising has developed in relation to Graham Harman’s emergent ‘Object-Oriented Philosophy’ and Levi R. Bryant’s ‘Object-Oriented Ontology’. Although I am nervous about allying my own work to these theories directly, and although this thesis does not address Timothy Morton’s (or any of the above authors) emerging philosophy in depth, it is important to acknowledge the conceptual influence of this work upon my own, especially with regards to what Morton calls ‘the mesh’. Although Morton is an important contemporary influence on environmental thinking in relation to literature it is principally this conception of the mesh that is important to the development of this thesis.

The mesh, according to Morton, ‘has no centre and no edge’ (2009a:3.46-3.47/8.18). In ‘Thinking Ecology: The Mesh 1’ Morton imagines an interdependence theorem comprised of two axioms. Axiom 1 determines that ‘things are only what they are in relation to other things’ (2009a: 1.53-1.58/8.18). Axiom 2 determines that ‘things derive from other things’ (2009a:1.58-2.02/8.18). These axioms broadly define his conception of the mesh. Morton details how the mesh applies to life forms: ‘[Axiom 1] Life forms are made up of other life forms (the theory of symbiosis) and [Axiom 2] life forms derive from other life forms (evolution)’ (2009a: 4.49-4.55/8.18). In the same lecture Morton details how this thinking applies equally to language as it does to life forms. This is particularly helpful, especially in relation to the ‘Metaphor, Metamor, Metamorphosis’ chapter of this thesis, in lending support to the relationship between writing and mark-making for example. However, Morton’s theories ghost the trajectory of my argumentation rather than define it. This information is therefore included as a footnote rather than within the main body of the research, marking its peripheral relevance. In line with Morton’s own thinking, as regards ‘the mesh’, this note sits on the border between thesis and non-thesis, illustrating the truth of his own observations.
argue that this can only be achieved by way of a truly interactive practical and theoretical enquiry. Morton favours the terms ‘ecology’ and ‘environment’ over that of ‘nature’. Ecology and environment are terms that reflect a more dispersed understanding of human being-in-the-world than the troubled etymology of nature allows. ‘Ecology without nature’ could therefore mean ‘ecology without a concept of the natural’ (2005:24). My response to this statement is echoed in my reaction to John Wylie’s treatment of ‘landscape’ (below, p.13): the cultural baggage invested in this term, ‘nature’, is not resolved, but merely set aside, in the decision to use another term. In this case, Morton is concerned about the opposition (to culture) that he sees as implicit within the term ‘nature’. He regards this opposition as dangerous because it suggests that there is another side, an outside to the term ‘nature’ (as embodied by human culture) that is impossible, in contradistinction to this belief, Morton asserts that

[… there is nowhere outside a signifying system from which to pronounce upon it; further […] this is one of the illusions that the signifying system enables and sustains. Virtual reality and the ecological emergency point out the hard truth that we never had this position in the first place. (2005:26-27)

Ideas of ecology tend to be more decentred, more web- or network-based than those of nature. This is not to say that understandings of nature cannot become similarly infused. In ‘Thinking Ecology’ Morton takes a more performative approach. Rather than replacing one term with another he attempts to think through the concept of Nature, acknowledging its historically nuanced baggage, in an effort to move beyond it:

Nature dissolves when we look directly at it, into assemblages of behaviours, congeries of organs without bodies […] Beyond concept, Nature is, a Nature for which there are no words. But we are already using words to describe this wordless Nature. (2010:215-216)

This research is influenced by the performative approach of Morton’s text. It is only in working through ideas of nature that we are able to thoroughly reform them.

Landscape

Landscape is a term used by some in an effort to avoid the binary oppositions of nature v. culture or man v. nature, containing within it as the term does, an acknowledgement of the
relationship between human and land. Harriet Tarlo glosses the etymology of this term in her introduction to *The Ground Aslant*:

The word “landscape” is a compound, of the land itself and the “scape” which acknowledges interventionist human engagement with land. In common parlance, this may be literal landscaping by gardeners or designers or it may be the representation of land in art. (2010:7)

This term derives from the German term ‘landschaft’, where ‘schaft’ is associated with making and/or creating. This presents an interesting crossover between etymological associations of nature and culture, as Raymond Williams has documented:

The fw is *cultura*, L, from *rw colere*, L. *Colere* had a range of meanings: inhabit, cultivate, protect, honor with worship. Some of these meanings eventually separated, though still with occasional overlapping, in the derived nouns […]

Culture in all its early uses was a noun of process: the tending of something, basically crops or animals. (Williams, 1985: 87)

Williams’ discussion of ‘culture’ establishes the relationship between encouraging growth, as in the tending of crops or animals, by providing the best possible conditions in which they might thrive, and its earlier usages, to ‘protect’ or ‘honor with worship’. This emphasis on growth links it to the Latin root of ‘nature’: ‘Nature comes from fw *nature*, oF and *natura*, L, from a root in the past participle of *nasci*, L – to be born […]’ (109). The overlap between the current usage of culture, as in ‘‘sugar-beet culture’ or, in the specialized physical application in bacteriology since the 1880’s, ‘germ culture’” (90), and relatives of ‘nature’ such as ‘nascent’ meaning ‘in the process of emerging, being born, or starting to develop’ (*Encarta U.K.*, 2012) establishes the continuity between these words at an etymological level. My decision to use the term nature as a principal term within this research is born of the desire to develop the continuities between these words, as are being developed elsewhere in terms such as landscape.

Traditionally […] landscapes have been defined by geographers as the product of interactions between sets of natural conditions – weather, terrain, soil type, resources, etc. – and sets of cultural practices – agricultural practices, religious or spiritual beliefs, shared values and behavioural norms, the organisation of society vis-à-vis gender roles, property ownership and so on. Nature plus culture equals landscape in this account. (Wylie, 2007:9)
John Wylie has argued that the terms ‘nature’ and ‘culture’, and their relation, precede that of ‘landscape’ (which, chronologically, they do). Wylie suggests that by conceptually reversing this chronology we can alter our understanding of this relationship:

[…] we should think of landscaping first. That is we should think about practices, habits, actions and events, ongoing processes of relating and un-relating, that come before any separation of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’. Instead of landscape being the outcome of interactions of nature and culture, practices of landscaping – everyday things like walking, looking, gardening, driving, building – are in actuality the cause and origin of what is ‘nature’ and what is ‘culture’. (11)

Rather than arguing for the precedence of one set of terms over another this research acknowledges that nature, culture and landscape are mutually informing frames of reference. The residual opposition of nature / culture cannot be resolved by a theoretical sidestep, or a reversal of precedent and terminological revision. This research acknowledges that a large amount of work is being done under the banner of ‘landscape’ and chooses to work through the concept of nature (with all of its complicated historical residues), drawing upon the variety of thinking being developed within different frameworks, in order to expand and extend understandings of nature.

Landscape is a term much used within the arena of practice-based and / or creative research. This is very probably a result of its association with phenomenology, in the work, most especially, of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. These phenomenological approaches, Wylie has more recently noted, are commonly predicated upon, and bent on explicating, a view of human beings as engaged actors rather than distanced observers; they define human being as embodied ‘being-in-the-world’, as “caught in the fabric of the world”, to use Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1963:156) felicitous phrase [...] a crucial element of such being-in-the-world is that it is understood both to precede and ultimately to ground any sharp distinction, that is, between ‘internal’ self and ‘external’ landscape [...] to be is to be already in and of the world, to be

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4 Martin Heidegger’s thinking underpins a great deal of contemporary environmental and ecological thought. Although his writings, as referenced in the bibliography of this thesis, have influenced the general shape of my thinking about humanity and its relationship with the world, it is Mark Johnson’s more contemporary work, allying phenomenology (with its roots in the work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty) with the findings of modern neuroscience, that I find more compelling. This relationship clearly emphasises the importance of practice as a means of discovery and, although arts practice differs from scientific practice, I have found the acknowledgement, common to both enterprises, that the world has more to teach us than we are able dream of in philosophy, crucial to the development of my work.

5 Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy echoes throughout this thesis, secondhand, in the thinking of Johnson and Wylie, among others.
phenomenologically nested in a world of ongoing concerns [...]. (Wylie in Brace and Johns-Putra, 2010:45)

The fruits of human creativity, poesis, or making, are thus often considered to be expressive of this ‘always already’ immersion in the world, testament to the inescapable co-incidence and mutual influence, or confluence, of man and world, as, for example, Kent C. Ryden writes, in his consideration of Robert Frost’s poem ‘Mending Wall’:

[…] the speaker of “Mending Wall” is not just talking about a wall, not just musing on his relationship with his neighbour and with humankind in general, but is also revealing his relationship with the local and regional culture and the environment in which the culture is embedded. The poem’s titular wall is richly symbolic, deeply metaphorical, but at the same time it has literal presence as an actual stone fence of the sort was built all over New England, fences that communicated intertwined social and environmental meanings. (2001:304)

This reading bears the influence of Martin Heidegger’s theory of ‘equipment’ or ‘tools’, a line of thinking most recently developed by the contemporary proponent of Object-

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As with the broken wall, according to Heidegger, the functionality of equipment reveals the particular character of human interaction with the world only when the tool or equipment becomes broken, when its functionality is in some way impaired. It is at this point that our absorbed immersion, our being-in-the-world (‘Dasein […] is nothing but […] concerned absorption in the world.’ (Dreyfus, 1991:68)) is revealed to us by way of its interruption:

To the everydayness of Being-in-the-world there belong certain modes of concern. These permit the entities with which we concern ourselves to be encountered in such a way that the worldly character of what is within-the-world comes to the fore. When we concern ourselves with something, the entities which are most closely ready-to-hand may be met as something unusable, not properly adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool turns out to be damaged, or the material unsuitable. In each of these cases equipment is here, ready-to-hand […] When its unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous.

[...] When equipment cannot be used, this implies that the constitutive assignment of the “in-order-to” to a “towards-this” has been disturbed. The assignments themselves are not observed; they are rather ‘there’ when we concernfully submit ourselves to them [sich stellen unter sie]. But when an assignment has been disturbed – when something is unusable for some purpose – then the assignment becomes explicit. (Heidegger in Moran, (2002:296-297)).

And so it is that man’s being, or Dasein, according to Heidegger, is characterised by this perpetual motion between absorbed at-homeness and being ill-at-ease, or not-at-home in the world. Hubert Dreyfus’ commentary on sein-bei and its relation to being-in-the-world details this tension in his observation that: ‘[…] one cannot translate sein-bei as being-at-home, as would be most natural, since Heidegger holds that Dasein is unheimlich, that is, never truly at home in the world’ (1991:45). This statement is shortly followed by the reverse claim: ‘What Heidegger is getting at is a mode of being-in we might call “inhabiting.” When we inhabit something, it is no longer an object for us but becomes part of us and pervades our relation to the other objects in the world. Both Heidegger and Michael Polanyi call this way of being-in “dwelling.” Polanyi points out that we dwell in our language; we feel at home in it and relate to objects and other people
Oriented Philosophy, Graham Harman (2002). These various conceptions of human-world relations as characterised by the treatment of materials and/or equipment might be understood as a form of what Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela have termed organism-environment coupling (1992), where human-environment relations are evidenced in the use and development of tools. Read in this way Kent C. Ryden’s development of Robert Frost’s analogy between the making of a stone wall and the making of a poem, can be understood as an acknowledgement of writing as an instance of organism-environment coupling:

As a cultural creation, an artifact is a material text just as a poem is a verbal text, and therein lies its ecocritical significance: as something created from natural materials that places people in a certain physical and imaginative relationship with the natural world, the artifact offers a window into human understandings of nature just as literature does. (2001:297)

As Wylie acknowledges, however, the relation between visual art and landscape is a more developed tradition than the relation between writing and landscape: ‘whereas landscape art is a familiar and rich visual tradition, there is in contrast no generally understood or accepted literary genre named ‘landscape writing’’ (2010:48).

Contemporary English dictionaries commonly define landscape in something like the following terms: ‘that portion of land or scenery which the eye can view at once.’ Most then go on to note that the term landscape may refer to a picture or image of the land […] a landscape is ‘scenery’ – something viewed by an eye […]. (2007:6-7)

through it. Heidegger says the same for the world. Dwelling is Dasein’s basic way of being-in-the-world’ (1991:45). Thus, according to Dreyfus’ interpretation of Heidegger, man is at once at-home, in his dwelling, and not-at-home, or ill-at-ease (unheimlich) in the world. This see-sawing of awareness is specifically characteristic of the human condition, according to Heidegger.

Harman’s interpretation of Heidegger’s tool-being is self-avowedly unfaithful, in the best interests of this theory:

My reading of Heidegger is definitely implausible if interpreted as a reading of Heidegger. In other words, there is no chance at all that Heidegger would read the book and say: “Wow! Finally, a reader who understands me!” As I mentioned in the book itself, Heidegger would surely be appalled by my interpretation. […] But the goal of this book is not to interpret Heidegger, but to interpret Heidegger’s tool-analysis […] which is in my view the the greatest thought experiment of 20th century philosophy. […] Stated differently, the tool analysis belongs to all human kind, not to its discoverer Heidegger. And it needs to be restated in non-Heideggerean terms if it is to have its full impact. That is what I have tried to do.’ (July 7, 2010)

As with my references to Morton I acknowledge Harman’s work as exceeding that of my own and yet existing in relation to my own.
Wylie seems to support such a development, noting that landscape phenomenology, or ‘the insight that we are caught in this fabric [of world] seems to be most aptly and powerfully articulated via literary or poetic (or artistic) registers’ (2010:52). The establishment of such a tradition has been contributed to by poets and editors such as Harriet Tarlo (The Ground Aslant: An Anthology of Radical Landscape Poetry, 2011) and Alec Finlay (Avant-Garde English Landscape/Some Versions of Landscape, 2005). These collections demonstrate a developing association between contemporary literary experiment and traditions of landscape. The same cannot be said for traditions of nature. This research aims to put writing, such as that gathered together by Tarlo and Finlay, to work within the context of ‘nature writing’, in order to creatively confront the tensions that inhabit this phrase. The decision to choose ‘nature’ over ‘landscape’ as a frame within which to discuss related writing is also a reaction against an emphasis on the visual in considerations of landscape. This tendency has informed my decision to avoid this term and its surrounding debates. ‘Nature’ provides a more perceptually neutral term, for this work, than ‘landscape’. 

This research uses poetic composition as an investigative tool, to rewrite a phrase from Kathleen Fraser (2000:176). Thinking through creative practice is understood within this research as an equally authoritative, but currently still under-explored, way of understanding and questioning the complexities of our everyday lives. This research, as a practice-based enquiry, acknowledges the large amount of theoretical enquiry that has been undertaken into the meaning of nature, culture, landscape, environment, ecology and the relation of these terms to writing, and by no means aims or claims to have absorbed the entirety of this research. What it does claim to do is to contribute to the tradition of thinking through the relation and overlap of these terms, through a combination of creative practice and critical reflection on this practice, in relation to existing scholarship. This approach affirms a belief in doing and making as a vital form of knowledge expression and accretion.

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8 Fraser’s phrase is ‘the movement of language as an investigative tool’ (2000:176).
Ecopoetics

The idea of writing as doing and / or making is related, in this research, to two key concepts, that of poesis and that of performance. Its relationship to the latter term emerges by way of its affiliation with ‘performance writing’ and the history of this term in relation to Dartington College of Arts, now incorporated into University College Falmouth, the funding body and principal academic environment of this research. Performance, in my mind, is related to an understanding of process. Writing is therefore applied, in relation to this word, within this research, as a particular form of process; a language-making process. This articulation overlaps with the sense of the Greek term ‘poesis’. This term has been coupled with the prefix ‘eco’ by various academics and writers. Most notably perhaps by Jonathan Skinner, founder of the journal ecopoetics (2001). In the UK this term is also inflected by Jonathan Bate’s understanding of the term: ‘Ecopoetics asks in what respects a poem may be a making (Greek poesis) of the dwelling-place – the prefix eco- is derived from Greek oikos, ‘the home or place of dwelling’” (2002:75). This appears to be not so different from Skinner’s understanding of the term:

‘Eco’ here signals—no more, no less—the house we share with several million other species, our planet Earth. ‘Poetics’ is used as poesis or making, not necessarily to emphasize the critical over the creative act (nor vice versa). Thus: ecopoetics, a house making. (2001:7)

Harriet Tarlo is critical of these descriptions, finding them ‘uncomfortably domestic’ (2008: np), something to be aware of, especially from a feminist perspective, within a realm that Tarlo understands (as defined by Bate) as a ‘a rather exclusive club of neo-romantic, male poets (with one or two modernists among them, but no contemporary innovative poets’ (2008: np). Skinner’s use of the term, although ‘homely’, contrastingly emphasises, and deliberately so, a move towards more innovative poetic treatments of nature, acknowledging, that ‘contemporary avant-garde poetry’s finickiness about “nature” is regretful [sic]’ (2001:6).

A sense of mutual resistance accompanies any sense of welcome, as Harriet Tarlo has observed, in the mingling of eco-critical and experimental poetry spheres (2007). Sue-Ellen Campbell has given voice to this sense of tension in her challenge to the Lawrence
Buell approach to environmental literature (2005): ‘It is increasingly clear to me that environmental literature in general […] works partly by shutting out social and cultural complexities – an omission that’s probably one source of the desire they embody and evoke’ (1998: 24). As further evidence of this tension, Tarlo writes that

[…] a search of the wider critical, academic sphere reveals a paucity of critical connections between the ecological or eco-critical world and literary criticism relating to postmodern or LIP [linguistically innovative poetry] poetry. Evidently there is an ambivalence abroad in the critical if not poetic community. (2007: paragraph 3)

This is strange given the ostensible commitment by ecocritics to think through the historically troubled relation between man and nature, or human culture and human nature etc. Whereas experimental poetry has been much influenced by ‘poststructuralism and its relatives’, Tarlo notes that eco-criticism has been marked by an equal and opposite resistance to these theoretical trends: ‘Thus it is that very few eco-critics engage with innovative or experimental writing’ (2007: paragraph 4). And yet, as Tarlo points out, ‘the subtleties of experimental poetics provide an ideal linguistic arena in which to engage in this shifting and sifting of assessing and reassessing our relationship with the places and spaces we inhabit’ (2007: paragraph 13):

[…] the avant-garde’s established resistance to western binaries, such as mind and body, subject and object, culture and nature [is] both significant and provocative, as well as being in keeping with current philosophical directions in environmental thought, if not eco-criticism itself. There is a suspicion of hierarchies, systems and epistemologies to be found in this work. If experimental practice is deeply engaged with some of the key debates which concern environmentalists, it is of course engaged through a practice which goes beyond debate into a form of linguistic action which dares to imagine more recklessly than most. (2007: paragraph 17)

Jonathan Skinner made a similar observation in his first issue of ecopoetics: ‘As our perception of the natural world continues to be refined (or forgotten), it seems that contemporary poetry’s complexities might actually be useful for extending and developing that perception’ (2001:5). Skinner’s journal provides a forum for just the adventurous, yet nuanced, poetic eco-exploration that Tarlo prescribes:

[…] a site open to the contradictions such work often willingly engages and embodies, ecopoetics would ideally function as an edge (as in edge of the meadow, or shore, rather than leading edge) where different disciplines can meet and complicate each other. (2001:6)
Skinner’s encouragement of the mingling of disciplines echoes the interdisciplinary emphasis of performance writing, the sense of which is carried forward in my reframing of ‘nature writing’.

Despite the apparent affinity of Skinner’s formation of ‘ecopoetics’ with the trajectory of my own research, I have not chosen ‘ecopoetics’ as a framing term. This has more to do with this term’s polemical inflections than its, welcome, innovative emphasis. In the final pages of *The Song of the Earth*, Bate challenges his reader: ‘ask yourself whether you can accept that a poem is not only a making of the self and a making of the world, but also a response to the world and a respecting of the earth’ (2000:282). This sense of responsible dwelling through / by way of / with / in language is inherent in the term, ecopoetics, according to Bate. If poetry of this kind is in fact a responsible inhabitation of the world through language then the rhetoric of world-saving follows swiftly on its heels. Skinner’s journal appears to have been founded with a similarly ambitious politics in mind. Although Skinner is less clear on poetry’s role at ‘[a] time we might, without exaggerating, think of as WW III – a relentless war on the planet – whose absurdity can be encapsulated by the image of homo ‘sapiens’ sawing away at the limb on which it is perched’ (2001:105), his conviction that an engaged and responsible treatment of the world around us is continuous with an engaged and responsible treatment of language, is evident. These language experiments are something that ‘no engaged poetry, no poetry alive to what is most at stake in the present moment, can afford to ignore’ (106).

Ecopoetics is, however, very much a term whose meaning is in motion. In the second issue of *ecopoetics*, Skinner observes as much himself: ‘Hanging around at this site makes one more sure of not finding such a thing as an ‘ecopoem’ or meeting an ‘ecopoet’ (2002:5). Six years later, Tarlo observed that Skinner was ‘still actively engaged in considering and re-defining the term six years after founding the journal’ (2008: np). Tarlo is also a significant contributor to the semantic evolution of this term. Her contributions to *How 2* (2008) and *Jacket* (2007) in editorial, critical and poetic capacities are evidence of this. In her special edition of *How 2*, devoted to a discussion of feminist ecopoetics, she acknowledges that, ‘I see the critical and creative explanation, exposition and / or resistance of the term ‘ecopoetics’ as a significant part of the work achieved by this special issue’ (2008: np). Christopher Arigo’s contribution to this issue testifies to this impulse. Arigo offers a ‘kind of theoretical framework’ for ecopoetics, in ‘some attempt at a
definition of what exactly ecopoetics is – because I feel that people like Jonathan Skinner, whose work and thinking I admire a great deal, just simply have not done what I think is the necessary framing’ (2008: np).

In her introduction to *A Ground Aslant* (2011) Tarlo distances herself from this term, however, stating clearly that ‘this is not a book of polemical eco-poetry or even of ecopoetics’ (2011:11), reverting explicitly to the term ‘radical landscape poetry’ (a term she uses in her article for *Jacket*, 32), from what appears to be a desire to distance herself from the polemic associated with ecopoetry. She is not explicit about the relation between ecopoetics and polemic but her grouping of these terms together implies their proximate relation. I distance myself from this term for similar reasons. This research is keen to avoid a relation to the polemic of world-saving, to which this term, explicitly in Bate’s view, and implicitly in Skinner’s, relates. This not to claim that nature writing, or nature poetry, is untarnished by this polemic. John Felstiner, for example, uses the term ‘nature poems’ to describe the work contained within his volume entitled *Can Poetry Save the Earth?* (2009). His final answer approaches that of Bate: ‘For sure, person by person, our earthly challenge hangs on the sense and spirit that poems can awaken’ (2009:357). Despite this, nature writing remains a more neutral term than ecopoetics. Skinner uses the term ‘nature poetry’ as a subgenre within the field of ecopoetics, but the relationship between these terms and ‘nature writing’, with its association with natural history, is unclear.

This research shares Skinner’s emphasis on ‘the materiality of language’, supporting Skinner’s observation that work which highlights these dimensions of language, ‘whether via image or sound or both—as in concrete and sound poetry—is a step in the right direction’ (2001:106). As with its relation to the burgeoning tradition of landscape writing and its association with linguistic innovation so my use of the term ‘nature writing’ sees itself as working within the same field as much of the writing published in Skinner’s journal. As previously stated, in relation to the term landscape, this research hopes to put poetics of the kind developed under the banner of ‘ecopoetics’ to work under the banner of ‘nature writing’ in an effort to expand understandings of ‘nature’ and its relation to ‘writing’ by way of the type of practical, creative questioning that is gathered together in these respective publications (Finlay, 2005a; Tarlo, 2011; Skinner, 2001-ongoing). This is an impetus that Skinner might well support, as he acknowledged, in the second issue of his
journal, that ‘Nature poetry has been in the wilderness long enough’ (2002: 5). This research chooses to use the term writing rather than poetry in order to establish a continuity between the terms, and to emphasize that writing is always a question of poetics.

Environmental Literature & Nature Writing

The term ‘nature writing’ is commonly understood to denote a variant of writing that engages with that which is natural, or other-than-human. This term is more commonly used to designate non-fiction writing, as Scott Slovic (editor of ISLE) notes in his definition of the term:

For scholars and teachers, the term nature writing has come to mean literary non-fiction that offers scientific scrutiny of the world (as in the older tradition of literary natural history), explores the private experience of the individual observer of the world, or reflects upon the political and philosophical implications of the relationships among human beings and the larger planet. (2004: 888)

This definition aligns ‘nature writing’ with the tradition of ‘natural history’, a tradition of which Skinner bemoans the gradual decay:

the natural history tradition which helped sharpen this awareness, a discipline of close, scrupulous observation of nature, is disappearing. The ongoing deinstitutionalization of natural history and evaporation of funding for basic natural history research (biologists refer to it as the ‘taxonomic impediment’) means that up to 95% of the species now suspected to inhabit the world, species still unknown to us, may remain consigned to human oblivion.

Perhaps we will begin to revalue the “nature walk,” and to venerate the humble, empirical tasks of “natural history,” in ways that were lost to the technological hubris of the last century; but with radically different senses of ‘nature’ and of ‘history,’ from those with which the Victorian era charged this discipline. (2001: 6)

Slovic’s description of ‘nature writing’ as an exploration of ‘the private experience of the individual observer of the world’ (2004:888), however, coincides with Skinner’s criticism that ‘transparent narratives of self-discovery, or solipsistic, self-expressive displays, seem ill-suited to the current crisis’ (2001:6). In contradistinction to this tradition Skinner suggests that ‘art alive to the differentiating nature of its own materials may be better equipped’ (6). Clearly Slovic’s and Skinner’s understandings of the relationship between
these two traditions are not entirely mutual. Skinner’s call for a renewal of the pursuit of natural history coincides with his suggestion that a revision and expansion of the ‘nature writing’ tradition is also overdue:

There is a rich tradition of nature writing in American literature (of which Thoreau is by no means the first exemplar) that has unfortunately become, for a variety of reasons, only more formally conservative as we have progressed into the crisis. One might increasingly compare this literature to a formal monocrop that belies the biological diversity it intends and, more damagingly, that tends to overlook or remove human language from the very materiality, and relationships, it would emphasize. (2001:105, my emphasis)

Lawrence Buell’s consideration of nature writing, or rather that of the (slightly) expanded but significantly overlapping term, ‘environmental literature’, may provide fuel to Skinner’s fire. Buell, however, affirms Slovic’s entry as a succinct definition of ‘nature writing’, including it within his glossary of terms in The Future of Environmental Criticism: Environmental Crisis and Literary Imagination (2005:144). This conception of nature writing overlaps with Buell’s account of environmental literature: environmental writing and environmental literature are, according to Buell, [t]erms sometimes used as virtual synonyms for nature writing, but always with the intent of suggesting a more encompassing range of reference, if not also a wider range of genres’ (2005:142). However, contrary to Buell’s suggestion, nature writing is not only confined to the genre of non-fiction. Slovic observes, in the same entry, that there is an emerging criticism of the narrow application of nature writing by critics who fear that by emphasizing the genre of so-called nonfiction (essays, journals, letters and treatises), there has been a tendency to marginalize people (including entire ethnic, national, and socioeconomic groups) who have communicated their observations and visions through other media, ranging from written poetry and fiction to oral narratives and song and dramatic presentations. (2004: 888)

Slovic references Patrick D. Murphy’s 2000 book, Farther Afield in the Study of Nature-Oriented Literature, as an example of the attempt to expand this narrowness of definition but goes on to note that it is increasingly popular for people who once focussed exclusively on nonfiction to spend their time now reading and studying works that fall into the broader category of ‘environmental literature’ – this term encompasses nonfiction nature writing,

This observation coincides with Buell’s definition of environmental writing and environmental literature (2005: 144). However, despite Buell’s suggestion that environmental literature is a wider category than that of nature writing, Tarlo notes that, ‘[i]n his seminal text, The Environmental Imagination, Buell’s search for the true, pure ‘environmental text’ leads him to valorise environmental non-fiction above all else, yet I find it interesting that he cannot help himself from referring to a far wider variety of fiction and poetry to back up his arguments, almost despite himself’ (2007: note 2).

‘Environmental literature’ and ‘nature writing’ clearly have a troubled relationship, at least as far as Slovic and Buell’s observations are concerned. This research sees no good reason to abandon the use of nature writing for a term that seems to suffer from a similar crisis of definition. This research builds on the suggestions of David Landis Barnhill, writing in response to Murphy’s upgrading of Thomas Lyon’s taxonomy of nature writing (1989), that there is no need for a new term, only new applications and understandings of this term (2010). As I have argued in relation to the emergent tradition of (avant-garde / radical) landscape writing (Finlay; Tarlo; Wylie) there is no need to revise the term in order to revise the practice. In fact, this research holds that relegating the term ‘nature writing’ does both term and (the relation of) its constituent parts a disservice by confusing the term’s use with the term itself, abandoning it as outmoded and redundant, rather than revitalising it through redefinition and reuse.

‘Nature writing’ is a term more frequently found within the covers of ISLE, the quarterly journal of ASLE – The Association for the Study of Literature and the Environment, a US institution founded in 1992, than it is within the covers of ecopoetics. The ‘nature writing’ found within ISLE or Green Letters (the UK equivalent of ISLE), tends to be exemplary of more traditional understandings and compositional strategies, than any of the environmentally-engaged literary forms discussed so far. However, the last few years have seen a shift of emphasis, a sea change to which I hope this research will add impetus. In a strategic statement, published in 2009, ASLE defines its purpose:

> to promote the exchange of ideas and information about literature and other cultural representations that consider human relationships with the natural world. The name of the organization is meant to be as *inclusive* as possible, encompassing any text
that illuminates the ways humans perceive and interact with the nonhuman environment.

ASLE encourages and seeks to facilitate both traditional and innovative scholarly approaches to environmental literature, ecocritical approaches to all cultural representations of nature, and interdisciplinary environmental research, including discussions among literary scholars and environmental historians, economists, journalists, philosophers, psychologists, art historians, scientists, and scholars in other relevant disciplines.

In addition to encouraging new writing about nature and environment, we foster contact between scholars and environmentally-engaged artists, including writers, photographers, painters, musicians, and filmmakers. We also promote the incorporation of environmental concerns and awareness into pedagogical theory and practice. (2009, my emphasis)

In the ‘Organizational Strengths’ section of ASLE’s ‘Strategic Plan’, ASLE states that it is ‘the primary professional organization in the field of literature and environment in the United States.’ Despite this its membership is not pervasive. It counts a total of ‘1200 individual members representing 49 of the United States and 32 other countries.’ Its influence, as the largest international organised body of its kind, is, however, certainly significant. Two years previously Tarlo acknowledged that both ‘ASLE US and ASLE UK […] are open-minded organisations are [sic] have offered conference and journal space to some of this [more innovative poetic and scholarly] work’ (2007). The 2010 ASLE UK conference saw panels on concrete poetry and the most recent ASLE UK conference, convened at Queen Mary’s University, London in September 2011, was both welcoming and encouraging of innovative approaches to literary considerations of environment, as their forthcoming publishing of conference proceedings should evidence (Solnick et al.).

Christopher Arigo’s work appears in the Autumn 2010 edition of *ISLE* (17.4), and Lucy Burnett (co-editor of *Emergent Environments*, the forthcoming publication of ASLE-UK’s 2011 conference proceedings and current (joint) postgraduate secretary for ASLE-UK) reviews Harriet Tarlo’s *The Ground Aslant* in *Green Letters* (vol. 15, Autumn 2011) noting, as she does, that this text is ‘a small but significant step towards redressing the balance which has accorded such work far less attention than it deserves’ (2011:106). This said, innovative poetic strategies, emphasis on the materiality of writing, or understandings of writing as process or performance, are by no means the norm within these organisations. ASLE’s poetic sympathies are, however, expanding, from the more traditional towards more innovative, and interdisciplinary (multi-modal / intermedia) understandings of
writing (writing as understood within formulations of performance writing for example) are progressively being welcomed. This research supports such impetus.

The aim of this research is to muddy the distinctions that relate and separate these terms so that ecopoetics need not become the sole indicator of environmentally-engaged innovative poetics with an emphasis upon the material, nor ‘nature writing’ be regarded as the primary domain of more conventional approaches to environmental writing (Lyon, 1989; Murphy, 2000; Barnhill, 2010). This research challenges conventional understandings of both ‘nature’ and ‘writing’, manifesting, what appears, to my mind, to be a much needed enquiry into accounts of what ‘nature writing’ is and does (and the relationship of its constituent terms). This research constitutes a critical, creative, and predominantly practical investigation that draws upon the emergent traditions of radical landscape poetry, avant-garde landscape and ecopoetics to investigate understandings of ‘nature’, ‘writing’, and the phrasal relation of these terms in nature writing.
My use of ‘framing’ in this research is not framing ‘as in a “limiting”’, as Alaric Sumner once wrote, as ‘a result with no leap to expand’, but rather, as ‘a force that through thought forces form’ (1999:83), forging new connections and associations about, as well as by way of, this old form, or frame: ‘It is in precise relation to structure that the excitements of disruption propose expansion’ (1999:84). Many of the writers referenced in this thesis develop their theories with the help of this conceptual tool: Christopher Arigo (as I mentioned in ‘Nature Writing’) attempts to make up for Jonathan Skinner’s lack of ‘framing’ by developing a ‘theoretical framework’ of his own for ‘ecopoetics’ (2007); Ian Davidson refers to ‘a framework of ideas’ in his discussion of the relation between the page and the poem (2007:80); and Kathleen Fraser describes poetry’s capacity to move her ‘beyond the familiar frame of a day’s mechanical response’ (2000:9). For these writers the frame is just one of many conceptual devices with which they develop their argument; it has no specific significance to their work as a whole. That is not the case in this research. Here, the frame provides a metaphorical device that links the page with concept formation. Making paper by hand involves the use of a frame. This frame defines the shape and size of the page. The argument underlying this thesis is that the page still provides the dominant material, and therefore conceptual, framework within which the relationship between human and other-than-human is manifested in writing. To use the page as material with which to write is to use the page as material for concept formation: concept formation is materially determined. This research argues that by adjusting the physical framework of the page, by altering the role that the page plays in the relation between human and other-than-human in writing, it is possible to alter the abstract configuration of the relation between human and other-than-human in writing; i.e. page reform (is frame reform) is mind reform.
Dirk Baecker\textsuperscript{9}, in his discussion of systems, presents a figure by way of illustration of the relationship between the inside and the outside of a system. He calls this figure (see Figure 1) ‘The Form of Distinction’ (2001: 69):

\begin{figure}[h]
    \centering
    \includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{form_of_distinction.png}
    \caption{The Form of Distinction}
\end{figure}

Baecker does not explicitly or implicitly develop a comparison between the page and this figure. For the purposes of this research, however, this figure can be read as the corner of a page: the edge of the marked state echoes the corner of a page; the unmarked state designates that which falls outside of the physical remit of the page i.e. everything else. According to Baecker’s account, creating and maintaining a system relies upon drawing distinctions; in order to establish the definition of the system and its relation to its environment a distinction must be made (between inside and outside / background and foreground etc.) i.e. a frame of reference. There is always, Baecker notes, an element of arbitrariness to the drawing of this distinction: ‘The drawing of a distinction [...] is an

\textsuperscript{9} Dirk Baecker’s work on systems theory became familiar to me through his theoretical development of the work of his one time teacher, Niklas Luhmann. Niklas Luhmann’s work was introduced to me through the phenomenology of Wolfgang Iser. Phenomenology, as I have already remarked, and systems theory are commonly drawn upon to support environmental arguments. Marilyn M. Cooper, for example, writes, in her foreword to \textit{Ecocomposition: Theroetical & Pedagogical Approaches}, that there has been a great shift in theoretical perception across disciplines. This shift has been triggered by, or is symptomatic of, what Cooper refers to as, ‘[t]he great shock of twentieth century science [...] that systems cannot be understood by analysis’ (2001: xi). This is a shift from a mechanistic view where

the world is a collection of objects. These, of course, interact with one another, and hence there are relations among them. But the relations are secondary. (2001: xi)

to a systems view, where

we realise that the objects themselves are networks of relationships, embedded in larger networks. For the systems thinker the relationships are primary. (2001:xi)

It is this commonality of emphasis upon relationship that links phenomenology and systems theory. Although this thesis does not examine systems theory in any detail, my use of Baecker’s diagram acknowledges the currency and influence of this approach upon environmental thinking more generally.
operation of cultivation: we have to presuppose the unavailable without which nothing would happen’ (2001:69). Once made, this distinction must be established and maintained (through use and repetition) in order to legitimate and sustain its boundaries / definition. And so it is with the page. The page has not been developed as much for its signifying capacity as it has for its convenience of use. And yet the page signifies, on a global scale, establishing and re-establishing itself through use and repetition.

The frame, in this research, is not considered only in relation to the page however. The frame, as in framework, is also used in relation to concepts more generally. Each key word in this research (nature, writing, human, tree, page) is considered as a frame that demarcates an ecology of ideas. Each of these ecologies links to other ecologies; each has their own trigger point in language. The ecology stimulated by each term is personally inflected, dependent upon the specific cultural encounter of every individual with the application and implications of this term. The overlap between these ecologies is normally sufficient to ensure a common, general understanding that enables communication of varying degrees, but detailed enquiry into any one of these ecologies entails a certain loss of bearings. Jane Humphries, reporting from the 108th General Meeting of the American Society for Microbiology in Boston (June, 2009), observes that microbiology offers a prime example of this terminological crisis: ‘Among bacteria, the entire concept of species breaks down; it’s difficult for scientists to even categorize what they are seeing’ (2010: 3). Microbiologist Margaret McFall-Ngai demonstrates how this disruption of perceptual scale leads to a rescaling of conceptual definition. Her microscopic observation of the human leads McFall-Ngai to redefine the human in a way that reflects this shift in scale: ‘Human beings are not really individuals; they’re communities of organisms’ (Humphries, 2010: 1). The macro-concept (human) is thus understood as place-holder, marker or umbrella term, for a collection of micro-concepts (organisms). These micro-concepts coincide with the micro-concepts of other macro-concepts (plants or animals, in this case). This is the type of understanding that is characteristic of theories regarding the ‘posthuman’, as I will detail in the following section. However, this conceptual structure is

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10 Margaret McFall-Ngai, Professor of Medical Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, specialises in the study of symbiosis. Symbiosis is one of the practical instances that Timothy Morton gives to demonstrate how the first axiom of his imagined interdependence theory (‘things are only what they are in relation to other things’ (2009a:1.53-1.58/8.18)) applies to the interdependence of life forms: ‘Life forms are made up of other life forms (the theory of symbiosis)’ (2009a:4.49-4.52/8.18). In this same account Morton details the mesh of language in similar terms. My application of her microbiological observations to abstract reasoning is thus very much in line with Morton’s thinking.
not limited to the concept of humanity. This framing structure percolates the entirety of this research so that understandings of nature, writing, tree, and page, are just as ‘post’, ecological, rhizomatic, or enmeshed, as the (post) human. Detailed study of the part leads to a breakdown (defamiliarisation and revision) of the conceptual whole. The sculptor, David Nash, observes as much in a reflection on his work with trees:

Initially I thought I was working with wood and then I realised gradually that I was working with much more than that, and I was actually tapping into the elements of earth, air, fire, and water, and that wood is really a weave of these. (Nash, 2010)

This concept of the frame has been similarly affected by the progress of my practical research.

On the 27\textsuperscript{th} August 2010 I used garden wire to form frames around some of the apples on this tree. I made one frame \textit{circular} (Figure 2) to echo the shape of the apple. I made another frame more like a \textit{square} (Figure 3), to echo the shape of a picture frame or page. Another, larger, square frame was constructed around a cluster of apples to give the effect of a \textit{tableau} (Figure 4).

These frames manifested, or reified, a certain way of seeing, on my part. This exercise was part of my effort to think through the apple (tree)’s relation to the page, and, more broadly, to writing. According to this conception the frame proposed a metaphorical transform of the page, and the apple / tree part was identified with the mark-making of writing; the tree was the text and the frame deonted the field of the page. What was very different about this creative hypothesis of page-text relations was the fact that the ‘page’ or frame and its contents were manifestly multi-dimensional. The frame did not spatially ‘contain’ the apple / tree part in the way that a page might ordinarily be understood to contain writing; it
was a physical gesture that suggested a certain way of thinking / perceiving. This act of framing was not exclusive. When viewed from the side (Fig. 5), for example, the wire (frame) appears to split the apple / tree part, rather than presenting a ‘whole’ (as a part split off from the tree). But then this act of ‘framing’ was always, I think, a comment on the partiality of framing just as much as it was an experiment to generate reactions between this physical hypothesis and the life of the apple-tree, that might physically continue / challenge this thinking through practice. As the days passed the apples / tree parts altered and, in doing so, affected the frames. The apples grew out of their frames (Fig. 6); the frames were bent by the wind or weight of apple / leaf / branch moving / growing / falling. A month later the apple had fallen (Fig. 7) from the circular frame.

Now this frame, variously, framed patches of sky, leaves, branches, parts of tree, other trees, depending on the viewer’s perspective. Three months later the apples had also fallen from the square frames (Fig. 8). As the apples fell, the branches snapped back up into the sky, unburdened by their apple weight, repositioning the frames, largely out of (my) grasp. This interaction between the tree and these wire frames exemplifies the relationship between the perceptual impact of practical research on conceptual development. This account of my experience with the wire frames is symptomatic of the findings of this research more generally. This research set out to investigate the macro-concepts of nature and writing through the related (macro-) concepts of tree, human and page, by way of a theoretical and practical appraisal of reading and writing with a tree. This detailed interaction with a tree and its environment, and the cross-reference between this tree environment and other environments of writing that arose from the transport of materials and the movement of my body between these environments, resulted in a breakdown in my perception (and resulting conception) of these entities as discrete unities. This practical enquiry gave rise to a reconfiguration of each of these concepts as a ‘weave’ of ideas or
micro-concepts (micro-concepts become macro-concepts as a result of a shift in scale) rather than as discrete, self-grounding conceptual entities. These findings coincide with articulations of the dense weave of perceptual and conceptual interconnection, that Timothy Morton has called ‘the mesh’ (2009; 2010). This research is an investigation into the weave, breakdown and reweaving of the enmeshed frameworks of human, tree and page and their relationship with nature and writing. Each of these terms is understood as a frame of some sort. The most obviously frame-like of all of these terms is the page. The fragmentation, dissolution and reformation of the page, in paper-making, model the conceptual breakdown and revision of the idea ecologies that constitute the other key terms (and their relation) within this research.

It is important to note, however, that this is not just another restatement of the endless referral (and therefore deferral) of meaning. This research understands meaning as embodied. An important factor of an embodied conception of meaning is the cognitive significance of emotion, or feeling (a more conscious emotional variant). For Mark Johnson ‘emotions are processes of organism-environment interactions’:

> by the time we feel an emotion, a mostly unconscious assessment has occurred of the situation we find ourselves in [...] We have perceived and understood our situation in a certain light, although with little or no conscious reflection [...] The situation specifies what will be significant to us and what objects, events, and persons mean to us at a pre-reflective level. (2007:65)

Feeling and emotion are fundamentally bound up with the ecology of ideas that make up every macro-concept. Referral between concepts constitutes a referral (and continuity) between the felt, embodied experiences of the situations which inform these concepts. The body is always constitutive of the concept, to which the emotional constituent of ideas testifies. The role of emotion in cognition is part of Mark Johnson’s broader conception of embodied mind. Mark Johnson’s theory of embodied mind supports the relation between perceptual interaction and concept formation. It is by way of Johnson’s theory that I develop my argument for the significance of the page in concept formation. According to Johnson,

> Our brains and bodies have specific neural networks whose function is edge detection [...] These various functional neural assemblies determine what stands out, for us, from a situation or scene [...] So, saying that we select objects is just
Johnson’s account of ‘edge detection’ in human perception links to the activity of frame construction: the drive to construct frames is a physical manifestation of the way in which we experience the world, bit by bit, rather than all in one go. The focal emergence of objects need not be conceived of in purely visual terms however, rather, it provides a visual metaphor of a more general perceptual function. We perceive frames and construct frames as a physical expression of our perceptual interaction with the rest of the world. Frame construction is an act of distributed cognition; it reflects how we think / perceive the world and reifies this to reinforce and support our perception. This thesis follows from Mark Johnson’s claims, developed from the research of Adrian Clark, that ‘we tend to offload much of our cognition onto the environments we create [...] we make cognitive artifacts to help us engage in complex actions (Clark 1998); [...] we distribute cognition among members of a social organisation’ (2007:150). Human ‘culture’ is exactly that, the growth of the human in relation to the rest of the world; we reinforce our perception by physically manifesting it within / by way of our environment and we come to further understand this environment and our relation to / with it (and the corresponding structuring of our perception) by means of this perceptual manifestation. ‘Thus’, Johnson writes, ‘mind emerges’ (2007:151): the world challenges and informs the development of human perception and human perception challenges and informs the development of the world.

A revised account of metaphor is central to Mark Johnson’s theory of ‘mind’, as it is to the development between the practical and theoretical aspects of this research. In The Extent of the Literal (2003) Marina Rakova\(^\text{11}\) provides a survey of twentieth century conceptions of what metaphor is and does according to the theories of I.A. Richards, Max Black, Monroe Beardsley, Nelson Goodman, Eva Kittay, Josef Stern, Donald Davidson, and finally George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. All, apart from Lakoff and Johnson, espouse more or less what Rakova terms ‘the standard assumption’: this ‘assumption is that, for a large number of words [...] only one meaning has to be considered as literal or basic, and all other meanings have to be treated as its metaphorical extension’ (2003:3). What

\(^{11}\text{Marina Rakova is one of the principal critics of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s conception of metaphor. She claims their theories are ‘philosophically inconsistent’ and ‘contradicted by empirical evidence’ (2002: 215). Lakoff and Johnson defend their work on the grounds that her arguments are ‘systematic misreadings’ (2002:260). It is not the business of this research to mount an extended defence of Johnson’s theory, but it is important to acknowledge that their theory has its weak points and its opponents, as evidenced by Rakova.}\)
Rakova does not say, but is implied by her explanation, is that this ‘standard assumption’ of the role of metaphor and its relation to the literal is constituted by a theory of semantic origin, or at the very least a centralised theory of meaning where meaning, as metaphor, spreads out from its literal centre of understanding:

the central idea running through the various accounts of metaphor outlined above is that to be used literally is to be used properly; we have a metaphor when words are not used as they should. When a word is used properly, it is used within its proper domain or semantic field; [...] words are said to be used properly when they are used with their primary or basic meanings, their literal meanings. (2003:12)

This word, ‘proper’, and its associations with property and propriety, the preservation of boundaries and ideas of containment, is at odds with the emergent and distributed account of meaning, as developed within this thesis and the theories of Mark Johnson. In contrast to this ‘standard assumption’ Johnson’s theory of metaphor establishes a ‘continuity [...] between our mostly nonconscious experience of embodied meaning and our seemingly disembodied acts of thinking and reasoning’ (2007:31). His argument relies upon the fundamental ‘intermodal’ or ‘crossmodal’ function of perception, i.e. the capacity of human beings ‘to correlate structures experienced in one perceptual domain with those in a different perceptual modality and in various motor programs’ (42). Metaphor, according to Johnson’s account, reveals the ‘flexible, recurring cross-modal patterns of our ongoing interactions that shape the very contours of our experience’ (43). According to Johnson, conceptual metaphors develop as a result of ‘the neural connections between the sensorimotor areas of the brain and other areas that are involved in thinking’ (167). Johnson draws upon the findings of cognitive neuroscience to support the suggestion that we use our sensorimotor neural circuitry for abstract reasoning by way of metaphorical mapping. Johnson provides several examples of such conceptual metaphors: understanding is grasping or understanding is seeing, affection is warmth, important is big etc. (179). Each of these concepts piggybacks, to use McCrone’s account of the same phenomenon, ‘on a processing hierarchy designed first and foremost for the business of perception’ (1999:158). These conceptual metaphors develop from a perceptual schema, or what Johnson refers to as image-schemas, of, for example, the activity of grasping and

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12John McCrone has written variously about technology, human evolution and neuroscience. He is the author of *How the Brain Works* (2002), *Going Inside* (1999), *The Myth of Irrationality* (1993) and *The Ape that Spoke* (1990) as well as various scholarly articles. His interests in ecology and theories of mind, demonstrated, for example, by his attention to the work of Humberto Maturana, evidence his work’s overlap with that of this thesis.
its associated connections / sensations, ‘that can be recruited for abstract conceptualization and reasoning’ in order to account for how abstract concepts emerge from embodied experience: we think, according to Johnson, not just with but through our bodies. Perceptual schemas ‘constitute a preverbal and mostly unconscious, emergent level of meaning’ that are characterised as ‘recurrent, stable patterns of sensorimotor experience […] that […] preserve the topological structure of the perceptual whole […] predicated on interaction with a wider environment’ (2007:148). Johnson refers to the neuroscientific hypothesis of Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff13 (2005) in order to illustrate the convergence of perceptual schemas with what Gallese and Lakoff call ‘concrete concepts’:

Understanding requires simulation. The understanding of concrete concepts – physical action, physical objects, and so on – requires sensory-motor simulation. But sensory-motor simulation, as contemporary neuroscience has shown, is carried out by the sensory-motor system of the brain. It follows that the sensory-motor is required for understanding at least concrete concepts. (164)

The perceptual schema of ‘grasp’ is understood by both Johnson, and Gallese and Lakoff, to be a concrete concept of this sort:

To have the concept grasp is just to have this schema with its specific parameters, with their specific values. The grasp schema is activated when we actually grasp a cup, and it is activated (with some inhibitory circuits) when we hear or read the word grasp or even when we just think about grasping something. Moreover, the inferential structure of a concrete concept is precisely specified by the internal structure of the appropriate schema (with the particular contextually determined values for its parameters). (164)

Johnson illustrates this with reference to a figure (taken from Rohrer, 2001) that shows ‘fMRI activation courses in response to literal and metaphoric activation sentences. Areas active and overlapping from a hand somatosensory task are outlined in white’ (2007: 169). This figure pictures the parallel processing that occurs within the brain when sensorimotor activity is carried out and when abstract thought is performed: abstract thought uses the same areas as sensorimotor performance, but the level of activity is severely reduced. These pictures illustrate how sensorimotor activity is irreducible to abstract thought and vice versa: thought ghosts sensorimotor activity. Johnson draws upon this evidence of the neural exploitation of sensorimotor experience in the formation of abstract concepts, as in

13 George Lakoff and Vittorio Gallese are contemporary cognitive scientists committed to the rejection of body/mind dualism. George Lakoff has been the co-author of much of Mark Johnson’s research, of which Metaphors We Live By (1980) is probably the most well known.
‘grasping’ for example, to account for the inter/cross-modal functioning of metaphor. Johnson states that conceptual metaphor is the ‘primary means for abstract conception and reasoning’ (177).

The title of Johnson’s book, *The Meaning of the Body* (2007), might seem to suggest the corporeal primacy of meaning, this suggestion is, however, at odds with his more expanded account of ‘mind’. Johnson emphasises the importance of environment in human concept formation, just as much as that of body and / or brain, in an expanded theory of mind, where brain, body and environment correspond in tri-partite collaboration:

The brain is not the mind. The brain is one key part of the entire pattern of embodied organism-environment interaction that is the proper locus of mind and meaning […] the proper locus of mind is a complex, multi-level, continually interactive process that involves all of the following: a brain, operating in and for a living purposive body, in continual engagement with complex environments that are not just physical but social and cultural as well […] Without a brain there is no meaning. Without a living, acting body – no meaning. And without organism-environmental coupling – no meaning. (175)

The development of Johnson’s theory in an environmental direction is everywhere implied but nowhere explicitly declared. Johnson quotes D.N. Lee14: ‘Like all animals, we exist by virtue of coupling our bodies to the environment through action […] Action in the environment is the root of the ecological self” (1993:34). It is not just that we express our cognition through the manufacture of artefacts and social networks, and thereby affect our environment, but that our creation of artefacts and social organisation are expressions of our environment’s affect on us. The body undoubtedly plays a key role in the development of language and conceptual thought, as Johnson details, however, this thesis focuses on the relationship between embodied perception and distributed cognition made manifest in certain (literary) artefacts and the social organisation to which these (literary) artefacts contribute; i.e. the point where the body generates mind in its interaction with environment, and environment affects the body, affecting mind, in tool and artefact creation. The artefact to which this research gives special attention, is that specific literary manifestation of the frame, the page.

14 David N. Lee is Professor Emeritus and Honorary Professorial Fellow of Perception, Action and Development at Edinburgh University. His work, as is suggested here, is concerned with discovering the “general fundamental principles underpinning sensory and intrinsic guidance of purposeful movements in humans and animals” (no date). As such, his work is scientifically engaged in the investigation of matters that have historically been the principal concern of philosophers of phenomenology: human being in / with / for the world.
Jeremy Rifkin’s *Empathic Civilisation* (2010) argues that cultural shifts in material operations lead to shifts in consciousness. Rifkin claims that the first industrial revolution led to a revolution in print that in turn affected an ideological shift in consciousness; the second industrial revolution led to a revolution in technology, this affected a psychological shift in consciousness. We are currently undergoing a dramaturgical shift in consciousness. He understands the relationship between material culture and human consciousness as characteristic of human empathy. Certain objects, therefore, not only shape thought, both Jeremy Rifkin and Nigel Thrift suggest, but certain objects, Thrift develops, ‘also very often make thought possible’ by dint of making ‘thought do-able’ (2007:60). I argue that the page is exactly such an object. I maintain that the page is both facilitator of literary behaviour and reification of literary conceptions with regards to environment. The page is a significant repository of our understanding of the relationship between the written word and its / our environment. The page, as an expression of the written word’s relation with its environment, reifies an understanding of the relationship between human and environment. This argument is informed and supported by an extended enterprise of reading and writing with a tree.

In the sections that follow I will explore these terms ‘human’, ‘tree’ and ‘page’ as both physically and theoretically emergent and distributed frames of reference. The interweaving of these frames within this research is documented in the penultimate section, ‘Metaphor, Metamor, Metamorphosis’. This interrelation of tree, human and page, in the reading and writing practice of this research, contributes to the ‘reframing’ of nature writing that concludes this thesis, ‘Nature Writing Reframed’.

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15 Where phenomenology uses phrases such as tool-being to explore man’s mutually affecting relationship with the world and the technology it uses and develops, Rifkin uses the term ‘empathy’, providing an alternative view of what Maturana and Varela or, more recently, D.N.Lee, regard as ‘organism-environment coupling’ (Maturana and Varela, 1992).

16 Nigel Thrift’s work on ‘non-representational theory’ (2007) overlaps with, and draws upon, that of Mark Johnson and the fields of cognitive philosophy and neuroscientific experiment. His background in human geography alternatively contextualises his research, however, making his work a useful expansion and / or alternative to that of Johnson.
There is no ‘I’, no single, unified executive system that co-ordinates all of the necessary bodily changes. Instead, there are numerous systems simultaneously “communicating” with one another in a vast dance of ongoing co-ordination and readjustment. (Johnson, 2007:59)

Although Johnson does not use the term posthuman at any point within his book, *The Meaning of the Body* (2007), his understanding of the human as emergent and distributed allies his theory with those of posthumanists such as N. Katherine Hayles (1999). This understanding of posthuman is not of the variety that believes that ‘the age of the human is drawing to a close’ to make way for their replacements, normally envisioned as ‘intelligent machines’ (Moravec; Dyer)\(^{17}\) but rather that the age of one specific understanding of the human is drawing to a close (Hayles, 1999:283):

the posthuman does not really mean the end of humanity. It signals instead the end of a certain conception of the human, a conception that may have been applied, at best, to that fraction of humanity who had the wealth, power and leisure to conceptualise themselves as autonomous beings exercising their will through individual agency and choice. (286)

This understanding of ‘the subject as an autonomous self independent of the environment’ (290) is, as Francis Fukuyama\(^{18}\) notes, ‘invalid in the posthuman era and, therefore, needs revision’ (2002:20). The conception that takes its place is akin to that as expressed above by Johnson, except, (as in Hayles’ account) there is normally more of an emphasis on humanity’s relationship with machines.

In this account, emergence replaces teleology; reflexive epistemology replaces objectivism; distributed cognition replaces autonomous will; embodiment replaces a body seen as a support system for the mind; and a dynamic partnership between humans and intelligent machines replaces the liberal humanist subject’s manifest destiny to dominate and control nature. Of course, this is not necessarily what the posthuman *will* mean – only what it can mean. (Hayles, 1999:288)

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\(^{17}\) Hans Moravec and Michael Dyer are both influential proponents of posthumanism. Their theories are principally concerned with the posthuman future of human and machine integration, and the development of artificial intelligence, as their respective publications detail (Moravec, 1990; Dyer, 1994).

\(^{18}\) Despite being fearful of what posthumanism might mean in terms of expanding the human capacity to alter our ‘nature’, and the political ramifications of this, Francis Fukuyama does at least agree on this point, that our conception of what it means to be human needs to be readdressed and revised, if not expanded.
My understanding of the human as distributed, or as Robert Pepperell\textsuperscript{19} terms it, ‘fuzzy-edged’ (2003:20), places more emphasis on environment \textit{in general} – whether plant, machine or otherwise – rather than emphasising the human coupling with machine life and accompanying issues regarding artificial intelligence, as Hayles’ account does for example. I am more interested in what a distributed understanding of the human means in terms of human cognition in general.

The chaotic, unpredictable nature of complex dynamics implies that subjectivity is emergent rather than given, distributed rather than located solely in consciousness, emerging from and integrated into a chaotic world rather than occupying a position of mastery and control removed from it. (Hayles, 1999:136)

As Gregory Bateson\textsuperscript{20} has observed, in order for such emergent and distributed cognition to take place ‘there must be a relevance between the contextual structure of the message and some of the structuring of the recipient’ (1987:154). Or, as John Dewey\textsuperscript{21} phrased it: ‘The primary postulate of a naturalistic theory of logic is continuity of the lower (less complex) and the higher (more complex) activist forms’ (1938/1991:30-31). Ian McHarg\textsuperscript{22} used this line of argumentation to observe the watery continuity between human blood and the saline solution of the sea:

The body fluids of simple marine organisms are all but identical with seawater. The blood of man is similar to the seas of earlier times. Loren Eiseley has said that the dimension of man’s emancipation from the sea is the length of that cell which separates him from its source of blood, the ancient brine. All creatures are essentially aqueous solutions confined in membranes. (1992:47)

\textsuperscript{19} Robert Pepperell is an artist and a Professor of Fine Art at Cardiff School of Art and Design. He draws upon his practical experience, as a painter and a draftsman, to develop his philosophy of consciousness and perception.

\textsuperscript{20} In \textit{A Legacy for Living Systems: Gregory Bateson as a Precursor to Biosemiotics} (2008) Jesper Hoffmeyer details how Gregory Bateson’s theories prefigure the development of biosemiotics, Bateson’s work developed systems theory in an ecological direction. His treatment of mind has influenced the work of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, whose work has, in turn, been influential upon that of Mark Johnson, and although Gregory Bateson is not referenced in Johnson’s 2007 text the work of Bateson’s daughter, Mary Catherine, is.

\textsuperscript{21} Mark Johnson’s philosophy is heavily influenced by that of John Dewey, the American pragmatist philosopher. Johnson’s work aims to develop Dewey’s findings, reviving the aims of pragmatism, a tradition largely overlooked by its philosophical contemporaries, in order to advance his claims that ‘aesthetics must become the basis of any profound understanding of meaning and thought’ (Johnson, 2007:x1). Understandably, both Dewey and Johnson’s developments of Dewey particularly support a practice-based approach to arts research.

\textsuperscript{22} The ecological perspective of Ian McHarg’s 1969 book, \textit{Design with Nature}, has been highly influential on the development of subsequent attitudes to human use, and development, of land. Although principally a landscape architect McHarg’s impact, as a result of this book, extends far beyond his immediate field.
McHarg provides one instance of the continuities between human and other-than-human entities. Biologist Lynn Margulis provides another. Margulis argues for the continuity of relation between human and non-human organisms according to the symbiotic exchange between organisms at a microbial level:

We *Homo sapiens sapiens* and our primate relations are not special, just recent: we are newcomers on the evolutionary stage. Human similarities to other life-forms are far more striking than the differences [...] humans have indeed evolved, but not just from apes or even from mammals. We evolved from a long line of progenitors, ultimately from the first bacteria [...] My claim is that, like all other apes, humans are not the work of God but of thousands of millions of years of interaction among highly responsive microbes. (1998:4-5)

This continuity between the physical make-up of the human organism and its vegetable, mineral and animal environment leads Margulis to argue for the continuity between the thinking processes of humans and other animals:

I argue for the continuity of human thinking with these less sophisticated, less complex engagements of animals with their world. (2008:112)

[...] we human beings are animals. Our rationality is not something apart from our animal bodies, but instead emerges from, and is shaped by, our embodied engagement with our environment. (2008:220-221)

But this does not just acknowledge a continuity between the development of human and animal physical and cognitive functioning, it acknowledges the shared evolutionary history of human and plant form, acknowledging relation at the level of genetic identity.

According to this view, structural similarity seems to entail cognitive similarity: our ability to empathise with life forms other than our own depends upon the degree to which we share their formal qualities: ‘in all communication there must be a relevance between the contextual structure of the message and some of the structuring of the recipient’ (Bateson, 1987:154). The veins of humans share a structural similarity to those of plants. This physical commonality is made manifest in language by the use of the same word for both structures: vein. Thus the physical formal structuring of both plant and human organism is disclosed in language by way of metaphor. Metaphor, it must be made clear, is not

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23 Lynn Margulis (1938-2011) was a pioneer of endosymbiotic theory. Her microbiological work on symbiosis is drawn upon by Nigel Thrift, among others. As with the work of microbiologist Margaret McFall-Ngai, her work on symbiosis makes her relevant to the establishment of Morton’s second axiom of his hypothetical theory of interdependence. Her work on the gradual transformation, or metamorphosis, via symbiosis, from one form into another provides a logical comparison with the argument developed in this thesis regarding the formation of writing and its relationship with trees.
understood within this thesis as a purely verbal construct. This verbal construct, metaphor, is a linguistic instance of a phenomenon that exceeds verbal articulation as a process of communication between forms on the basis of structural similarity, as observed by Bateson (above, and in the previous section). The verbal manifestation of metaphor evidences, in human language, a phenomenon that exceeds the domain of verbal language: a similarity of cognitive structuring made possible by the paralleling of physical structure. Continuities in the physical structure between organisms enable continuities in the cognitive structure between organisms. I do not use this term, ‘cognitive’, as a euphemism for conscious thought, however, but as a term to denote a great range of structural functioning within (and between) organisms. My use derives from Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s use of this term as a description of doing and making across a range of conscious and non-conscious physical organism functioning. As Maturana and Varela observe, ‘all cognitive experience involves the knower in a personal way, rooted in his biological structure’ (1987:18):

[…] every act of knowing brings forth a world […] All doing is knowing and all knowing is doing […] Bringing forth a world is the burning issue of knowledge […] this bringing forth of a world manifests itself in all our actions and all our being […] there is no discontinuity between what is social and what is human and their biological roots. The phenomenon of knowing is all of one piece […]. (1987:26-27)

Thus we might say that the capacity for humans to make lines, in writing, is continuous with the human capacity, at a less complex level of structural functioning, to produce lines in the form of veins and hairs. This argument establishes a continuity between human line formation in writing with the apple tree’s leaf vein formation. This is by no means to suggest that all forms of line formation are identical, however. Line formation is infinitely various, as Tim Ingold observes in his brief history of lines (2007). It is rather to use the phenomenon of the line (in its infinite variety) as a phenomenon through which a continuity (at various degrees of proximity or remoteness, depending on the degree of

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24 Where microbiologists, such as Margulis and McFall-Ngai, have investigated the formal developments between organisms by way of symbiosis, the cognitive scientists and co-researchers, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, have suggested that shifts in the operational systems of humans, and other animals, develop in relation to the environments with which they interact. Although not exactly symbiotic this form of what Maturana and Varela call ‘structural coupling’ evidences the interaction and mutual influence between organisms and their environments. Their claim that knowledge is a form of action that is influenced by and influences environment is an important point for the development of my argument that environments actively affect and / or produce writing, just as environments affect and produce the human form. Writing is therefore just as much an other-than human, as it is a human, phenomenon.
identity between physical structure) between the material and cognitive structuring of human and other organisms, can be observed.

Ingold’s preliminary taxonomy arranges the physical line into three major classes: threads, traces (41) and ‘cuts, cracks and creases’ (44). The fourth category of line, and arguably fundamental to all of these categories, is the ‘ghostly line’, ‘line in a sense that is more visionary or metaphysical’ (47):

Thus the line of Euclidean geometry, in the words of Jean-François Billeter, ‘has neither body nor colour nor texture, nor any other tangible quality: its nature is abstract, conceptual, rational’ (Billeter 1990:47). Infinitely thin, drawn upon a plane that is both transparent and without substance, it is – as James Gibson puts it in his study of the ecology of visual perception – a kind of ‘ghost’ of the lines […] that we actually perceive in the world we inhabit (Gibson 1979:34-5). […] Looking up into the night sky, we imagine the stars to be invisibly connected by ghostly lines into constellations […] Only by doing so can we tell stories about them (Berger 1982: 284). (2007:47-49)

It is this type of line, I argue, that draws upon and contributes to every one of Ingold’s lines listed in his taxonomy. Furthermore it might be stated that the ghostly line is a conceptual registry of the line as experienced at a perceptual level, i.e. the cognitive continuity between an organism’s physical structuring and that of the structuring of his environment contributes to these ‘ghostly’ conceptual understandings and applications of line. As Johnson writes: ‘Topologically speaking, our bodies are in our minds. Our “minds” are processes that arise through our ongoing coupling with our environment’ (2007:130). If our bodies are what they are as a result of their ongoing coupling with environment it therefore follows that our environment, as registered within the body by way of this coupling, is also constitutive of our mind. An understanding of the human as a distributed, emergent entity thus supports an understanding of writing as similarly distributed and emergent, supported by an understanding of the commonality of line formation, as a characteristic of writing. The structural continuity of particular interest to this research is the continuity of line formation in humans and trees, specifically as they converge in writing.

The genetic evolution of line formation is linked to the phenotypical evolution of line formation: ‘Like all animals, we exist by virtue of coupling our bodies to the environment through action […] Action in the environment is the root of the ecological self […] We
are what we do’ (Lee, 1993: 34). How we behave (culture / phenotype) affects what we are, or what we become (ontology / genetics) most notably through the incorporation of alterity within the self of the organism, for example, through food consumption or sexual reproduction. The phenotypic argument is supported by the likes of Hayles, who suggests that

human functionality expands because the parameters of the cognitive system it inhabits expands. In this model, it is not a question of leaving the body behind but rather of extending embodied awareness in highly specific, local, and material ways that would be impossible without electronic prosthesis. (1999:291)

But electronic prosthesis is not the only, nor perhaps the easiest or most obvious, way of expanding human functionality. Johnson presents a simpler, more general argument for the expansion of human physical and cognitive functioning: ‘Change your brain, your body or your environment in nontrivial ways, and you will change how you experience your world, what things are meaningful to you, and even who you are’ (2007:2). The way we write affects the way we understand and experience the world, every change in this writing will have a corresponding affect on our perception of the world, the greater the change in writing the greater the shift in cognition. Changing how (where and by what methods) and what (the semantic concerns of linguistic ‘content’ and material composition) we write, effects change in our writing environments as it does in the human self as both reader and writer. Altering our writing habits alters our writing practices; alterations in our writing practices alter the textual environments we produce, which in turn affect the environments of readers and writers that inhabit (and incorporate) these textual environments, which has an effect on the writing produced and so on.

If, as writers we are serious about generating environmental change then we should be doing so in the environments of our texts and of our textual composition. For the literary text, as for the system of the human self, or tree, the method and technique of composition constitutes its object just as this object constitutes its composition and technique: I am, and I or it is, my environment. I am what was and what will be my environment. Thus, to return to a discussion of the quotation from Johnson with which I opened this section, the ‘I’ that I call myself is not only not a ‘single, unified executive system’, I am constituted by ‘numerous systems simultaneously ‘communicating’ with one another in a vast dance of ongoing co-ordination and readjustment’ within my body, between body and brain, for
example, but also between my body (including my brain) and my environment. My periphery is a haze of organism-environment interaction. I am a ‘fuzzy-edged’ entity, a distributed and emergent system in relation with other distributed and emergent systems, and, to return to Dirk Baecker, and to merge his claims with those of Judith Butler, no system is self-grounding:

one can never start anything at all from scratch, neither one’s own life nor a relationship to whatever phenomenon. Systems, regarded as non-self-evident sets of possibilities, are already there; they emerge, they enable and they constrain what is to happen […] (2001:68)

Systems are environments that are inhabited and / or constrained by other environments. Systems are environments that exist between and among other environments, that effect each other, that vie for priority, that emerge, decay, are absorbed in part or in entirety into others or that absorb and are changed by the absorption of these others. Judith Butler has observed that no individual is ‘self-grounding’ (2005: 19). I would extend this observation to argue that no system, whether physical or metaphysical, is self-grounding. Human language is not self-grounding. Not only in the Wittgensteinian sense that no human possesses a private language, but beyond this to the blurred edge of the human realm where human and other-than-human interweave: not just human language but human writing must be understood as a recent heir to the many, diverse communicational developments that are a product of our historical, interspecies, evolutionary progress.

Before turning to a more detailed examination of how the frame of writing overlaps and intersects with others, in the form of the page, I will now turn to a consideration of the tree, and the overlap this frame, as both physical and conceptual entity, manifests with those of human (discussed here) and page (still to come).

25 In Giving an Account of Oneself (2005) Judith Butler acknowledges the limitations of self-constitution and self-knowledge, arguing for a more dispersed account of the human self and its formation. Given her interest in the distinction between sex and gender and the extent to which gender is environmentally, or culturally, constructed and / or performed (Gender Trouble, 1990) perhaps this development is unsurprising. In Giving an Account of Oneself (2005) Butler recognises the contingency of the human self upon its ‘external’ conditions and / or environment. Parts of this account complement Hayles’ account of posthumanism, as well as the theories of the other philosophers, theorists and scientists, referenced in this thesis, who assert the importance of interaction between human and non-human organisms, and their environments, in the formation of entity, organism and environment.
I began this research project with the following intuition: the production of writing in relation to the page, as reformulated tree, formally undermines any project to preserve the ‘natural’, as an immediate manifestation of the re-appropriation of ‘nature’ as a resource for human cultural production. There has been a significant range of post-structural and deconstructive work that has challenged and reworked this polarisation of nature / culture, as I have indicated in the earlier section of this thesis, ‘Nature Writing’, and my intention is not now to repeat or review this work. The account I give here is a practical one, an account of how, by working with and through materials and organisms that I identified according to either one of these conceptual frames, these concepts and their relation began to break down; not as a result of a purely conceptual enterprise but as the result of the intertwining of embodied perception and conceptual thought that developed in the course of this practice-based research of reading and writing with a tree.

Owain Jones and Paul Cloke\(^26\) have observed that, ‘[t]he fate of trees is often emblematic of the wider environment’ (2002:2):

Trees in Britain and elsewhere have become carriers of some people’s environmental anxiety and love for nature, cropping up in various discourses on environmental crisis, countryside change and habitat loss, and quality of urban life. (2002:6)

The logo of the National Trust, for example, is an oak branch, allying national and environmental concerns under the banner of the oak tree; in the UK, road signs to places of natural interest are accompanied by the stylised image of a conifer: the tree is a symbol of ‘nature’. Cloke and Jones’ study considers ‘trees as both social constructions and as real dynamic material entities’ (3-4). Their study thus acknowledges the relationship between experience and abstraction:

\(^{26}\)Dr Owain Jones and his former supervisor Professor Paul Cloke are both cultural geographers, specifically concerned with the investigation of nature-culture relations. Although a very different piece of work, and a book that operates in a separate, albeit relevant, field, Cloke and Jones’ (Jones and Cloke, 2002) choice to focus on tree culture as a practical example of the complex interface between human and non-human organisms, or ‘cultures’, shares a common impetus with this (my own) research into the human-tree relations of the reading and writing practices examined in this thesis.
In doing so we seek to respond to Philo’s (2000) concern regarding the dematerialised nature of much contemporary cultural geography, which ignores ‘stubbornly there-in-the-world kind of matter’ (33). There is nothing more ‘stubbornly there-in-the-world’ than the trees which, we guess you could now take a look at by moving to a window, or taking a short stroll outside. (2002:4)

This research project has been undertaken as a result of a similar preconception regarding the materiality of language, more especially literature, and the manifestation of its relationship with environment by way of its materials. Furthermore, as Cloke and Jones also note,

In contemporary understandings of nature-society relations it is recognised that nature is not merely inscribed upon by human culture and practice. Rather, nature ‘pushes back’ with its own vitality which is manifest in speculative material processes. (7)

It is exactly this activity of ‘pushing back’ that I am interested in within this enterprise of reading and writing with a tree. I am interested in the agency of this tree (and of its immediate environment) and the impact this agency has upon / within my reading and writing processes. The aim has been to develop a model of reading and writing that is manifestly affected by this environment. This issue of non-human agency can be a ‘thorny’ issue. Again, Cloke and Jones’ articulation with regards to this issue approximates my own: ‘We know that trees are not agents in the same ways that humans are, but to acknowledge this is not to deny that they are agents at all’ (215). Moreover, the tree, as I observed of the human in the previous section, should not to be mistaken as a unified agent, but understood as a distributed entity, emerging with and among other organisms.

The tree I chose as the focus of this project is an apple tree. This apple tree forms part of an orchard, situated in the grounds of Tremough Campus, University College Falmouth. This orchard is a remainder from the previous life of this site as a convent school. The apples were initially grown, along with other fruit and vegetables, to feed the nuns and the girls they taught here. Orchards, Cloke and Jones observe, ‘reflect a time-deepened dwelling of trees and people; where trees have had a physical, active presence in (re) construction of landscape’ (12). The cultural impact and significance of this tree as an apple tree within an orchard pre-dates this project. I have worked in close relation with the gardeners on the Tremough Estate, informing them of my activity in order to make sure
that any activity I undertook was not considered harmful to the tree and its surrounding area. David Garwood, head gardener, has been a great support in this project and has assisted my investigation of this tree by providing access to any information he has regarding its history. This is not much however. The tree variety is unknown and, when I took a sample of apples to be identified by the apple expert at ‘Applause for Cider’, a day of apple celebration at Trelissick, Cornwall (3rd October, 2012), he was unable to identify the variety, suggesting that this was perhaps one tree that had been grafted with various different varieties. When asked, Garwood regarded this as unlikely given that there were no obvious marks on the tree of where the grafting would have occurred, other than the mark from the original grafting. However, this experience prompted him to remind me that apple trees are rarely grown from seed in gardens like this. The more usual practice is to buy apple tree root stock and to graft branches of the desired variety onto this root stock to ensure the variety of apple grown. As Penn State’s College of Agricultural Sciences Cooperative Extension details,

Many people mistakenly believe that fruit trees grow true to name from seeds. In reality, if you collect seed from a fruit grown on a plant, the seeds will produce plants that will be a hybrid of two plants. The new plant will be the same kind of plant, but its fruit and vegetative portions may not look the same as the parent because the plant is ‘heterozygous’. Therefore, all fruit trees must be vegetatively propagated by either grafting or budding methods. (2005: 3)

The majority of apple trees are not ostentatiously hybrid as they produce apples of the same variety, and yet this apple growth depends upon the bonding of one tree variety with the root stock of another, meaning that most fruit trees are indeed hybrid; a hybridity that is, ironically, a means of guaranteeing the ‘purity’ of the fruit. The identity of the fruit tree with which I have been working remains, however, ‘unknown’.

Throughout this research I have avoided referring to the tree as mine but rather refer to it as the tree with which I’m working, or the tree I’m working on. This has not been the same for the gardening team however, who all refer to this tree as ‘Camilla’s tree’. So much so that when I was invited to take part in the grafting of apple trees in the orchard they suggested that I label the tree’s grafted from the apple tree I was working with as ‘Camilla’ so that they would know which one it was. The grafting was successful. As a result, these three or four trees, grafted with the unnamed variety with which I have been working, will now be listed as ‘Camilla’ in Tremough gardening records. This naming
provides a marker by which to distinguish this variety of tree and fruit from the others. It provides ease of reference. It also marks the association of my person with this tree as a result of this research. The growth of these trees in my name will be a legacy of this project, one about which I feel ambivalent. Honoured as I am to be remembered in this way within the garden, I am suspicious of what this naming means. Does this language trace exhibit that a tree’s significance in human language is dependent upon its human significance? As I argued earlier, in the section on the human, human language has developed between and among other organisms, it is the result of our evolutionary coincidence with other species. Our interrelation with other species signifies in our language, just as the languages of other species signifies their interrelation with the human. More immediately, the influence of the human on the growth of this apple is apparent in the bump on the trunk where the initial graft took place and then in the branches cut as the tree has been pruned to optimise fruit growth. The use of my name to identify this apple tree is not a claim for its identity with my person, rather it is just another marker of this tree’s relationship with, and culture in relation to, that of the human.

But the human influence is by no means the only influence on this tree, nor perhaps the most significant one. One of the principal reasons I was allowed to work with this tree was because of the rabbit damage. The bark of the tree had been almost entirely eaten away from the main trunk of the tree as had the bark on the lower branches, cutting off the flow of nutrients from the roots to the rest of the tree. When I discussed the research, in its initial phases, with David Garwood, I had asked about the possibility of writing into the tree. Writing into the tree’s bark would mean opening up the tree to possible infection, he said. Garwood would only sanction this if the tree was already endangered, and so he directed me to the trees with rabbit damage. In the final year of this research the tree looks as if it may well be dying. The blossom was sparse and the apples are few: thirty-six in total. The surrounding trees are not registering the same results, so it is unlikely to be the effect of more general environmental conditions (poor weather around the time of pollination, for example).

With every hour, and day, of observation (recording my impressions through photograph and audio recording) and conversation with those who worked here in the walled garden, the amount I really saw, felt and heard, in relation to this tree, grew significantly. It took several hours of observing this tree before I came to realise that almost the entire surface of
its bark was covered by lichen (a symbiotic relation of alga and fungus) of differing varieties. Lichen is epiphytic, not parasitic, and so exists alongside the tree without impairing its health in any way. Then there was the moss that grew there also. This is sometimes removed for aesthetic purposes but is not considered a threat to the health of the tree. Periods of rain, or early morning dew revealed the spider webs woven between the leaves and branches of the tree. I began to notice the tracks in the leaves left by apple moth (*Epiphyas postvittana*) larvae, known as mines. The eggs are laid in the leaf and the larvae move through the leaf feeding on the leaf cellulose. The tracks get wider as the larvae grow. Larvae that mine in this way are referred to as ‘leaf miners’. I noticed the excrement of birds and other organisms marking leaves and branches. The ‘leaf miners’ ate their way out of their leaves, and ate their way through the leaves of the tree from the outside, as caterpillars, wove the leaves shut around them, and gestated into moths. Flies laid their eggs in the rainwater that collected in the bucket I left beneath the tree for papermaking, these eggs hatched into larvae that lived in the water, before gestating into flies and becoming airborne. I learned that the disfigured parts of the tree, where the bark bulged and bubbled, was the result of aphids. Here the fruit and leaves grow poorly and the aphids left a white cotton wool-like fluff on the branches. These marks and blemishes and their relation to various other-than-tree organisms is explored in a series of poems, ‘on apple skin’, whose postcard style format (once printed) refers back to the earlier poem, ‘send me a postcard please’. None of these organisms asked permission of the tree to make their mark. I too made my mark, just by being here, and yet I continued to be concerned about the way in which the specific mark-making of writing might contribute in a negative way to the life of this tree. My experience of being with this tree confirmed my understanding of the mutual affect of life-forms and processes, confirming the continuity between organisms and their environments. And yet my attempts to write on or with this tree felt obviously out of sync with this growing together of organisms here in this tree. Writing on the branches, leaves or apples in pen seemed at once a desecration and a complete irrelevance to the life of the tree. Diana Lynn Thompson notes a similar sentiment on writing on leaves as part of *hundreds + thousands*: ‘I’m writing on leaves […] I have to remind myself, this isn’t graffiti. It disappears.’ (2001:38). These forms of writing were communicating more about the environments from within which they were used and had been developed than they did with regards to this environment of tree.

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27 Diana Lynn Thompson is a contemporary Canadian environmental artist whose work with writing in relation to trees shows some overlapping concerns with the practical components of this thesis.
David Abram identifies alphabetic writing with the sensory removal of the human subject from the ‘more-than-human field of forms’ as part of an argument to suggest that writing is incompatible with embodied environmental engagement:

Alphabetic writing can engage the human senses only to the extent that those senses sever, at least provisionally, their spontaneous participation with the animate earth. To begin to read, alphabetically, is thus to be dis-placed, cut off from the sensory nourishment of a more-than-human field of forms. (1996:196)

This line of argument is used to support a sense of split between word and world. My early attempts at writing (alphabetically) with this tree, or more accurately on this tree, did not produce a sense of being personally cut-off ‘from the sensory nourishment of a more-than-human field of forms’ but rather contributed to a sense that my writing techniques were in some sense at odds with this environment. I was more aware of the techniques of writing, that I used, as ‘belonging’ to, and as being derived and developed from (bearing the traces of) another environment; the ‘inside’ environment of desk, chair, pen and paper.

It was not that the alphabetic word was cut off from the more-than-human field of forms, but rather that the ‘normal’ forms of alphabetic writing, not having been developed in common with this more-than-human field, were therefore not expressive of it. Pen and paper writing, and digital word processing, are reliant upon, because they have developed out of and alongside, a specific (normally indoor) environment. In order to develop a writing that was expressive of the tree I needed to spend time developing a writing in this tree environment, that would therefore be expressive of this tree; a writing that was embedded within and constituted by this tree’s more-than-human field of forms.

I began this research with the belief that the tree was doubly banished, as far as literary representations of trees were concerned. First, it was materially reformed, into paper, in order to make this verbal token possible, and then, on the tree’s reformed surface its verbal significance was inscribed as token word. The destruction of trees in order for trees to gain literary significance, when literature is in fact more concerned with the significance of literature than it is with the significance of trees, seemed an unpardonable flaw in environmental literary production. I did not believe that Abram was right in claiming that alphabetic writing, in all its forms, promoted a split between human and other-than-human organisms and environments, but I did believe that pen and paper, the computer typed page
and the digital document communicated very little, in a material sense, of the life of more-than-human organisms. My aim was therefore to develop a writing practice that did not constitute the annihilation of the tree as presence, in order for it to gain significance in representation. Lurking in this conception of the relationship between tree and its literary paper reformation were the interrelated conceptions of ‘pure presence’ and autonomous identity: that something could be completely itself. As I have mentioned, above, the spider webs, the aphid fluff, the lichen that covers almost the entire surface of the tree, the moss, the tracks my feet left in the grass around the tree, the bobbles of pink wool (from my hat) and strands of hair that remained in the tree days after my last visit, all gradually revealed that ‘pure presence’ was never an option. This tree was not purely a tree; it was an environmental collaboration, a balancing act. This tree was more or less present as a tree, more rather than less. My desire in this research was to develop a method of writing in which the tree was present more rather than less. The tree, in page form, is present less rather than more. The tree is contained within the page as a physical memory (physically, in the paper page, and conceptually, in its digital variant) that is forgotten more easily than it is remembered. My understanding of writing altered with my reconception of this tree. A word is a combination of abstract and material significance. The way a word is made means something. Threads of twigs through the page highlights both the material extension and the abstract significance of paper in relation to tree.

Figure 9 Twigs Through Paper

The relation of tree to paper highlights both the material significance of words as well as the abstract significance of trees. Thus the polarised distinction between reality (tree) and fiction (word) is broken down. What emerges rather is a meditation on the relationship between abstract and material significance in perception. The work understood in these terms constitutes a reification (a physical trace or repository) of perceptual thought:

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perception as material extension. It was through a combination of the observation (an observation that approaches the practice of natural history, of which Skinner laments the decline, 2001: 6) of the way in which these organisms affected the growth of leaf and fruit, and the observation that my own mark-making had on leaf and fruit growth that I came to the idea of writing into the apples as a way of writing with the tree. This argument is developed in further detail in the final section ‘Nature Writing Reframed’, for the moment, however, I now turn to a discussion of the ‘Page’.
Ric Allsopp has observed that ‘even contemporary work on the materiality of writing […]
has largely confined itself to the space of the page’ (1999:76). This research extends the
metaphor of page, as a conventional support for writing, beyond its paper format and the
formal conventions its digital manifestation is heir to, in an effort to probe the dynamics at
play in the combinations of human and other-than-human forms and forces, in the marking
and surfacing of nature in writing, and writing in nature. The page provides a metaphorical
framework within which to examine the interplay between nature and writing.

Ian Davidson relates his account of the page and its treatment in poetry, more especially
experimental poetry, to the ‘turn towards the ‘spatial’ in the twentieth century’ (2007:6).
He argues that Cubism and the genesis of collage manifest an effort ‘to escape the over-
determinism of classical ideas of perspective and historical notions of progress which no
longer seemed possible’ in a culture where time and space were increasingly experienced
according to various scales that no longer allowed for a centralised, or normal, model of
space-time relations (6). If the page had hitherto been understood as a discrete site of
autonomous literary composition, this conception develops along more emergent and
distributed lines in the age of Cubist experiment and collage. These techniques were
developed, Davidson argues, in an effort to ‘represent the fragmented nature of modern
experience’ as experienced against the loss of a unified cultural whole, or at least a unified
cultural perspective (as figured by the standardised page):

If this was an experience characterised by an inability to maintain a common
perspective over past, present and future, whether that perspective was ideological,
ethical or optical, then the freeze-frame of Cubism and the fragmentation of collage
provided both the method and form for its representation. (6)

These developments were made explicit within the literary realm by the Dadaist treatment
of ‘language as material’. Tristan Tzara’s ‘TO MAKE A DADAIST POEM’, Davidson
claims, ‘made the link between the process of visual collage and the process of writing
poetry more explicit’ (8-9). Collage facilitated the degree of intermodal exchange,
between art disciplines that had traditionally been treated distinctly, in such a way as to express the spatial-temporal crossover that was coming to define the modern experience.

One of the defining features of my practice-based research has been the cross-cutting between environments of indoor study and outdoor tree. This personal traffic also entailed a corresponding traffic of materials. Cross-cutting between environments stimulated a reassessment of materials and their ‘proper’ treatment within certain environments. This re-contextualisation of materials reveals information about the environments to which they ‘belong’ as well as the relation of these materials to those environments. This practice was in effect an exercise in what the Russian Formalists have dubbed, ‘defamiliarisation’ (Shklovsky, 1917/1998). A process of refamiliarisation follows that of defamiliarisation, so that the once unfamiliar relations between object and environment become familiar, normalised, and at some level, differently understood. This experience provides a practical example of how organism-environment coupling affects the formation of mind according to Mark Johnson’s expanded theory of mind (2007), as introduced by the ‘framing’ section of this thesis. Johnson asserts that it is through the creation of homogenous artefacts and setting up ‘standardised’, repeatable, systems for interacting with these artefacts, that we are able to minimize the variance in the situations that we encounter, reducing the need for the conscious organisation of perception. Antonio Damasio28, quoted by Johnson, writes that

All living organisms from the humble amoeba to the human are born with devices designed to solve automatically, no proper reasoning required, the basic problems of life [...] The single word homeostasis is convenient shorthand for the ensembles of regulations and the resulting state of regulated life. (Damasio, 2003:30)

Johnson develops Damasio’s observation, asserting that

homeostatis-oriented processing occurs beneath the level of conscious awareness, it happens ‘before you know it’. It must be more or less automatic, for if we had to consciously control all of this monitoring and adjustment, we would have to devote all our energy to control even the most elementary bodily operations. This would quickly exhaust our cognitive resources and would make it impossible for us to carry out the multitude of coordinated functions required for life. (2007:53)

28 Antonio Damasio is Professor of Neuroscience at the University of Southern California. Damasio’s work makes links, or at least speculates on the possibility of links, between human biology and human cognition. His 2003 work, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain, is particularly important to the development of Mark Johnson’s argument for the role of emotion in human cognition.
A large amount of this homeostasis-oriented processing is thus facilitated by the establishment of environments that support certain modes of cognitive or pre-cognitive organism functioning, as in the case of writing environments, for example. The increasing instability in the normative structure of experience demands the creation of new cognitive supports. This, I suggest, was one of the stimuli for the accompanying explosion of innovative experiment across the arts in the early twentieth century. Currently we are surrounded by warnings that we are approaching, or are already in the throes of, environmental crisis, cognitive artefacts that support and generate innovative cognitive processes are therefore once more in demand. ‘Through the process of defamiliarisation, cut-ups make the reader re-examine the constituent parts of a text, breaking down the established paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships’ (Davidson, 2007:11). Collage once again presents a model by which environment-object relations can be re-imagined, but this time it need not be confined to the page, as this section of the thesis will show.

Both Kathleen Fraser (2000) and Ian Davidson (2007) single out Olson’s open field poetics as a crucial moment in the development of a more page-aware poetics. In Eric Mottram’s ‘composition by field’ (1977:4) the understanding of the page is refracted through a particular aspect of the world beyond the page: the field. This correlation between page and field, or ‘natural’ phenomenon is not uncommon. In a recent interview for the British Library’s exhibition Writing Britain: Wastelands to Wonderlands (2012) entitled Writing Wild Places, Simon Armitage talks about how he associates the Yorkshire moors with pages: ‘maybe I associate them, at some level, with blank pages [...] they’re there waiting to be written’ (0:37/4:47). Mottram uses this term ‘field’ as a conceptual metaphor that has less to do with land open to the sky bounded by fences, walls, or hedges and more to do with a sense of open space bounded only by the edges of the page. The conceptual metaphor at play here (‘field is enclosed open space’) draws upon the experience, whether personal or culturally inherited, that identifies being in a field with a sense of relative freedom and room for manoeuvre.

Importantly for Mottram, composition by field is more than a poetic process [...] Mottram outlines a poetics which seeks to be inclusive, to see the poet as an object within the field of the poem, not its centre. (Davidson, 2007:12)
Davidson understands Mottram’s poetic understanding as part of the larger US movement of Language Poetry where ‘[i]t is the construction of the poem itself that is the event […] a page becomes the construction site of the poem (16).

There is a sense, throughout Davidson’s argument, that the page, in the work he discusses, becomes understood as in some (mostly abstract) way inhabited by the reader / writer. In relation to the writing of Pierre Joris and Michel Foucault, Davidson writes of ‘the idea that one can get inside a text, become part of it and by extension, as readers, constructors of an individual text within the many possibilities that both its spatial construction and spatial reading can bring’ (94); he describes how ‘[t]he reader has to move about within the poem’ (144), referencing McCaffery’s description of Carnival’s design ‘to draw a reader in to a locus where the text surrounds her’ (McCaffery, 1999). ‘The page becomes,’ for these writers, according to Davidson, ‘a diagrammatic representation of the spaces language might inhabit as well as a representational, lived space, and one the reader enters and uses’ (162). The influence of Henri Lefebvre’s spatial poetics, his focus on ‘the way the body ‘produces’ space through perspective, scale and travel, and that of the space of the body itself, both its internal space and the body of the skin’ (45), is evident in Davidson’s argumentation. This line of thought combined with his understanding of the function of the page in contemporary literature presents an understanding of the space of the page as produced by the reader / writer: ‘[r]ather than space being envisaged as pre-existing surface or container within which the material of the poem is arranged, the space of the poem is now produced by the writer and reader in the act or performance of writing and reading’ (144). What Davidson fails to acknowledge, at least explicitly, is the reverse effect of this argument; that the space of the page produces the reader / writer in turn. Davidson refers to McCaffery’s Carnival (2001), a text whose scale is such that the reader’s body can be enveloped by it, a text that the reader must move her body in order to manipulate. This is the case to a greater extent in the text exhibitions of Caroline Bergvall. In ‘Say Parsley’ (2010) for example, where the page becomes a room, whose walls are pages; where letters are suspended in mid air: the word fractures as the page expands. Bergvall’s exhibitions present concentrated instances of the more fragmented relation between reader and the written word that is characteristic of the contemporary Western, particularly urban experience, but increasingly a general phenomenon thanks to digital, mobile phone technology, of being surrounded by text. This dispersal of text, joined up according to the individual navigation of space and attendant levels of attention, means that
collage is now a state of mind. The relationship between page as inhabited and page as ‘naturally’ constructed by that which is other-than-human, has been developed still further by the work of Ian Hamilton Finlay.

Ian Hamilton Finlay’s work is often understood from within the context of concrete poetry. The Sao Paulo concrete poetry group, Noigandres (Augusto de Campos, Decio Pignatari, Haroldo de Campos), defined Concrete Poetry, in 1958, in the following terms:

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ideogram: appeal to non-verbal communication. concrete poem communicates its own structure: structure-content. concrete poem is an object in and by itself, not an interpreter of exterior objects and / or more or less subjective feelings. its material: word (sound, visual form, semantical charge). its problem: a problem of functions-relations of this material […] with the concrete poem occurs the phenomenon of metacommunication: coincidence and simultaneity of verbal and non-verbal communications; only - it must be noted - it deals with a communication of forms, of a structure-content, not with the usual message communication. (1958/1968 in Solt)
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More recently Miranda Tufnell and Chris Crickmay have reminded us that the word ‘concrete’ comes from the Latin roots creare ‘to create’ and con ‘with’, meaning ‘to create with’. Tufnell and Crickmay give an artist’s account of the cognitive facility of creation that complements Mark Johnson’s theory of artistic creation as an expression of the distributed function of human mind, considering creation as a form of conversation:

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Creating in touch with sensation and feeling in the body awakens us to the sensuous detail of the material world – the opening of a hand, the coolness of a stone, the flow of a pigment […] and paradoxically it is this attention to detail that opens and loosens the field in which we perceive things. Creating, in whatever way is available to us, moves us out of abstractions and generalisations of our everyday seeing and language into the particular qualities and feel of the world about us [...] Forming or creating things that move us changes and expands our perception. What we create is always in some way speaking into being a part of ourselves which is as yet hidden and unspoken, unexpressed even to ourselves. (2004:41)
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Creativity draws upon an array of perceptual and conceptual experience and organization. A reading of Ian Hamilton Finlay’s *Little Sparta* incorporates the coolness of a stone, the flow of water, reflecting light, the changing wind, as part of a literary experience. In his essay on ‘How to Read’ Harry Gilonis recalls Stephen Bann’s ‘long ago’ observation that ‘some works in [Ian Hamilton] Finlay’s garden are not so much garden features as transpositions of reading conventions into the environment’ (Gilonis in Cutts, 2006:122).
would like to make the reverse observation that in composing a text that is more explicitly composed of more-than-human elements, such as grass, earth, water and trees, within the compositional ‘field’ of the text, in treating the garden like a page, Finlay’s work suggests how the page is also an inhabited space, a space within which we move conceptually as well as corporeally.

‘Before the reader picks it up, opens the covers and starts reading it, the book starts its work. There are paratexts from the start […]’ (Gilonis, 2006: 118). The literary paratexts of cover, endpaper, typography, page, page-turning, spread and reading-order, that Gilonis discusses, ghost a ‘reading’ of Finlay’s garden. There are two particular situations that I would like to focus on from Finlay’s garden. The first is the series of walls whose parallel (page) text is published in *Canal Stripe Series 4* (reprinted in Bann, 1967).

![Fig. 10 Little Sparta, Stonypath (August, 2010)](image)

*Canal Stripe Series 4* is composed of six pages. Each of these pages has a corresponding wall. The text divides into three double page spreads. The text runs almost along the bottom of each page. In many ways it undermines my argument to copy these words here as if its meaning was not altered by its material (re)manifestation. This work is one of words alone, rather than a work of layout, font type and size choice, page turning and all the other paratexts that Gilonis mentions in his essay. Each work is a situated experience. I present this abstraction of both wall and page text in an attempt to examine these texts in terms of parallel mapping. In Ingold’s terms, my concern is for the ghostly lines that both texts invoke (2004:47). These ghostly lines, the lines my imagination reads between them, are presented here to an imperfect extent, in order to evoke similar ghosts in the minds of other readers. In the action of opening the first double spread of *Canal Stripe Series 4* the reader divides, in opening, the words ‘horizons long’ from ‘for little fields’, and reunites
them in their subsequent page turning, closing the spread. This is best illustrated by the final spread (‘little fields | long horizons’; where ‘|’ marks the centre crease) where ‘little fields’ unfold from ‘long horizons’ and fold back into each other in the page turning that closes the spread. Page opening and closing inspires and resolves desire. This opening and closing is of course impossible when reading the stone walls.

In the reading of the stone walls the text is navigated in a very different way. There are no explicit instructions given to the reader (just as there are none given for the reading of Canal Stripe Series 4) but there is a path that has been trodden into the grass between the walls (three on each side) by the many feet that have read them that marks the habitual reading patterns as a trace of feet in grass. Just as there is a habitual, or ‘normal’ treatment of the book, so there appears to have evolved a habitual or ‘normal’ treatment, or reading, of these walls. By walking between the walls the reader is able to maintain the double spread view provided by the book, reading each wall in the place of a page.

third wall spread:

    HORIZONS LONG    |    FOR LITTLE FIELDS

second wall spread:

    LITTLE FIELDS LONG    |    FOR HORIZONS

first wall spread:

    LITTLE FIELDS    |    LONG HORIZONS

(‘|’ marks the line marked by readers’ feet, paralleling the centre fold of the book)

This path creates a ‘spine’ effect. This spinal path presents a central axis from which a reading is performed. The spine of a book provides a similarly central axis, engendering the page-turning action that defines a book. The double spread experience emerges from walking between these wall texts, and walking within the text that these walls cumulatively (along with the navigation of the reader) create. This experience of reading these walls
‘rereads’ the absorption of writing in the form of the printed page; the reader does not just pass each page by, walking, as in page-turning, but is very much an authorial part of the textual composition itself.

In a live reading of the walls the eyes of the reader move from the left hand side of their body to the right, in an exaggerated throw-back to the reading of the double spread. You walk through the ghost of a page and you leave with a revised understanding of how reading is performed. You leave the physical text behind, taking away its ghost to restructure your experience. There is no closing of the book, putting it away or leaving it to hand, at the end of this wall text. These walls are more to body than they are to hand. The wall text involves the use of feet and legs in reading, rather than the usual involvement of fingers and hands: the whole body moves through the text. The top of the page and the top of the wall form horizons of different sorts. The reader looks up from the text, over its horizon. Each page, or wall, is part of an organizing structure the like of which encloses ‘small fields’. A double page spread can form the right angle of a field wall or hedge. The wall text forms a series of hurdles, which at any one time might form the two walls of a very small paddock, sheep pen, or fold. Over the walls, and to each side, horizons of different varieties stretch out: the extended situation of the text. Jessie Sheeler suggests that ‘The wordplay ‘long’ is heightened by the wide landscape and the confinement suggested by the wall ‘excerpts’.’ (2003: 7)

To some extent these walls echo the page. On another level these walls fragment the inside environment upon which the book and the page rely. These walls are not doing what walls normally do: keeping people or animals in, or out. They are, however, organizational structures. Although they do not mark boundary lines here, they do propose a certain ‘framing’ structure of experience, or ‘situation’ to return to a phrase of Mark Johnson: ‘The situation specifies what will be significant to us and what objects, events, and persons mean to us at a pre-reflective level’ (2007:65). The meaning of a situation is established, and derives from, a compost of ingrained structural determination and experience. The making of this wall text derives as much from Ian Hamilton Finlay’s reading tendencies and experiences as it derives from our own.

There is no need to walk down the centre fold as so many others have. You may walk round each wall a different number of times, reading in serpentine loops or series of
bubbles, your reading is structured by your manipulation of this environment; just as you might navigate the book in alternative ways (reading the last line first or reading where the page falls open, for example). Both structures feed into (and derive from) experiential norms to be altered or adjusted according to the reader’s desire or current tendency. As with the inscribed bridges and stiles in his garden, Ian Hamilton Finlay’s wall works emphasise the physical structure of writing, the reading of these works involves a specific physical organization of the reader’s body, encouraging an understanding of language as something that effects our bodily navigation of environment. They physicalise metaphor to suggest an active appraisal of language, as a structure that orders and reflects our cognition, as do fences and trees, walls, stones and stiles. This garden encourages an appreciation of writing, on a very physical level, as a cognitive support, a means of encouraging a certain perception of the world through encouraging certain reading (and writing) behaviours.

The second feature I will discuss from *Little Sparta* is Finlay’s use of a quotation from Saint Just: ‘the present order is the disorder of the future’.

![Fig. 11 Little Sparta, Stonypath (August, 2010)](image)

The arrangement of this quote in large stone fragments recalls the shattered sculpture from ‘an antique land’ reordered into page and sonnet form in Shelley’s ‘Ozymandias’ (2000:849). This is a poem that evokes past order through the presentation of immanent disorder, presented once again through the ordering of the sonnet, evoking the past through the double fiction of story and quotation. The poem predicts the inevitable progress between order and disorder, creation and destruction, by way of shattered monument. Ian Hamilton Finlay’s fragments of stone suggest a reading of the page as an enormous, solid structure, and a magnificent tribute to literary culture, now shattered, that coincides with Ian Davidson’s reading of the page, and its progressively fragmented treatment, following
the advent of collage (2007). And yet the words are legible, each word has its own stone: each word a stone, a building block with which writing might be reformed. But each stone is far too heavy to be moved. The resulting effect is that the reader restores the page in their conceptual treatment of the stones. The rupture is more physical suggestion than read experience.

It is important to note, also, that Finlay's construction of this shattered text is, in one sense, a fiction, made up of units shaped to appear as fragments of a larger (previously unified) whole, of which they were never a part. This act of imagining is therefore, in part, directly contrary to the direction in Shelley's text: the shattering of this page is not a 'literal' marking of the fall of a great 'order'. But, to return to Rakova’s observation (referenced in ‘Framing’) with regards to metaphor’s relation to the literal, this shattered text can indeed be regarded as just as literal as the text that Shelley references: Finlay’s structure is a comment on the fracturing of a conception of the reading experience, as a whole. His building of this structure is a physical literalisation of, and a monument to, his reading habits and corresponding conception of the page. Concrete poetry, with its emphasis on the material of literary composition and its affect on reading and writing behaviours, indeed, its comment on reading and writing behaviours as materially produced and sustained, challenges the literary manifestation of the page and the reading and writing behaviours it reifies. Finlay’s garden explodes, as much as it invokes, the structural norms of reading and writing. Little Sparta is a landscape that is written into without being written out. It suggests a reordering of conceptual structuring by way of the innovative reorganisation of the physical constructions we inhabit, and from which conceptual structuring abstracts. Reading the garden reforms reading and this reform of reading process is, in some sense, a reform of the reading self.

Kathleen Fraser gives another account of the form of writing and its relation to, if not mind-formation, the development of the poet’s sense of self: ‘Surrounded by utterance, both common and uncommon, song entered the child’s ear and defined her, an ever-present page lightly pencilled with the graph of her own uneven movement into personhood’ (2000:8). Fraser identifies this child with both page and graph, mark, or writing. She adjusts this imagining a few lines later to identify the mind as ‘a large empty page to be imprinted with the intaglio markings of a world crowding forward to make an impress’ (8). In doing so her writing exemplifies Johnson’s argument of the way in which environment
affects mind-construction; here it is the specifically literary environment of the page. This metaphor is further developed on the following page: ‘The once radiant page of the mind, for years normalised into standard-size foolscap, was again destabilized, its tactile surface brought alive, as if with the marks and artful fabrication of handmade paper’ (9). Fraser’s conception of the page is fundamentally related to her conception of literary personal development: the construction of the page, in her account, is bound up with the construction of personal identity. Personal development is expressed in terms of literary development, meaning, as with Davidson, the reverse may also be true. The standardisation of cultural norms is symbolised by the ‘standard-size foolscap’. The individual reform of this standardisation is understood in terms of remaking the page by hand; an expression of the personal crafting or recrafting of the page to reflect or express ‘one’s own peculiar way of experiencing how the mind moves and how the senses take note’ (175, my emphasis). Hélène Cixous\(^29\) writes that ‘[w]e have mouths all over our body [... w]ords come out of our hands, our underarms, our belly, our eyes, our neck’ (1999:79). The image she depicts is a very expressive and yet resistantly conceptual articulation of the expressive power of the human body. The human body is not culturally acknowledged as the expressive authority of which Cixous’ statement dreams. It is the page wherein this authority resides. It is important therefore to acknowledge the material limitations of the texts examined by Fraser and Davidson. As Karin Littau\(^30\) reminds us, it is important to realise, and to remember the book’s (and the body’s) materiality, in order ‘to ‘make perceptible’ not just that readers [and writers] have bodies, but also that books have bodies, that is, they are physical, that they enter into physiological relations with other bodies’ (2006:154). It is the remembering of this physiological relation and the balancing of this understanding against our conceptual understandings that is especially important in any understanding of the relationship between human body, page, and tree. If the normalisation, or what Damasio might term the ‘homeostasis’ (2003:30), of each ‘day’s

\(^29\)As with Judith Butler, Hélène Cixous is a post-structuralist feminist. Where Butler’s main influence is Michel Foucault, Cixous’ work is more heavily influenced by the deconstructionism of the late Jacques Derrida. The boundary crossing of deconstruction offers another method by which one thing is theoretically demonstrated to be related to another. Cixous’ work on the body and its relation to language is her particular point of relevance within this thesis. This thesis applies a broader understanding of what is, in Cixous’ work, a highly gendered account of language and its relation to the body. Here body is understood to designate both human and non-human organisms’ material extension. A connection is made in this thesis between Cixous’ argument for the human body’s ability to articulate itself in language and the articulation of a tree’s body in writing.

\(^30\)Karin Littau’s research into theories of reading extends into the realm of translation studies, manifesting an overlap between theories of reading and translation that parallels the links made between these fields in the argumentation of this thesis.
mechanical response’ is identified with the ‘standard-size foolscap’ of the page, the movement beyond this ‘familiar frame’ (Fraser, 2000:9) suggests a remaking or reformation of this page, according to the poet’s own image (in the form of hand-made paper). If the aim of the poet is to express not just herself but her environment, in the form of, for example, a tree, how might the tree affect, or take part in this reformation of the page? How might the tree’s presence, as with that of the poet, be made tangible (‘tactile’) in the page so that its body might speak, as in Cixous’ terms, for itself?

“When I was a child, my grandmother used to mix a paste for me of flour and water. Then I would go out into the yard and pick grass and make drawings out of pencil and grass pasted to paper’ (Norma Cole). (Fraser, 2000:174)

What follows, in the next section, is my own account of this negotiation between person, page and tree and the role metaphor plays in the binding of these entities together as a process of both physical and conceptual metamorphosis.
METAPHOR, METAMOR, METAMORPHOSIS:

In the section entitled ‘Framing’ I referred to Mark Johnson’s account of edge-detection as the result of functional neural assemblies in our bodies and our brains that ‘determine what stands out, for us, from a situation or a scene’ (2007:76). Johnson reminds us that what stands out for us is not the result of autonomous manipulation of environment but rather the result of the relation of brain, body and environment in any given situation: ‘So, saying that we select objects is just shorthand for the focal emergence of objects within a horizon of possible experience’ (76). I related this idea of frame formation to the literary activity of page making, or the making of literary texts in the form of pages. Here the edges of the page determine that the writing on the page stands out from all else that surrounds the page, foregrounding writing in relation to its environment. As I noted earlier, frame construction, as an act of distributed cognition, reflects how we perceive the world and reifies this perception, reinforcing and supporting it. In order to reform this primacy of writing in relation to environment, the frame of writing needs to be reformed. In order to reform our understanding of the relation between writing and its environment, the cognitive artefact that supports the interrelation of body, brain and environment in literary environments, i.e. the page, must be reformed. This reframing aims to reconfigure the page as a vehicle for writing that manifests the continuity between human and other-than-human forms of life, so that both human and other-than-human forms of life signify as part of this text, rather than presenting human line formation, in the form of writing, as split off and separate from other-than-human expression. By developing cognitive artefacts and nurturing cognitive situations of this kind we provide physical supports for the mental reconfiguration of brain-body-environment relation that is reified in the page: page reform is mind reform. This whole process of establishing ‘continuity […] between our mostly nonconscious experience of embodied meaning and our seemingly disembodied acts of thinking and reasoning’ (31) by way of artefact creation and the resulting conceptual abstraction, is identified by Johnson as the result of the intermodal function of metaphor. According to this account metaphors develop as a result of ‘the neural connections between the sensorimotor areas of the brain and other areas that are involved in thinking’ (167), not forgetting the fundamental affect of environment on brain and body functioning, especially the influence of cognitive artefacts, as an important aspect of
distributed cognition: we think through our writing environments as much as we think in them, or to rephrase Merleau-Ponty’s observation with regards to landscape, our writing environments think themselves in us. Metaphor is therefore not purely a literary construction. Rather, metaphor is a literary manifestation of a process that exceeds literary, or linguistic (in a narrow sense), functioning. Metaphor, according to this reading, is a word used to reference the emergent evolution of meaning as a result of the interaction of body, brain and environment. Metaphor, in this expanded sense, is a form of metamorphosis. The continuity between this term as a literary structure, that also identifies the function of intermodal cognitive processing at less complex levels within the body, at the level of organ function and accompanying sensation, for instance (‘to feel something in your gut’), serves to highlight cognition as a continuous process that interweaves embodied and environmental functioning with conceptual abstraction. It is by way of metaphor, in this sense, that page reform takes place.

Metaphor, the pattern that connects writing, as an aspect of human line formation, with tree line formation (as detailed in ‘Human’), is not just a principle by which one thing relates to another, but rather an account of how one thing becomes another. Metaphor, in this sense, is literal. This account of metaphor coincides with Donald Favreauau’s\textsuperscript{31} description of biosemiotics:

Biosemiotics is the study of the myriad of forms of communication and signification observable both within and between living systems. It is thus the study of representation, meaning, sense, and the biological significance of sign processes – from intercellular signalling processes to animal display behaviour to human semiotic artifacts such as language and abstract symbolic thought. Such sign processes appear ubiquitously in the literature on biological systems. Up until very recently, however, it had been implicitly assumed that the use of terms such as message, signal, code, and sign with respect to non-linguistic biological processes was ultimately metaphoric, and that such terms could someday effectively reduce to the mere chemical and physical interactions underlying such processes. As the prospects for such a reduction become increasingly untenable, even in theory, the interdisciplinary research project of biosemiotics is attempting to re-open the dialogue across the life sciences – as well as between life sciences and the humanities – regarding what, precisely, such ineliminable terms as representation,  

\textsuperscript{31} The semiotician Donald Favreauau is one of the principal contemporary proponents of biosemiotics. Along with the biologists Jesper Hoffmeyer and Kalevi Kull, both of whom are featured in Susan Petrilli’s 2003 text, *Translation, Translation* (referenced later in this thesis), Favreauau is engaged in furthering the development of biosemiotics as an interdisciplinary engagement between the sciences and the humanities, as initiated by the pioneering work of Charles Sanders Peirce, Thomas A Sebeok and Jakob von Uexkull, among others. Professor Wendy Wheeler is the most well-known British proponent of biosemiotics in relation to environmental literature and nature writing.
sign of, and meaning might refer to in the context of living, interactive, complex adaptive systems. (2005)

This research might therefore, loosely, be understood as a biosemiotic enterprise. It is not, however, the business of this research to establish itself as such. I mention the coincidence as a means of flagging up the relations between this research and the contemporaneous enterprise of complementary fields that are also developing an understanding of the literal function of metaphor. Metaphor is transformative: it is the changing of one thing into another. Metaphor is metamorphosis. Theories of this kind are not limited to the field of biosemiotic research either; the related field of translation studies is engaged in a similar enterprise (as is made evident by the overlap in contents pages between Susan Petrilli’s\textsuperscript{32}, \textit{Translation, Translation} (2003) and Donald Favareau’s \textit{Essential Readings in Biosemiotics} (2010)). Peeter Torop’s account of ‘text processuality’ (2003:280), in Petrilli’s text, suggests a more specifically textual manifestation of this process of metaphor as metamorphosis:

The change of the text’s ontology in contemporary culture due to the possible simultaneous existence of various forms of the same text in different media and discourses (translation, annotation, advertising, comics, etc.) allows us to regard culture as the process of intersemiotic translation. Intertextuality, interdiscursivity and intermediality as the environment of text generation and reception impel us to regard the signs of different texts as intersemiotic, being comprehended simultaneously within the frameworks of different sign systems. (2003:271)

Torop\textsuperscript{33} thus develops a model of how concepts travel and mutate within and between media as a process of ‘total translation’. Human culture, according to Torop, is ‘an infinite process of total translation’ (271). Torop’s theory builds upon Roman Jakobson’s third category of translation, ‘intersemiotic translation or transmutation’: the ‘interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of non verbal sign systems’ (1959:232). This form of translation extends beyond the realm of more obvious visual, verbal and audio texts to translation between the semiotic systems of human and other-than-human organisms and their corresponding cultural artefacts. Torop annexes his research more explicitly to the

\textsuperscript{32} Susan Petrilli is a Professor of Philosophy and Theory of Language at the University of Bari in Italy. Her 2003 text demonstrates the increasingly interdisciplinary reach of translation studies. This text includes chapters on translation as a biological process occurring between organisms (Jesper Hoffmeyer; Kalevi Kull; Thomas A. Sebeok); translation as intersemiosis, translation as a process of information assimilation between forms and genre (Peeter Torop); and translation between language and the body, or the somatic inscription of language (Stanley Ruthrop), to name a few of the themes that are relevant to this thesis.

\textsuperscript{33} Peeter Torop is Professor of Semiotics of Culture at the University of Tartu in Estonia. His theories of intersemiosis, although not acknowledged as such by him, present interesting linguistic parallels to the micro-biological observations of McFall-Ngai and Margulis, already acknowledged in this thesis.
field of biosemiotics in an article written with Kalevi Kull, ‘Biotranslation: Translation between Umwelten’, where ‘[t]he concept of translation is redefined in a way that allows us to apply it to sign processes in non-humans’ (2003:315-328). Horst Ruthrof’s development of Jakobson’s third category of translation (also in Petrilli) combines translation theory with the theories of Mark Johnson. According to Ruthrof’s account:

> It is only because we already know how to link certain expressions with specific clusters of nonverbal signs that we can talk about meaning at all. It is a consequence of this knowledge that we are able then to make the shortcut to linguistic context. (2003:74)

> Language is an evolutionary latecomer that functions as an economising grid which cultures have superimposed on nonverbal semiosis for communicative efficiency. Translation is one of the fields of study where the fault lines between these signification systems become visible. (2003:79)

This research develops through the framing device of metaphor rather than that of translation. However, Torop’s assertion that ‘all types of communication in culture could be presented as a process of translation of texts (or fragments) into other texts’ (2003:271) coincides with the account of metaphor I develop from Mark Johnson, as does Ruthrof’s account of the linguistic continuity between body and text. In what follows I develop an account of the material and semantic evolution of this research in relation to Torop’s account of ‘total translation’ understood according to Ruthrof and Johnson’s account of the interrelation between body, mind and environment by way of metaphorical transformation.

I understand the progress of this research as a physical articulation of metaphor: the physical reform of one thing, in this instance the page, in terms of another, in this instance a tree, as contributing to and resulting from, a corresponding conceptual reconfiguration.

According to Tim Ingold ‘there can be no history of the line that is not also about the changing relations between lines and surfaces […] these relations and their transformations’ (2007:39). Any account of writing, as an instance of line formation, is correspondingly an account of the particular interface between line and surface: their relations and mutual transformations. Lichen is a species of organism that is epiphytic rather than parasitic; it grows on or in other organisms without impairing the functioning of this other organism. Lichen is the result of a symbiotic relationship between fungus and alga. There is a species of lichen that grows prolifically over the bark of the apple tree.

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34 Kalevi Kull is a Professor of Biosemiotics, and a colleague of Peeter Torop, in the Department of Semiotics at the University of Tartu in Estonia.
with which I have been working, called *Graphis* (Nimis et al. 2009). The variants specific to this tree are *Graphis scripta* and *Graphis elegans*. *Graphis scripta* is commonly known as ‘handwriting lichen’ presumably a registry of its resemblance to the black print of letters on white paper, although, to me, the tangle of black marks look more like a mess of chromosomes than they do script (but then chromosomes are also compared to letter forms) (2009:31-32). Both *Graphis scripta* and *Graphis elegans* are comprised of a ‘pale cream to whitishgrey’ thallus (‘thallus usually names the entire body of a multicellular non-moving organism in which there is no organization of the tissues into organs’) and ‘long, slit-like, black fruits with lip-like raised margins’ (in the case of *Graphis scripta*) or long, black ‘fruits that are longitudinally furrowed’ (in the case of *Graphis elegans*) (2009:32).

![Fig. 12 Closeup of *Graphis scripta* on Tremough Apple Tree (31/05/11)](image)

Ingold’s brief taxonomy of the line (self-admittedly incomplete), as I have noted in my discussion of the human, categorises lines in terms of threads, traces, ‘cuts, cracks or creases’ (44) and ghostly lines. The fruits of *Graphis scripta* and *Graphis elegans* are neither additive nor reductive traces on the body of the thallus. They are not threads, since they are part of the lichen ‘surface’ itself, and they are not cuts, cracks or creases either. Rather the lichen produces (they are self-additive perhaps) these black protrusions, these wrinkle, out of itself. The (ghostly) impression this relationship between line and surface leaves in my mind, is of a writing that emerges out of (as a result and in support of) the paper: the paper exists because of the writing and the writing exists because of the paper. The question that emerged as a result of this impression was how might the page be reformed so that rather than being parasitic on a tree, it might be reconceived as epiphytic, or better still, symbiotic? What form of writing would support this tree both as line and surface?
One of my earliest attempts to think through the relationship between tree, page and writing, developed during the initial (and more general) phase of this research at Dartington College of Arts in Devon (09/09-07/10), took the form of a series of photographs of, what I considered to be, a branch-like scrawl in a page of mist or snow.

Both mist and snow affect our perceptual encounter with the tree, altering its perceivable outline. The tree affects the way the snow falls or the mist gathers and the mist, or snow, affects the way the tree appears. Both mist and snow, the way they fall, the way they have fallen, through the function of metaphor, affect our perception of the page, and the way we experience the page affects our perception of mist and snow. According to this reading, the page, like the mist or the snow, threatens to obliterate our perception of the tree. By insisting on this comparison between page and snow or mist I aimed to reconceive the page. Falling mist, or snow, is not bounded or flat, as the page is. Falling snow and mist are elements you can walk through; elements that both tree and human body can usually survive intact. But it is not just that these elements affect our perception of the tree, it is also that these elements have helped to shape the tree, as in the case of the thallus with regards to the fruit of the lichen: the growth of the branch is a result of the interface between tree and weather resistance. The scrawl of the branch approaches the act of signature: the sign of an individual marking their particular existence in an act of marking a page. Every signature is different, not just from person to person but from moment to moment even when performed by the same person. That person has changed and so too have their circumstances. This conspires to produce a new signature every time, which nonetheless may well be recognisable as the mark of that (same) person. So it is here in the case of this branch and its growth in relation to the air within which it grows. A branch forms according to the assistance and resistance of the environment in which it grows. A
branch grows in girth and in length, growing out and along with every year of life. A signature scrawl is, likewise, formed according to the assistance and resistance of materials and their use by the person making this mark. This mark is usually understood as that made by a human hand in relationship with, for example, pen and paper. The signature marks the particularities of this hand movement in relation to this pen and this paper, in particular. But this signature has been practised in many different scenarios, with many pens and pieces of paper, among other things. These experiences are retained in the mind of the maker. Every branch is particular, but this act of branching repeats throughout the tree. Each branch manifests its relation to its environment, signing its particular existence as a relation with this environment, so that every branch is a record of tree and of the environment that enables and impedes it.

The similarity between these branches and a scrawling signature is reinforced by transforming the environment of air and branch into that of ink and page. This is achieved in the form of photographic print. Once transformed into paper and ink, as a photograph, the branch as scrawl on page is bounded, is framed, in a way that it is not (or not so obviously) when experienced live, as a branch on a tree. The framing is different. The edge still exists, as a boundary, in the framing of attention, but it is less tangible, less fixed. This act of framing is an act of environment: the frame affects the experience. ‘in mist’ was the result of an effort to think through the relationship between the branch and its formative elements, in terms of page, and the relationship between tree and print as writing.

In the first issue of *ecopoetics*, Jonathan Skinner includes his arrangement of Julie Patton’s ‘Slug Art’ (2001:86-90). Patton is similarly interested in the relationship between human
writing and the marking of more-than-human organisms, in this case a slug. In ‘Slug Art’ the words are arranged in the spaces in the leaf that the slug has (apparently) eaten away. It is the absence of leaf that provides the space for the words of the (human) slug: it is in the absence of leaf that the slug leaves its mark as ‘burrowed text’ (86). This act of writing is a decimation of environment. This act of marking is a ‘perfor mance’ (87). The body of the text, following the body of the slug navigates ‘the space in between’ (87) the leaf. Here the mark of the slug’s appetite in relation to the leaf is not enough to speak itself, it must be spoken, and signed, for ‘-signed, / June, buggy’ (89). In ‘Thoughts on Things: Poetics of a Third Landscape’ Skinner considers Patton’s ‘Slug Art’ as an example of a third landscape, as an ‘in-between space’, an ‘interstitial zone, found everywhere life is found and, indeed, permitting further life’ (Skinner in Iijima, 2010:45-46):

I call it a cyber text in Donna Haraway’s sense of machine-animal-human hybrid, not as a computer based writing, but in reference to a scanner, and Photoshop and QuarkXPress running on a Macintosh computer, helping me to align Patton’s marks with slug’s tracery […] Between the petals of the rose of the world move invertebrates; just as the word ‘slug’ itself vibrates, in Patton’s writing, between the registers of garden, print shop, and street. (44)

Skinner’s account of the interwovenness of machine-animal-human, after Haraway35, resonates with Morton’s conception of the mesh (2009b), especially in his discussion of the third and fourth implications of the ‘interdependence theorem’, where ‘(3) Drawing distinctions between life and non-life is strictly impossible, yet unavoidable’ (1.16/6.40) and ‘(4) Differentiating between one species and another is never absolute’ (3.13/6.40), when he talks of the ‘living’ relation between human and computer viruses (2.00-2.43/6.40). However, the account of this weave given by ‘Slug Art’ is more human and machine than it is anything else. The body of the leaf is sacrificed in order for the body of the page and the written word to signify. The slug’s leaf ‘consumption’ (89) reveals the page as backdrop / overlay; the page is the system within which the leaf signifies. The leaf is given linguistic significance by the page and it is through the destruction of the leaf that the words of the human (on the page) appear. The significance of the page and of human

35 Donna Haraway is perhaps most well known for her posthumanist feminist theories, of which ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ (1991) is a prime example. However her biological research has included several accounts of metaphor and its role within biology. This work links her to the project of biosemiotics, although this is not a connection she has explicitly developed herself.
writing entails the destruction of the leaf. The parallel between human and slug mark-making, as writing, suggests that perhaps human literacy is no more (or less) harmful than the appetite of a slug.

If the written word, as mark, is understood as an expression of human authorship within the environment of the (usually blank) page, then the page, reflects an understanding of environment as (very little more than) a vehicle for human expression. The significance of a page is greatly increased once written (on). The poetic use of the page as a component of poetic expression troubles the significance between word and page, human articulation and its environment. The page, as environment of human articulation in writing, figures as yet another human articulation of environment: the boundaries of the human expand. The destruction of the page, in a way comparable to the destruction of the leaf in ‘Slug Art, when the page is cut into, burnt or otherwise physically compromised, as in iterations of Tom Phillips A Humument (1975:228), affects the human potential to signify. The leaf feeds the slug as the page feeds the human capacity for literary signification. The slug destroys the leaf to feed itself. The human destroys the tree to make the page to feed itself. Destroying the page threatens verbal significance. When holes are cut into the page you are able to see the world beyond; the environment of the page takes the place of the word: the page, in its partial absence, becomes a site for other-than-human significance.

John Gibbens’ Underscore (2008) is an interesting text to compare to ‘Slug Art’. Pages of this text are comprised of colour photocopies of leaves laid over the printed page, affecting the potential of human writing to signify according to the syntactical formations of which it was ‘originally’ composed. The leaf lines of the page challenge the lines of the printed letters as a form of (related) material significance, vying for semantic dominance. This sense of competition between human and plant agency as played out in the relation between written word, page and leaf is undermined, however, when examined in closer detail. The leaves have been stuck to another (coloured) page, in which holes have been cut, and laid over the written page. The leaves have been placed and fixed on this other page: human authorship is still the dominant agency at play. The leaves continue to give an ‘other’ significance to the text but this other significance is organised by Gibbens. My aim, as my references to ‘in mist’ and the branch scrawls in mist and snow demonstrate, was to develop a way in which the significance of the tree could signify on a par with this human writing; to develop a means of writing that was co-authored by human and tree.
Jeff Hilson includes copies of Gibbens’ leaf compositions, from *Underscore*, in *The Reality Street Book of Sonnets* (2008: 249-251). Here too, Hilson includes part of David Miller’s *Untitled (Visual Sonnet Sequence)* (2008:194-195) a series of texts composed of fourteen brush stroke lines on each page. Each sonnet is a physical registry, or trace, of the various interaction of ink, brush, hand (and by extension body) and page. I began comparing photographs (Figures 17 & 18) of tree branches stretching between the margins of the trunks with visual poems such as Miller’s.

![Fig. 17 tree poem (in mist)](image1) ![Fig. 18 tree poem (in snow)](image2)

Miller’s body is registered in the gestural quality of his painted brush strokes. The photograph of the tree registers the branches as similarly gestural. The difference here is that the lines have not been formed as a result of the branches’ interaction with the page, the photograph is not direct a trace, in that sense, of the tree’s interface with the page, and therefore, it might be claimed, this is not a tree writing. The ink trace of tree is produced through a combination of light effect on paper. The work is the result of an organised and deliberate human framing, that, to return to Sumner’s phrase, offers no scope for the tree to expand (1999:83). The tree is a passive rather than an active influence in the production of this text. Contrastingly, Tim Knowles’ *Tree Drawings* (2005-2007) were ‘produced using drawing implements attached to the tips of tree branches, the wind’s effects on the tree, recorded on paper. Like signatures each drawing reveals the different qualities and characteristics of each tree’ (2007). These ‘drawings’ more closely resemble the mark-making process of David Miller’s *Untitled (Visual Sonnet Sequence)*. The different physiology of each tree, its relation to the wind, pens and paper is recorded over a certain
period of time. These traces are writing in the same sense as Miller’s *Untitled (Visual Sonnet Sequence)*. In contrast to the photographs I composed, Knowle’s pieces are the result of the direct influence, of a tree, as mark-maker, in relation to the page.

The question generated by these works (those of Knowles and Miller) is, if these are writings, what is their significance to the reader? My answer returns me to Mark Johnson’s account of the overlap between sensorimotor processing and its relation to abstract thought. As I have established, in the section of this thesis entitled ‘Framing’, there is a parallel processing that occurs within the brain when sensorimotor activity is carried out and when abstract thought is performed: both activities take place within the same areas of the brain, but the level of activity that occurs in abstract thought is a reduction of that generated by sensorimotor performance. Johnson’s use of Rohrer’s

Tim Rohrer’s studies on the neural foundation of conceptual metaphor present suggestive neuroscientific evidence that appear to corroborate Mark Johnson’s claims. However, as has been previously noted of related research, these findings are, so far, inconclusive.

fMRI visuals (2001) demonstrates the extent to which abstract thought uses the same areas as sensorimotor performance. These pictures illustrate how thought ghosts sensorimotor activity. These results are used by Johnson to support his account of the intermodal function of metaphor: to say something is painterly, or to see something as painterly, stimulates the same areas of the brain as are activated by the activity of painting. Abstract understanding thus returns us to sensorimotor experience: we understand these words through our body. I have held a paintbrush in my hand and have dipped it in ink and / or paint and made lines with it across paper. The expression of these lines that I leave on paper is related to the activity of making while not being reducible to it; the trace outlasts the action. These lines present a graphic expression of this interaction, a trace of the continuous process now terminated. What we read, or re-live in a visual appreciation of these marks, is an understanding of how the ink, brush, hand and page interact, of how they were performed and how we might reperform them. This understanding of the relation between mark-making and sensorimotor experience invokes John Hall’s definition of ‘Performance Writing’ as ‘all word writing that finds its way into performance or, through words, provides the memory of performance for re-performance’ (*Thirteen Ways of Talking About Performance Writing*, 2007:33). The gestural quality these traces mark incites a physiological empathy: an imagination of what it might feel to make these lines, a ghosting of their production.
Alistair Noon’s *earance 6 (for mouth, throat and lips)* (in Cobbing, 1998) provides an interesting point of comparison. Noon defines his work according to ‘a continuum’ that runs from the predominantly visual emphasis of ‘scriptions’ that ‘use text or text-like signs as their material’ to the phonic emphasis of his ‘phonetic compositions’, which employ ‘both alphabetic and non-alphabetic signs to denote specific sound’ (1998: np). He acknowledges the performance potential of scriptions and the ‘visual impact’ that his phonic compositions might have, but notes that this is ‘not the primary intention’ (1998: np). Noon locates *earance 6 (for mouth, throat and lips)*, a text made up of eleven, variously textured, pencil lines (approximately 14.5 cm long and 0.5 cm high) that run horizontally across the page (with approx. 1 cm between each line) one beneath the other, as being ‘[s]omewhere in the middle of this continuum’:

the text has visual impact and is a basis for improvisation, within a fairly strict framework. I read the poem linearly: the lines on the page become sound-lines, breaks in the lines on the page are caesuras in the sound-lines. Shade can imply volume, dense pencil-squiggles rapid short sounds, longer pencil-lines extended sounds. Height of the pencil-lines in relation to the background can imply a deviation in pitch from the monotone which the straightness of the lines on the page seem to denote. An improvised reading of this text takes account of these factors without attempting a 1 to 1 relation of sign to sound – the text is an aid to performance rather than an object to be decoded. (1998: np)

Noon understands *earance 6 (for mouth, throat and lips)* as performative interaction between human body, pencil mark and page. The textual situation occurs at the point of intersection between page, line, ear, eye ‘mouth, throat and lips’. The human body organises these lines into sound, ‘reads’ them, in a mental or physical performance. The human body, and its relationship with its environment, extend the script of the page in performance. Accounts of reading as a performance of this type are complicated when it comes to reading the marks made by a tree, however. In *STONE TONES* (1974) Paula Claire notes, in a way that compares to Noon’s account, that, ‘During 1972, while interpreting pieces like Bob Cobbing’s *15 Shakespeare Kaku, Judith* and *Mary Rudolph’s Chromosomes*, I got used not only to improvising to deliberately ambiguous letter forms, but blobs, smudges and dashes amongst these letter patterns’ (1974). She goes on to explain how her performance of *STONE TONES* is, similarly, improvised in relation to the physical impression of stones, as a combination of black and white lines, dots and blobs, of
various size, on these pages. This method of performing writing presents one possible method of reading tree marks as text.

Another method is suggested by my earlier argument of the relationship between human and tree lines. In the section ‘Human’, I argued for the cognitive (after Maturana and Varela’s account of cognition) relation between human and other-than-human life forms that arises in relation to physical structural similarities. If imagination ghosts physical experience then human experience of ‘limbs’, as in for example the stretched arm reaching towards another body, might be recruited in order to approach an impression of branches, or tree ‘limbs’, stretching across to those of another tree (as pictured in Figures 17 & 18). Similarly, the experience of producing lines with pens on paper can be recruited, in combination with an experience of the movement of tree branches in the wind to approximate an understanding of how the lines of Knowles’ ‘Tree Drawings’ were produced. Thus a conceptual understanding of tree lines, and/or the marks made by trees, is continuous with a combination of embodied and environmental experience.

It is important to clarify, here, that this practice is not anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism sustains a belief in the human separation from environment that is incompatible with the argument, which infuses this thesis, of continuity between human and other-than-human organisms. Certainly it would be an error to reduce the whole to the functioning of any one part in any simple way, but it would be equally reductive to deny that the part can tell us nothing of the whole to which it contributes and by which it is informed. As N. Katherine Hayles notes, ‘[t]he body is the net result of thousands of years of sedimented evolutionary history, and it’s naïve to think that this history does not affect human behaviours at every level of thought and action’ (1999:184). The continuities of cognitive structuring that arises from continuities in physical structuring enable us to approach an understanding of things other than ourselves as a result of the fact that, to a certain extent, we too are other than ourselves. Thus, by way of metaphor, the transformation of one thing into another, in the form of both physical and conceptual evolution, human cultural growth, developing as integration with environment, constitutes environmental understanding.

However, a tree need not only be understood as performance when performed by the human ‘reader’. The tree itself is both reader and writer in relation to its environment, as I
suggested earlier in my reference to the growth of the tree branch as scrawl (Figures 13-16). Figures 13-16, Miller’s Untitled (Visual Sonnet Sequence) and Knowles’ ‘Tree Drawings’ are all considered as ‘the work’. What is different in Noon’s piece is that it is an aid or prompt for the work, a score rather than the work itself. The work, for Noon, is the performance of the mouth, throat and lips. The work is in the body. So too we might regard the tree as the work, as both performance and trace of performance; both mark-maker and page within the larger page, or context, of its surrounding environment. Of course, tree lines are not formed in the same way as pencil lines or ink brushed by hand on paper. To return to Ingold’s taxonomy, tree bark is lined with ‘cracks and creases’: ‘ruptures in the surfaces themselves’ (2007:44). Tree branches, roots, leaf veins are partly traces: ‘the trace is any enduring mark left in or on a solid surface by a continuous movement. Most traces are of one or other of two kinds: additive and reductive’ (43). But these traces form, in the case of tree branches, as a thread-like residue of cumulative cellular growth not through the more resistant surface of soil or earth (unlike roots) but in the less resistant medium of air. Tree branches are not quite threads though either: ‘A thread is a filament of some kind, which may be entangled with other threads or suspended between points in three-dimensional space’ (41). Tree branches are solid ‘filaments’ on a much grander scale than the filament of a spider web, for example. And, unlike the spider web, tree branches are not so much ‘suspended between points in three-dimensional space’ as they are protrusions into three dimensional space, supported by a trunk (another protruding line) that emerges as a transformation of solid surface (earth), gas (air) and liquid (water) into tree. The lines of the tree form as a collaboration between line (tree) and surface, or ‘page’ (environment). As Ingold notes, lines, as in the instance of trees, can also be understood as surfaces themselves (as in the cracks and creases of tree bark); a leaf too is largely constituted by its ‘thread-like’ network of veins.

Diana Lynn Thompson suggests the relationship between pine needles, as linear formations, and writing, in her arrangement of ‘thousands of pine needles pinned to the wall’ some of which seem to be frozen in mid descent towards ‘a large white bowl full of black ink’ below (Incunabula, 2001). Her sketchbook is filled with drawings of pairs of pine needles organised in a way that suggests script, reminiscent of the lichen Graphis scripta I mentioned earlier in this section. In my own development of this thinking I produced a series of texts made by arranging pine needles on the photocopier.
The photocopier produces page impressions of these needles according to how they are placed within the machine. These texts are page and ink expressions, or reactions, to the situation of the pine needles within this machine. The photocopier in some way reads, translates or transforms, one situation into another. Just as the photocopier ‘reads’ and ‘writes’ an impression of the pine needles so too the reader ‘reads’ and ‘writes’ these blobs and lines (the photocopier was a tool much used by Writers Forum poets) either actively or passively with both body and, as a result, her mind. This reference to the photocopier returns me to a consideration of the photograph (Figures 13-18) as a trace of a comparable transformation, and, circuitously, to Torop’s account of translation.

To recap, I argue, at the start of this section, that Torop’s account of translation as a process of draft-making, of the translation of one text into another, in any form (or combination) of textual, metatextual, intertextual, or extratextual translation, presents a physical expression of the intermodal character that Johnson argues, is definitive of human perception and the cognitive process of metaphor. Torop makes a step in the same direction. His reference to Robin Allott’s claim that ‘semiosis in some sense is perception’ (1994, *my emphasis*), leads him to talk of the ‘perceptual unity’ of human culture (2003:280). This reading of the perceptual nature of translation, or, according to my application of Johnson, metaphor, coincides with Maturana and Varela’s view of cognition:

\[
\ldots\text{ every act of knowing brings forth a world }\ldots\] All doing is knowing and all knowing is doing \[
\ldots\text{ bringing forth a world is the burning issue of knowledge }\ldots\] this bringing forth of a world manifests itself in *all* our actions and all our being \[
\ldots\]

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37 Robin Allott’s work focuses on the relationship between phenomenological philosophy, specifically that of Merleau-Ponty, and neuroscientific accounts of the embodiment of language.
there is no discontinuity between what is social and what is human and their biological roots. The phenomenon of knowing is all of one piece […] (1987:26-27)

The perceptual unity of human culture must therefore be ‘of one piece’ with nature by virtue of this infinite process of exchange between and within organisms and environments. Human perception is made up of, or supported by, the ‘distributed’ perceptual exchange between media that Torop dubs the ‘infinite process of total translation’ (2003: 271) i.e. culture. But this translation process does not stop, and cannot be stopped, at the margins of what is considered human culture (if these are even clearly discernable). This process of exchange and translation, of metaphor, and metamorphosis, by virtue of which we incorporate other-than-human entities, and they us, and the accompanying corporeal (and conceptual arising out of this) knowledge of materials other than our own, is one that occurs between all materials; we are of it rather than it being of us. Thus, the suggestion runs, every individual is engaged in a continuous process of textual, metatextual, intertextual and extratextual translation in their absorbed metaphorical processing of the material that constitutes their world. The photocopying machine inks a translation of a situation onto paper forming a text in a way that is comparable to the perceptual processing of the human individual transcribing the world. The page that writes this human processing is comparable to, and in some sense is (as it is ‘of’), the world.

My aim, in developing a reading and writing with a tree was to develop a writing where both line and page were expressive of tree, so that there was no prioritising of one line (of the human line) over the other (the tree line), or surface. So far I have documented my research into the relation between human and tree mark-making and surfacing, more generally. In what follows I will discuss the verbal dimension of this research into human and tree line and surface interaction. To return to my consideration of ‘in mist’, earlier in this section, my concern was to combine the mark-making and / or surfacing of a tree with the syntactic composition of human language to create a hybrid composition that was at once, and more immediately expressive of the relation between, both tree and human in language.

I began to make headway in this pursuit at the very beginning of 2011. This period of research is covered by the ‘through skoulding log’. This section of the research stems from an automatic writing exercise in which I read texts such as Alice Oswald’s ‘Pruning in
I had become interested in the place of reading and how this affected the poem. It was easier to become absorbed in the poem as read inside, but once it was read, or listened to, in an outdoor environment related to the one described in the poem I often felt the experience of that environment jarred with the poem, or vice versa. I was interested by this reaction, adhering to Johnson’s view of the cognitive significance of emotion (2007:65), and determined to develop a form of writing that did not present this jarring sensation in my work with this tree.

I began writing responses to these readings, most notably in the case of Skoulding’s ‘Through Trees’ (see ‘through skoulding log’). I felt that this form of automatic writing in response to another poem in the environment of this tree was a way of writing through both tree environment and poem. On the back cover of eye-blink (2010b) John Cayley praises Harry Gilonis’ work as a translator, as someone who reads and writes through others:

```
knowing them       knowing ( their ) words
traces after       they have / we have left
proof that we may read
best by writing through others
```

There is a sense, in Cayley’s piece, that writing through someone else’s words becomes a meditation upon and / or a focussed extension of these words. The translations published in eye-blink (2010b) are ‘guaranteed faithless re-writings, re-workings of 64 poems by eight major poets of the Chinese T’ang dynasty (618-907 AD)’ (back cover). Translation here is overtly transformative. Cayley’s words suggest also that perhaps we write best when writing through others. This was certainly my hope; that through immersion, in writing through the words of Skoulding in the environment of this tree, my writing would emerge shot through with traces of both Skoulding’s words and a deeper sense of tree. However, I was not only interested in the development of the sense of the poem on a verbal scale. I was keen to develop a method of writing that physically referenced, that physically contained, or evidenced, fragments of both tree and (for example, Skoulding’s) poem.

Gilonis’ Reading Hölderlin on Orkney provides a useful reference as the result of a similar enterprise. Gilonis emphasises that his engagement with Hoy was not a ‘proper’
engagement, by which I understand that it was not an in depth or particularly detailed engagement, he then qualifies this assertion with the following acknowledgement:

That said, I hope I’ve been honest in reporting what I saw; and in my enthusiasm. I was in fact in a very quasi-Objectivist, truth-to-materials mood when writing/drafting the poem; walking west of Moor Fea near the ‘Burn of Light’ that drains the Loch of Stourdale south near Flingi Geo, I wrote a note about the coldness of the water. Given that it was November on Hoy, I was, I think, right to infer this; but honesty would not permit of that. So I clambered half a kilometre off my route and sacrificed, unnecessarily, a good 100 metres of altitude; and went and dipped my fingers in the burn.

It was cold. (2010a: back cover)

Gilonis’ text employs a typological referencing system to distinguish between the words of others and his own:

Words and phrases in **boldface** are derived from Hölderlin. Other nods go to Theodor Adorno for the essay on parataxis and Hölderlin’s late poetry; to Ian Hamilton Finlay for Orkney Lyrics; to the singing of Talith MacKenzie, once of Mouth Music, and to Hugh Marwick’s magisterial The Orkney Norn (qv for tullimentan – ‘scintillating, twinkling’ and geo – ‘a narrow gully with the sea at its bottom’). (2010a: inside cover)

Gilonis marks words used taken from Richard Seiburth’s ‘wonderful Princeton paperback of Hölderlin’s *Hymns and Fragments*’ in **bold**, and references Ian Hamilton Finlay, Talith MacKenzie and Hugh Marwick in *italics*. Adorno’s influence is evidenced in the syntactic arrangement, but there is no obvious referencing system that evidences Hoy’s presence / influence in the poem (in excess of the standard referential capacity of language). What form of referencing system might I employ in my own work that would register the presence / influence of the tree in a physical way within the poem? My initial answer was to leave these texts on the tree or in the tree’s immediate vicinity. On the 13th January 2011, I placed one text on the tree (Figure 22) and one text on the grass beneath (Figure 23). On the 6th January 2011 I had placed an automatic writing in the bucket that I had placed beneath the tree in which to collect rainwater, tree matter and apples (Figure 24), by the 13th Jan it had already begun to significantly decompose (or ‘reform’): this is what I hoped for all of the texts. I documented the transformation of each of these texts in relation to their respective environments. The breakdown of the texts in the **grass** and in
the bucket was quite rapid. The fragmentation of the text on the tree involved more authorship on my part than the fragmentation of these other texts.

On 14th January 2011 I decided that the text on the tree looked too much like a billboard and that I would therefore ‘assist’ its environmental decomposition by tearing it into fragments. The paper was soaked through with rain and so it tore easily along its weaknesses more than being guided by me, and certainly with no conscious thought as to how the resultant text would read (see ‘through skoulding log’, entry for 14th January 2011). I recorded a reading of the resultant text and was happy that the audio recording registered, in the gaps and pauses, the influence of the body of the tree within the syntactic arrangement of the resulting (audio) text. Once typed out, however, the influence of the tree on the syntactic arrangement is manifested, once again, by the blank space of the page. The photographs presented the tree’s body as visual (ink) text. But both of these transcriptions / transformations were ultimately unsatisfactory, as I saw both as being more expressive of other-than-tree materials than they were of tree.

I developed this fragmentation technique with the writings of other poets and thus a similar typographical referencing system emerged to that used by Gilonis: every text had a different typeface. The text fragments used in this exercise were Harry Gilonis’ eye-blink (2010a) and Reading Hölderlin on Orkney (2010), Alice Oswald’s The Thing in the Gap-Stone Stile (2007), Maggie O’Sullivan’s Body of Work (2006) and Sarah Riggs’ chain of miniscule decisions in the form of a feeling (2007). My own textual fragments were handwritten. Unlike the tearing of my own text the fragmentation of Gilonis’, Oswald’s, Riggs’ and O’Sullivan’s work was deliberate. I chose the fragments from these works that best ‘spoke’ to me of my experience in this environment. This typological referencing
system is of course ‘invisible’ in the audio recorded readings of these fragments. Both tree presence and words of other poets are spoken in my own voice. Although the presence of the tree is ghosted in the sound of the wind. So too the words of selves other than my own are sounded by me without sounding as my own. But the difference between my own and other writers’ words was becoming harder and harder to distinguish. This process of reading and writing through the fragmentation of other texts over the body of this tree and the resultant audio recordings and printed page texts provides an instance of what Torop calls ‘text processuality’ (2003:280). This process was an endless draft-making with no sense of ‘final’ text. Or if there were final texts these were offshoots or sidelines to the main impulsion of the project. My own writing style was developing, as a result of this reading and writing through others (human and other-than-human) in both material and syntactic terms. The emergent compositional process manifests the distributed and emergent ontology of tree, human, page, word and resultant (as amalgam of all of these) text. But the dominance of the page in this amalgam was persistent.

Early on in the progress of this research I was producing texts that were overtly concerned with the presence of human and other-than-human bodies in the form of a written text. I understood the human body as that which binds us firmly to the animal kingdom and the other-than-human world, so often identified as ‘nature’. I was trying to devise a way that a tree, as emblematic of this form of ‘nature’, might signify more prominently in the text making process but I was also interested in the significance of ‘bodies’ more generally, be these human or other-than-human. I wanted to develop a form of writing in which corporeality, the stuff, the matter, of our existence could be celebrated as a significant component of language, as the research of both Ruthrof (2000; 2003) and Johnson (2007) affirm: the significance of matter, the meaning of the body (whether human or otherwise), is fundamental.
I played around with the shadows my body cast, on trees, grass and snow (Figures 26-28). Shadow is the negative imprint of a body registered in its surroundings as a discontinuity of (sun) light reflected on a surface: a shadow is a light cut out. The shadow is the cumulative result of the relation between body, light and surface, or environment. This cumulative effect was one that I was aiming to achieve in writing. I was principally concerned with presenting the affect of the tree in a material way within the poem, but this desire was the result of a more general concern with the disenfranchisement of the body in writing. In the title of this research there is an absent, but implied, person, who reads and writes with a tree. The embodied presence of this person within writing is as much a concern as the material presence of the tree. It was for this reason that I included a fragment of Maggie O’Sullivan’s poem ‘(for my mother)’: ‘(like noBODY at all)’ (2006:87/88) in the tree text.

This phrase appears twice, once at the bottom of the first page and once at the top of the second page of the poem in the second section, ‘More Incomplete’, of Maggie O’Sullivan’s *A Natural History in Three Parts* collected in *Body Of Work* (2006).
capitalisation draws attention to the presence of this word ‘BODY’ even as its signifying capacity is negated by the word within which it finds itself ‘noBODY’ and then again by its written manifestation, speaking of the absence of a BODY, who, despite ‘being covered in mouths’ (1999:79), according to Cixous, is absent in the language of the printed text. This woman’s body exists in a complicated amalgam of absent presence, where the written text invokes this body by way of reference that is also displacement. The body of the mother is thus dispossessed by a writing that declares the body’s inability to speak for itself, whilst mourning the semiotic absence of the mother’s body that is not incorporated in the page. In signalling that this body is not ‘like’ its written manifestation at all, the text speaks of its failure to represent that which it is not present, even as it maintains some effort of comparison. But it is not just the inability to signify bodily that is a problem within this text. The problem of signifying singularly is also an issue.

wish WE.
(could WE not)

(O’Sullivan, 2006:88)

These lines follow the second utterance of ‘(like noBODY at all)’. These lines gesture towards the immersion of the self in a group - ‘we’ - whilst also including a reference to the selves who do not speak this ‘we’, since ‘we’ is so often spoken by an individual, speaking on behalf of a group. Here, for example, as readers, we articulate a ‘we’ that was not ours to begin with. There is a mourning of the dissolution of the self amidst a mass of others, among which it is a part of ‘we’, and a mourning of the inability of whichever self speaks to articulate, to present or presence, these others. What is wished for is both to be with and among – wish WE – and yet not to be articulated as such – (could WE not).

There is no question mark after the second phrase but the phrasing suggests the possibility of a question – could we not? The desire is ambivalent: appearing to wish to be part of this accumulation of bodies whilst also wishing to signify bodily, with all the accompanying implications of physical specificity. This phrase is followed by the suggestion, through the relation of underlined words that ‘WE/AFTER DARK…can’:

WE
AFTER DARK
floor sag Day/Bet Rose can tenderness, can turn, can. (88)

The dark can diminish the sense of separation that isolates the self so that a mother, a female body, can become ‘Mammal without end.’ (88), both exalting in and troubled by
this endlessness, rounded up, punctuated as it is, by a full stop. So this poem expresses the distributed emergence of a woman’s body within and among the bodies of those that surround her, these other human and more-than-human bodies that are part of her and of which she is a part. And yet all this emergent distribution is expressed in a form that does not reflect, that does not overtly manifest this amalgam of human and other-than-human bodies. The materiality of this amalgam is silenced by the page: ‘The Art of Silence.’ (88). This final phrase of O’Sullivan’s reminds us that silence is an art form, and as such it is expressive. So too the blank page is expressive: the page speaks, as the body does, the trouble is whether or not this language is recognised, heard, or understood.

O’Sullivan’s phrasing acknowledges the complexity of the relation between presence and authorship, existing as we do by virtue of a variety of physical and conceptual systems that extend before and beyond us, that have formed us, that we take part in and contribute to, individually and collectively, but within which your particular presence and ability to speak for yourself, by way of and among others, is always compromised: ‘you’ are always constructed, or presumed, in advance, and yet called to respond, because not yet known. I want to return to the material presence of both tree and human bodies (among others) in the page by way of a continued discussion of the distribution and emergence of these bodies at a syntagmatic level of writing. In what follows I discuss Zoë Skoulding’s ‘Through Trees’ in relation to a fragment from Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own, and Alec Finlay’s Mesostic Herbarium.

[…] a shadow seemed to lie across the page. It was a straight dark bar, a shadow shaped something like the letter ‘I’. One began dodging this way and that to catch a glimpse of the landscape behind it. Whether that was indeed a tree or a woman walking […] . (Woolf, 1993:90)

When I first came across Zoë Skoulding’s ‘Through Trees’ sequence I understood this ‘through’ to mean ‘by way of’ trees. I believed the title to express something about the composition of the poem. I understood each column of words as a shadow of a tree. Each trunk was made up of a column of words expressing how the tree, as a poem, was forged from a complex combination of elements containing both so much more and so much less than a tree. These expectations express more of what I understood these dark bars to suggest – the letter ‘I’, a tree trunk, a distant human figure – than they do with a reading of Skoulding’s poem. I reference this in order to declare some of the ground from which my reading of this sequence grows. When I spoke to Skoulding about her sequence (16th
February, 2012), she told me how its composition had been influenced by walking through trees. Immediately I realised that this ‘through’ was not the ‘through’ that I had initially understood; it was ‘through’ as in ‘between’. This sequence had grown from a very different starting point in her conception, to the one from which it had grown in mine. This was therefore a series of poems primarily about the human I moving between or through trees. It is about trees moving between or through (within) the human self more than it is about the formation of this poem by way of trees (although the two senses are linked). This made a lot more sense. I had been puzzled that trees seemed so peripheral in a sequence that seemed to announce itself as being made up of trees. The poem was much more about the extent to which moving through trees affects the human and the way in which they infiltrate her thoughts, interrupting or igniting the self as stockpile of past and present experience. These columns of words are less expressive of the trunks of trees than they are of the space between trees – a human experience – the experience of being ‘between’ – a place where we all walk; where the artist utters.

Each bar of words is a snapshot of this ‘between tree’ space, as inhabited by the poet, fixed into a word sequence on the page. But, as expressions of the poet’s journey between, or through trees, they are also expressive of the environment that lies between these trees whether the poet is there or not. Indeed this sequence habitually blurs the boundaries between entities so that in the opening few lines –

circled by gull
shrieks slicks of
mud sucking at
feet banded sky

- it is unclear who or what is ‘circled by gull / shrieks slicks of / mud’ or ‘feet banded sky’ (2004:31). The effect is dizzying. There is no still point within which the reader might orient themselves, in an effort to understand, or identify with the landscape being described. The sky is at your feet, in slicks of mud. I presume the opening verb to reference the ‘I’ of the poem, with whom I am ready to inhabit (or co-habit) for the length of my reading. But there is no ‘I’ in this sequence, or no ‘I’ declared, other than the bars of words that speak of both themselves, and me, as ‘you’. The reader is not sure who, where, or what she is, until ‘black trees’ emerge in the fifth line:
circled by gull
shrieks slicks of
mud sucking at
feet banded sky
black trees this

These black trees suggest a stable point about which all else spins and sucks. We are black trees circled by gull shrieks and slicks of mud that suck at our feet, feet that seem also to be in the sky with the trees. Or we are ‘this’, the indeterminacy sustained by the tree’s environment, as by the tree, and the poet, and its ambivalent function as adjective, adverb and / or pronoun. A more personal point of contact is proffered in line 9, when we are addressed as ‘you’. This address is a call to identity. This ‘you’ with its refracted sense of ‘I’, and its impersonality (like nobody at all), steps closer.

Apostrophe, the mode of address that speaks to a ‘you’ that is never there, is both nostalgic and hopeful. It is a Janus-faced mode of address, speaking to a past, both present in and absent to the speaker, in the hope that it will somehow hear and in hearing persist, or prove its persistence in being spoken and / or heard. It hopes, in the future, to presence the past.

water jolts foot
steps closer you
have to go with
what’s coming

The present is a hazardous balance between a future that ‘steps closer’ to this ‘you’ whose foot ‘jolts’ in the balance between the sucking mud of just a few moments ago and ‘what’s coming’. There are no hand rails here, no punctuation other than the apostrophe – a mark to register absence and belonging – that, in telling us more about relation than identity, expresses an attachment – a belonging – to absence. Absence belongs in the very heart of ‘you’, as the spaces within each dark bar imply. This absence allows sense to emerge. It is in this space ‘between’ that relation is established. But this is also the place where things fall apart.

Each poem in Skoulding’s sequence, each ‘straight dark bar, a shadow shaped something like the letter ‘I’ that lies across the page, repeating itself (as a narrow thirty line structure, each line containing between 12 and 16 characters, excluding spaces, making up between two and four words per line) as a stable typological construct whilst maintaining a
linguistic and syntactical diversity, leaves the reader with the reverse impression of Woolf’s observation, quoted at the start of this discussion. Rather than attempting to dodge the overwhelming determinacy of these columns in order ‘to catch a glimpse of the landscape behind it’ I regard these ‘I’s as landscapes in which I, as a reader and a ‘you’, am willingly involved as authorial agency. Understanding of the situation is not to be found outside or behind an ‘I’ that remains unchanged but within the landscape of each dark bar. Each dark bar is made up of a language laced with reference to both you and I, where neither is ‘literally’ bound to their exact letter arrangements but whose sense exceeds the literal, by way of metaphor, to return to Johnson. Each I is a registry of the landscape it has walked through; each I has become ‘another through/such trees’. This fragment announces the metaphorical exchange intrinsic to the confluence of organisms and environments by which we are all informed. Each of these poems, each straight dark bar is shot through with traces of trees, as paper poem, as linguistic registry of exchange with trees, as articulated by a human that shares DNA in common with the trees she speaks of. Thus we find, in each of these straight, dark bars, both trees and women walking.

Syntactically this poem registers the interchange between organisms that I have discussed in more detail in the section ‘Human’. It offers little assistance, however, as to how to construct a text that is, more obviously, a material amalgam of the bodies of both tree and human in text. Alec Finlay’s work moves more obviously in this direction.

Finlay’s work with the Yorkshire Sculpture Park (documented in Avant-Garde English Landscape, 2005 and on his website, 2010) plays with poetry forms that explicitly exceed the format of the page and / or book. He has held numerous renga days, held on a renga platform in the Yorkshire Sculpture Park, or elsewhere where participants compose a shared writing (2005b) made up of the lines of different contributors. No line is specifically attributed but all the names of the participants are referenced in some way as part of the work. I attended a renga day in the orchard of Cotehele, a National Trust property in Cornwall (April, 2010). On this occasion, the renga masters were Paul Conneally and John Hall. A video (Full Bloom Renga, 2010) was made of the reading of this renga in which each participant reads a verse. Although the compositional process of this renga was very much an exercise in writing between different (human) bodies in a specific environment there was little involvement of the materiality of these bodies or their environment within the various material compositions of the text.
The agenda of Finlay’s ‘proposal for a cornfield’ was much more materially ambitious. A field was ploughed and sewn with corn. This field was also sewn with poppy seeds arranged along the letter lines of ‘ALIEN YIELD’ (2005a: 54-55). The concept was that, as the corn and poppies grew, these words would be revealed, although how readable they would be from the ground was uncertain. Unfortunately the poppies did not grow as wished and the letters failed to emerge in the field: the more-than human text triumphed over the human text (2006; 2007). The project was then taken in a different direction; the corn was harvested and used to make bread (2005d) which bore the stamp of this failed poppy text.

Finlay’s Mesostic Herbarium was a less ambitious project but one that overtly included the material presence of the more-than human as part of the text. Mesostic Herbarium is a collection of mesostic poems written into the names of trees to which they were then attached in Yorkshire Sculpture Park (2003), as part of Propagator (2003-ongoing). Finlay’s project remodels the herbarium around the environment of the tree rather than subjugating the tree to fit with the indoor environment of the printed page, or book. The pages in this project are metal plaques. But the edge of the plaque is not clearly the edge of the poem. The tree is understood by Finlay to be part of the experience of the poem in the environmental overlap, or experiential coincidence of ‘you and the tree and the poem’ (2005c). In an auto interview with Davy Polmadie (a pseudonym of Alec Finlay), however, he states that these mesostics ‘don’t belong to a particular place, a clearing or view over the park’ they have a mobile existence.

Though it is good to ‘plant’ or fix the poems and give them a place to belong, when you read them in their particular corner of the landscape you take in the surroundings as a matter of course – the poem doesn’t need to comment on this. After all, you and the tree and the poem are there. (2005c)

These poems have a very varied existence, they exist online, in books and as plaques attached to trees in the Yorkshire Sculpture Park (although some of these have now been removed). Although the tree exists at the fringes of the mesostics in these works it is not materially integrated within the text and the compositional process has not been directly influenced by the trees in any way. The material composition of the text reflects Finlay’s statement that ‘I think sometimes we forget how little we're actually belonging to, aware of, or within things, places; we sometimes say that we're aware of this tree the poem is tied to, but actually we're listening to words in our mind, within a wood – does that make
sense?’ (2012). The distributed and emergent elements of this work are more to do with their verbal composition and their different media manifestations than they are to do with the material manifestation of human or more-than-human bodies as composite textual elements.

Finlay’s use of the mesostic is illustrative of this: ‘Pick a name and then grow your poem around it. The names [of these trees] make stems and the chosen letters their growing branches’ (2005). Finlay writes that these mesostics are ‘grown poems’; poems that are ‘bred on existing word-stock’:

```
Another
sPartan
Pips
Like
marblEs
```

(Finlay, 2003a; photograph by Morwen Gregor, 2003)

Each letter elicits the genesis of a new word, invoking words other than this tree: Sparta invokes the multiple ‘elsewhere’s of his father’s (Ian Hamilton Finlay) house and garden works in Scotland, the ancient time and place of Sparta, after which that Finlay home was named, and his father’s feud with the local council that inspired this name change. ‘APPLE’ provides the alphabetic building blocks to reference the complicated past from which Finlay’s work springs. As Finlay notes, these mesostics act like mini autobiographies (2005c). Gilonis’ work asks ‘what / might be pure / of origin?’ (2010: 1) and Finlay’s mesostic answers: nothing. Each name serves as a place-holder or marker for an entity, an identity, shot through with alterity. Pure presence is never an option, representation and imagination, abstraction and deviation are always part of what it is to exist. The mesostic breaks down words into their letter components in order to re-use them in the formation of other words, illustrating the emergent properties of language. The fixative function of a name is splintered by the emergence of new words from each ‘initial’ letter foundation.

It is important to note that this is not how the herbarium traditionally functions. *The Oxford Companion to the Garden*’s entry for ‘Herbarium’ states that ‘[o]ne of the most important aspects of the herbarium is to verify the identity of a plant. A herbarium specimen, with its accompanying data of provenance [origin], will serve to authenticate a plant’ (2006). A herbarium stores a sample of a plant along with a list of data, by which
other samples can be identified i.e. classified and attributed the same or another name: ‘The accurate naming of plants [...] is essential for their study’ (2006, my emphasis). And yet it is exactly this activity of naming that is troubled in Finlay’s splintering of the name as mesostic, as it is in Gilonis’ Reading Hölderlin on Orkney where ‘the bare stones / of language’ are ‘set wobbling / by the weight / of the imminent / moment’ and ‘names [are] like morning breezes’ haunted by their present absence ‘cooling / as the un-named lochan’s / slaty water […]’ (2010: V). So it is that Finlay’s work undoes the colonial drive to impose order and control on the more-than-human world in his Mesostic Herbarium.

In his essay entitled ‘Poetically Man Dwells’, published in Poetry, Language and Thought (2001), Heidegger asserts that ‘Poetry is what really lets us dwell. But through what do we obtain a dwelling place? Through building. Poetic creation, which lets us dwell, is a kind of building’ (2001:213). The tree’s name can be read as a trace of the human endeavour to build, to formulate or formalise our relationship with this tree, in language. In his late work Heidegger uses his favourite metaphor of the forest path to emphasize that his writings are ‘not works but paths’ (Wege nicht Werke) (in Moran, 2002:219). This emphasis on process is appropriate in this context. Finlay emphasises the generative aspect of his work over any ‘final’ manifestation as the Mesostic Herbarium’s full title, Propagator, makes clear. To propagate, Finlay writes, is ‘to publish or transmit, as books do, or ideas; to breed or multiply, as letters grow into words; to extend to a greater area, as the imagination can create a new map of a landscape’ (2005c). The Yorkshire Sculpture Park’s website sustains this emphasis, making it clear that the poems in this project are suggestions intended to activate the imagination and inspire readers to grow their own mesostics through these or other words, or names: ‘The poems are an invitation to the reader to compose their own’ (2012). Finlay’s mesostics offer a way in to the relationship between human and other-than-human organisms by way of writing. This form of writing confuses, extends, and diffuses the name and in doing so comments on the instability of the referential capacity of words in general. The mesostic disrupts the apparently stable, singularity of a name, commenting on the emergent and distributed referential properties of language (via the sharing of letters): no word is self-grounding, each is reliant upon the alphabetic matrix that supports and sustains the existence of every verbal articulation. The word thus emerges, as I have argued in ‘Framing’, as a placeholder, a marker, or trigger point for a schema of perceptual signification. In the mesostic the ‘economising grid’ (Ruthrof, 79) of language begins to breakdown. The mesostic thus presents a model of the
interweaving of significance, as a linguistic example of what Torop calls the ‘process of translation of texts (or fragments) into other texts’ (2003:271) that is constitutive of the ‘process of total translation’ that is culture. Human culture is generated as a result of the transformative relation between presence and representation. I do not want to overestimate the symbolic importance of the mesostic, however. This fracturing of words and the interplay between presence and imagination arises in an extension of the initial phases of the ‘through skoulding’ project in a text-making with plants and apple blossom, as I will now document.

‘Replay’ is an example of one of the final offshoots of the ‘through skoulding’ project where texts were generated through the reading of other’s writing in relation to the tree. ‘Replay’ resulted from the experience of listening back to the recordings (access via ‘though skoulding log’) I had made of reading through the written fragments lain over the tree and looking over the photographic texts that documented this practice. The choice of words and their arrangement express this transformative process of translation, or metamorphosis. This mutation across a range of media presents an external expression of the intermodal cognitive processing that is characteristic of metaphor. And yet the materiality of this text still did not include the physical signifying capacity of the tree. To remedy this I forced a selection of this and other poems onto the branches of the tree so that the branches of the tree physically ‘broke’ the page, protruding through the text and altering the readability of the writing. This was still not satisfactory, since I had been the principal agent of this composition. Gratifyingly, however, over the days that the pages remained, they began to fold and flop as a result of the rain. Their readability was once again altered but this time less as a result of my own agency; I had set up a material situation in which the tree’s environment had begun to signify in relation to my printed page.

38 The placeholder or marker function of the word is perhaps made most obvious in the form of the hyperlinks embedded within this document. These hyperlinks present a vital instance of the word’s function as placeholder or marker, through which the reader might access a perceptual schema or horizon of experience that cannot be reduced to the word as a discrete collection of letters. The hyperlinks of this thesis present points of similarity with the letters around which the mesostic poem develops. The hyperlinked document, much like the mesostic form, encourages a plurality of routes, or to return to Heidegger’s term, pathways, through the text. Thus, as I have noted in the preface, the structure of this thesis emulates the structure of the final page and tree installations, both indoor and outdoor, where the textual narrative emerges according to the particular route the reader takes.
These experiments broke open the syntactic structure of the words by reforming the page in a way that was comparable to the experiments of *Writers Forum* poets (e.g. (ed.) Cobbing, 1992). This was developed in a more-than-human direction as the environment progressively registered its authorship, affecting the readability of these texts. However, the breakdown of the page was re-established by the documentation of this event in the form of the photograph, even though the ink marks here marked the non-verbal bodies of more-than human organisms as part of the text. This was a step in the right direction but not a resolution. The photographs reified these events as pages, undermining the potential of the tree’s body to signify apart from print, and, by extension, undermining the wider perceptual capacity of the human body.

The same was unfortunately true of the blossom project. In this work I used fragments of a great number of texts (Clark, 2008; Oswald, 2006; Gilonis, 2010a, 2010b; Riggs, 2007; O’Sullivan, 2006; Black, Buckheit, Gardner, Goodwin, Presley, Riley in *Shearsman* 85 & 86; Skoulding, 2004). I placed the fragments between the blossom buds in the hope that as the buds opened the growth of the flower would produce new readings of these fragments not just through obscuring elements of the text but also through recontextualisation as the blossom grew, decayed, and developed into apples. Some of these fragments were released onto the ground as the buds loosened into flower; where they fell and how they decayed presented a sequence of environmental authorship.
Although the blossom and leaf growth affected the readability of the writing, a live reading filled in the blanks that were obscured by the tree, writing the tree out of the text. The problem I now faced was how to develop a way of writing in which the body of the tree continued to signify as part of the writing rather than as a temporary obfuscation. This came with the advent of the apples. Having tried writing into the flesh of an apple with pencil indoors and registering how the flesh of the apple responded to the writing impression by developing this marking, contributing to the marking of the writing as a responsive surface, I experimented with writing into apples on the tree. My thinking was that if I wrote into the apples at an early stage these lines would grow with the apple. This process was the most successful of these experiments so far: the incisions made by the tip of the pencil in the apple’s skin, exposing the flesh, scarred over and as the apple grew these scarlines changed: the marks I had made in the apple were altered and extended by each apple. In this final offshoot of the practice the poem is authored by the coincidence of both human and tree body, as both readers and writers. This ‘final’ articulation is one of apple tree as (page) environment. The evolution of this strand of the practice has been gradual, a practical account of this evolution is given in ‘Apple Frazz’.

On 23rd September 2010 I was at home (inside) sitting at my desk, and, as usual there were several apples in front of me (on my desk) brought inside from the tree. Earlier in the year I had tried writing on an ash branch that had been broken from a tree during a storm. I found what I learnt about the wood through inscribing it with a knife or writing on it with a pen much more interesting than the verbal articulation of the words I marked as a result of this process. This time, using a pencil, I wrote ‘apple’ on the apple. This was practice as research: I wrote in order to see what would happen. At first there was little reaction. The writing formed a colourless indent in the apple. Shortly however, the flesh of the apple bruised along the lines my pencil had indented. This bruising was both a physical reaction...
to my act of writing, a part of the process of writing formation, and the writing itself. This process of writing continued beyond my immediate involvement with (authorship of) its formation. As a performance this process of marking continued beyond my involvement. There was a sense in which the apple was performing this writing. Or, at least, that the interaction of my intention, action, tool and material constituted the performance of writing. The authorship of this writing was an expanded and expanding one. I repeated this action of writing on another apple. I wrote ‘writing’ and waited for it to begin to scar. As it began to scar I wrote ‘writing’ below the scar. There was a contrast between the state of this ‘writing’ and that of the ‘writing’ above – one reflected the past, one projected the future of this form of ‘writing’. I continued this practice down one side of the apple. The result was ‘the same word’ repeated seven times, one underneath the other. The identity of this word is refracted through the particular situation of every act: the list of ‘writing’ descends from darker to paler in colour. The physical manifestation of this word reflects its temporal-material interaction. This phenomenon is not apparent for long, however.

Two months later (November 2011) my photographic record shows how the bruising reflected the strength of my impression with the nib of the pencil more than the temporal relation of the act. It also shows the encroaching apple rot that threatens to affect these writings still further. By January 2011 the entire apple was consumed by this rot. The apple was a brown mess of jagged crinkles that rivalled the ‘writing’ indentations as a form of line/surface interaction. The marks I had contributed to making had been further affected by the interaction between apple and bacteria (in this case, monolinia fructigena). This whole experiment was evidence of the metonymic relation between the particularity of the individual act (and environment) of writing, and the relation of this (environmental) act to writing as a conceptual umbrella or ‘whole’, towards/within which every act of writing contributes and develops an abstract understanding, or concept. My understanding of what writing was and did was significantly affected by this experiment. This understanding of writing experience was not, however, the norm as far as my own experience of writing went. This particular, albeit significant, experience was not habitual. It was in fact exceptional, and as such was (and is) up against a lot of competition to alter, markedly and lastingly, my (or anyone else’s) broader conception of ‘writing’. The dominant understanding is determined by the dominant practice, hence the foundational importance of practice as research. Moreover it affirmed the act of writing, and the continuing existence (and temporal development) of that writing, as a fundamental activity.
or interactivity of environment(s): person, pencil, apple, bacteria (indoor air temperature, air quality, damp, gravity etc.). Every act (of writing) is environmental collaboration.

This writing would have turned out very differently had I been writing on an apple on a tree. Every act of writing on such an apple would have likewise been very different, according to the particular environmental interaction (of writing) with each apple - for example, the stage of development of each of these apples - as my experiments on apples on the tree later in 2011 were to show. These writing experiments became an exercise in material deconstruction. The environmental constitution of ‘noun’ and ‘verb’ as inscribed variously into apples on this tree, and documented over time, manifests the commonality between ‘noun’ and ‘verb’ as materially constituted process. The life of this writing, initiated once again by my pressing into the apple flesh with a pencil, is developed by the continuing environment (in excess of my immediate influence) of each apple on this tree. Each word is a particular interactive expression of the relationship between myself and this apple tree manifested in writing. The documentation of this practice evidences the metonymic aspect of all representation particularly well as it is sometimes (as in the case of ‘metaphor’ and / or ‘metonym’) impossible to document the full word in one picture. This simultaneously (and serendipitously) presents a metaphorical deconstruction of the divisive binary relation between presence and representation. Each photograph is unable to present the whole word ‘in one go’. So too are we unable to perceive the whole word in ‘one go’, but must move around the apple, navigating it according to our space-time perceptual limitations, remembering the bits we have just seen in order to form a perceptual/experiential ‘whole’ (or ‘full’) impression. Our perception is environmentally (brain / body and all that surrounds/influences it) contingent, and expressive of its interactive contingency (albeit largely unconsciously / pre-cognitively). This contingency of articulation is correspondingly expressed (and made conscious) in all efforts of representation; the intention to represent is always in competition with the materials to represent, or articulate, themselves (as presence). Communication is a manifold palimpsest of intentional and unintentional influence: forms of representation are as expressive of our own perceptual capacity, as they are of that which we intend to express, as they are of the materials with which we create (or contribute to) these expressions. This contributes to an account of the partial (dispersed, refracted, or - to re-use a term used by Robert Pepperell (2003) in his account of the posthuman - ‘fuzzy-edged’) nature of ‘human’ authorship and / or agency. These experiments register the transformative influence of environment within
upon writing and writing upon within environment, in this particular human / apple tree instance. In these instances human body and tree interact to produce an experience of ‘page’ where page is no longer a flat, bleached rectangle (an inappropriate mirroring of both human and tree body) but a field of experience defined by the material particularities of both tree and human body and their interaction within a material-perceptual ‘situation’ (Johnson, 2007:65) or horizon of experience, where felt qualities signify as an important feature of the structural composition of the text.
NATURE WRITING REFRAMED

In November 2011 I learned how to make paper, on the Tremough Campus of University College Falmouth with the assistance of Lucy Morley. My aims, as stated in the account noted in the PhD Practice Log, were

to develop my own knowledge, and break down preconceptions regarding the interaction between ‘natural’ (tree) and ‘cultural’ (materials associated with, or resultant of, human fabrication) materials and practices;

to practically integrate materials previously conceived of as being ideologically opposed;

to insist on the porosity of boundaries;

to use practice to overcome theoretical division;

to practise integration;

to alter knowledge structures, to understand and to develop knowledge through doing and making;

to evidence the theory that practical action (making and doing) are as much part of mind creation as cerebral action (thinking);

to show that practical and cerebral doing / making / thinking are subspecies, or subgenres, of each other rather than separate realms of behaviour;

to practise metaphor, metaform, metamorphosis;

to perform real imagining.

As such this process of paper-making (or page-making) became an important nodal point, a significant ‘framing’ stage, within the research as a whole. Here was an example of addressing the key themes of this research all at once, of attempting a physical reframing of the page so as to integrate the body of the tree in a significant way. What I discovered through this process of paper-making, was that I had in fact been engaged in the making and remaking, or forming and reforming, of ‘the page’ throughout the practical progress of this research.
Paper-making is in fact paper-reform. The page emerges out of the remnants of other pages, or systems (to return to Baecker, 2007), emphasising the point made earlier in the thesis (‘Human’) that no system is self-grounding, emerging through the distribution and integration of other elements. The activity of laying pages under the tree, or in the bucket (filling with rainwater), of piercing paper pages with the branches of the tree and observing their gradual metamorphosis in relation to their environment (tree, then hedge, box indoors and box beneath the tree), were all, in their different ways a form of ‘mulching’ the page: soaking the page in water and then fragmenting it, to varying degrees, so that these pages are reduced to (or returned to) a paper pulp from which the ‘new’ page will be (re)formed.

The audio readings / writings at the tree, as in ‘through skoulding’ for example, are an interesting element of the practice to consider in relation to this mulching process. As the body of both page and reader reform, or fragment, the words and bodies of others (mulching) so too the recording ‘solidifies’ them, as recordings that can be played and replayed as stable compositions; compositions that nonetheless contain within them the registry of other-than-human elements (wind, tree, water, Dictaphone and other technological traces). These compositions are then further ‘mulched’ in the listening back process that informs the construction of poems such as ‘replay’ or ‘pruning words’. Where the poem is not reformed in the form of digital or physically printed page it is, in most cases, reformed into page by way of the photograph: the impression of human and tree (and other other-than human) bodies is captured within the frame of the photograph, as they are in an alternative form, in the audio recordings.

In this paper-making I used ‘tree’ materials (leaves, apple mulch, grass, lichen, moss and rainwater gathered from on, or beneath, the apple tree in Tremough) of the same variety as those gathered and used in the more expanded method of page / tree reform and integration that I had been practising throughout the research so far. The printed pages, or starting text, were those of my confirmation of route document, another ‘final’ (read ‘temporary’) manifestation of idea mulch (in the form of quotation and reference) to take the form of printed word and paper page. I didn’t have a container big enough to make the paper, so I mixed the ‘tree’ elements in my bath, with its ghost of the human body, and made pages using the wire mesh and hand-made paper-making frames (re-used from old picture frames) to produce flat, rectangular, physical impressions of this human and other-than-human amalgam. Each page archives the relation of these elements at a certain point in time. Every page is a material ‘freeze-frame’ of this relation. These paper pages are
(mostly) not ‘alive’. At one point, as I was writing, the pile of pages beside me began to move, and an insect surfaced out of the topmost page, having eaten its way up through the pile, contained as it had been by the moss that was now drying out and becoming less of a happy home, I imagined. No doubt there are bacteria that continue to live within these sheets as well, their lives preserved within the structure of the page. Elements of this tree environment, combined with those of my home environment, bath and picture frames, conspire to produce a page structure expressive of their material intersection: human and tree ‘ecologies’ combine. I had chosen only to partially mulch the ‘original’ text of my confirmation of route submission so that certain words, or elements of words and phrases were still readable. But in this amalgam of tree and writing materials background and foreground are neutralised: grass blade covers word and word covers leaf, and all are ‘contained’ within (this particular expression of relation is made possible by) the framing structure of the page. The page becomes the place of intersection, a particular set of space-time relations, of human and other-than-human material. The page, as such, provides a symbol, or an objectification, of the conceptual processing, of thinking through words and trees and pages: a material ‘still-frame’ of the interweave of these elements in cognitive (in its expanded sense) experience. The tree matter figured is dead, and in this sense the paper making fails according to the aims of this research: a live presencing of tree as reading and writing environment. However, these elements still structure and inform the reading / writing experience and, in doing so, structure and support the formation of the self, as a form of distributed cognition. Rather than the human self imposing its own structure on that of the tree / natural / other-than-human world this composition is a result of their weight, form and mass in relation to that of the paper-making frame, the wire mesh, the bath tub, and rainwater. The authorship of every page is thus distributed. With this process in mind I want to return to the questions that introduced this research and address them one by one, in order to ‘spell out’ the reconfiguration, or reframing, of nature writing that this research constitutes.

How might a tree figure in / as writing without being ‘marginalised’ by the cultural document that is the page, by its ‘other’ bleached, rectangular form, as surface for human writing? The ‘final’ articulation of the practical research, discussed in the conclusion of ‘Metaphor, Metamor, Metamorphosis’, in the form of the live writing into the apples on the tree, provides a more obvious example of how this tree is, as I mentioned earlier in that section, integral within both line and surface of the literary composition, or perhaps, both
line and ‘field’, or ‘page’, provides a better description. The tree, as a structure, informs the formation of both the writing, as scarring and indentation, in the apples, the emerging lines that result from the growth of the apples, and the compositional structure of the reading / writing experience itself; the tree as a structure whose branches move (up or down) according to the wind and the weight of leaves and apples they bear and how this structure is approachable by way of the human body, all figure in the reading experience. The tree is author of the lines in its reaction to my mark-making in the apples. The tree, as I have earlier discussed, continues the authorship of these lines so that the words I made will not be the lines of the words readable (or not) in the apple by September. Working with this tree, the sense of the individual particularity of every material of a word in relation to this tree, has infused and informed my choice of words. The experiences I name, and reference, in human language within this work, are the result of my perceptual interaction, and research, with this tree. In this way the page is a term used to designate a reading structure, one form of which is the bleached rectangular sheet that normally bears the trace of words in black print. The page, as a conceptual structure informs and interrogates the tree as a structure of reading and writing composition, but is not reducible to the object that most obviously bears its name. The page in this way is reformed, or released, from narrow physical definition. Not only this but practical research of this ‘nature’ reveals the page to be as much a conceptual construct as it is a physical construct (as much ghost as it is ‘real’ presence) so that remodelling the physical page accompanies a conceptual reconfiguration, revealing the page as an emergent and distributed phenomena from the start. The page is ‘impure’, the tree is ‘impure’, the ‘human’ is impure; each of these entities is bound up with the existence of the other, this much has not changed. However, this research has demonstrated that it is possible to reform the balance of this relation so that a tree can become a more formative authorial agent in the compositional process of both reading and writing. Human growth (culture) marginalises, in that it others, the growth (culture) of other organisms, but so too may the growth of other organisms marginalise human culture. This research has demonstrated ways in which human and other-than-human organisms might be worked with in order to discover more about humans, other-than-humans, and their relationship, through the physical composition of a common text. It has demonstrated the ways in which this tree is already, to an extent, a repository of human culture, in a sense comparable to the trace of the tree in the human cultural document of the page. It has demonstrated that neither physical nor conceptual separation is possible, but that it is possible to affect the balance to include more, or less, of
(the affect or material presence of) any one element in this mixture, or what Timothy Morton would call, ‘mesh’. The tree, as that which is considered natural, thus regains its ability to mark the ‘surface’ of the page, as it is included in the page in this particular version of paper-making, or as it continues the human mark in the apple tree poem. The tree becomes both mark-maker and page, as a direct agent and experiential presence in the reading and writing process. The tree thus ‘speaks’ as tree within the poem, and yet this does not mean that the human ceases to speak. Indeed, this research has shown that the human was ‘speaking’, in that it was physically affecting, in the existence of this tree from its initial planting. The natural, or other-than-human, is always already shot through with human influence. The human is always already natural, shot through with the influence of the other-than-human. A sufficient definition of ‘human’ is not simply that which is other-than other-than-human, nor does the reverse give a sufficient account of ‘nature’. Each is a material and conceptual framework, or mesh, that enjoys continuities of different qualities, quantities and variations. The orchard, for example, as Cloke and Jones observe, constitutes a between space of human and other-than-human material and cultural co-operation (2002).

What then does the page say about our relationship with ‘nature’ in writing? The page, as narrowly defined in terms of the bleached, flat, rectangle, a form from which the digital variant evolves, condemns the human relation with that of the tree. The tree, in this form, is very little more than raw material to support human literary expression. But the page need not be conceived of as such, in fact, as I have noted above, we already conceive of the page as more than this. If the page as an emergent and distributed, rather than a fixed, framing is embraced within literary production there is no saying what interesting inter-organismal compositional strategies and formations might be (and are being) developed. Whatever these strategies and formal structuring are, they will be expressive and supportive of a composition that considers human authorship as just one of the agencies at work in ‘writing’ environment. And so, in response to Bate’s (2000) argument, alphabetic writing need not articulate the irrevocable death knell of nature, or no more than it already does (where nature is understood simply as that which is other-than-human). This research suggests a series of ways in which writing might be revised, along with the material and conceptual manifestations of page, to reform its relationship with that which is natural, (other-than-human), or, as in this particular instance, tree. Human writing is heir to the numerous structural relationships between line and surface that exist within us, as
well as within (and as a result of evolutionary relationship with) our wider environment. In this sense ‘nature’ writes in us and in human writing. In another sense, the surfaces, tools, and environments, with which we write are other than ourselves, and yet they can be formed to reify a certain sense of ourselves. If we are to emphasise the sense in which that which is other-than-human writes in more standard compositional forms, theories regarding authorship of the environments of writing must be improve in order to express the authorial influence of these more-than-human forms. In this sense nature is writing, where nature is the subject performing writing as a verb, and by virtue of the fact that nature is, as a noun in a testing of equivalence with this other noun, writing (as gerund), that also is. It is in the question of how much that the balance hangs.

This research has been an investigation into writing with questions regarding nature in play, to borrow the structure of John Hall’s phrase (as quoted in the initial phase of ‘Nature Writing’, 2006:40), and of how we are to understand nature in the face of questions regarding writing. The result of this cross-referencing is that nothing emerges ‘pure’, but then, it appears, it was ever thus. To conclude the findings of this research I refer to, John Tallmadge’s question, issued with regards to ecocritical reading strategies. In ‘Towards a Natural History of Reading’ (2003:282-294) Tallmadge observes that the current groundswell in nature writing and ecocriticism might provide a way of reorganising political thought (283). However, he notes, the methodology is so far insufficient to the task: ‘where are our methods to match our mountains?’ he asks (283). His response is a practical one: get outside and use your experience of this outside world, or ‘field research’, more specifically mountain climbing, as a critical tool in a reading of Clarence King’s Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada (1872). This research suggests a similarly practice-based methodology to match the ecocritical fervour to balance human and other-than-human authorial agency, at least as far as small scale writings go, and thus suggests one way of answering Tallmadge’s question. Here is a method by which the value of both human and non-human life forms are taken seriously, acknowledging the intersemiotic dependence of non-human and human systems within compositional strategy; a type of writing always in excess of human semiotic intention, a type of writing that acknowledges its ‘wild inside’ (Woods, 2011). This is language understood according to John Dewey’s expanded sense of language, as Mark Johnson notes,
not merely consist[ing] of spoken or written words; rather it includes all forms of symbolic interaction by means of which we indicate significant questions, patterns and structures. Language in this rich sense is the basis of our ability to communicate with others, to co-ordinate actions, and to engage in fruitful enquiry through the employment of meaningful signs. (Johnson, 2007:266)

Language ‘in this rich sense is the basis of our ability’ to communicate with, and affect, other humans as well as organisms and environments other than ourselves (although this communication is not always positive). Affect is proof of the continuing communication between organisms and environments that is the foundation of all communication and language-making. However, Johnson goes on to detail Dewey’s profound sense of irony that language (in the broadest sense of symbolic communication in general) is both our great vehicle for the growth of meaning, inquiry and knowledge and simultaneously the source of our all-too-frequent failure to capture the depth and richness of our experience, thereby limiting our ability to understand and reconstruct our experience. Language both enriches meaning and at the same time, as a result of its selective character, ensures that we are forever doomed to overlook large and important parts of meaning. (2007: 266-267)

Thus this thesis returns to the observation of itself as a partial and temporary ‘solidifying’ of material that is the result of much mulching, of human and other-than-human material, both materially, perceptually and conceptually, and is presented here, as a coming together of this material, that has many other possible configurations, as an emergent and distributed manifestation of ‘page-making’ as a result of my human, reading and writing with a tree. This thesis presents a perceptual, conceptual and material, reframing of what it is to write nature.
FINAL INSTALLATIONS

The necessary transition between indoor environments of writing, conducive to the survival and generation of the book (the library or study, for example), and outdoor environments of writing, conducive to the survival and generation of trees (most notably that of the apple tree in the orchard at Tremough, for example) has fundamentally influenced my account of the reframing of nature writing presented in the concluding chapter of this thesis (‘Nature Writing Reframed’). The final installations, of tree and paper works indoors (in the studio) and outdoors (in the orchard), were designed to environmentally manifest these findings. My aim was to present a material hybrid, or collage, of the interweave of environments that have informed the evolution of this research (as a material and conceptual enterprise) as an empirical manifestation of my thesis that nature writing is the result of both physical and conceptual environments, and their relation. These installations are environments in which the processes and products of reading and writing are both physically and conceptually reorganised in order to share and reflect upon the conceptual restructuring, or reformation of mind, that has been the result of this research. These installations offer a spatial application of the findings of this research, presented in less spatially extended form within this thesis. In what follows I provide a brief description of the structure of each of these installations.

The Orchard Installation

The apple tree that has been so central to the evolution of the practical dimension of this research provides the central focus of this installation. The words scarred into the apples on the tree are the building blocks of this tree text, but it is late September so much of this text has already dispersed: many of the apples have fallen, some are there to be read underfoot, others have already decayed and disappeared. This re-emphasises the lack of clear beginning or end of this text. The text begins at the point when the reader starts to engage, or becomes aware of being engaged, with the apple tree as text. As has been detailed in the rest of this thesis, the text of the tree far exceeds that of the words written
into the apples but these words, and the text it comprises, are the most explicit point at which human and tree organisms coincide in the act of textual composition.

The plastic boxes that surround this tree text reflect upon the variability of the tree environment in contrast to the more stable conditions of the archive (box). These boxes are designed to draw attention to the durability and/or fragility of materials. If the paper texts inside these boxes had been laid out directly on the grass they would have rapidly begun to decay. The plastic box reduces the environmental impact of the orchard on these works. These boxes, as environments of textual preservation, parallel the larger environments of text preservation such as the library, gallery or museum. On a less formal scale the study is also an environment of text preservation, as well as a space within which a stable set of environmental conditions (homeostasis) conducive to textual composition might be maintained. These environments also preserve a set of social norms and/or reading and writing conditions. Indoors the written text and the reader/writer are sheltered from any external influence that might degrade the text and/or textual practice. The juxtaposition of these mock archive boxes and preserved texts with the text of the tree aims to expose the way in which environment affects/effects writing and writing affects/effects environment.

In front of the tree is a deep plastic tray filled with the pulped fragments of this research, both printed page and tree. The paper-making frame and mesh is provided for the reader to pull through this pulp in order to experience the impermanency of the page: the reader is able to frame, dissolve, and reframe this liquid text every time they draw the paper-making mesh through the pulp.

**The Studio Installation**

The studio installation explores the relationship between environments of reading and writing in an alternative, but related way. Here the thesis text is displayed on a lectern for the reader. This text is surrounded, at the base of the lectern, near the reader’s feet, by a physical selection of the publications referenced within the thesis. This physicalisation of the reference in relation to the thesis plays on the idea of the footnote whilst also
emphasising the difference between the quoted fragment as it exists in the thesis and the fragment as it exists within its initial publication. Unlike the orchard environment, here these texts can be piled on the floor with no fear for their physical well-being. In contrast, here it is the floor of the studio that must be protected from any damage by the tree and its related materials (here again a tree marks the centre-point of the installation) by a layer of cardboard.

The mirrored wall of the studio offers the reader a visual impression of their reading behaviour. The mirror presents an at once static and moving image of the page, of which the reader, along with the various page manifestations, is a part. The reader sees themselves reflected in a line of mirrors that also reflect the tree and the paper installation in the other half of the studio. The wall of mirrors is made up of a series of large mirror panels stretching almost the full length of the studio. There is a break between the mirror panels, if the reader stands at the lectern and looks at him/herself, that separates his/her reflection from the reflection of the tree and paper works. This is a subtle reminder for the reader of the more usual mural division between normal human and tree writing environments, brought together here within the single space of a studio. The reader has the option of scanning the thesis with the view of the tree and paper installation in front of them. This installation is a physical expression of, and reflection upon, the formal structure and argumentation of the thesis.

The tree, in this installation, is not the tree principally referred to in the thesis, that tree, as has already been observed, forms the centre of the orchard installation. The tree in the studio is, or was, an apple tree that was also grown in the Tremough orchard, near to the tree that was the principal focus of this research. The tree in the studio is now dead. Its death presages the death of the tree that is the focus of this research. The presence of this tree, in the studio, comments on the level of abstraction involved in any experience and/or conception of a tree. Every experience and/or conception of a tree is informed by the conception and experience of many trees. As such it evokes the presence of the tree that has been the main focus of this research, whilst also evoking the level of abstraction, and therefore absence of sorts, that has been an inescapable part of this research in relation to that tree.
Beneath the tree, in this installation, is an accumulation of writing materials, dead tree material, and, presented on a solitary plinth, the bones of the magpie found in the bucket beneath the tree. All of these materials have played a practical part in the evolution of this research. This dead tree material has come from a variety of trees, including the tree that has been the main focus of this research. This material has been stored inside to minimise decay. However, unusually, this storing has not been particularly effective since the material is altered by the internal environment of storage. Alteration is inevitable: the tree material cannot be preserved as it was on the tree, either on the tree or indoors. The effective preservation, storing, or archiving, of material is one of the crucial criteria of PhD research. Both installations, orchard and studio, comment on the relationship of this demand in relation to the life processes of organisms such as trees. A photograph of a tree evokes a very different experience, and a very different knowledge, to that of a real tree. These installations provoke questions regarding the underlying bias of academic structures with regard to knowledge as environmental experience, suggesting that the environment of the studio, the study, and the library encourage very different knowledge experiences and behaviours, than do outdoor environments, of which the Tremough orchard provides just one example. As such this installation is, explicitly, an environmental experience.

Moving on from an examination of the installed tree, a tree that invokes, is part of, and constituted by, all the experiences and memories, real and imagined, of trees that the reader / writer has come across in his life so far, the reader might begin to move between the pages suspended from the lighting grid of the studio by nylon thread and paper clips. These pieces hang, suspended, in the air in a different, and yet similar way, to the suspension of the apple texts on the tree in the orchard. Although the environmental structure is very different the lack of fixed start or end point of reading is comparable, as is the structuring of the experience so that the orientation of the reader’s whole body is a necessary part of the reading process: both installations invite the reader to move between the suspended texts. In both environments the reader might lie on the floor and look up for an alternative reading of the work. These installations make the movement of the whole body an important part of the reading process. The relation between one page, or part of the text, and the next is governed equally by the proximity and the chance attention, which cannot be separated from the movement, of the reader. The reader makes his or her own way through the installation. The reading experience that evolves from this process is one in which the movement of the reader’s whole self, where movement of attention cannot be
dissociated from the movement of the body, and the reader’s mental and physical observation, are fused. The physical structuring of the installation thus mirrors the theoretical observation of this thesis, and indeed the reading experience ideally encouraged by the installation: that meaning generation (whether generated by reading or writing or any other means) is as embodied and environmental as it is cerebral, or conceptual.

Just as the mirrored wall of the studio provides an occasion for the reader to visually reflect upon the progress of their reading behaviour and the shifting situation of their reading as environment, the reader is aurally immersed in the utterances of another author whilst they produce their own reading of this / these text(s): a recording of an automatic reading, recorded live in the orchard, interweaves the sounds of orchard and studio environments, apple tree text and thesis, as well as the paper appendices included within it. This sonic textual environment loops at low volume in the studio.
Mark Johnson, following from the research of Gregory Bateson (1972/1987), Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1992), and supported by the contemporary research of Antonio Damasio (2003) and Tim Rohrer (2001) in neuro- and cognitive science, argues that there is a ‘continuity […] between our mostly nonconscious experience of embodied meaning and our seemingly disembodied acts of thinking and reasoning’ (2007: 31). Johnson’s argument suggests that cognitive processing arises as a result of, and reflects, the operation of the human organism, as a whole. However, the operation and development of the human organism, as a whole, is heavily dependent upon, and is engaged in constant interaction with, its environment. This environment may enable and extend, or inhibit the growth and development of the human organism both materially and conceptually. With reference to Rohrer’s research, Johnson develops an account of metaphor as a series of conceptual operations that arise as a result of an organism’s action in the environment. According to Johnson, and McCrone, conceptual processing ‘piggybacks’ (to use McCrone’s phrase) ‘on a processing hierarchy designed first and foremost for the business of perception’ (McCrone, 1999:158). This argument suggests that the structure of our experience engenders the structure of our conceptual processing, and, since the structure of our experience is so heavily contingent upon our interaction with the structures of our environment, it follows that the structure of our environment, by way of its effect upon human behaviour, affects the structure of human conceptual processing. This thesis examines Johnson’s hypothesis in relation to the construction of reading and writing environments, textual composition, and the reconception of text as environment. Through the close reading of a range of page, book, garden and exhibition texts, and with special attention given to the findings of my own writing experiments involving book, paper, page and tree, and the examination of and movement between their respective environments (as detailed in the digital and material appendices and installations of work), this research finds that the environment from and within which the text is composed has an important conceptual effect upon the reader and, perhaps more especially, the writer. Furthermore, this research finds that the act of composition affects the environment with, and within, which the text is created. Textual composition is therefore reconceived of as the re-
composition, recombination, or reform (and reframing, both material and conceptual) of both human and other-than human environment.

With regards to the relationship between nature and writing, one of the key concepts that this thesis puts forward is that of the frame. This figure relies upon the hypothetical relationship between concept formation and sensori-motor function as explored in the work of Mark Johnson. Cognitive- and neuro-science still have a significant way to go to establish this connection more definitely. This thesis draws upon a detailed interrogation of my own experience, and the writing that has resulted from this experience, (of working with the different materials and environments of paper, page, book, studio, library, study, walled garden, tree, pen, pencil, apple, leaf, grass, computer, and various weather conditions) in order to explore ways in which Johnson’s philosophical hypothesis might support a reconfigured understanding of the environmental constitution of nature writing.

Elements of Mess and Uncertainty

It is important to note, however, that although Johnson’s findings are compelling, especially when considered in relation to the findings of my own practice-based research, and the related scientific findings are encouraging, they are not conclusive. The argument developed within this thesis in relation to Johnson’s philosophy provides evidence for a compelling and well-argued hypothesis but it is a hypothesis that remains to be scientifically proven. This thesis is not a piece of scientific research, and makes no claim to produce scientific findings. This is the thesis of a practice-based arts research project and as such the conviction inspired by both its theoretical and practical arguments and experimentation is sufficient to demonstrate its worth.

Working among predominantly non-human living organisms introduces a significant propensity for uncertainty within research. The magpie in the bucket is a perfect example of this. Things would suddenly occur within the physical parameters I had set for this research, the small area surrounding this tree, which I could not control. This lack of control was one of the most interesting, inspiring, and powerful influences on this research. It was through the abrupt alteration and interruption of my physical and conceptual
environment that I was forced to register and engage with the environment of the tree. This environment was not something I could stabilise, control, or readily predict. The stable backbone of this practice was provided by the rigorous method of creative and theoretical enquiry that I applied throughout.

The iterative nature of this practice-based research makes it a very immediate form of enquiry: reason and feeling were correspondent factors in the development of the practical elements of this research. As a result the progress of this practical work reveals the mess inherent in practical thinking. It is not until you edit your notes and present them in the refined form of a written thesis, with all its standardised structural conventions, that this thinking appears ‘neat’. And even then this neatness has its weak points that, if pressed, may give way to reveal an underlying knot of underdeveloped thinking, prejudice or preconception. These points exist in every argument. In practice, the mess of active thought is registered materially, there is no honest method of disguising it. To deny this messy progress is to deny the process by which you arrive at your answer, and to do so is to undermine the value of this answer. To observe the elements of mess (the false starts, the doubling back on yourself, the repetition) inherent in the physical documentation of thinking (as live practice) is not to diminish the rigour with which this process is pursued.

There have been many developments during the progress of this practical thinking that are not fully developed in the argument of this thesis. The shadow photographs provide one such example. In retrospect, however, these photographs fit very well with the idea of ghosting that I develop in relation to Tim Ingold’s category of ‘ghostly’ lines. The interaction between a body and its environment as it interacts with the (sun)light casts a shadow. This shadow might be read as a metaphor (metaform) of the way in which human-environment interaction influences (casts the shadow of) conceptual thinking, but this is a line of thought that has not been developed. The recordings of the blind exercises, performed with the help of Eleanor Stevens in the first year of this project’s life, present another example of such seemingly unresolved branches of this practical research. Although not theoretically developed, these experiences, and their record, as it is included here, helped to develop the thinking that sustains this thesis. These elements of practice were part of the journey towards the final emphasis upon page-making and apple tree writing. There is far more material than could be exhaustively examined and productively included within the theoretical development of this research. I expect that the
material that has not been thoroughly harnessed to my argument here will provide the fuel for several years of postdoctoral research to come.

What I would do differently

My principal regret is that I did not have one more year with this tree. Although the process of writing into the apples produces effective results in relation to my argument regarding writing’s environmental constitution, I believe this argument may have been more successfully supported by a decision to write the same word into every apple on the tree, rather than attempting to compose a poem of different words in relation to a parallel page construction (see apple tree poem). The variety of developments of this one word, as it evolved in relation to the particular growth of each apple, would have more clearly demonstrated my argument regarding the metonymic relation of the particularity of the individual act (and environment) of writing, to ‘writing’ as an abstract framing concept (as developed in the final pages of ‘Metaphor, Metamor, Metamorphosis’).

Knowing what I know now about the volume of storage this project demanded I would, in retrospect, have approached the archivists in the library to discuss how best to archive this material at the start of this project. Even if this had not led to significantly different results, it would have increased the impact of the research on the university, as an institution, more broadly and would have more effectively engaged with and developed concepts relating to archive and knowledge storage so fundamental to academic research.

Conclusion

Despite the elements of mess and uncertainty that are endemic to this form of research, grounded as it is in a material development of knowledge in relation to practical experience, I am confident that I have amassed, processed and documented a sufficient quality and quantity of practical research to manifest my findings and provide a sound basis for the development of the theoretical aspects of this argument, rooted as it is in the progress of this practice.
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‘tree song’ ..........................................................................................................106

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CAMILLA NELSON

writing apple

finger writer finger holder scar holder cackcrackling joint jagged
frazz of apple teeth meat meet apple
here, unidentified onset
now I'm not myself nor you either
in its not self mine inset decay's unrepresentable
hard peaks of wrinkled skin will I soon become
like this my checks' blush brown decay
what horror lies in earth hold still,
let me examine your fine lines of teeth
your skin raised creviced lines wrinkles I gave you
gave me these wrinkles oh my words let me examine you
examine yours and mine together what is their difference their identity
effect oh mine oh yours oh mine and yours together in a prayer of
wrinklings
in my writing with you fleck your skin I say you thought some
object because
you other than you addressee you dressed undressed
in writing of a sudden lingo-d out of life in terminology form
of knowledge far from applying sapling, old and fruitless all written
over now with
words from world that is, human mindful, mind full
no brain you respond yes this is what you are writing telling
read my
write my you affecting me affecting you affecting me affecting
stopping no full stopping

83
from Written Responses
to Photographs and Audio Recordings,
Reading and Writing with a Tree 2010–2012

(10:30am 6th Jan 2011 response to audio recorded on same day
@ 08:30am 6th Jan 2011)

the sound of grass under me squelch of inarticulate masterings
resistant to hearing a body brunt of rain, grass precision of camera
framing stars with suble experience the inference such weather means
breath buff click of rain nails static impatient with environmental
facts & wishing myself out of this discomfort rain-like ice of fingers ear
full of what my skin wants not to listen to the cold unwilling part in
drowning vision orchard awkward sharpness on my skin almost as
sea in the greens of moss and lichen and the pale green grass and the hard
snap of rain

reader write a response
melt glass to needle point become the lichen sponge
sound overwhelms of tree on rain and road on rain and head
and hair on paper audio speaking rain
the crackle of a gramophone algen fungus grown together
rain confused words dictaphone is glöckenspiel
rain, jewels on wire necklace the absent speech of thought
between speeds putting leaves to bed

reader write a response
so loud the expectation of rain the violence of water
unobliterate continuum lip stiff flat throat mutters
don’t let her in screaming gulls mew loudmouthed
thought in rain it be whatever you want it to be

desire, the great transformer swish unhappy swipe of waterproof
rubbing rain towards skin eventual invasion
listen to those legion armies hear their will to touch your skin
the softness of beauty the hard ache of rain

reader write a response
what is the shape of this leaf-drenched feeling
rain fall sounds of trapped leaves on a window
somewhere other than this what is my familiar
in what language tree names rain a scrawl I can’t quite read
but feel to mean

reader write a response
the parrot squeal of camera tongue needs flash to see (darkener)
automatic bird each wing flap opens eye and mouth at once
mew to see swallow up a square of this and store it flat
in undeveloped meaning

reader write a response
only intonation meaning sound is wordless
phrasing with the shape of mouth lip throat teeth tongue
chorus with the brain to furnish noise with sense but all I hear
is human bird song word blur sound taps through you
breath emitting organ sound beyond breath sound body
earth sound water
SOME DEFINITIONS FOR NIGHT

the time which follows evening like the next carriage of a train. A justification for candles and by extension love whose pronouncement is made easier in dark spaces, over small flickering flames and a cascade of wax. Night is a storied place for creatures that have not been named yet; a mammalogist says of a purple, rhombus-shaped creature— it's as if it just stepped out of night where it had been hiding. Night is a habitat for dreams, the acre of forest inside us. Night cannot be measured by the second or the hour hand. It is its own time, requiring only that we breathe deeply. Night is a large womb, a spectacularly bloated pregnancy. Entire planets are born from night. And night is an opening chapter I am yet to write; it will include penitwallyes, the terrible red-eyed Rolling Calf, and the following instruction: turn these pages slowly— push the sun down, down, below the horizon— and a story will come to steal your breath.

Kei Miller

HILL SNOW CAR SPEAK

snow hill through the windscreen
snow haze on the hill
white heat rises from the hill’s white skin
wind stirs snow on the hill
hill’s white breath rolls off the hill out of the gate onto the road
hill’s skin speaks to the road spreads itself out on the road and says
the car drives over the road’s new tongue speaking two black bars of its own

Camilla Nelson
tree song

*if you feel unbalanced replace an arm or leg gently on the floor*

if needs be

limbs laid gently on the floor broken on the floor creaking

breaking from the body of the tree

lie there a while I’ll come back for you I’ll be back for you
to fetch you through the earth I’ll root you up discover you later

much much later more earth than tree then tree son treason tree soon

you left me there for years and years far away from trunk warmth sap song

xylem phloem slowly stilling into silence silence

my limb my lamb hush hush
don’t cry I’ll be back I’ll come back for you soon

a betrayal leaving you there

there on the ground but I was breaking limb from limb and had to let you fall

understand it was not what I wanted daughter you were unwanted daughter

and you were let fall

you were let fall

survive the storm you’ll understand in time in tree time in storm time

and soon wet with rain you’ll fall piece by piece out of tree

out of bark and leaf and into earth and grass and earth and rain and air

will rot you down slip out of tree out of memory of me

in time in time

you’ll feel me pull my tree pull underground I’ll pull you back to me

I’ll drag you up through the hairs of my roots back into me
rot into water I’ll drink you back in sing you back into me sing you
back inside and soon and soon you’ll be back in the trunk of me
and then once you’re back you’ll know you’ll
understand why it was

I had to let you go
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