Choking on the madeleine: encounters and alternative approaches to memory in a contemporary art practice

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PhD

Awarded by The University of the Arts London

March 2015
Video documentation of *Disruptive Desires* (DVD)

*Fig. 1  Hunting Lodge (abattoir), colour slide, 2010, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print*

This photograph is part of my photographic series *Hunting Lodges* (see Juncture IV: Portfolio, pp. 198-219)

It is thus repeated in Juncture IV: Portfolio (see Fig. 131, p.210)

*Video documentation of the installation Disruptive Desires which was exhibited in the Crypt of St Mark’s Church Kennington, London (6 December - 16 December 2012).*

*Disruptive Desires* forms a core part of my research, and is discussed in depth in Juncture III of my thesis. Further documentation of the installation in the forms of photographs and video stills are included in Juncture IV: Portfolio. The individual videos that were part of *Disruptive Desires* are included on a DVD in Appendix I (p. 343)
Abstract

This practice-based thesis proposes radical, critical, creative reconsiderations of memory and how the mnemic may be expressed in art practice. The research took place through developing a series of works within contemporary installation art practice, which considers the experience of memory an abstract, affective event.

The thesis confronts the typical assumptions and ocularcentric misconceptions that the mnemic is a visual phenomenon. It challenges presumed relationships between photographs and memory then asks: How may notions of memory be re-examined through art practice so as to allow alternative expressions of memory to emerge? After the critique, the thesis offers an alternative concept of memory that may be incorporated into art practice: the memory-event. The concept emerged through my art practice alongside engagement with the writings of philosophers Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and contemporary theorists such as Simon O’Sullivan and Brian Massumi.

The inquiry utilises O’Sullivan’s framework as a method towards parallel critique and creation in contemporary art practices; these counter existing forms of thought. The framework includes seven Deleuzean concepts applied in rethinking memory: the encounter, affect, the production of subjectivity, the minor, the virtual, the event, and mythopoesis. The thesis adopts this approach, and demonstrates how the memory-event developed through phases of research. Firstly, the thesis establishes and critiques prevailing ideas and expressions of memory. It then defines the methods and theories to disrupt existing assumptions of the mnemic, showing how the defined methods and theories were applied in reconsidering and posing alternatives to established assumptions. Included is a visual and textual portfolio of work exploring the ideas of memory produced in my art practice.

The implications of this research for art practice constitute, through the mobilisation of the memory-event, potentials for liberation from the constraints of representation and common assumptions of memory. This produces innovative expressions of the mnemonic experience, and continues to challenge ways in which memory is considered.
Acknowledgements

I became fascinated by the notion of the *juncture* while thinking about the structure and concept of this thesis. It is a term that simultaneously refers to a number of ideas; a meeting point, a point in time, a crux, a turning point, a cross roads. The final juncture of my PhD project, which I am now approaching, is one of endings and beginnings, closures and openings; a moment of concurrent culmination and germination. It is at this particular juncture of my research career that I wish to extend the greatest gratitude towards a number of individuals and institutions, who have through their direction, encouragement and advice made the emergence of this thesis possible.

I am most grateful for the unwavering support and thoughtful guidance from my Director of Studies, Dr Mark Ingham. The challenges and encouragements set through your continuous, rigorous and thorough critiques have enabled me to creatively develop my research skills, art practice, critical thinking and writing to where these are today. Having matured through the working out of my doctoral thesis, these skills will continue to grow as I grow and advance in my career as a researcher, as an artist and as a writer.

I also wish to extend my appreciation for the consistent and thoughtful advice, suggestions and meticulous feedback on my art practice as well as my writing from my second supervisor, Prof Anne Tallentire. Your involvement in my PhD project has been invaluable and I appreciate the sensitivity, honesty and consideration with which you have guided me. Thank you both for pushing me and urging me to question thought [to break things asunder and avoid an infinite cycle of thinking and re-producing the Same], to creatively experiment in order to generate the new, to let one idea crash into another, to think potentiality, to reach the level of independence required of me, and to begin in the middle. A multiplicity of beginnings, a multiplicity of endings, through the middle.

Thank you also to Edwina Fitzpatrick, who was one of my supervisors for a period of time. Your advice was much appreciated, as were our conversations and the facilitation of an exhibition space at Wimbledon College of Art.

The support received from The University of the Arts London has been invaluable, from seminars and research training, to help received from the staff in Research Support, access to facilities, and funding for attending and speaking at conferences in the UK and abroad.
I would like to thank my dear friend Mari Jensen, for the many hours she spent helping me locate hunting towers and lodges in Sweden, for facilitating meetings with hunters, for driving around the Swedish country side with me [entering The Twilight Zone] and carrying equipment into deep forests and out onto muddy fields. Your help and great company were invaluable.

I wish to thank my parents Lil Falkensson and Danden Jensen for all your love and encouragement, for your contributions to discussions and for understanding the long absences.

Thank you to Stuart Goddard for the immense support, love, care and patience you have shown me; for listening, for the coast, for the laughs, and for keeping me rocking and rolling. Roll on, Hayle Place.

Thank you to Paul Glavey, my reader and close friend, who has been my primary proof reader throughout this project, painstakingly looking over draft after draft, asking critical questions and making considered suggestions. I appreciate your attention to detail, your time and effort, our extended philosophical debates and discussions, your friendship, and the brutal honesty that your involvement demanded of you. I cannot thank you enough.

A very special thank you to Prof Jeremy Barr for our extensive conversations, your thoughtful suggestions, strategies, and advice. I commenced ‘the search’ you encouraged, which generated a true sense of calm and focus, and for which I am eternally grateful. I have a feeling your approaches will be of great use for years to come. Thank you.

I also wish to thank my professional proof reader Paddy Long for your close reading and sensitive corrections of my writing. Your careful suggestions added clarity to my thesis without removing my ‘voice’. Thank you for the long hours you put in, your meticulous feedback, and your words of encouragement – I am, indeed, ‘still breathing, still smiling’.

I also appreciate the long conversations and discussions I have had over the years with Dr Catherine Maffioletti, Sean Hall and Dr Graham Lang. Thank you your reflections on my work, for your thoughtful comments, and for your friendship.

I extend my sincerest gratitude to Bo Andersson, Dan Andersson, Eiler Blanck, Bäreberg’s hunting team, Rev Stephen Coulson and St Mark’s Church Kennington, Tom de Ville, Carole Evans, Ruth Hunt, Svenna Jensen, Tom Jensen, Liz McQuiston, Jenny Odqvist, Dr Malcolm Quinn, Linda and Doug Rimington, Carl Rosenqvist, Sumit and Printset, Nicole Thomas, Eppie Thompson & and Kennington Community Choir, Mark Venner, staff at the University of the Arts London, as well as colleagues and friends who have helped and supported me throughout this project.
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Fig. 2  Hunting tower, colour slide, 2007
        45 cm x 45 cm D-type print

        This photograph is part of my photographic series Hunting Towers
        (see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp.220-259)

        It is thus repeated in Juncture IV: Portfolio
        (see Fig. 141, p. 220-221; Fig. 146, p. 228)
Introduction

This practice-based thesis, *Choking on the madeleine: encounters and alternative approaches to memory in a contemporary art practice*, investigates ways in which concepts of memory can be expressed in new and alternative ways in art practice. The research began in 2006 in response to my noticing common assumptions and misconceptions of memory that I came to understand not only as dominant, and that they constitute limits to the way the mnemic is considered. I first noticed these assumptions through the use of various metaphors of memory in language and in sign- or object-based systems of signification. These reveal forms of thought holding that the phenomenon of memory is a primarily visual experience. The consequence is their presumption that photographic images are inherently linked to or are themselves understood as memories. This led me to the hypothesis: there are sets of thought that govern the manner in which memory is understood, and these forms of thought consequently have an impact on how memory is expressed in art practices. As I disagree with the models of memory presented through these systems of thought, I set out to interrogate these and search for new ways of thinking, and making art about, the mnemic. The thesis thus had two aims: to critique and disrupt misconceptions and assumptions of memory (ocularcentric forms of thought in particular) then, in correlation, to develop an alternative concept of memory.

Approaches

I approached this subject from the point of view of an artist engaged in an installation art practice, with the aim to critically and creatively examine and express the experience of memory. The research was thus undertaken through corresponding engagements with theory and practice, through writing, and through my practice as an installation artist. I first started to explore ideas of memory in my practice when I encountered my disagreement with existing assumed relationships between memories and photographs. The perception emerged when I realised that I do not understand my family photographs as constituting memories, nor do I understand the phenomenon of memory as a purely visual experience. I began to think more critically about photographs, and about art practices that use photographic images in order to signify concepts and meanings, such as the prevailing ideas of autobiographical or cultural memory, the loss of memories, trauma and nostalgia.
My research is critical of those approaches to the art experience that assume it as being representational and interpretative; that understand it as an experience demanding a reading of the work of art along the traditions of deconstruction or semiotics. The research thus seeks a form of practice that operates outside of the known systems of signification such that it will produce affective art experiences, in place of art that demands reading. That is, I am interested in what the work of art does, rather than what it purports to represent. I have throughout this research project used my art practice to search for ways of embodying the concept of the art experience as an affective event, as well as alternative ways of exploring notions of memory. The research took place through ten works. It resulted in a major installation in 2012, *Disruptive Desires*, which formed a part of my PhD thesis and submission. In my practice, I focus on creating affective, poly-sensory experiences, and often bring various elements together, such as videos, photographs, objects, sounds, scents, heat and soil. In approaching ideas of memory, I have concentrated on personal memories that exist unaccompanied by representations in the forms of photographs, videos, testimonies and other records. I ask questions about the value that such representations place on documented moments. In my explorations of memories of meaningful yet unrecorded moments, I aim to let personal memories and those of others, life and experienced events, fiction and imagination, merge, smudge, blur and bleed into one another, so as to produce other ideas of memory, other subjectivities, and not necessarily human memories.

**Method to Thought**

The research utilises a two-pronged method to thought. Firstly, this thesis questions assumed notions of memory and the functions of art practices. Secondly, it seeks to conceive of alternative models of memory, and a practice that creates affective experiences. A key aim for the practice elements of my research is to express the personal experience of memory in a transient manner. In such expressions, the personal transmutes into the apersonal through sensory, affective and experiential environments in the form of installations. Rather than to cause a sense of recognition of how – it has culturally been acknowledged – memories look, feel or appear, the purpose is to create works that express notions of experiences of memory and past moments via processes of becoming and affect. In other words, focusing on affect comes from concentrating on a bodily and emotional response from having emerged from the event of the installation. This is opposed to attempting to represent and solidify memory’s abstract and shifting, slippery and variable characteristics. I have utilised a method of parallel critique and creation through territories of practice, theory and concepts. This is a method established in the writings of twentieth-century philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, who aimed continuously to re-new philosophy through such a process. The method described by Deleuze and Guattari has been further developed by contemporary theorists, such as Simon O’Sullivan and Brian Massumi, who have used the process as a way of approaching contemporary art practices.
I grew up in Sweden, where I spent my childhood between my mother’s flat in the city of Göteborg on Sweden’s west coast, and my father’s house in rural Västra Götaland County. Throughout this research, I have focused primarily on memories of undocumented moments related to the practices surrounding hunting, a common and traditional activity amongst farmers, agricultural workers and other rural residents in Sweden. Practices of hunting form one of the themes of my practice; however, this practice may also be understood as one defined by journeys. Since the beginning of this research project, I have been travelling back and forth between the UK and Sweden, in order both to gather materials and to visit members of the hunting community. These materials consist of photographs and videos that I have created, and objects such as antlers, soil, found images and documents. The art works I have produced throughout the research make use of these materials.

I have utilised a Deleuzean framework as developed by O’Sullivan for contemporary art practices (2010 189-207). I chose this framework because O’Sullivan defines it as a method through which artists may break away from habits of thought and dominant approaches to thinking about art. Simultaneously, they may generate new and alternative concepts, forms of thought and approaches to art. O’Sullivan’s framework builds on seven concepts borrowed from Deleuze, which include the encounter, affect, the production of subjectivity, the minor, the virtual, the event and mythopoesis. Five of these concepts feature more heavily and directly in this text, while the two concepts of the virtual and the event form much subtler elements yet underpin approaches to thought which the thesis puts forward. The utilisation of O’Sullivan’s framework as a method to thought and to an art practice has been integral to my research, as it offers ways of critiquing and re-thinking existing ideas while at the same time generating new and alternative notions. I have explored these concepts through my art practice in search of alternative approaches to considering and expressing memory. In Juncture II of this thesis, I shall define and discuss O’Sullivan’s Deleuzean framework in greater detail. In Juncture III, I shall elaborate on how I have used this method to guide my research, including my art practice.

As established, this thesis sets out to address how ideas and expressions of memory may be re-considered through an art practice. The primary concern in this research is thus the impact of limitations to notions of the mnemonic on the making, thinking about and experiencing art about memory. I have utilised my art practice as an installation artist to explore how memory may be expressed and thought through differently from the way it is in practices that insist on representing memory. The thesis mainly draws on writings on art, philosophy and photographic theory, and does not set out to address scientific, medical, neurological or psychological research into memory. Furthermore, the art practices on which the thesis has focused are primarily contemporary installation-, photography- and video-based, omitting discussion of disciplines as painting, traditional sculpture, or drawing. The research has sought to concentrate on expressions of subjective (undocumented) memories (via the apersonal), and memories unrelated to trauma.
or distress. Broader fields of social, cultural or collective memory that investigate memories of conflict or suffering are excluded. While I have used the concepts and writings of Deleuze in my research, I elected not to include reflections on Deleuze’s texts dealing specifically with art. The reason I have excluded these texts is that my thesis specifically addresses installations and contemporary art practices not covered in Deleuze’s work. I have, however, found Deleuze’s writings, and concepts aiming to provide structures for the renewal of established thought, particularly useful in my research. I have therefore investigated how Deleuze’s ideas have been considered by contemporary writers on art and Deleuze. My principal focus is on O’Sullivan’s work, as the forms of thought and practices he explores are closer in relevance to my project.

Structure and Junctures

My thesis is divided into four main parts, Junctures I to IV. In this thesis, Juncture is a term used in place of the traditional chapter. The word Juncture suggests several concepts, the combination of which makes the phrase a useful tool in my explorations of the notions and problems of memory and time, and the exploration of these within my art practice. Juncture has temporal associations – a juncture may be a point in time, a moment, an occasion, an instant – while it may simultaneously suggest locality; a meeting point, a crossroads or junction on a map, a position or even a turning point, a connection, a hinge. Juncture may imply a critical situation – a crisis, a predicament or crux, an emergency or plight – while concurrently connecting with states of being: a condition or articulation, position or status, point, posture or circumstance. Each Juncture of this thesis presents a part of the process through which my research has developed, as well as related contextual, theoretical, creative and literary properties.

The first Juncture introduces the principal problems and assumptions of memory challenged by my thesis. This part of the thesis sets out to define an over-arching form of thought that governs ways in which memory is considered. I understand this as constituting that which in Deleuzean terms is referred to as a dominant image of thought. Juncture I presents an outline of this concept of the image of thought, then further explains how dominant ways of thinking about memory may be understood as part of an over-arching image of memory. I draw on the theories of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari as well as of contemporary writers on Deleuzean thought in order to establish this image of thought. In defining an image of memory, I present an overview of the development of typical assumptions of memory, and of prevalent themes of memory in art practices and in what Andreas Huyssen terms memory discourse (2003 8). Furthermore, I argue that presumed, generally accepted ideas of memory have generated a wide range of metaphors. Deleuze and Guattari discuss metaphors as symptoms of thought systems that, when applied, indicate a presupposed, ‘indirect discourse’ (1980/2004 85). Deleuzean theorist Claire Colebrook understands these as part of a model for guiding thought in particular directions (Colebrook 2002
Building on these hypotheses, I have come to perceive metaphors of memory as symptoms of the image of thought which dominates the manner in which the mnemonic is considered. I critique these metaphors as part of a language organised around an image of memory, and question their significance in the developments of cultural understandings of memory. I also critique them because I perceive metaphors to have formed parts of a system of signification of the mnemonic in art practices, in which objects or expressions have gained assumed symbolic associations with memory. As such, these metaphors and long-established references have, as Lynn Berger notes, become clichés (2011 175-190); ‘overused’ expressions and ideas that reveal a ‘lack of original thought’ (Oxford Dictionaries 2013). One of the problems of using such metaphors in art practices is that the metaphor functions as a sign in the produced work, a sign that is part of a wider system of signification causing only recognition of the sign itself, rather than leading to contemplation or affect. That is, the metaphor comes to stand in for memory. The work of art is reduced to a mere representation. Examples include the artist Christian Boltanski’s use of archives, found photographs, and storage boxes as metaphors of memory, Ilya Kabakov’s use of snow as a representation of memory’s supposed ability to conceal and preserve individual memories, and Lorie Novak’s installations where family photographs and media footage overlay to represent ways in which (personal and social or cultural) memories may similarly overlap. Other practices in which metaphors are used to represent memory include those of Nancy Ann Coyne, Nico Dockx, Alasdair Hopwood, George Legrady, Zoe Leonard, Rabih Mroué, Jo Spence, Carrie Mae Weems, and Fred Wilson. My own position in the context of such uses is discerned in the inclusion of a well-known Proustian reference in the title of this thesis, *Choking on the madeleine: Encounters and Alternative Approaches to Memory in a Contemporary Art Practice*. I thus state that I situate my research outside that of the dominant and formulaic repetitions of materials; outside the repetitions that have reduced these materials to the status of clichés, such as Proust’s illustrious passage in *In Search of Lost Time* (2003).

In response to this, I have included a number of lesser-known quotes from works of fictional writers in my thesis; these may proffer alternative examples of literary references addressing memory. The interrogation of metaphors is crucial to my research, as I believe that uses of metaphors in art practices reflect a drive towards representation – of which I am also critical. I remain so because they appear to be desires to represent the phenomenon of memory rather than to generate an affective experience. I wish to demonstrate through Juncture I how metaphors of memory have developed over time. They have come to form the basis for current assumptions of memory – and therefore how memory is addressed in art. I have thus included a thorough history of the developments. I have relied primarily on the writings of Douwe Draaisma in my explication of the history of general metaphors of memory.
In Juncture I, I also examine the prevalent focus on the visual aspects of the metaphors and discussions on memory, and in art practices aiming to express the mnemic. As I question existing beliefs on the relationships between memories and photographic images, I focus on and examine, in particular, photographic metaphors of memory. I demonstrate how similarities in assumptions of memory and those of photographs have led to such correlations and beliefs. I examine the emphasis on vision within dominant thought, as *ocularcentrism* may be understood, thus query the relationships between visual perception and memory, seeing and photographing, the eye and the lens. This part of the Juncture relies, in addition to Draaisma’s work, on photographic theory, and specifically the writings of Roland Barthes and Geoffrey Batchen. In this context, I outline some of the texts and practices that support suggestions of the assumed relationships between memory and photographs. Juncture I hence defines the dominant forms of thought that I wish to challenge and re-think through my research. I do so in order to explain how my research is positioned – and with what, precisely, it is in confrontation; what I aim to avoid in order to re-new the manners in which memory is considered and expressed, and why such a renewal of thought is necessary.

Juncture II of this thesis provides outlines of methods used in my research. They were selected so as to attempt a break with an identified image of thought, an *image of memory*, as was defined in the first Juncture, and to aid in the creation of alternatives to this image of thought. Breaking away from this image of memory is important. Otherwise, if left unquestioned, assumptions forming what Deleuze terms ‘false’ ideas of memory (1968/1991 54) may dominate thought, thus would limit ways in which the mnemonic is understood. Juncture II of the thesis therefore proposes the alternative notions of time, memory and existence that underpin my research. Further, these may help in disrupting established theories so as to lead to innovation in approaches to memory. I base my discussions on concepts developed through the writings of Henri Bergson and Deleuze in order both to examine such alternatives, and to establish a form of thought that understands the past and the present as two co-existing states. These key understandings form the foundation for my research; they are the parameters within which both my thought and my art practice are developed. I examine the proposition of Bergson and Deleuze – that the act of remembrance takes places as a ‘leap’ into a past region (Deleuze 1968/1991 56-57), as opposed to its being a reconstruction of the past in the present – and examine the complexities thrown up by such a theory.

I return to my examination of photographs and memory in Juncture II, and find that Roland Barthes argues in *Camera Lucida* that photographic images are not memories: in actuality, they block memory (1980/2000 91). I discuss Barthes, and my differentiations between thought, recollection and recognition. The discussions take place through considerations of two photographs from my family album, so as to demonstrate the relations between the concepts. I also use my consideration of these two photographs to critique ocularcentric approaches to
memory, as well as querying assumed relationships between photographic images and memories. Juncture II also presents a framework for thinking Deleuzian concepts through an art practice. A Deleuzian framework is defined by Simon O’Sullivan in *From Aesthetics to the Abstract Machine: Deleuze, Guattari and Contemporary Art Practice* (2010 189-207), where he discusses establishing a new form of contemporary art practice. This practice seeks to disrupt conventions and to propose alternative ideas and forms of expression; it favours the creation of affective experiences, and steers away from deconstructive or semiotic ideas of the art-work as a readable sign (ibid. 189).

I have used the practice as a method for thinking about art, about memory and about my own practice. The framework has aided me in my desire to disrupt and renew thought and practices about the experience of memory. O’Sullivan features heavily in my thesis, as he reflects specifically on contemporary art – and on installation art in particular – through a Deleuzian perspective, and hence provides useful strategies for approaching art via Deleuze in a contemporary art practice.

A number of contemporary writers and theorists have re-examined these examples or other historical works in their writings on Deleuze, although I have not found their perspectives useful in thinking about how art practices operate or how works of contemporary art are understood today. The second Juncture of the thesis outlines a method for developing an art practice that simultaneously breaks with existing thought and produces new ideas or forms of expression. The method may be understood as the utilisation of the Deleuzean framework designed and offered by O’Sullivan (2010 189), in which the art practice is considered an *actualising machine* that produces new possibilities for thought (ibid. 201). O’Sullivan’s suggested framework has been applied in my practice and in my re-considerations of models of memory so as firstly, to break away from typical approaches and assumptions, next to create alternatives to them. I define and elaborate upon O’Sullivan’s framework in Juncture II, and show how O’Sullivan has used this method in his consideration of the work of the artist Cathy Wilkes. In addition, I have identified such strategies in the operational methods of the contemporary Swedish artist Klara Lidén, which I discuss in relation to O’Sullivan’s framework. The works and approaches by Lidén are, to me, clear demonstrations of how art practices may resist and reject representation, established thought and the dominant insistence on the work of art as a readable sign. Juncture II thus forms a significant part of the process of breaking with the assumptions and image of thought outlined in the first Juncture. It explains, further, how applying contemporary Deleuzean theories in my research may help me both confront existing ideas of memory then generate alternatives to these established ideas.

1 Recent examples of such examinations of art through Deleuze can be distinguished by considering the programme of the 2013 *Deleuze Studies* conference, which included papers that contemplate Deleuzian thought in the works of artists such Joan Miro, Paul Klee, the Fluxus movement, Martha Rosler and Paula Rego (Pombo Nabais 2013). Furthermore, although there are many inclusions of discussions on contemporary practices of artists such as Cildo Meireles, Marcelo Exposito, Cathy Wilkes, Andreas Slominski, and Anita Friek, many chapters of the recent *Deleuze and Contemporary Art* publication (Zepke and O’Sullivan 2010) insist on discussing Deleuzean theories through artists such as Francis Bacon, Paul Klee, Vincent van Gogh, Leigh Bowery, Martin Kippenberger, Hannah Höch and John Heartfield. I would not, however, wish to historicise works of art or limit the notion of contemporary art to that of the present; chronology is not necessarily of importance. It is more a certain spirit – what O’Sullivan describes as the generation of new and affective encounters – that may define contemporary practices (2010 189-207).
The third Juncture of my thesis discusses my implementations of O’Sullivan’s Deleuzean framework and Bergson’s theories of time, space and memory in my practice. I consider how these processes of thought have enabled me to re-think concepts of memory, and how alternative expressions of memory may emerge from the uses of such methods. Juncture III thus primarily focuses on how I have considered these methods in my practice, as well as how they have manifested themselves through different practice-based experiments. I introduce, provide details of and contextualise key themes in my practice, including journeys, memory and hunting. Installations and series of work produced as part of my research into and the development of an alternative idea of memory are then discussed through O’Sullivan’s framework, including the photographic series Majorna (2006), Hunting Lodges (2009 onwards) and Hunting Towers (2007 onwards), and the installations Aftermath (2009) and Luffare Narratives (2009).

The installation Disruptive Desires, which took place in December 2012 and marked the culmination of my research, is addressed. This part of the Juncture introduces the installation and discusses the integral creative theoretical concepts applied in developing the exhibition, followed by the forms of affects and alternative thoughts generated. I complete Juncture III by outlining sets of principles governing a concept of memory, and alternative ways of expressing memory through art practice. I have called this concept the memory-event: a concept to have emerged from the creative processes of thinking and making in creating Disruptive Desires. Juncture III thus demonstrates how a Deleuzean framework, such as that proposed by O’Sullivan, may be used to approach dominant systems of thought, challenge the canon and produce new ideas. What Juncture III therefore establishes and puts forward is a new approach to thinking and making art about memory.

The third Juncture is followed by a Conclusion, which summarises my findings and states the significance of this research. Importantly, the Conclusion establishes my concept of the memory-event as a new way of approaching ideas of memory in art practice. Not only that, it outlines a set of principles for mobilising this concept. The memory-event is to be understood as a concept developed through the critiques, methods and experiments carried out in this thesis. It builds on thought and methods acquired from the writings of Deleuze and Guattari, and from contemporary theorists such as Simon O’Sullivan and Brian Massumi. Through using such approaches to thought and to creative practices in establishing the memory-event, I extend existing thought beyond where it currently lies and into the specific contexts of explorations of memory in art practice. I offer this concept as a way both of addressing misconceptions about memory and of generating new ways of expressing the mnemic.
A fourth Juncture is found after my conclusion: Juncture IV: Portfolio. Juncture IV takes the form of a visual portfolio of the works I have produced in my practice throughout this research project, accompanied by short descriptive texts. Some of the works included are also referred to in Juncture III of the thesis, where the focus is more on analysis than on description. Juncture IV is divided into ten Parts. For clarity, this Juncture has its own Contents page and Introduction. It details the most recent work I produced as part of this research, which is *Disruptive Desires*. Following images of the installation, Juncture IV: Portfolio unfolds backwards in time. In this way, it describes the origins and process of the development of the most recent work, showing how my thought has emerged from the previous understanding. Each part of Juncture IV contains visual images and descriptions.

The first part of Juncture IV provides details of the 2012 installation *Disruptive Desires*. This exhibition marked the conclusion of my research. Due to its large scale and significance in relation to my project, I have placed particular emphasis on this particular installation. I discuss *Disruptive Desires* in three phases: the completed exhibition, the location, and the practice-based experiments in which I engaged in setting up *Disruptive Desires*. These are clearly highlighted in Juncture IV. Video documentation of *Disruptive Desires* may be found on a DVD placed towards the beginning of the thesis (see p. 2). The video footage is constructed to guide the viewer through the installation, and is accompanied by the audio tracks from two videos that were part of *Disruptive Desires*: *Up Around the Bend*, and *Hunting Songs*. In this audio-visual documentation, the viewer is taken down the stairs to the Crypt, and into the central space. Footage of two projections (a still photograph, and *Hunting Songs*), and antlers protruding out of the walls, is followed a projection of the video *Bait Cam* along one of the Crypt’s catacombs. The camera then returns to the central space to record *Hunting Songs*, before travelling down another catacomb to document the screening of the video *Up Around the Bend* on a TV monitor. The viewer is then taken back towards the central space of the Crypt and into a space in which a projection of the video *Luffare Narratives* is taking place. *Disruptive Desires* is to be understood as an installation using multiple elements, of which these videos were part. The screened videos are thus not considered individual works, but elements of a particular installation. However, to facilitate viewing of these after the installation, Appendix I (p. 343) contains on DVD: *Bait Cam*, *Hunting Songs*, *Up Around the Bend* and *Luffare Narratives*. The parts of Juncture IV following *Disruptive Desires* include my works *Hunting Lodges* (2009 – onwards), *Hunting Towers* (2007 – onwards), *Aftermath* (2009), *Luffare Narratives* (2009), *Déjà Perdu* (2009), *she felt empty in my hand* (2009), *Journeys Back* (2008), *Burning* (2007), and *Majorna* (2006).
Images and Illustrations

Photographs, video stills and other visual imagery accompany and illustrate the content of the textual elements of the three first Junctures of this thesis. These are indicated by the numbers in brackets within the text. Some of these images are of my practice and are therefore also present in Juncture IV. Where repetition occurs, I provide details of where the image may be found in Juncture IV. I have inserted large, double-spread photographs from my series *Hunting Towers* between the Junctures of my thesis. In the many practices of hunting, hunting towers are used as markers in the identification of territories, borders and edges, and as phases in a process that is part of an extensive practice. I have adopted the approach and applied it in the layout of my thesis, so as both to indicate the territories and borders of each Juncture, and to highlight the status of each Juncture as being parts of a process. A numbered reference will be inserted on the pages directly following each double spread, although not mentioned in the text. Furthermore, all images and illustrations in the thesis, including those of Juncture IV are numbered, listed and indicated in the section Visual Documentation (see pp. 354-357).
Previous pages (pp. 22-23)

Fig. 3  *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2008
45 cm x 45 cm D-type print

This photograph is part of my photographic series *Hunting Towers*
(see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 220-259)

It is thus repeated in Juncture IV: Portfolio (see Fig. 157, p. 239)
Juncture I:

Discerning an image of memory

Later, when he had time to reflect on these events, he would manage to piece together his encounter with the woman. But that was the work of memory, and remembered things, he knew, had a tendency to subvert the things remembered. As a consequence, he could never be sure of any of it.

(Auster 1999 13)

Introduction and Background

This practice-based research was undertaken in pursuit of new ways of thinking and making art about the subjective phenomenon of memory. My concern with art and thoughts on memory arose when I became aware of certain prevalent theories, forms of expression, the use of metaphors (in language as well as art practices), and assumptions that seemed to govern how concepts of memory are considered and materialised through art practices. That is, I sensed limitations in thought and approaches to art about memory; approached guided by limiting suppositions of the ways in which memory functions. Certain kinds of objects and visual images recur as signs of memory in exhibitions and in particular artworks, as part of what Simon O’Sullivan understands a ‘regime of signification’ (2001 126). Such modes of expression often involve the use of personal photographs and albums, news footage and iconic images from popular culture, archives (actual or metaphorical), re-enactments, triggers and traces, testimonies, historical written documents, and layerings of images. My research is guided by the conviction that the applications of specific kinds of images and objects in expressing memory have formed a visual language for talking about and making art about memory through reliance on the metaphorical value of the images and objects themselves, rather than on the actual functions and phenomenon of memory.

The tactic of relying on metaphors may reflect the current lack of a complete scientific understanding of memory given that metaphors of memory are used to communicate the mnemonic through associations with various systems, images or objects. Instead of discussing memory’s largely unknown functions, metaphors have become a means of considering memory through the familiar functions of known entities and processes. There are now numerous expressions in which the phenomenon and operations of memory are compared to materials and structures such as archives, storehouses, photographic images, film, writings, and records. My thesis particularly addresses the photographic metaphor of memory; it questions instances in both writing and art

1 I sensed such limitations in the works of writers and artists on memory, including Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time (2002), Marianne Hirsch’s The Familial Gaze (1999) and Annette Kuhn’s Family Secrets: Acts of Memory and Imagination (2002), as well as works by Christian Boltanski, Lorie Novak, Jo Spence, and Carrie Mae Weems.

2 This will be explored further in Juncture II of this thesis

3 I shall discuss the notion of the trace in my critique of metaphors in this Juncture of the thesis
in which memories and photographs are compared directly. Memory and photographs have been described similarly, which I believe has contributed to the fixed form of thought in which the two are equated. Both memory and photographs have been described as frozen moments in time (Flusser 2000 2), as traces (Draaisma 2000 4-5; Bergstein 2010 15), and as records of human visual experiences (Jay 1993 34-35). However, this thesis argues that neither memories nor photographs are frozen moments nor traces, nor are they dependent upon human vision. Further, my thesis asks how a memory may be considered static when memories tend to mutate, and how a photograph as an image on paper or pixels on a screen may be equated with one single moment.

My thesis questions how memories may be understood as traces of experiences, when extensive twentieth-century research seeking physical traces of memories in the brain proved that these do not exist (Draaisma 2000 4-5). Furthermore, I wonder how a photograph may be evaluated as a *tracing*. The notion of the trace in thoughts on photography appears in one of the earliest publications on photography, William Henry Fox Talbot’s 1844 work *The Pencil of Nature* (2010 3). Fox Talbot’s writing reflects a nineteenth-century approach to photography as an objective medium, one that produces truthful records. The more contemporary intended meaning for *trace* in speaking about photographs may in some contexts be closer to the term *referent*, as conceived by Roland Barthes in *Camera Lucida* (2000 76, 87). For Barthes, the referent is understood as the physical person or entity that must have been present in order for her/him/it to be depicted in the photograph. All photographs thus contain an indexical relationship to the referent, which Barthes notes cannot be denied (ibid. 76). As previously stated, my thesis also questions the ocularcentric emphasis on representations of vision in memory and photography as indicated by the photographic metaphor of memory. While photography is indeed a medium through which visual images are created, directly drawn parallels between the camera’s lens and the optics of the human eye are problematic. Looking with one’s own eyes is a significantly different experience from viewing through the lens of the photographic camera; the photographic image presents a stillness that differs significantly from the flow in human vision (Locke 2003 99-110). In relation to vision in memory, photographic theorist David Bate notes that ‘not everyone remembers visually’ (2010 250-251). Although many memories may have visual elements, other memories do not, or are only partly visual: one may remember a feeling, a thought, a smell or a tactile sensation entirely lacking visual elements.

I have also become aware of a prevalence of art and writings about memory focussing specifically on contexts of trauma, suffering, or nostalgia. In his work *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory*, Andreas Huyssen discusses this prevalence as an over-representation of memories of suffering in what he broadly terms *memory discourse* (2003 8). Huyssen describes the establishment of this recent prevalence as a ‘privileging of trauma’. He explains how in the 1990s the focus on trauma and memory emerged from a growing international interest in Holocaust studies then merged with research into memory in relation to other events of suffering.
Other discourses of traumatic events include a wide range of topics ranging from apartheid through slavery, disease and domestic violence to sexual abuse; these have formed and directed the principal discussions on memory (ibid.).

However, I had no interest in making art relating to pain, suffering or nostalgia. I wanted, rather, to make art about the experience of memory in and of itself. The kinds of memories that exist yet lack external forms of representation, such as photographs, videos or writings, particularly draw my interest. This stimulus led me to begin making work that responds to my childhood memories of the rural practices of hunting and the hunting community near where I grew up in Sweden. Of these, no photographs or other forms of documentation relating to these memories remain. I started asking questions about the limitations governing art about memory, and how it may be possible to make art about memory without using known objects or images as signs denoting the mnemonic; without relying on the constructs of ‘regimes of signification’ (O’Sullivan 2001 126). Eventually, this led me to explore the development of sets of beliefs and misunderstandings of memory, ideas to which Deleuze would have referred as ‘badly analysed composites’ (1968/1991 58). I understand these as misconceptions of memory, ones that limit the way in which memory may be considered and expressed in art practices. This limitation Deleuze defines as an ‘image of thought’ (1968/2004 164); a form of limitation that sets the boundaries of where thought can travel – and in creative practices, how concepts may be used, expressed, and reflected upon.

Within this Juncture, forms of thought that I understand as dominant, and in some ways limiting to thought and creative practices, will be addressed. In subsequent Junctures, and building on this critique, I aim to put forward new paradigms for developments of a variety of methods within such practices. One of my aims is the development of a concept that could potentially more adequately express the mnemonic, allow for new forms of thoughts on memory to take place, and encourage art practices that deal with issues of memory, thus to leave over-used metaphors behind and enter new territories. I approach these aims of the thesis along a Deleuzean trajectory of thought, by adopting Deleuze’s emphasis on critique in constant parallel with creation4 (Deleuze 1990/1997b 122) and Simon O’Sullivan’s proposition for a Deleuzian framework for art practices wishing to break with images of thought (2010 196-204). That is, I set out to critique existing and at times dominant forms of thought on memory (both in theory and in art practice) in order to help me create a new, alternative concept of memory. I have used my writing and my art practice to think through and develop this concept, which I have called the memory-event. Hence, I offer the memory-event as an alternative to the seemingly dominant memory-image and other image-based metaphors. I shall return to this concept throughout my thesis so as to demonstrate its

4 Deleuze appears to have borrowed parts of this method from one of his influences, Henri Bergson. Bergson termed a similar method 'intuition', which he used in order to create new problems in philosophy. Deleuze describes this method in Bergsonism as an 'essentially problematizing method (a critique of false problems and the invention of genuine ones)' (1991 35). This methodical balance of critique and innovation seems to underpin Deleuze's oeuvre; however, Deleuze applies this not only to creating problems but also to providing alternative solutions and new thought.
development. The importance of the development of this new framework for approaching the mnemonic in art practices is that it confronts existing misconceptions of memory. Therefore, it may enable new forms of expression and new practices to emerge, ones no longer restricted to the established uses of signs of memory.

This first Juncture of my thesis sets out to distinguish the development and elements of some prevailing assumptions of the concept/s of memory. The implications of an image of thought will be discussed through the writings of Gilles Deleuze as well as through current Deleuzean scholars such as Kenneth Surin and James Williams. Next, distinguishing how I have come to understand this concept in relation to ideas of memory as an image of memory is addressed. The constitution of selected dominant approaches to memory will be shown, as will what I see as the problematic aspects of these existing approaches, where such forms of thought originate, what supports them, and what maintains them.

This Juncture defines metaphors of memory as symptoms of an over-arching image of memory, what Simon O’Sullivan may have proposed is a *myth of memory*⁵ (2007 146). Establishing what these approaches are and what effects they generate is important: it highlights the need for a reconsideration of what memory is, what it does, and how it can be reflected upon in art practices. Describing opposing attitudes is also important in the development of my concept of the *memory-event*. Such clarification denies the use of the metaphors and clichés I am critiquing; also, it further explains how the *memory-event* differs from other concepts – and why such an alternative is needed.

Determining the forms of thought that I perceive as dominant includes examining the influences that limit thought to particular patterns, the consequences of such limitations, and the linguistic terms that reveal, support, and help to maintain these dominant forms of thought. More specifically, this Juncture explains the way in which dominant ideas of memory – what Deleuze calls ‘images of thought’ (1968/2004 164) – restrict new forms of thought from taking place, and investigates the metaphors that reflect and reinforce these images of thought. Since I find the notion of equating photographs with memory too restrictive, I specifically critique image-based metaphors of memory. I shall demonstrate how, historically, certain ideas of memory have dominated forms of thought, and consequently also writing and art. These forms of thought have led to certain kinds of expressions experienced in recent and contemporary art practices dealing with memory. Therefore, the Juncture is important not only in the development of my concept of the memory-event; it also investigates how this concept may be used in an art practice in order to renew ideas of how art about memory can be created and understood. The germinal potential of

⁵ I will explore O’Sullivan’s proposition of utilising the concept of mythopoesis in acts of myth-making and myth-breaking in creating new thought in Juncture II of this thesis
the memory-event is that, once set in motion in an art practice, the concept could stimulate the creation of works of art that challenge the way memory is considered and the experience of what art about memory could be, and put forward new, alternative ideas and expressions of memory.

The Image of Thought

Having sensed the limitations of certain conventions in approaches and expressions of memory, I became drawn to Deleuze’s writings on his desire to break both actively and creatively with existing ideas, clichés and set systems that restrict the movement of thought. Deleuze refers to such an organisation of thought as an image of thought. Deleuze’s interrogation of the image of thought seems to me to be a system of critique, a system applied in my thesis in order to critique the organisation of thought about memory. As I wish to consider the subjective experience of memory as event-like as opposed to purely image-based, I am concerned with the image of thought that supports certain prevailing attitudes and theories of memory as a predominantly image-based phenomenon. I also want to explore the basis for and continuance of such attitudes and theories, and discover what forms of action could be taken towards their uprooting. This concept of the image of thought appears in the third chapter of Deleuze’s primary Doctoral thesis Difference and Repetition (1968/2004 164-208). The concept then develops and forms the nucleus of his maturing philosophy, as he rigorously and continuously attacks dogmatic representations of thought and the act of thinking. The issue of representation is a well-known problem in philosophy; an issue that seems to saturate and affect various parts of the human experience, including ways of thinking, speaking, and understanding the world (Herzog 2000). Deleuze’s attack on representation stems from a desire for deeper thought to take place – or, perhaps more accurately, for new thought to take place.

Deleuze’s chapter on The Image of Thought (1968/2004 164-208) examines what may constitute this image of thought, the limits it may place on thought, and the fundamental dilemmas it produces. It is in this chapter that Deleuze ultimately warns against conformity to thought (ibid. 170), or adherence to what he sees as a particular form of ‘pre-philosophy’ (Surin 2005 159). The image of thought, as Kenneth Surin explains, is active ‘on the plane of immanence’7, hence ‘constitutes a pre-philosophical presupposition that philosophy has to satisfy’ (ibid.). That is, it determines, in an often inconspicuous and subtle manner, the boundaries of thought, and

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7 See Appendix II (p. 347) for a definition of a plane of immanence
remains in place until identified, realised, and interrogated. Therefore, if the ways in which memory is considered are not scrutinised, the danger is that forms of a priori assumptions govern thought about memory, reflect unquestioned beliefs, and limit expressions in art practices to well-known metaphors and symbols. These metaphors include archives, storage spaces, and family photographs. If an image of thought is not forcibly broken, we are doomed to a cyclical thinking the Same⁸, as Deleuze cautions: ‘we have not advanced a single step, but remain imprisoned by the same cave or ideas of the times which we only flatter ourselves with having “rediscovered”’ (1968/2004 170). An image of thought thus remains in place as firstly, it produces repetitions of the Same and secondly, in relation to this repetition of the Same, it generates a revolving chain of circumstances synchronous with an illusory sense of having advanced or created, determined, and developed something new, something beyond that which has already been discovered (ibid.). An image of thought, Deleuze explains, operates on often imperceptible planes. Turning away from this image, or rebelling against it, often proves a difficult task. Deleuze further discusses the complications involved in detecting such preconditions and limitations (ibid.), and ultimately attaining actual new thought.

While parts of this Juncture are highly critical of presuppositions and a priori understandings that may limit thought, the next Juncture contains creative suggestions and catalysts that may cause new thought to occur. They take the form of so-called encounters, posed in order to break with dominant images of thought; using notions of non-recognition to facilitate violent and forceful rips in the representations of thought or of the limits on the act of thinking. It is a matter of going ‘against the grain of received doxa’, an ‘active dismantling’ (Lecercle 2010 68). However, as has already been established, for Deleuze the critical purpose of philosophy is not purely to critique the works of others. Rather, its purpose is to create (Surin 2005 185). Deleuze sees this type of creativity as a ‘very special form of creation, in the realm of concepts’ (1990/1997b 26), there in order to generate encounters that lead to the construction of new concepts and new thought. It is with this method that I approach thought about memory, and the construction of the memory-event as a creative concept.

So as to establish what confronts the memory-event as a concept, I needed further to establish how an image of thought restricts existing forms of thought and practices. The hegemonic image of thought, what Deleuze at times calls a ‘moral image’ (1968/2004 167), is one that serves authority; an image whose presence Deleuze claims can be distinguished throughout the history of philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/1994 52). The image of thought itself historicises, it emphasises a lineage of thought (Colebrook 2005 189). It may take the form of canonical ideas, dominant discourse, a set of queries, or even a general understanding of a particular issue or subject (Williams 2005 124). Although Deleuze appears primarily preoccupied with the image of

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⁸ Deleuze’s capitalisation of the Same indicates its identification as a term, and as being different from the everyday use of the word same.
thought in philosophy, it is not necessarily limited to this discipline since it may be considered a factor affecting thought in other fields as well. A dominant image of thought could, for instance, limit understandings not only of what thought entails. It also, via ‘ready-made conceptions’ (Moulard-Leonard 2008 15), forms a priori assumptions of, for instance, the restrictions governing various creative practices such as art, architecture, or cinema. Deleuze is cautious of such images; their authority often renders them absolute, hence undisputed. A dominant image of thought may thus have actual critical, social, and political consequences. Such an image of thought may be easily detectible in some instances yet may on various insensible or unconscious strata in other cases remain concealed (Deleuze 1968/2004 167). The constitution of this image is twofold: a hegemonic static notion of what constitutes thought, alongside a suggestion that the natural ability of the mind is to engage in thought.

I would argue that many prevailing writings and art about memory are governed by such an image of thought and its related canonical beliefs, concerns and assumptions. As such, the works generated through such practices tend to use ‘ready-made conceptions’ (Moulard-Leonard 2008 15) and familiar metaphors, which in turn often cause recognition of the subject of memory [this work is about memory], rather than thought about the experience of memory. As is implicit in the Proustian reference in the title of my thesis, Choking on the madeleine, I find Proust’s passage about the experience of involuntary memory in In Search of Lost Time as one of those over-used citations. Here, Proust’s often referenced protagonist dips a petite madeleine into a cup of lime tea and experiences a surge of memory, and this passage that has become transformed from a paragraph of text within a larger body of fiction to a metaphor, a cliché, of memory to be used in a range of different contexts. The issue with uses of such metaphors is that these forms of expression are so well known that they tend rather to stimulate a sense of recognition than for deeper thought to occur.

A particular danger here is that the complexities of memory may be reduced to sets of established conventions of representation in art and in literature. In her recent article Snapshots, or: Visual Culture’s Clichés, Lynn Berger defines these conventions as clichés that define the way memory and photography are thought about and linked (2011 175-190). The Oxford Dictionaries define the term ‘cliché’ as a ‘phrase or opinion that is overused and betrays a lack of original thought’ (Oxford Dictionaries). Berger notes that clichés are not necessarily solely linguistic; they could include objects, images and other symbols (2011 182). Deleuze notes in Cinema 2: The Time Image, that the image is reduced to a cliché due

9 In their joint work What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari define philosophy, art, and science as three truly creative disciplines, or ‘three great forms’ of thought, that continuously tackle ‘chaos’ (1991/1994 197). They also propose the notion that while art and science may creatively use concepts – art doing so in order to create sensations – it is only philosophy that is capable of creating concepts (Roffe 2005a 294; Deleuze and Guattari 1991/1994 198).

10 In response to this and in the hope of avoiding the recognition of the familiar, I have gathered and included in my thesis a number of less frequently used passages from the more recent fictional writings that also speak of memory, ranging from the writings of Paul Auster to those of W.G. Sebald. These form passages into thought on memory, as alternatives to Proust’s overly referenced petite madeleine.
to its representational role, ability and purpose, but that its status as cliché is concealed by the major thought that produced and maintains it (1985/1989 20). The metaphors that have emerged between photography and memory, which Berger understands as clichés, include the idea of memory as a ‘container of old experiences’ and photography, in its assumed links with memory, as a mechanism for ‘freezing time’ and creating ‘souvenirs of experience’ (ibid. 180).

A further danger is that metaphors may come to denote an idea of memory as a graspable, static entity, or that they function as a form of shortcut to anything related to memory. For example, the mnemonic metaphor of the archive (a moment stored in the archives of memory), suggests a storage-like function of memory and a systematic – perhaps chronological – ordering of individual memories, separated and isolated, and searchable at will. The suggestion of the archive as memory has been questioned by theorists and historians, yet the metaphor is often used in writing and in creative practices. For example, Jacques Derrida notes in Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression that it is only through its exteriority to memory that an archive may be understood as an archive (1995 11); and in his work The Big Archive: Art from Bureaucracy Sven Spieker asserts his disagreement with what he sees as the ‘prevalent view’ of the modern digital archive as memory (2008 15). Spieker notes a similar discord with such viewpoints in the writings of the historian Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, whose position is made explicit when he states that: ‘[M]emory is not an archive, nor is an archive a memory bank. The documents in an archive are not part of memory; if they were, we should have no need to retrieve them; once retrieved, they are often at odds with memory’ (Spieker 2008 iv). Jens Brockmeier also questions the storage and archive metaphor, which he regards as dominant in current research, most overtly in his paper After the Archive: Remapping Memory (2010). However, the archive as a metaphor for memory appears in the recent works of writers such as Mary Bergstein (2010) and Elisabeth Reissner (2009), and in the visual practice of a range of artists – Christian Boltanski, Nancy Ann Coyne, Nico Dockx, Alasdair Hopwood, Ilya Kabakov, George Legrady, Rabih Mroué, Lorie Novak, and Fred Wilson, amongst others.

I believe this use of the metaphor of the archive is more about a desire to control memory, for memory to function as an archive, and concerns an anxiety of forgetting11. If only specific, remembered experiences of the past could be arranged out of the chaos of pastness, broken down into neat, individual memories that remained the same, in a linear order, nothing would be forgotten. As previously stated, I also believe the use of the metaphor indicates an attempt to grasp the incomprehensible through drawing parallels with better-known entities. Friedrich Nietzsche, in his critique of metaphors, finds that when ‘the thing itself’ is beyond understanding, the focal point becomes that of relationships between humans and perceptions, and a range of bold metaphors emerge to stand in for this ‘thing’ (Ansell Pearson and Large 2006 116). Over time, these metaphors are used in literature and other media, and may eventually, as Nietzsche suggests, come

11 Furthermore, this use may also be understood as a sign of the assumption that forgetting is the opposite of memory; that memory is placed in a binary opposition to forgetting.
to be ‘fixed, canonical, and binding’ (ibid. 117). I find the archive one such metaphor of memory, often used as a shortcut in writing and in art practices to signify memory. The archive is one of the many metaphors I question in my development of the memory-event. I have developed this as an alternative concept of memory rather than yet another metaphor through my practice-based research, and through the Deleuzian framework put forward by O’Sullivan (2010 196-204). I wish to critique existing metaphors and propose an alternative way of approaching the mnemonic, so that art practices may be pushed out of habitual uses of such metaphors and into new, as yet unrevealed forms of expression. The idea is to develop expressions that focus less on signification (what does it mean?) and more on a form of doing; less on the idea of Truth in memory and more on continuously changing perceptions of remembered events. The problem of relying on the metaphor in the communication of concepts is, as Nietzsche warns, that there is a danger of mistaking the metaphor for the idea or entity for which it stands; that ‘we forget that our perceptual metaphors are just that, metaphors, and we erroneously think that they give us things in themselves’ (Ansell Pearson and Large 2006 40). That is, memory could be mistaken in thought and in creative practices for its being like an archive (or any other commonly used analogy), beyond the metaphor, and the archive could erroneously be understood as the thing itself. In order to discuss memory, the thing itself – in writing, in thought, or in art – new approaches to thinking about memory are needed, which is partly what I set out to address in my practice-based research. In attempts at breaking with a dominant image of thought (memory), I place heavy emphasis on my critique of the metaphor as symptoms of this image of memory. This was chosen in order to allow for a re-thinking of memory to take place.12

An Image of Memory: Dominant Ideas Through Language and Thought

Within the context of this thesis, I wish to discuss the image of thought I am interrogating as an image of memory. I understand this image of memory as a dogmatic form of thought that ultimately, often inconspicuously, limits our approach to a deeper contemplation of memory and its functions. The image may be distinguished in past expressions of culture, science, language, art, and philosophy; clearly apparent at times, whilst only barely and vaguely sensed in other instances. Writing in Derrida’s Copy, Archive, Signature: A Conversation on Photography, Gerhard Richter discusses this image of thought in terms of a tradition of thinking about memory (Derrida 2000/2010 60). Richter understands this tradition as an inheritance in thought of its established ‘figures of discourse’ and ‘modes of argumentation’ (ibid.). Furthermore, he emphasises the need to remove inherited assumptions, proposing a complete re-consideration of memory (ibid.). Problematically, this image of memory – established and inherited notions of what memory supposedly is and where it is located, the experience of memory, its functions, what its properties are, and to what it is limited – appears still to be dominant and present, permeating to various

12 I presented critiques of metaphors of memory present in this thesis at the Portuguese Association for Anglo-American Studies’ Self, Memory and Expression conference in Portugal 2009. See Appendix III (p. 351).
degrees contemporary culture, thought, and creative expressions. In exploring the properties of this dominant image of memory and the past, I aim to discuss its residual affects in terms of both thought and art practices. The exploration forms a part of a cyclical, possibly repetitive motion that critically considers an issue and the related apparatuses supporting this image of thought, as well as their aim to maintain it. For Deleuze, this is an ‘extraction of a problem’ (Lecercle 2010 69), which in this thesis is the issue of a dominant image of memory. Engaging in such a critique of an image of memory is important, as it is applicable in establishing my concept of the memory-event.

I found *where to begin* in my interrogation of a dominant image of memory and the removal of presuppositions difficult. Perhaps the problem lies in the idea of a beginning – and its polar opposite, an end – as both assume points: fixed elements. Deleuze stresses the difficulty in questioning and removing commonly held ideas, presumptions, and dominant beliefs: ‘Where to begin in philosophy has always – rightly – been regarded as a very delicate problem, for beginning means eliminating all presuppositions’ (1968/2004 164). As a solution to the problem Deleuze and Guattari suggest that philosophical thinking should begin in the middle, with a plateau, inserting itself into the rhizomic13 space formed between multiplicities connected to other multiplicities, other plateaus inside other rhizomes (1980/2004 24). In writing about memory, the philosopher Edward Casey suggests a similar approach, given that ‘in the case of memory, we are always already in the thick of things’ (Olick *et al* 2011 11). The middle, a start-anywhere ‘continuous, self-vibrating region of intensities’, is a non-linear approach to thought, one that actively avoids ‘any orientation toward a culmination point or external end’ (ibid.). Beginning in the middle allows for a continuous process to take place, for a maximising of connections to occur, a circumvention of stasis and, ultimately, for potential new thought to emerge, from the middle.

Furthermore, beginning from the middle sets out to avoid and prevent assumptions of pre- and post- dichotomies, coordinates, fixed polarities and planted roots, insides and outsides, and a history constructed from a ‘sedentary point of view ... in the name of a unitary State apparatus’ (ibid. 25) by an image of thought. Beginning with this non-beginning, in the middle, is a deliberate act, an act of at times going-against-oneself or one’s presumed knowledge, an act that demands an intentional disregard for *a priori* understandings of the issue at hand, for presuppositions, and for our own common sense notions. One of Deleuze’s key influences, the Dutch seventeenth-century philosopher Baruch Spinoza, addressed this problem of where to begin, and warned that it is our own knowledge that limits us to ‘inadequate ideas’ (Buchanan 2000 5). Deleuze’s search for ‘adequate ideas’ means a disentanglement from set beliefs and ideologies, a start in the middle, and an aim for absolute freedom, an *act* of liberation, of thought (ibid. 6), however utopian such aims may be. Setting in motion such a process of the liberation of the concept of memory from dominant thought assumes an uprooting of prevailing, existing forms of thought and their associated forms of expression. That is, there will be a deliberate displacement of the

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13 For a definition of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the rhizome, see the Glossary in Appendix II (p. 348)
dominant image of thought that holds this concept in place. This displacement will occur through
critical interrogations of how memory is regarded and the forms of articulation supporting and
maintaining this form of thought. The concepts, presumptions, generalisations, linguistic terms,
and other forms of expression force into solidification that which is abstract.

Mapping Thought Through Language: A Critique of Metaphors

For the first time in his experience of writing reports, he discovers that words do not necessarily
work, that it is possible for them to obscure the things they are trying to say. Blue looks around
the room and fixes his attention on various objects, one after the other. He sees the lamp and says
to himself, lamp. He sees the bed and says to himself, bed... It will not do to call the lamp a bed,
he thinks, or the bed a lamp.

(Auster 1999 147-8)

Having explored and defined an image of thought, and how this concept can be understood in
relation to thought on memory, I shall now address metaphors of memory as symptoms of an
image of memory. I also want to highlight how these metaphors promulgate an image of thought.
‘Language is a map, not a tracing’ suggest Deleuze and Guattari in the fourth plateau, November 20
Through their discussion on language and allegory, they warn against investing metaphors with
any significant value, as these are ‘merely effects’ and are only ‘a part of a language when they
presuppose indirect discourse’ (1980/2004 85). However, the authors already express a certain
suspicion, what Lecercle describes as ‘hostility’ (2002 25), of metaphors in the very first paragraph
of their earlier work Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Deleuze and Guattari 1972/1983
9). When language presupposes ‘indirect discourse’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004 85), it
becomes an indicator, or a symptom of thought systems. This notion is evident in Deleuze’s Essays
Critical and Clinical (1993/1997a 177) as the discipline of literature forms a ‘symptomatology’, or
what Colebrook defines as ‘a way of diagnosing the language and styles which orient our thinking’
(2002 xxxii). In this context, metaphors may be understood as signs, symptoms, or the effects as
Deleuze and Guattari suggested (1980/2004 85), of a particular dominant image of thought, or
image of memory. Historically, the linguistic uses of metaphors of memory have led to a range of
diverse ideas, many of which have been listed and discussed in Douwe Draaisma’s14 Metaphors of
Memory (2000). These uses of metaphors, which I see as acquiescing to sets of conventions and
presumptions, not only fail to communicate the properties of memory, but also hinder or block
deeper thought regarding memory.

14 Professor Douwe Draaisma (Theory and History of Psychology at the University of Groningen) wrote his Master’s thesis, De
Metaforenmachine (1993) on the manner in which memory is has been discussed, focusing on the role of the metaphor in such
discussions. The thesis was eventually published in book form and translated into English as Metaphors of Memory: A History of
Ideas about the Mind (Draaisma 2000; 2010). Draaisma’s work is predominantly influenced by areas of psychology and provides
accounts of and traces, amongst others, Freudian, Behavioural and Cognitive ideas of memory back through history, linking concepts
of memory from a range of schools of psychology to various philosophical, technological, and literary sources.
The term *metaphor* suggests a *carrying across*, or a transfer of ideas, and performs the act of equating and equalling one entity with another, *exchanging* one for the other – assuming, as Deleuze and Guattari caution, ‘indirect discourse’ (1980/2004 85)\(^\text{15}\), or what Franz Kafka calls an ‘incoherent assumption’ that is ‘thrust like a board between the actual feeling and the metaphor of the description’ (Brod 1948/1964 155). Written in a diary in 1922, we find Kafka’s well-known rejection of the metaphor as he exclaims, ‘Metaphors are among many things which make me despair of writing’ (ibid. 398). In fact, Kafka spoke of a complete ‘elimination’ of all allegories, signs or symbols; an elimination that disperses of ‘barriers between words and things’, so that ‘words *become* things’\(^\text{16}\), and the tool for this deterritorialisation of words and things is ‘metamorphosis’ (Lecercle 2002 25), an emerging form, and a *becoming*.

The problem of the indirect discourse of the metaphor, Deleuzean writer Brian Massumi asserts, is that the metaphor is a linguistic act that ‘projects world-lines in advance … it foretraces’ (2011 119). That is, the metaphor presumes, guides thought in a particular direction, and therefore limits thought to that trajectory. The linguistic analogy discussed by Michel Foucault in *The Order of Things* creates connections between disparate elements; it ‘… makes possible the marvellous confrontation of resemblances across space; but it also speaks … of adjacencies, of bonds and joints’ (1966/2005 24). However, the power of these constructed relationships, these ‘hinges’ (ibid. 20), Foucault continues:

> ... [I]s immense, for the similitudes of which it treats are not the visible, substantial ones between things themselves; they need only be the more subtle resemblances of relations. Disencumbered thus, it can extend, from a single given point, to an endless number of relationships

(ibid.)

Linguistically, we as humans are dependent upon these forms of expression (Lakoff and Johnson 2003) – metaphors and analogies. The suggestions they carry across, the suggestion that they are capable of carrying across, the indirect discourse, may however, be deceptive. An indication of this may be detected in areas of writing that concern memory. The academic and psychologist Ulric Nesser provides a critique of metaphors in the chapter ‘Memory with a Grain of Salt’ in *Memory: An Anthology* (2008 80-88), in which he clearly communicates an understanding of the deceptive dangers of metaphors of memory as these suggest ‘levels of permanence and accuracy that memory does not really possess’ (ibid. 86). Examples of such suggestions are found in a range of historical and well as contemporary metaphors, from the memory-as-archive or the memory-storage room, to the memory-photograph or the memory-computer analogies (Draaisma 2000). Such expressions demonstrate that the simplification of, and therefore also the reduction of,

\(^{15}\) I have presented my research into metaphors at different national and international conferences. See Appendix III (pp. 351) for further detail

\(^{16}\) My emphasis
the often complex concepts or structures metaphors are designed to communicate presumes the interpretative capabilities of the ‘indirect discourse’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004 85) for which they are intended. Metaphors hence allow for the occurrence of confusions between content and expression to take place. It is therefore important to acknowledge and to question our usage of such metaphors, despite our linguistic dependence on them. A revision of traditional communication models that allow for such confusions may be a difficult if not a quixotic undertaking. It may, though, lead to an autonomy of concepts and systems with their own values, meanings, and distinctive structures.

Draaisma’s compact yet expansive *Metaphors of Memory* (2000) offers a wide overview of a range of known allegorical descriptions of memory, dating back to Antiquity and Aristotle. In my summary of these, having viewed a spectrum from the earliest to contemporary records, the development of metaphors of memory may be roughly illustrated as a looping of a few strands of ideas in the context of memory: images, the written word, architectural structures and spaces, and scientific materials or mechanical devices (see Fig. 4). These could comprise four basic categories containing recurring ideas and themes, and have since Antiquity been expressed in a variety of forms.
Among the earliest records of metaphors and theories of memory, memory is understood as a form of sensory imprint. Plato introduces in the fourth century BC the classic wax tablet metaphor in *Theaetetus*, where memories were thought of as being impressed into the wax of the soul, leaving a permanent *eikon* or image (Draaisma 2000 4-5). This metaphor was an extension of Plato’s teacher Socrates’ idea of memory as a ‘slab of wax’ internal to the soul, into which sensory perceptions are imprinted (Krell 1990 14). The idea was that the impressions could later be replayed and re-experienced through the activation of recollection (ibid.). It is not, though, made clear exactly how this activation would occur. Such discussion is for several reasons important in the history of theories of memory. Firstly, it serves as a backdrop to philosophical questions concerning perception and representation; however, it also formed the foundation of and affected subsequent theories of memory. The wax tablet metaphor returns in Aristotle’s theories of memory in *Of Memory and Reminiscence*, yet the latter is far more literal in his use; the wax is no longer a metaphor, whereas the soul *is now of* wax (ibid. 25). Here, memory contains actual duplicates of perceptions, ‘sensory copies’ (ibid. 28) transported from the heart, then conceived as the centre of memory (ibid. 46), to the brain by the *pneuma* [Greek: soul or spirit] – a fundamental element within physics and medicine in the fourth century BC (ibid. 25). Socrates also put forward a theory of an ‘internal scribe’ writing in the soul. His having done so initiated the idea of the problematic ‘memory trace’ still mentioned in the twentieth century and which led to research into the so-called *engram* or physical trace of memories in the cerebral matter (Draaisma 2000 4-5).

The ocularcentric metaphors of memory that first appeared in ancient Greek thought reflected also a notion of the experience of memory as a visual phenomenon likened to that of the act of viewing an image. This was one produced through procedures similar to those of imprinting or embossing via sensory perception (Ackrill 1981 67; Krell 1990 15). Furthermore, as signs or symptoms of particular values generated by an overarching image of thought – an image of memory – these metaphors echo Aristotle’s hierarchy of the senses, ranging from the most to the least important: vision, then hearing, smell, taste, and last of all, touch (Stewart 1999 20; Jay 1993 34-35). Such approaches and stratifications of thought contain implicit presuppositions that memory must derive from sense perception. The emphasis on sense perception is further inferred by limiting perception to five particular, defined and disparate senses, of which vision takes precedence. The experience of amalgamations of perceptions and the suggestion of an interminable multiplicity of forms of perception remain absent from such discussions.

Antiquity also presented architectural or compartmental theories of memory, including St Augustine’s metaphors of storehouses, treasure chambers, and palaces. St Augustine speaks of these notions, all anchored in the external world through mental visualisations of actual places, as essential in the shaping of an internal place, ‘an inner place – though it is wrong to speak of it as a place’ (1961 215), articulating and stressing the conditions of the metaphor used. Such expressions gave rise to a number of architecture-based metaphors, from temples
and churches, to castles and depots or stockrooms, all of which tend to assume a storage-like role for memory. Combined, they render this phenomenon devoid of other functions, or if not completely devoid then at best secondary. These kinds of metaphors are still in use today, including ideas of individual memories filed in the archives of memory or stored in memory banks.

The first three prevailing strands of thought remained dominant throughout the Middle Ages, and were superseded only by the mechanical, technical or scientific metaphors from the Enlightenment onwards, aside from a short interruption during the Romantic era\(^\text{17}\) (Draaisma 2000 75). The nebulous and ungraspable complexion of memory (Parr 2008 1) appears to have led to this wide range of metaphors in attempts to grasp, understand, and communicate its properties; Deleuze would have claimed that such linguistic devices emerge from a ‘reaction to a non-language material that it transforms’ (Lecercle 2010 72), turning the abstract into something ‘utterable’ (ibid.). However, it is questionable whether, through the use of the metaphor, we have indeed come to greater cultural or scientific understandings of memory and of our experiences of the past.

Many of the fundamental elements of early metaphors of memory such as the wax tablet or contained spaces re-emerge continuously throughout history. For example, Thomas Aquinas still refers to the ‘impressions into wax’ in his work on mnemonics the thirteenth century; Geoffrey Chaucer links storage, memory, and writing in his notions of memory as a monastery cell (Draaisma 2000 30); Giambattista Vico uses spatial metaphors in his treatment of memory in the eighteenth century (Carter 2009 25). Jacques Derrida notes how Sigmund Freud’s investigations into the human mind and memory, which in 1925 led to the metaphor of the Mystic Writing Pad, reveals a tradition in thought of memory as a form of writing or inscription, earlier described as in wax (1995 14). The Mystic Writing Pad applied by Freud as an analogy for how memories are created was a form of writing and drawing device. This device consisted of a base of wax, covered by a celluloid sheet. When writing onto the device using a stylus the dark wax could be seen through the celluloid sheet; when the sheet was lifted off the wax base, the traces on it would no longer be visible.\(^\text{18}\) For Freud, the slab of wax represented the unconscious, and inscriptions onto the celluloid sheet symbolised impressions and perceptions of experience of the world external to the mind. The traditions in thought to which Derrida refers are the ideas of writing and tracing in the wax of the soul proposed by Socrates and Aristotle, as seen (above) in this Juncture of my thesis (Krell 1990 14, 25).

\(^{17}\) The Romantic era produced a set of metaphors of memory that linked human memory to the terrains of nature: the aphototic zones or depths of the ocean, gorges and abysses, brooks and creeks, forests and woodlands, even the landscape itself, became mnemonic symbolic elements in an age that wished to highlight and further humankind’s relationship with nature (Draaisma 2000 75, 97). Furthermore, ideas related to polarity, electricity and magnetism of the natural world as well as focal points in contemporaneous eighteenth- to early nineteenth-century scientific research were of particular interest (Batchen 1997 152-153)

\(^{18}\) References to Freud’s Mystic Writing Pad are still present in some contemporary studies in psychology, including those of Matthew Battles, Mary Bergstein, Joanne Morra, and Todd Samuel Presner. Furthermore, an upgraded version of the Mystic Writing Pad as a metaphor for the mind and for memory can be found in recent popular media, discussing computer tablets and iPads as updated versions of Freud’s metaphor (Rosen 2013).
Another example of a re-emergence of early metaphors of memory, is Robert Fludd’s seventeenth-century *Theatre of Memory*, based on the Elizabethan ‘public theatre’ (Yates 1966 51) and possibly on Shakespeare’s Globe Theatre (Draaisma 2000 43), which used *the stage* as a metaphor for memory as it contained the various props, narratives, and architectural elements of an actual theatre. In a conversation between two female characters in his 1895 play *The Importance of Being Earnest* (2000 34), Oscar Wilde discussed the personal diary as a container for memory, reverting once more to the Socratic idea of the scribe writing onto the soul as onto a slab of wax. Notions of mnemic storage were also noted in the writings of seventeenth-century philosophers, for instance, and most notably, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and David Hume (Krell 1990 75-82). However, their theories addressed *storage* not in a metaphorical, rather in an actual, sense. Locke and Hobbes detested the use of the metaphor to the extent that they regarded it an ‘abuse of speech’ (ibid. 82). Both Locke and Hobbes maintain that perceptions are impressed into memory, and the concept of the wax tablet remained. Locke claims that ideas, reflections, and perceptions are stamped onto the soul, and that these impressions are stored in memory, the internal ‘repository for ideas that have ceased to be’ (ibid. 75-79). Locke further suggested that ideas and perceptions may be experienced anew, through a form of what we could today discuss as a cinematic ‘screening’ of ‘dormant pictures’ (ibid. 78); it is not, however, clear how this ‘screening’ would take place.

In a recent article addressing the effects of an increasingly widespread reliance on the Internet and online communication, memories are described in a rather traditional sense as being ‘inscribed into our biological memory banks’ (Wegner and Ward 2013). This is reminiscent both of Socratic thought of the *inscription* of memories in the soul (Draaisma 2000 25), and of St Augustine’s mnemic metaphors of storage facilities (ibid. 27-28). The technology writer Jemima Kiss uses a similar analogy in another article from the same year, and appears to confuse the act of recollection with the storage of digital family photographs in her use of the phrase ‘visual memory bank’ (Kiss *et al.* 2013). The use of the term ‘biological memory banks’ (Wegner and Ward 2013) suggests correlations in thought between human memory and the computer, as the expression *memory bank* is used both in relation to computer storage and in research into human memory. In addition, the article also puts forward the concern that the Internet could become a form of replacement for memory as well as a form of mediation of individual memories (ibid.).

19 However, while the character Miss Prism states that ‘Memory… is the diary that we all carry about with us’, Cecily answers that memory also ‘usually chronicles the things that have never happened’ (2000 34), exposing Wilde’s thoughts on the fluidity and uncertainty of memory.
The Photographic Metaphor of Memory

As I have a particular disagreement with metaphors of memory suggesting that the phenomenon of memory is a purely visual experience, and thus equate photographs or photographic processes with memories, I shall focus more heavily on photographic metaphors of memory. These forms of metaphors came into use in the first half of the nineteenth century, soon after the introduction and commercialisation of the photographic process (Draaisma 2000 69, 104). The reflective, mirror-like image created by the early photographic process of the Daguerreotype was described, for example, by the American writer Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1859 as a ‘mirror with a memory’ (ibid. 119). Having survived a range of successive metaphors, photographic metaphors of memory still remain in everyday language as commonly used and generally accepted concepts in contemporary Western cultures. The scrutiny of these implied comparisons derives from my fundamental disagreement with such equations, as well as their linguistic employment and prevalence. The problematic use of such metaphors not only suggests an erroneous understanding of memory itself as a purely visual phenomenon, however, the use of such metaphors also shows a misconstruction of the visual medium, the visual experience, the mnemonic experience, as well as practices of photography. The indicated similitude results in an evocation of memory not as something fluid and fleeting, moving and ever-changing, spatial and extensive, private and subjective, ambiguous and ungraspable (Parr 2008 1), or even as an experience or event in itself. Instead, it indicates a notion of memory as a tactile object with static and flat characteristics, machine-like in its operations and ocularcentric in nature, accessible and public, with a content that invites – or, rather, demands – interpretation.

Metaphors of memory that refer to lens-based media and the visual experience appeared long before the invention of the fixed photographic image. For instance, associations between memory and the visual phenomena produced by the pre-photographic optical device known as the Camera Obscura were soon drawn after its invention. Photo-historian Geoffrey Batchen includes a William Cowper poem from 1785 in his discussion on such associations, as a contemporaneous expression of the desire to make permanent the transient images inside the device: ‘To arrest the fleeing images that fill / The mirror of the mind, and hold them fast...’ (Cowper 1785 in Batchen 1997/1999 84). The drive to fix the ephemeral images projected inside the Camera Obscura inspired a multitude of both sequential and parallel scientific research projects in the 18th and early 19th centuries, the result of which was the photograph (Batchen 1997/1999). The assumed relationships between memory and photographic images became further solidified in language and thought in the early stages of the nineteenth century as the research into the stabilisation of

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20 Metaphors that for example see the photographic album as a form of preservation of memory, or expressions such as ‘photographic memory’, ‘flashbulb memories’, ‘memory images’, ‘I can picture it as if it were yesterday’, and similar phrases.

21 Other successive metaphors not commonly mentioned today include: memory as a phonograph (Draaisma 2000 69-70), a switchboard at a telephone exchange (ibid. 84), a writing-pad (ibid. 3-4, 8), or a hologram (ibid. 4, 129, 160, 168-73).

22 Professor of the history of photography and contemporary art Geoffrey Batchen (CUNY) points out in his book Burning with Desire: the Conception of Photography (1997/1999) that the photograph as the product of these various research projects cannot be attributed per se to a single individual. In support of this notion, he provides a list of 24 names, all of whom claim to have been ‘the inventor of photography’ (ibid. 35) (Batchen n/d).
these images came closer to producing what we now understand as photographs (Draaisma 2000 69, 104). Nearly a century later, photographs were still understood as ‘involuntary mirror images or memories’, or ‘traces’ that had been recorded from ‘the continuum of lived experience’ (Bergstein 2010 15). However, these associations were not without their critics; in the 19th century, writer Johann Huber and psychologist Théodule Ribot were quick to oppose any photographic relations to memory (Draaisma 2000 123, 125). However, the metaphor in language survived.23

Photographic or image-based metaphors of memory, the photograph-as-memory or memory-as-image place a particular emphasis on the visual perception or the visual experience of lived moments24. What I see as an inadequacy in the photographic metaphor of memory lies in this ocularcentricity, its stasis, and its failure to account for many of memory’s characteristics – only a chosen few. Furthermore, since a majority of metaphors of memory are based on already existing objects, systems, concepts or narratives, they too appear inadequate, or as Deleuze may have expressed it, false (1968/1991 61). The photographic metaphor is seen through and supported by terminology in the context of remembering, including expressions such as picturing or visualising, memory images, and in our mind’s eye, and photographs are often referred to in everyday language as material memories, linguistically and cognitively blurring the line between physical objects and metaphysical ideas. The blurring of such lines not only limits notions of memory and the past to those objects; it also burdens objects and media such as photographic images with expectations of mnemonic characteristics and abilities to embody memory. Rather than a purely visual event, Massumi instead discusses the lived experience as a ‘fusion’ of the ‘between of different senses; the experience is not in one sense or another ... it is not cross-modal, it is amodal’ (2011 74). Namely, it is an experiential, multisensory event from which we emerge. This is what Deleuze discusses as ‘lived abstraction’; the ‘event of sense-relation’ (ibid.). With this idea in mind, the photographic metaphor appears to present a particularly constricted notion of memory; a notion that implies a purely visual experience, and one that suggests an embodiment of memory.

23 The dangerous antagonist in Paul Auster’s City of Glass (The New York Trilogy), Boston Stillman, aka The Professor, discusses the loss of meaning in language, calling for a revision of expression: ‘When things were whole, we felt confident that our words could express them. But little by little these things have broken apart, shattered, collapsed into chaos. And yet our words have remained the same. They have not adapted themselves to the new reality. Hence, every time we speak of what we see, we speak falsely, distorting the very thing we are trying to represent. It’s made a mess of everything. But words, as you yourself understand, are capable of change. The problem is how to demonstrate this ... [the thing] has changed into something else. The word, however, has remained the same. Therefore, it can no longer express the thing. It is imprecise; it is false; it hides the thing it is supposed to reveal’ (Auster 1999 77).

24 Ocularcentric assertions can be found in the writings of Gordon Fyfe and John Law, who argue that we mainly learn about the external through the visual (Rose 2001 6), and John Berger, suggesting that ‘seeing comes before words’ (1972 7). Others placing much emphasis on the ocularcentric, listed in Gillian Rose’s Visual Methodologies (2001 7-8), include Chris Jenks in his suggestions that the world is a ‘seen’ phenomenon (1995), Richard Rorty in his claims that knowledge is gained through vision (1980), and Paul Virilio in his insistence on that the current world is caught in a ‘vision machine’ (1994).
Interrogations of Metaphors through Practice

When I first began to explore expressions of memory and to question photographic metaphors, I did so through carrying out practice-based research into family photographs, into that which is left out of the camera’s viewfinder, and that which is left out of the album altogether. Looking through my personal family photographs, I realised that I did not – and do not – understand these images as material memories, a suggestion often made in discussions on family photographs. I often remember the events at which the photographs were taken. I also remember the subjects, and often the objects depicted. What I came to understand as I was studying my family photographs was that while I recognised aspects of these depictions, such as the represented events, subjects or objects, the photographs did not function as or behave like memories. I seemed to remember the various events differently from what these still images presented. I found the motionlessness of the photographs contradictory to the flow of the depicted events as they unfolded in my memory, then I also questioned the conventional focus of these images in terms of subject matter: why the inclusion of photograph after photograph of posed groups of people seated at tables or standing together in gardens, or isolated individuals in poses only ever seen in photographs?

What these photographic images came to highlight for me was a number of prevailing perspectives; perceptions of how memory is experienced, of what is deemed a culturally valuable reason to photograph, let alone include in the family album, and of how these photographs came to be composed. One presumption seemed to be that memory is the result of sensory impressions, which I questioned, asking whether one was unable to remember an atmosphere, a thought, an emotion, or an insight if there were no, for example, visual, auditory or tactile impression. In this context, I noted an emphasis on vision as the primary sense in memory, as well as beliefs in correlations between the optics of the human eye and those of the camera’s lens; linking photography to seeing and, via this vision, directly linking photography to memory.

Looking at and thinking about my family photographs also drew attention to art practices that involve themes of memory or incorporate family photographs, and of how these themes and images – and their meanings – are apprehended through works of art. Throughout the early stages of my research, I noticed a misperception (among my peers, tutors, friends, family, and visitors to exhibitions where I was showing my work) that my inability to recognise my family photographs as memories equated to not remembering my childhood. As previously stated I do, though, remember my childhood, and I remember most of the events at which the photographs in my family album were taken. An extension of this misperception of not remembering was the assumption that my supposed lack of memories constituted a case of repressed memories, seen as an indication of having suffered a traumatic childhood. I began to wonder where these assumptions came from.

25 This attitude is present in the works of writers such as Kate Douglas, Julia Hirsh, Marianne Hirsch, Sarah Kember, Annette Kuhn, Marita Sturken, and Dylan Trigg.
Fig. 5 Ça-n’a-pas-été (album), colour photograph, 2005, 15 cm x 10 cm C-type print

Fig. 6 Ça-n’a-pas-été (album), colour photograph, 2005, 15 cm x 10 cm C-type print

Fig. 7 Ça-n’a-pas-été (album), colour photograph, 2005, 15 cm x 10 cm C-type print

Fig. 8 Ça-n’a-pas-été (album), colour photograph, 2005, 15 cm x 10 cm C-type print
as in fact I had a very ordinary childhood. There were no major disturbances or traumatic events as I was growing up. I was also more interested in memory in itself, and am not convinced that memories are the results of either trauma or elation. In order to prevent such misperceptions, I needed to clarify my ideas further and to place the focus on what really interested me – that is, questioning relationships between family photographs and the subjective experience of memory. I began by reading about memory and the familial image in the writings of Roland Barthes, Marianne Hirsch (1997; 1999), and Marjorie Perloff (1995). I explored Annette Kuhn’s methods of ‘memory work’ in *Family Secrets: Acts of Memory and Imagination* (2002), and read Valerie Walkerdine’s analysis of her frequently referenced *Bluebell Fairy* photograph in the essay *Behind the Painted Smile* (1991), which highlights the way in which photographs may conceal rather than reveal the reality of trauma and neglect. Both works, as well as the writings of Marita Sturken (1991), Catherine Keenan (1998), Elizabeth Edwards (1999; 2004) and Julia Hirsch (1981), seem to reveal the authors’ beliefs in memory as an entity situated, as Sarah Kember describes it, ‘between the particular subject who remembers, and the particular object that stimulates the remembrance’ (2008 177).

I began to wonder how, if this is indeed the case, an object may be understood as a memory. Although such perspectives acknowledge the fragility inherent in the understanding of the photographic image, these kinds of approaches to familial and personal photographs either rely on that very fragile relationship between the remembering subject and the image as object, or on the idea that because of the similarities in conventions and framing of familial photography, one person should be able to recognise themselves and their family in the family photographs of others. I would claim that we do not recognise ourselves and our families as such; we recognise only the photographic conventions. Wishing to find out whether the familial customs and practices of photography held any answers to my questions about relationships between the photographic image and memory, I began to investigate these conventions. I explored the conventions by examining the construction of the family album and the structure of the photographs included in such albums. I looked at Jo Spence’s (re-)staged photographs in her 1979 work *Beyond the Family Album*, Ralph Eugene Meatyard’s peculiar fictional album *The Family Album of Lucybelle Crater* from the early 1970s, and Gillian Wearing’s *Self-portrait* series from 2003. Wearing features in her own series, wearing masks, in uncanny self-portraits of herself as a child, or as various family members. Around this time, and prior to my PhD research, I also started working on a photographic project focusing on ideas of editing, construction, representations of the self in the album, entitled *Ça-n’a-pas-été (album)* (see Figs. 5-8). My idea for this project was to create a form of fictitious personal album, in an approach to some extent similar to that of the Irish artist Trish Morrissey in her photographic series *Seven Years*. Like Spence, Meatyard and Wearing, Morrissey’s work forms a kind of fabricated album, where the artist herself appears alongside her sister as various members – female and male – of a family, or perhaps any family. Their roles and

26 Barthes noted in *Camera Lucida* that photographs are not memories: equally importantly, Barthes added that the photograph ‘actually blocks memory, quickly becomes a counter-memory’ (2000 91). I shall return to this suggestion on p.51 of this Juncture of my thesis.
characters change, however, the visual language of the photographs is consistent with that of the traditional personal or family album. Though created in 2004, the mise-en-scène and clothing visible in Seven Years [referring to the age gap between Morrissey and her sister] are those of the fashions and styles of the 1970s and 1980s. A date and a year form the title of each image in the series, such as July 22nd 1972, January 25th, 1979, and October 1st, 1987, which further reinforces the visual references to these two decades present in the photographs. In my series Ça-n’a-pas-été (album), I also appear as the main subject [as a main subject, any main subject], having photographed myself in a range of different places – in a domestic space, travelling, getting married – using a long shutter-release cable. The shutter-release cable is visible in the resulting photographs, as I wished to place emphasis on the construction of not only the images in Ça-n’a-pas-été (album), but in any personal or family album. This project was also where I could begin to explore how one presents oneself to the camera for images intended for the album, including the presentation of oneself for oneself and of oneself to possible others.

Judith Williamson traces the origins of the photographic habits and conventions of the family photograph back to the late nineteenth century, when the general public began to photograph themselves and their families (1994 238). The creation of the familial image then began to occur outside the professional photographer’s studio. The role of the studio photographer was largely replaced by that of the amateur photographer, often a family member, and photographic norms and conventions were enforced and encouraged through advertising (ibid.). The general public also learned how to portray themselves as a family in front of the camera by looking at representations of other families (ibid. 237). The family album also became a vessel through which families exercise their needs to provide proof of having reached culturally valuable milestones, and the need to externalise and make visible a sense of familial connectedness and happiness (Chalfen 1987 8). Williamson also puts forward the argument that these forms of portrayal of the family generate a ‘systematic misrepresentation of childhood and family life’ (Williamson 1994 239). Within the family unit, photographs are more often than not taken by a parent. This may affect the manner in which the children portrayed understand themselves and their past from their family album because the images are, as Williamson put it, ‘constructed entirely by others’ (ibid. 241). However, although the photographic image may have been taken by a parent, nowadays – in an era when the camera has become an accepted part of family life – the subject portrayed has also learned how to present themselves in front of the lens, and are hence partially in control of their own image. That is, the subject knows the process and the purpose of the familial image; it is to be looked back upon possibly by oneself and potential others.

Roland Barthes notably discussed in Camera Lucida (2000 10-12) the experience of being photographed – or being knowingly photographed, to be precise – and the act of posing. He describes this event as a form of metamorphosis. In front of the camera and prior to the exposure of the photograph, Barthes, conscious of the ‘social game’ of the ‘photographic ritual’ (ibid. 11),
poses and transforms himself ‘into an image’ (ibid. 10). That is to say, Barthes presents not himself as himself to the camera; rather, he offers the imagined image that he wishes to correspond with his actual self. It is an image that he understands as ‘the advent of myself as other’ (ibid. 12). The posing subject is conscious of the meaning of the countdown to smile, of the customary expectation of meeting the gaze of the photographer (via the lens of the camera), and of the act of presenting oneself as an image to the camera. That same subject is also well aware of the consequences of rebelling against these ‘social games’ (ibid. 11); the many rejected and hidden photographs of myself as a teenager that never made it into the album may be understood as potential signs of this – stereotypically angry, returned gazes, resentful body language, or stubborn refusals to face the camera (and my mother). While these processes of photographing and editing, rituals, and considerations of the image of oneself and other family members in front of the camera may cause a form of false image of family life (Williamson 1994 239), an image in which there are no rifts, tears, tensions or disagreements, this is not the conflict I had, or have, with the assumed link between photographs and memory.

I wanted to study forms of self-(re)presentation and readings of personal or family photographs in Ça-n’a-pas-été (album), to emphasise the ‘social games’ discussed by Barthes (2000 11) and the practices of editing, selecting and presenting the photographic images (as results of these ‘social games’ and conventions). This was an important exploration in terms of my thinking. However, I also knew I was moving within well-known territories and did not feel that I was reaching far enough beyond the known into the more pertinent territories of representations of memory and assumed relationships between the photographic image and the subjective experience of memory.

This initial research came together in an installation entitled Ça-n’a-pas-été [this/that has-not-been], and consisted of three elements: my made-up personal album Ça-n’a-pas-été (album) (see Figs. 5-8) created using a long shutter-release cable visible in each photograph containing a human subject, a slideshow of actual family photographs from which I had crudely cut out myself (see Fig. 9), and a set of domestic furniture severed in half, seemingly cut off by an imaginary viewfinder (see Figs. 10-11). The title of the exhibition was a play on Barthes’ concept of the ça-a-été (this/that-has-been); what Barthes defines as that which one cannot contest in photography – that what Barthes calls the ‘necessarily real thing’ (2000 76) was positioned in front of a camera at a point in time, making the photographic image ‘a certificate of presence’ (ibid. 87). The actual or material quality or character of this recorded presence of a ‘real thing’ cannot, however, be certified.27 The title of the exhibition hence alluded to and further reinforced the idea of the constructed qualities of family and personal photographic albums.

27 As can be understood through photographic works by artists who deliberately and playfully displace assumed perceptions of the ça-a-été of the image and leaving the viewer to wonder what, exactly, has-been? Practices taking such approaches to image-making may include those of artists such as Joan Fontcuberta / Pere Formiguera, Thomas Demand and James Casebere whose photographic works depict entirely constructed environments and scenes.
I do not see myself as a photographer yet I am fascinated by photographs, and use photographic images in my art practice. Photographs regularly appear as prints, projections, parts of films, and parts of my installations. I am drawn to the seeming contradictions between the visual richness of the photographic image and the ambiguities of its circumstances. That is, I am intrigued by how the photographic image appears to contain vast amounts of information, while simultaneously remaining fundamentally vague, relying heavily on subjective interpretations or understandings of the situation in which the image was created, and rarely guaranteeing much beyond the ça-a-été.

I wanted to explore these interests in relation to the family album, and to consider how photographs in such albums may both show and conceal the history of the family they are in some ways designed to disclose – not necessarily negatively. I started questioning the way in which some themes of memory in art practices that at that time appeared to dominate memory discourse. As highlighted by Andreas Huyssen, these include themes of childhood trauma, neglect, abuse, amnesia and repressed memories, the institution of the family, or the Holocaust. I wondered how it is possible to make works of art about memory that are not loaded with such themes, or

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28 Walter Benjamin quotes Berthold Brecht in A Small History of Photography in his discussion on the questionable ability of the photographic image on its own to convey meaning: ‘Less than ever does the mere reflection of reality reveal anything about reality. A photograph of the Krupp Works or the AEG tells us next to nothing about these institutions’ (Brecht quoted in Benjamin 1978 255). Brecht gives this example of a photograph of the German Krupp works munitions factory, a building of which a viewer would need a contextual understanding in order for her/him to appreciate its meaning. Without an appreciation of that context, the ‘reality’ Brecht speaks of may not be directly comprehended through the visual means of the photographic image alone. To Brecht, this reality is not in the brick building as such; rather, it is the combination of the details of the organisation, background, and the political, industrial, and economic power of the Krupp Works.

29 I have noticed that such themes of memory still appear to dominate the areas in which they are brought up and discussed, a dominance also noted by Prof Astrid Erll in her recent book Memory in Culture (2011 80). The focus on these themes may be reflected in the works of artists whose work is about memory, as well as in publications, conferences and other research projects about memory. Recent and upcoming conferences also appear to focus on relationships between memory and trauma, abuse, and the post-memory of the Holocaust. To name a few, these include the conferences The Future of Trauma and Memory Studies: Challenging Interpretive and Theoretical Boundaries (The Future of Trauma and Memory Studies 2013), Recollection, Retribution, Reconciliation: Postmemory and Justice in a Transnational Age (Center for Global Studies 2012) at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the 2013 Spaces of Memory in Comparative Perspective: Performing Life in Former Sites of Suffering and Death research event at the University of London (Raphael Samuel History Centre 2013), and the 2014 Gendered Memories of War and Political Violence conference at Sabancı University, Istanbul (Petö and Gül Altınay 2013).
not understood as being related to such themes. What about memories of the mundane and the everyday, what about memories of a minute ago, what about memories of thoughts and the unrepresentable? Can or should one not make work about such memories? These were issues that eventually led to further reservations about metaphors, clichés and representations of memory, about memories that exist yet have no physical representation, and about how ideas of memory may be mediated through an art practice. These were also the very questions that led to my involvement in further research in the form of PhD studies and in this thesis, investigating how ideas of memory may be re-thought through an art practice, how an artist may make work about the experience of personal memory without the burden of the extended themes of trauma or neglect, and how one may make work about un-represented memories without the use of re-stagings or re-enactments.

In her essay *Photographs as Objects of Memory* photo-historian Elizabeth Edwards highlights the problematic dilemmas of equating the mnemonic experience with photographs, and warns that despite our personal insistences of thinking about the photographic image as a container of memory, it is not in fact a ‘window on the past’ (Kwint et al. 1999 223). Czech philosopher and photo-theorist Vilém Flusser further points out the problematic issue of erroneously considering photographs as ‘frozen events’, as these representations, as Flusser puts it, ‘substitute scenes for events’ (Flusser 2000 2). This suggestion of the freezing of a moment is present in the works of numerous writers on photography – for instance, Thierry de Duve discusses the photograph as a form of ‘suspension of time’ (de Duve 2007 110); Sandra Plummer talks about photography’s ability to ‘freeze and preserve time’ (Plummer 2012); and Susan Sontag sees photographs as slices: a ‘slice of time’ (Sontag 1977 17), a ‘slice of space’ (ibid. 22), a ‘slice of life’ (ibid. 54), a ‘slice of the world’ (ibid. 69). Aleida Assmann understands photographs as representations of memories (Assmann 2010 36), while Elisabeth Reissner discusses the ‘photographic memory’ of archives (Reissner 2009), and John Szarkowski describes photographs as containing a ‘parcel of time’ (Szarkowski 2003 101).

The artist Hiroshi Sugimoto also asserts that photography is process of ‘fossilization of time’, through which memories are imprinted and recorded (PBS 2005), and Peter Wollen discusses photographs as having the ability to preserve elements of past moments, fossilised ‘like flies in amber’ (Wells 2003 76). Sugimoto makes it explicit that he understands the medium as a replica of memory, and as a ‘system of saving memories … a time machine in a way to preserve the memory, to preserve time’ (MOCA 2010). The artist Shuli Sadae states in an interview about her 2012 *Reconfiguring Memory* work 2012 that a photograph is always about memory (Sadae 2012), while the photographer Nicolas Dhervillers understands his own practice as operating through an ‘appropriation of cultural memory, of photographic memory’ (Rothman 2012). The distorted visuals of corrupted digital image files are put forward as explanations of errors in human memory in the artist David Szauder’s recent series of visual images entitled *Failed Memory* (Szauder 2013).
Szauder asserts that ‘our brains store away images to retrieve them later, like files stored away on a hard drive. But when we go back and try to re-access those memories, we may find them to be corrupted in some way’ (ibid.). Numerous assumptions may be revealed through Szauder’s work and statement.

The assumptions made are that there are correlations between photography and memory, that memory is a purely visual phenomenon, that memory functions as a form of storage [in the brain], that the human brain is computer-like, and that memories changing over time (as memories may do) means they are damaged or infected. These metaphors of memory and approaches to photography as a way of a freezing of time and storing memories are also present in art critic Sean O’Hagan’s discussion on the artist Carrie Mae Weems, to whose work O’Hagan refers as a form of ‘still theatre’ which also serves as a ‘repository of memory, suffering and struggle’ (2010). The use of such metaphors reflects the seventeenth-century ideas of memory that developed from Fludd’s *Theatre of Memory* (Yates 1966 51) and from Locke’s suggestion of memory as a literal storage-like repository of recollections (Krell 1990 75-9). I find it important to mention these recent uses of metaphors of and discussions about memory, as these indicate that the way memory is understood and referred to – as static, photographic, storage-like, a preservation – through metaphors is still part of current thought and language.

In a recent publication, art historian Mary Bergstein discusses the relationships between photographs and memory and by doing so reveals presuppositions of correlations between photographic images and memory. More problematically, Bergstein appears to see the two as interchangeable (2010 3, 5, 9). She states early on that photographs are ‘analogous to diverse kinds of memories, fantasies, or dreams (ibid. 15) and that they appear to imitate ‘the mental phenomena of memories and dreams’ (ibid. 9). Bergstein claims that the understanding of photographs as memory images is essential to our reading of art (ibid. 18). In such situations the flattening of space-time relationships in the form of photographs, or what Flusser identifies as ‘meta-codes’, demands a particular mode of interpretation: a negotiation or reconciliation between the human mind and the ‘vibratory blocks of space-time’ as Deleuze calls the ‘exterior milieu’ (Lorraine 2005 253) in which we find ourselves (Flusser 2000 5). Similar concerns regarding photographic images are seen in the writings of Dr Damian Sutton, who questions what elements of past-ness and time these representations are capable of expressing (Coulter-Smith 2006 67). This past, as seen in a Deleuzean continuous process of becoming, continuously connecting and discarding *everything in every moment*, may find itself outside of the represent-able. From this perspective, the suggestion of photographs as representations, or even embodiments, of memories is contradictory, highlighting the need for alternative approaches to thinking about memory and photography.
There are dominant strands of photographic theory that discuss and critically interrogate relationships between photographs and memory. Batchen’s book *Forget Me Not* (2004) reflects on some of these crucial discussions on photograph-memory connections in critical writings on photography, and stresses that while such connections are continuously drawn and assumed, photographic theorists have disputed these, in particular Roland Barthes:

Some of photography’s most insightful critics have argued that photography and memory do not mix, that one even precludes the other... [Roland] Barthes, for example, has claimed that ‘not only is the Photograph never, in essence, a memory... but it actually blocks memory, quickly becomes a counter-memory’... for Barthes, it seems, memory is not as much image as sensation.

(Batchen 2004 15)

Photographs hinder memory, Barthes suggests (1980/2000 91), in a similar manner to my proposition that metaphors obstruct rather than facilitate, transmit or carry across thought. Furthermore, the ‘sensation’ Batchen mentions, as something different from ‘image’ (2004 15), is further explored in Barthes’ seminal work *Camera Lucida* (2000) in his discussion on Marcel Proust’s *À la Recherché du Temps Perdu* and Proust’s dissatisfaction with photographic images. Proust’s often referenced protagonist experiences surges of involuntary memories of his past from the taste and texture perceived while consuming a tea-saturated *petite madeleine* (2003 50); here, the experience is overpoweringly nostalgic and sensual – in place of the image, textures, flavours and scents coalesce to form a *sensation*. This experience, triggered by what Deleuze in the chapter ‘The Secondary Role of Memory’ in *Proust and Signs* calls a ‘sensuous sign’, is a sign that demands ‘reading’, interpretation; hence, the *petite madeleine* in the case of Proust becomes synonymous with the protagonist’s associations with Combray (1964/2000 52-66).

This *sensation* derives ultimately from a sense of longing and desire for that to which one cannot physically return. As Barthes notes towards the end of *Camera Lucida*, ‘I cannot penetrate, cannot reach into the Photograph. I can only sweep it with my glance, like a smooth surface’ (2000 106). With the notion of the *sensation* in mind, Batchen notes: ‘To induce the full, sensorial experience of involuntary memory, a photograph must be transformed. Something must be done to the photograph to pull it (and us) out of the past and into the present’ (2004 94). This *something* may take the form of personal narratives, an identification drawn with that image and its contents. However, such links are inherently fragile, impermanent, shifting, and difficult to transfer or to communicate. The photograph as a ‘sensuous sign’ (Deleuze 1964/2000 52) to the past, a *monument*, commands reading; in relation to this, I once more question the suggested status of the photograph as memory.

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30 Barthes quotes Proust in the second half of *Camera Lucida*, who found the force of thought more powerful in terms of recollection than the triggers of photographic images; in fact, Proust found photographic images detrimental to the ability to remember a person – that these portraits came in the forms of ‘photographs of a being before which one recalls less of that being than by merely thinking of him or her’ (2000 63).
The monument – a word derived from the Latin *monere*, ‘to remember’ (Thanem 2001 31) – imposes a form of reading based on a shared cultural understanding of the concept. Deleuze and Guattari, however, use the term monument in considering works of art in their joint work *What is Philosophy?* (1991/1994). Here, monument is understood as a ‘compound of created sensations... preserved in itself’ (1991/1994 164, 176), not for the past, but for the future (ibid. 176). For Deleuze and Guattari all artworks to function as monuments (1991/1994 167), however, as opposed to the memorial-monument, these summon not memory but ‘present sensations that owe their sensations only to themselves’ (ibid. 168), and encourage acts of fabulation (ibid.). Therefore, in place of, and perhaps in opposition to, imposed forms of readings of the memorial-monument, works of art form blocs of ‘percepts, affects and... sensations’, becomings that can be sensed, rather than read (ibid. 176, 177).

Traditionally the family album, as a readable memorial-monument is, sociologist Don Slater suggests, a configuration through which ‘we construct ourselves for and through images’ (1995 134), and he sees the editing of this album as a form of ‘operation on memory’ (ibid.). Furthermore, Adrian Parr notes in *Memorial Culture and Deleuze* that monumentalisation of the past is a form of *immobilisation*; it fixes the memory of this past, denies it activity or movement, and limits it to certain interpretations (Parr 2008 7-8). This may partly explain my disagreement with the idea of equating photographs with memories. Firstly, these types of images in my family album do not reflect my subjective experience of memories of the events they supposedly represent; secondly, the immobilisation through monumentalisation or representation causes an absence of the fluidity of experienced events that stimulates conflicts of memory. These objects, heavily loaded with familial values and sentiments, *demand* recognition. As Deleuze suggests, the object may be a primary demand of recognition; however, the ‘values attached to an object’ are inherently linked and demand equal attention (Deleuze 1968/2004 171). In order further to understand the fluidity of experience and how memory corresponds with the present, I explore in the following Juncture of this thesis theories of time, perception, and memory through the writings of Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze and Simon O’Sullivan. There, I shall show how this exploration has helped me re-think ideas of memory and to consider these in relation to my disagreements with photographs-as-memories.

What happens then, my initial research asked, if one does not recognise that external object in terms of its supposed mnemonic associations? Does this mean an abnegation of its sentimental, familial or cultural values? I would argue that an inability to recognise the photographic image as *memory* causes not a denial of the value of the object at hand; rather, it leads to a deeper contemplation regarding this particular object, reflecting on its sources, relations, and connections. It is the violence of the moment of non-recognition, or what Bergson would have called ‘the failure of recognition’ – a psychic myopia or deafness, *apraxia* (1896/1988 93), that coerces thought. It is a new and abrasive encounter causing a confrontation in which we are faced not only with
forced thought or what we are able to think, but also an awareness of that which we are unable to think or grasp, that which is out of reach (Deleuze 1968/2004 180). Non-recognition hence causes levels of thinking beyond the superficial, and Deleuze gives the related example: ‘... whence the question of Socrates’ interlocutor: is it when we do not recognize, when we have difficulty in recognizing, that we truly think?’ (ibid. 175), in which the unrecognised object requires further reflection, inspection and introspection than that which we already know and understand.

In support of this thesis’ search for approaches to memory alternative to those based on ocularcentric forms of thought, this Juncture has established and examined the prevalence of visual theories and associations of memory. It has also presented an idea of metaphors as symptoms of an overarching image of thought (an image of memory), and interrogated photographic metaphors in particular, in order to question beliefs on relationships between memories and photographic images. I have through this first Juncture outlined theories and practices that use and rely on such relationships, to explain what forms of thought the thesis objects to, seeks to avoid and sets out to confront, in its aim to reconsider the manners in which memory is understood and expressed in art practice. The next Juncture builds on this Juncture, investigates approaches to breaking with an image of thought, and proposes methods for challenging existing forms of thought about memory.
Previous pages (pp. 54-55)

Fig. 12  *Hunting tower*, colour slide, 2007
45 cm x 45 cm D-type print

This photograph is part of my photographic series *Hunting Towers* (see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 220-259)

It is thus repeated in Juncture IV: Portfolio (see Fig. 147, p. 229)
Juncture II:

Methods for Breaking with an Image of Thought

Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental **encounter**. (Deleuze 1968/2004 176)

The previous Juncture of my thesis defined and discussed prevailing ideas of memory, metaphors and representations of memory as part of an over-arching image of thought, one that I understand as limiting to the concept of memory in thought and creative practices. The present Juncture responds to that image of memory; it draws up a set of creative devices and alternative approaches to thought and art with the aim of breaking free of the restrictions imposed by such an image of thought and memory. I have formed these devices and approaches by borrowing and setting in motion a number of creative concepts developed by Gilles Deleuze, Henri Bergson and the contemporary theorist and artist Simon O’Sullivan. I have chosen forms of thought that may be used to oppose, dislocate and counter-act an image of thought, including the ideas of the disrupting **encounter**, the pursuit of **minor** language and practice over those of the dominant or **major**, and the interrupting acts of the **stuttering** and **stammering** of major language and practice. I have used the writings of Deleuze and Bergson in considering non-representational approaches to memory, perception and time. I have also borrowed concepts that have helped me develop an installation art practice on memory; the practice focuses on the bodily experience of the installation, steering away from desires to represent memory. These concepts include **becoming[s]**, **affect**, and **assemblage**. By thinking the borrowed concepts through my practice, I have been able to contemplate how these concepts may be understood in relation to art practices. Furthermore, doing so has also helped me re-think the concept of memory, define the attitudes advocated by my idea of the memory-event, and distinguish the forms of thought opposed by the memory-event.

This Juncture will first introduce Henri Bergson’s unconventional considerations of time, space and memory, as his understanding of the relationships between these concepts has greatly influenced my own research and my thinking. I shall do so firstly by addressing Bergson’s seminal work *Matter and Memory* (1896/1988), then discuss Deleuze’s response to these ideas as presented in Bergsonian thought in his work *Bergsonism* (1968/1991). Once these key ideas of time and memory are defined, I shall introduce a number of creative tools and perspectives that have helped me confront the image of memory, mainly through the writings of Deleuze and O’Sullivan.  

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31 In this Juncture, I also use the works of other writers on Deleuze and on art, including David Burrows, Brian Massumi, Dorothea Olkowski, Clifford Scott Stagoll and Dr Damian Sutton, alongside ideas put forward by Roland Barthes and Nicholas Bourriaud.
The tools and perspectives include the consideration and implementation of the Deleuzean concepts of the encounter, minor and major language and practices, and the disruptive acts of stuttering and stammering.

In conjunction with the approaches to thought here described, I wish to make a number of propositions in relation to this Juncture. The first proposition is to view the present and the past as two different states [not as one becoming an earlier or later version of the other] and as existing alongside each other, rather than being perceived as ‘components of linearity’ (Hemmings 2005 564). The second proposition relates to the first: it regards the experience of time, of life, as the result of emerging from a continuous state of becoming, and not as a construct of moments. I propose a consideration of memory and time as fluid rather than static ideas [as in the photograph-as-memory], and an active avoidance of attempts to represent memory, in thought and in art practice. My fourth proposition is to circumvent that which has already been explored and repetitions of the well-known examples of others, in order to let thought encounter new concepts, practices and situations. This approach is strongly advocated by Deleuze throughout his entire oeuvre (1968/2004; 1993/1997a; 1964/2000; 2001; Deleuze and Guattari 1972/1983; 1975/1986; 1980/2005; 1991/1994). Lastly, and most importantly, I propose a form of practice [in thought and in art] that continually strives to operate in the margins, in the fringes of dominant discourse, in order to keep questioning and posing alternatives to major thought, methods and practices. This deliberate act of seeking to operate in the margins is also encouraged in the writings of Deleuze in regards to philosophy, and in the works of O’Sullivan, who in a Deleuzean spirit urges artists to seek the margin, the edge of current practices.

**Bergson and the Experience of Time**

Deleuze, influenced by the French philosopher Henri Bergson and his seminal work *Matter and Memory* (1896/1988), discusses the notions of multiplicity, time, processes of change and principles of becoming as integral to conditions of life and actuality. Deleuze’s focus on Bergson is often understood as the cause of recent interests and re-discoveries of Bergson’s writings, through which his approach to duration is being carried forward (Lawlor and Moulard 2013). Bergson’s *Matter and Memory* is an innovative text, which at the turn of the previous century highlighted the importance of accepting aspects of memory as being of different kinds. Furthermore, Bergson stresses throughout this work, that in order to understand what memory is and how it operates, it cannot simply be understood as a fainter version of perception. Much as in Bergson, in Deleuze’s philosophy existence is becoming. Existence is defined by a ‘continual sense of movement and change’ rather than by the structures around us; these structures may instead essentially be
considered as products of continuous states of becoming (Roffe 2005 295). Bergson regards memory not as an archival machine capable of filing and dispersing memories in chronological order. Rather, he sees memory in terms of a process that generates an ‘entirety of memory’ (Olkowski 1999 110); a compressed non-linear, achronological totality of experiences of events. I am using Bergson’s work on memory and the experience of time, as well as Deleuze’s writings on Bergson, in order to re-visit and re-state their understanding of time and memory. Thus, I shall offer an alternative to the linear forms of thought visited in the previous Juncture. It is important in the construction of my idea of the memory-event to re-think memory and the way in which the past is understood such that this concept embodies the co-existence of the present and various pasts that Bergson advocates.

Deleuze uses parts of Bergson’s writing in Difference and Repetition, and focuses more specifically on Bergson in his book Bergsonism33 (Deleuze 1968/1991). Firstly, Bergsonism addresses some commonalities between Deleuze and Bergson through introducing issues of representation. For Bergson, the issues are primarily in relation to perception, time, space and memory. In Bergsonism Deleuze introduces questions of how concepts and entities that differ in kind become inseparable in representation (ibid. 22). His first examples are of the unification and blurring of time and space34 in representation, and the merging of and confusion between recollection and perception (ibid.). Challenging these blurrings, Deleuze explains, tends to lead only to a negative opposite, a form of nothingness. What Deleuze suggests is that challenging confusions between time and space tends to lead to concepts that instead of becoming separated in thought, become ‘nonspatial and nontemporary’.

Deleuze explains that confronting confusions between recollection and perception often results in suggestions of states of amnesia and the unperceivable, rather than in a separation between the two. Duration, namely, time yet not as a representation or spatialised clock-time, is in Bergsonian thought [duree] understood as a ‘transition of change’, and an experience of duration that provides the experiencing body with ‘a composite of space and duration’ (ibid. 37). Bergson sees as ‘pure time’, ‘non-chronological time’, the duration experienced by the mind (Sutton 2009 68); he sees memory as an emerging process implying time, indicating and embracing the various speeds at which different experiences develop. Seeing recollection and perception as differing in their respective essences, Bergson draws a clear distinction between the two concepts by defining them as ‘pure recollection’ and ‘pure perception’ (1896/1988 68). In representation composites of space and time become indivisible.

33 The title of Deleuze’s book, Bergsonism, is an invented term and speaks of Deleuze’s approach to Bergson’s thought as a school of philosophy in its own right, as well as Deleuze’s desire to highlight Bergson’s importance in philosophy.
34 In Bergsonism, Deleuze refers to the concepts of time as duration and space as extensity (1968/1991 22).
This confusion of differences in kind may to some degree explain my conundrum over and disagreement with the assumption and idea of the *photograph as memory*. The idea of the photograph as memory asserts the assumption, and perhaps the expectation, that the photographic image represents time and space, and that this image unifies time and space to the point at which they become indistinguishable from one another. Deleuze’s example of confusions between the states of recollection and perception is relevant when thinking about the photograph as a form of representation, given that it blurs the borders between visual perception [that which derives from visual perception] and memory [that which derives from recollection]. Confusions between the visual experience of viewing a photograph representing an experienced event, on the one hand, and the remembered experience of the represented event, on the other, may encourage another form of blurring in thought. What complicates the matter is that the photograph as representation is an image with a relatively strong claim to the authentic [as opposed to the drawn image or other created work]. The photograph is an image that purports to stand in for its referent and state a *ça-a-été* (Barthes 2000 76), a ‘certificate of presence’ (ibid. 87). In disputing such confusions over the photograph, the negative opposites would suggest a loss – even the repression – of memory or an absence; even, perhaps, in the case of the undocumented moment, something non-authentic.

In Deleuze’s disagreement with what he considers dominant physiological and psychological theories of memory, Deleuze introduces the focus of these theories as their being presentations of ‘false problems’ or ‘badly analysed composites’ (1968/1991 54). The ‘false problems’ include preoccupations with separations of mind and body, flesh and cerebral matter, the attempt to locate recollections, as well as considering the brain ‘as the reservoir… of recollections’ (ibid.). Deleuze’s approach hence sits in opposition to, or entirely outside of, the many theories represented in the form of metaphors that I have discussed in the previous Juncture. This is a disagreement not simply with current thought, but with a very long history of thinking about memory, one to have influenced forms of expressions in language and in creative disciplines. Bergson, also uninterested in attempting to find the locus of recollection, presents two forms of memory, ‘recollection-memory’ and ‘contraction-memory’ (Deleuze 1968/1991 51-52). I shall return to Bergson’s theories of memory through looking at *Matter and Memory* as well as Deleuze’s *Bergsonism*, however, I shall first briefly visit Bergson’s approach to time and recollection, as it is vital initially to establish his understanding of the two discrete concepts.

For Bergson, memory is closely interconnected with duration, and his work *Matter and Memory* expands more explicitly on how recollection takes place in relation to the present and the past. As Deleuze explains in *Bergsonism*, the present is for Bergson in a constant state of movement and may be defined by its activity, while the past is that which is no longer active yet still *is* (1968/1991 55). The activity of remembering is understood as a form of ‘leaping’ into the past (ibid. 56-57). The leap is an activity taking place in the present; however, it does not seek to re-establish the past as a present state. Deleuze re-states his disagreement with what he sees
as dominant physiological and psychological concepts of memory. He does so because these theories pose fundamental so-called ‘false beliefs’ both of past and of present states, and of how they relate to one another in memory (ibid. 58). These beliefs belong to the perception that the past is understood as past only after having been present; in such theories, the same past is then reconstructed in the present and by the present. Deleuze asks how, if it were not past at the same time as it were present, the present would be able to pass,.. He comes to the conclusion that the present and the past should not be thought of as two linear points, one following the other; rather, it is preferable to think of the past as being ‘contemporaneous with the present that it has been’ (ibid.). In this way, the two concepts of the past and the present are seen as coexisting (ibid. 59). The experience of these co-existing relationships and the continuous creation of the present are symbolised through Bergson’s illustration, often referenced, in the shape of a cone appears in Matter and Memory (1896/1988 197). ‘To be is to be felt... to be in affect’, writes Massumi in his recent work Semblance and Event (2011 20); the body, the ‘seat of bare activity’ (ibid. 27) perceives – it perceives process, not time (ibid. 94). This perception of the incessant experience of the present, of lived experience, is part of the creation of memory. It is what Bergson calls the ‘entirety of memory’ as illustrated in his concept of the cone (Olkowski 1999 110). Deleuze considers Bergson’s cone as a means of discussing the idea of repetition occurring through the relationships between the past and the present, that is, how their co-existence causes a virtual repetition as ‘the whole of our past is played, restarts, repeats itself, at the same time, on all the levels that it sketches out’ (Deleuze 1968/1991 60-61). Bergson’s illustration of the cone embodies the link between matter and memory (Lawlor 2003 55), and is formed between the specified points $S$, $A$ and $B$ (Bergson 1896/1988 196-7) (see Fig. 13).
The cone represents a continuous process and an accumulation of recollections. The present is in unceasing production, a process from which we and the world emerge. That is, the present is in a constant state of becoming. The tip of the cone, point $S$, is in constant contact with plane $P$ as it continually advances, moves forward in time, ‘edging into existence’ (Massumi 2011 89). An ever-moving present thus emerges. Point $S$ may be thought of as the experiencing body. Bergson calls this point the ‘image of the body’, the acting entity that endures the movement of plane $P$, or the representation of the external world, the universe (Bergson 1896/1988 196-7). Remote, unconscious memories, or pure memory, constitute the wide base $AB$ and forms a ‘complete past’ (Guerlac 2007 43). Such memories emerge from time to time through dreams, through triggers causing experiences of involuntary memory, and the force of thought (Lawlor 2013). The base, Bergson explains, remains ‘motionless’ (1896/1988 196) and inactive.

The entire $SAB$ cone diagram hence represents memory in its entirety, our past in total (Gunn 1920/2004). The cone contains immeasurable internal points; they emerge in relation to the extent of the temporal separation between the memory and the present position (Lawlor 2013). That is, the closer to the tip, point $S$ and hence the closer to the movement by plane $P$ a particular memory is located, the closer it is to the current experience of the present (Sjunnesson Rao 2005 31). The illustration of the cone provides an alternative concept to prior, more static ideas of memory, given a focal point on movement, on becoming, also by replacing notions of the present.

It pushes the past moment into stasis, with a contrasting suggestion that it is in fact the past that forces the present into being. Bergson’s concept of memory heavily depends on his understanding of sensory perception and the experience of time. Contrary to Platonic theories of memory, Bergson suggests that the past at all times coexists with the present through continuous movement (Lawlor 2003 55). He further argues that what we perceive has never been present; we perceive only the past, that is, as a past past. Such suggestions would stand in contrast to some arguably dominant Platonic notions of memory which, in a contrasting sense, assert that all present images ‘repeat or copy past ideas’ (ibid. 56): ideas that are static and pre-conceived, rather than moving and emerging.

In his development of a concept of memory that differs from previous notions of memory, Bergson places a creative emphasis on ideas of movement and becoming. One of the key Bergsonian claims differ substantially from previous, Platonic theories may be distinguished through the way in which the loci of memory and the past are understood. Bergson puts forward a hypothesis of a much more abstract notion of memory. This is in place of the stasis suggested by the premise of theories such as the embossment of memories into the wax of the soul, as was discussed in the previous Juncture (Draaisma 2000 25). Instead, Bergson proposes that the past is not contained in the cerebral matter, and that it ‘exists in itself and not in something else’ (Guerlac 2007 45, 46).
Memory has its own location elsewhere. The cone is hence not *per se* a container for memory, thus should be regarded in a much more abstract manner. Rather than serving as a form of storage space, the cone illustrates particular relationships and multiple systems – those between matter and memory. Bergson’s cone embodies a new appreciation of time and experience from which one emerges, instead of becoming subjected to it.

**Deleuze’s Propositions of Memory**

In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze offers four interconnected and inter-reliant propositions of memory based on Bergson’s cone (1968/1991 61). These directly address ‘false beliefs’ (ibid.) of memory and they present new, alternative ways of approaching the properties of recollection. They support Bergson’s radical theory that it is the past that produces [our understanding of] the present: ‘we do not move from the present to the past, from perception to recollection, but from the past to the present, from recollection to perception’ (ibid. 63). Bergson’s theories of the past, the present and memory not only introduce ideas of how memories may be formed; these also address their dynamic significance in the present. It is a suggestion of memory that echoes the virtual, ‘non-sensuous’ perception discussed by Alfred Whitehead, as an ‘immediate past… surviving to be again lived through in the present’ (1942 212). The crux lies in the manner in which we surface from the endurance of events – we do not pass through time, we endure time and emerge from it; the *contraction* of past events creates the present. In describing Bergson’s discussion on these relationships between the past and the present, Deleuze explains that:

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\text{[A]ll of the past coexists with the new present in relation to which it is now past. The past is no more “in” this second present than it is “after” the first – whence the Bergsonian idea that each present present is only the entire past in its most contracted state}
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(1968/2004 103)

The past may therefore be defined as the ‘synthesis of all time’. Paradoxically, as Deleuze continues, ‘We cannot say that it was. It no longer exists, it does not exist, but insists, it consists, it is. It insists with the former present, it consists with the new or present present’ (ibid.). Such coexistence transcends the ordering of the spatial and the temporal; memories of the past are placed into a new context, made to, *forced* to, ‘consist with’ that of the present, continuously (ibid.). The present, and the past, are hence not unchangeable, fixed states; they are in a constant process of *becoming*. Deleuze offers his first proposition of memory by defining the activity of recollection as taking place through a *leap* in the present, into the metaphysical region of the past (1968/1991 61, 63). The suggestion of a leap into this past element is a means of opposing the ‘false belief’ that the past is reconstructed in the present, as was previously discussed (ibid. 61-62).
Secondly, Deleuze confronts the ‘false’ perception of the present self gradually becoming a past self, that is, the idea that one state eventually becomes another. It is not clear how, exactly, this transformation from one identity into another would take place. Deleuze substitutes for it the proposition that the present and the past self are entirely different from one another, differing in kind rather than in degree (ibid. 126), and that the experience of life is a continuous experience of parallel pasts and presents (ibid. 61-62). This is a non-linear, process-based approach to notions of the present and the past, understood by Deleuze as perceiving the ‘present present’ and the ‘former present’ as two separate states (1968/2004 102). Deleuze differentiates between the two kinds of presents by giving the present present additional elements, given that it not only reflects back onto itself, but also represents the past – although this is a present unaware of its future pastness: ‘The present present is treated not as the future object of a memory but as that which reflects itself at the same time as it forms the memory of the former present’ (ibid.).

The third false belief Deleuze tackles via Bergson builds on the second proposition, and focuses on the dominant preference of linearity in addressing what he calls the ‘paradox of coexistence’ (1991 62). He suggests that rather than thinking of the present and the past as ‘a before and an after’, the past following the present, the two should be understood as co-existing (ibid.). Deleuze’s final proposition is what he calls the ‘paradox of psychic repetition’, namely, that in each present moment, the entirety of the past co-exists with the present ‘on various levels of contraction and relaxation’ (ibid. 62). In other words, the past cannot be thought of as a previous present – or a diluted perception of a former present – nor may it be seen as equivalent to the experience of recollection alone. To Bergson and Deleuze the past as a contracted, virtual state of all pasts, co-existing with the present, and the phenomenon of recollection is the result of a successful leap into a region of the co-existing past.

This idea of trying to recollect something as being a virtual leap into the past is for Deleuze connected to the desire to remember something (1968/1991 63). In Bergsonian thought, recollection is characterised by its activity, a movement of thought, and the past becomes represented in an acted form. The activity, recalling the past through reproduction and reflection, involves the perception and contemplation of the ‘present present’ (Deleuze 1968/2004 102). Both the past and the present thus depend on one another: the past as a structure of time in the form of ‘a contraction of instants with respect to a present’ (ibid.), and the present as a temporal continuum connecting to that ‘contraction of instants’ in synchronicity with its self-reflective dispositions. Deleuze explains this activity, this leap into the past, as a form of active search. It may include various leaps into different regions, such as when failing to remember or failing to recognise something. Then, finding oneself in an element too contracted or too expanded, one would have to leap once more until one finds the ‘correct leap’ (1968/1991 62). Once the correct virtual leap has been made, recollection is actualised by its becoming an image (ibid. 63). ‘Image’ may seem a confusing term, in that it fails to explain the transformation of experience or memory.
into an image or image-like representation; for Bergson, the term *image* is used in the loosest sense (Bergson 1896/1988 17-22). In Bergsonian thought *images* in relation to the phenomenon of recollection are understood as ‘affective sensations’ rather than a purely visual experience (ibid. 234). This ‘memory-image’ as part of an ‘internal moment’ of recollection emerges somewhere between what Bergson terms ‘pure memory’ and ‘pure perception’ (ibid. 132). The very activity of the leap into a virtual region of the past causes the actualisation of recollection, *the becoming of an image*, possible, and merges it with the present (Deleuze 1968/1991 63, 65, 66). By separating memory and perception Bergson is able to show how recollections are not dependent on perception, and that memories may exist without sensory impressions (Bergson 1896/1988 108-109, 118-119). This is a vital line of thought in relation to my thesis. I am questioning the prevalence of understandings of memory as a primarily visual phenomenon, and am interested in the kinds of memories that are without either an actual or a virtual form of representation. By considering perception as different in kind from recollection, memories are given a status equal to that of perception, thus each may be understood as a phenomenon in its own right, rather than merely as weakened forms of perception.

After outlining Bergson’s theory of co-existing states of pasts, presents and recollection, Deleuze sets out to define different aspects of the actualisation of memories that takes place after *the leap* into the past (1968/1991 70-71). Firstly, the actualisation involves a form of psychic movement of the past towards the present, which is then followed by an extension of ‘useful’ recollections into the present (ibid. 70). In the performance of this leap, one is aware of the difference between the experiences of the past and those of the present. Through this awareness, memory is experienced and understood as past, and is not confused with the present experience. The distinction is followed by a moment of adjustment and negotiation, which happens between the first two aspects and the present, before a form of embodiment of the recollection is ensured.

This realisation occurs when past’s present is understood not in relation to its current present, but in relation to its own present, which is now past (ibid. 71). The present is simultaneously emerging and becoming; it pushes forward and generates an appreciation of the past moment as past, and not a form of ‘recollection of the present’ 35 (ibid.). This is a present that is pushed into existence by the past. Through once more considering Bergson’s cone, the present may be understood as a contracted form of the entirety of the past (ibid. 91).

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35 Deleuze sees *paramnesia* as the result of a disruption of this last aspect of recollection, in which the present would be sensed as a memory (1968/1991 71). The false memory of paramnesia is a form of *déjà vu* and is generally understood as the certain feeling of previously having experienced a current moment in time (Thain 2004).
If we consider the Deleuzean-Bergsonian notions of being, time and the past, we are faced with concentrations of incessant movement. Representations of being, time and pastness force these states into fixed forms, representing perhaps more a desire to fix and to stabilise these fleeting states than the disposition of those states themselves, and what these produce is the construct, or the idea of separated, individual instants ordered in a linear fashion.

Deleuze opposes this idea of the instant, or the moment, by stating that:

[L]ife does not itself have moments, close as they may be one to another, but only between-times, between-moments; it doesn’t just come about or come after but offers the immensity of an empty time where one sees the event yet to come and already happened, in the absolute immediate consciousness.

(2001 29)

If the moment may be understood as a construct, as a concept operating so to provide an order, a rhythm, punctuation to the flow of life and ‘the immensity of an empty time’ (ibid.), and by endowing monuments, photographs and other forms of representations of events with value, these could be regarded as by-products generated by that construct. That is, there is a correlation between the focus on the idea of the moment and the presence of representations of such moments. A lack of representation may therefore be explained by a related lack of emphasis on what Deleuze calls ‘between-times’ or ‘between-moments’ (ibid.). The problematic issue here is not an unfulfilled requirement to represent, but rather the symbolic cultural value of representation. To some degree such representations create a sense of linearity, an ordering of the chaos of emerging and overlapping events, a pulse, and a rhythm where there is no rhythm. These representations hence accentuate and give value to particular beats, to specific moments, although they skip other beats, bypassing the ‘between-times’ (ibid.). The production of such a series of constructed moments and absences is of particular interest to me, as it concerns some of the fundamental matters of my thesis: the manner in which the past and memory are experienced, valued and represented.
Encounters of Non-Recognition: Considerations of Two Family Photographs

Having explored and established Bergson's theories of time, space, experience and memory, I shall now define one of the key Deleuzean devices I have identified as useful to my project: that of breaking with a dominant image of memory. This is the Deleuzean concept of the encounter. As alluded to in the first Juncture of this thesis, in *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze first explores the forceful notion of the encounter (Deleuze 1968/2004 176) as a strategy for allowing new thought to take place. The concept of the encounter may be understood as a form of break, rupture, or schism that 'can only be sensed' (ibid.); it is that which commands, demands, compels us to think. Bergson also saw the *forcing of thought* as the very purpose of philosophy. Bergson commented in *Creative Evolution* that 'we must do violence to the mind, go counter to the natural bent of the intellect. But that is just the function of philosophy' (Bergson in Walker 2009 18). Without this 'violence to the mind' or the challenging of commonly held ideas and an image of thought – the 'natural bent of the intellect' (ibid.), a deeper understanding of the process may be lost. That is, without the continuous violent act of the encounter, the danger is that no real thought takes place and we are thus doomed to 'think the same' (Deleuze 1968/2004 170). Simon O'Sullivan desires a form of practice in writing and art, one that is not solely critical, but that deliberately and violently acts on the issues it critiques in order to create something new. Experiences which do not force thought are, according to O'Sullivan, not encounters; these are simply 'objects of recognition', 'non-encounters', as no thought has taken place (O'Sullivan 2007 1). I shall return to O'Sullivan's writings on the encounter as part of a method of working in art practices later in this Juncture.

If an encounter poses an ultimate state of non-recognition in order to cause new thought to occur, it was an encounter that drove me towards this research project. An absence of recognition, or an inability to recognise *memories* in photographs taken during my childhood, once ignited a flame of interest that eventually led to my engagement with doctoral studies. As previously stated, these family photographs communicate very little of what I may identify as *memory*. I understand the phenomenon of memory as subjective and transitory, at times arbitrary and abstract, and very different from the stasis of the visual representations of my family photographs. I do remember many of the depicted events; however, I remember them differently from the way they are portrayed in the visual representations produced. I remember a sense of space, an atmosphere, sounds and conversations, a smell, visual perceptions that differ from those of the photographs, and some of these mnemic experiences lack visual imagery altogether.
I shall now take a closer look at one such photograph from my family album in order to demonstrate some of the problems involved in confusing photographs with memories. My grandparents, mother, uncle and I are depicted in the photograph above (see Fig. 14), presumably taken by my father during a family summer outing by a lake in Sweden. Although possibly too young to remember this specific event, I do remember the journeys to and being at this or similar events, and mnemically associate these with elements other than the purely visual or those contained in representations of such events. That is, the photograph is of personal interest and value to me as an image; it purports to show the formation of us as a group, signs of interaction, the way we as a family rather self-consciously represent ourselves to ourselves, to one another and to potential others, the much younger-looking faces of my relatives and surely a memento mori of my aging grandparents. However, the photograph remains a depiction, a visual representation of an event, rather than a memory as such.
I fail to recognise and think of or accept this photograph as a memory, and as an adequate simile of the affective, multi-sensory experience of having-been-there. My memories of personal experiences of this or similar events are less static and more abstract than the overall coherence presented in the photographic image. My memory of this event is less of an image and more of a sensation, less of how we as a family appeared and more of how we interacted with one another, less of a contained space and more of a sense of relationships to bodies and entities in space. That is, my memories of this or similar events have little to do with the posed photograph, and more to do with memory as affect, as an outcome of having emerged from experience. I remember the ride in my great-grandfather's old dinghy, the waves produced by it as we crossed the lake and the fear that pike might bite my fingers off as I touched the surface of the water, my mother's warm breath, the sensation of slippery algae-covered rocks against my bare feet, the amalgamated smell of beer, coffee and suntan lotion, my uncle swearing, sugar cubes dissolving in my mouth, the physical perception of being held, tiny, skittish fish in the shallow water near the shore, the feeling of the rough bath towel against my skin, my father's dark sunglasses and incessant talking, his gold-capped tooth flashing, sticky cinnamon swirls clinging to the inside of plastic bags, my great-grandfather jokingly taking out his false teeth to entertain me. Though memories of such lived experiences exist, and may be re-sensed or recollected via the fleeting affect of memory, they may not have a physical, tactile and graspable form of representation. I see endeavours to represent such moments as futile, because representation inevitably fails to contain what claims to embody. Instead, in its re-presentation of a said moment, it reduces what is inherently complex to a surface. Once more quoting Bergson, such a transmutation of memory via representation is 'enough to suppress what follows it, what precedes it, and also all that fills it, and to retain only its external crust, its superficial skin' (1896/1988 36).

This photograph is not a memory.
This writing is not a memory.

In *Camera Lucida*, Barthes becomes fascinated with the encounter of a photographic portrait of him for which he cannot remember posing (2000 85). This is a strange image; on the one hand he cannot recognise it, while on the other hand he cannot deny having physically been-there, given that the photograph clearly depicts him. No matter how closely he inspects the details of the photograph, he cannot recollect the moment when it was created. Similarly, in the case of my family album, I cannot deny having been-there, although it is possibly the only fact the photograph may substantiate. However, I see the failure to recognise the photograph as memory not as being negative, nor even as dismissive of the power or worth of the photographic image; rather, I see this moment of non-recognition as important, since I find non-recognition itself as an event that brings about real thought – it becomes not a repetition of the familiar, but something different entirely, or something familiar presented anew.
I shall now consider a second photograph from my family album. The next example further illustrates my disagreements with considerations of the photographic image as memory, yet also reflects Barthes’ discussions of having-been there. I do not remember posing for the portrait above (see Fig. 15), although it is clearly a posed photograph. Much as Barthes (2000 85), I cannot deny having been-there. I recognise myself. This photograph visibly depicts me. I sat in front of a camera at that point in time; that cannot be denied. I must be about ten years old in this photograph. I look at this image as an adult, and I cannot remember the moment when the photograph was taken. Instead, I remember a multiplicity of moments, similar moments, any of which could have resulted in this photograph. I will thus consider this photograph as the product of various potential moments and the processes its production entailed.
I am sitting at my father’s kitchen table, I know that; I recognise the door behind me, and the cup in front of me. My grandfather’s wife is sitting next to me in this photograph, I know that too; I recognise the pattern on her knitted cardigan. I remember her, and I remember sitting next to her, a person not used to children, or having to speak to children. This is recognition, rather than a surge of involuntary memory. When I actively think about my father’s kitchen, I remember the coalescence of scents: those of burning wood, coffee, baking, the dog, Dad’s diesel-stained jacket. The humming of the refrigerator, the crackling of firewood. Sticky fly-papers hanging from the ceiling. The large kitchen window, the glass so old it warped the view of the garden, bent the trees into strange shapes, doubling them, merging with one another and with the nearby barn.

I do not remember posing for this particular photograph; I remember posing for photographs for my grandfather. Posing for photographs was a serious event for him. He was, and still is, a serious man. I was terrified of him. He rarely smiled. He did not visit very often, but I dreaded the visits. These were thoroughly adult events. Hours around the kitchen table, listening to conversations I did not understand, speaking only if spoken to. Watching adults in conversation; the movements of my father’s moustache, the flashing of my grandfather’s big teeth, my stepmother’s tanned hands resting on the table. My grandfather was a figure of authority, and it was with authority that he requested photographs such as this one.

The procedure commences. My grandfather points his Leica at me. He has told me this is a very expensive camera, but I have no understanding of monetary value. He is the one who later develops the film and enlarges the photograph. He was the only person I knew who had his own darkroom and expensive cameras and a sailing boat. He always writes on the back of the enlarged photographs in soft pencil, detailing when and where the photograph was taken, and whom the copy is for. This copy is not for me. It is a photograph of his young granddaughter, taken and carefully enlarged for his son. A sentimental, thoughtful gift from a man I have never seen show much emotion.

I watch my grandfather with curiosity and apprehension, watch him adjust the camera settings, watch the top of his balding head as he sets the shutter speed and the aperture. I sit in anticipation as he frames and composes the image. He tells me how to sit and where to look. Not to smile too much. Then a tense moment of silence. His stern face is pressed against the camera, one eye looking through the viewfinder, the other tightly shut. I may smell him, the smell of an old man. Aftershave only old men use. Coffee. Mothballs. Dry-cleaning chemicals. Silence. I may see him pursing his lips. I am holding my breath. The sound of the shutter closing brutally breaks the silence. Pause. He looks at me over his glasses. I do not know whether he is pleased or not.
I look at this photograph as an adult, remembering not the moment it was taken, but an amalgamation of similar moments, multiple moments of silence, moments of holding my breath, moments of studying my grandfather’s balding head. I cannot deny I was there, but I do not remember it. The photograph, a portrait, a visual representation of me at the age of ten, contains no memories. It causes a reaction of recognition to occur, in accordance with *a priori* understandings of the circumstances under which this photograph was created; the cardigan, the door, the cup; the smells, the spatial relations, the location. As discussed in Juncture I, Barthes argues that photographs are not memories, but that they in fact block memory (2000 91); he refers to Proust’s reflections on photography in the second half of *Camera Lucida*, where Proust notes that he tends to remember more about a person by merely thinking of him or her than by looking at a photograph of the said person (ibid. 63). In this instance, looking at this photograph, I do not remember the moment it supposedly represents.

This photographs contains no memories. It barely serves as a trigger.
Deleuze and Practice-based Research

A Deleuzian methodology, although an antithesis in itself and difficult to outline, may be thought of, as James Williams suggests, a ‘continuous maximising of connections’ (2004). This continual attention to the making of connections is necessary in order to realise the full potential of particular concepts, whether in pure thought or in practice. It means not only an escalation of connections; it requires also a cyclical repetition of connecting and disconnecting, maintaining the connections that are useful, and discarding the ones that express the Same (Deleuze 1968/2004 170), and that which has already been discovered. O’Sullivan introduces such an art practice as rhizomic in its ‘production and utilisation of alternative or “counter” networks “outside” those of the dominant’ creating relations to, revolting against and rupturing ‘the dominant mode of production’ (2007 17-18). Summoning Deleuze within the art encounter is less about establishing an art practice claiming to be philosophical; quite the opposite: it is about utilising within an experimental art practice the creative thinking already expressed in Deleuze’s work. This part of the Juncture will address the Deleuzean approach to art-making advocated by O’Sullivan, as O’Sullivan’s writing on contemporary art has been particularly influential on my research and development of thought. I shall thus introduce O’Sullivan’s propositions for a new form of contemporary art practice. It utilises what may be understood as a Deleuzean method in order to break with conventions of thought. This is important to address, because these propositions are fundamental to the methods of my research and art practice, and form the ‘conjunction’ – as O’Sullivan put it – between ‘Deleuze and contemporary art’ (2010 189).

O’Sullivan utilises Deleuzean thought in his own art practice, most notably in Plastique Fantastique, a collaboration with the artist David Burrows (Plastique Fantastique 2014). A number of other contemporary artists have also used the writings of Deleuze in their practice, including Andrew Conio, Manuel DeLanda, Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe, Thomas Hirschhorn, Joseph Nechvatal, Sandra Plummer, Ola Ståhl and Tom Tlalim. O’Sullivan considers in his chapter From Aesthetics to the Abstract Machine: Deleuze, Guattari and Contemporary Art Practice (2010 189-207) new, emergent ways in which a ‘Deleuzean framework’ may be applied within contemporary art practices. O’Sullivan articulates a particular form of art practice to have emerged over the recent years, which he understands as Deleuzean (ibid. 190). This practice differs from the conceptual and post-conceptual art movements of the 1980s and 1990s, because it steers away from the idea of art work as sign (ibid. 189), focusing less on the transference of meaning as on what the art work or art practice might do and avoids ‘straightforward signifying strategies’ (ibid. 190).

O’Sullivan sees this more recent direction reflected in the use of increasingly ‘subjective assemblages’ (ibid. 190) in certain three-dimensional works of art, and in the blurring of the abstract and the figurative in current painting practices. These new practices involve works he understands as ‘impossible to place’ (ibid.); moving and shifting, unanchored to any fixed
paradigms, operating on the ‘seeping edge’ (Massumi 1996 217-39) between the virtual and the actual’ (O’Sullivan 2008b 98). Artists such as Jim Lambie, Eva Rothschild, Rachel Morton and Hayley Tompkins are indicated by O’Sullivan as being part of this new, non-representational form of art practice (O’Sullivan 2010 190).

I am drawn to O’Sullivan’s idea of a new art practice materialising through a Deleuzean framework. However, the examples given are not entirely convincing, and some works by these artists seem deeply rooted within traditions of conceptual and post-conceptual art. Rothschild’s work may vacillate between the figuration and abstraction; however, by focusing almost entirely on the formal qualities of sculpture, Rothschild’s work makes very specific references to the established Conceptual and Minimalist practices of the 1960s and 1970s. It is not clear just how her work may be understood as being part of a new form of art that rejects the idea of the work of art as sign. I would like to think of the new art practice O’Sullivan is proposing as having particular operating principles lying within the resistance of representation and established languages of art. In its avoidance of the dominant languages and practices of art, the practice seeks the margins and fringes of current practices. I wonder if O’Sullivan’s emphasis on object-based art or his focus on oscillations between different formal aspects of painting are important in the current context.

I would propose that this art practice is less preoccupied with medium or styles, and is more centred on the blurring of boundaries between art and life, on forms of practices that are not necessarily recognised as belonging to the realms [and languages] of art, and on the bodily affective experience generated by the assemblage of the art work or installation. Examples of practices using what O’Sullivan identified as ‘subjective assemblages’ (2001 190) could include the diverse works of the Swedish artist Klara Lidén, whom I shall return to in this Juncture; the urban games of Viktor Bedö and the Invisible Playground group, and the video installations of Philippe Parreno. Other examples of such practices may be understood in Fabrice Gygi’s challenging of systems of control through his constructed social spaces, the immersive installations Dump, Hole and Simply Botiful by the Swiss artist Christoph Buchel, or the fictitious, elderly architect’s apartment created by Elmgreen and Dragset for their recent Tomorrow installation at the Victoria and Albert Museum in London. These artists seek to create, in a rather Deleuzean sense, subjective and affective assemblages in which art and life become indistinguishable (Deleuze 1990/1997b 95). Their creators do not appear particularly concerned with distinct artistic media or interested in creating works that may be positioned between binary forms.

The works to which O’Sullivan appears to return most frequently are the ‘assemblages’ of the artist Cathy Wilkes, in particular her work Beautiful Human Body (O’Sullivan 2001 190-192). Wilkes questions the suggestion of accurate representations of subjective experiences of the world, and rejects the ideas of static states of being that the suggested representation proposes. In a manner similar to that of O’Sullivan, curator Will Bradley reflects on Wilkes from a discernibly Deleuzean perspective, and understands her work as for ‘a people to come’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1991
for ‘a community perhaps yet to be brought into being’ (Bradley 2007). Bradley proposes that there is a resistance to ‘proscribed narratives of contemporary art’ in Wilkes’ installations. This resistance is found in her rejection of distinct readings of her work in relation to art history and its particular established language and metaphors, and in her denial of the set meanings of objects (ibid.). Through her work, Wilkes sets out to challenge fixed ideas of the self, of memories, of relations to others and the world around us, along with suggestions of predetermined sets of aesthetic signs as decoded by viewers of exhibitions. Many of Wilkes’ exhibitions consist of found, everyday objects, some of which appear as elements of one installation then re-appear later as different elements of other installations. The accumulated objects used by Wilkes aid her in her confrontation with representation and symbols as their being defined metaphors, these found elements may, apparently contradictorily, be understood as having both general and explicit meanings; as simultaneously and vaguely standing in for something, and signifying nothing, in a continuous, undefined narrative. The desire in Wilkes’ practice and similar art practices is to communicate via affect, and for the work to be ‘felt’ rather than ‘understood’; in this way, Wilkes attempts to assist her viewers to escape the language of fixed signification (ibid.). O’Sullivan sees Wilkes’ work as a good example of the new practice he advocates. He sees it as operating through a Deleuzean structure (2010 189): the objects she uses in her installations help her create assemblages that float between representation and abstraction, and allow for a co-existence of the general and the autobiographical. He identifies Wilkes as part of a Glasgow art scene that rejected the major languages of signification and openly political practices in favour of something different (ibid. 191).
Subjective Assemblages: Introduction to Klara Lidén

I consider O’Sullivan’s ideas of ‘subjective assemblages’ (2010 190) as central to the works of the contemporary installation- and video-artist Klara Lidén. This will be established further in my discussion on O’Sullivan’s propositions for a Deleuzean framework for art practices. Lidén is a Berlin/New York-based Swedish artist whose interventions and alternative social systems may be understood as constituting challenges to dominant systems and customary forms of behaviour (Scott 2013 143). Although her work is not directly political, there is a critical and subversive undertone in Lidén’s work. She re-considers established practices, forms of living and the mechanisms of cultural institutions, including galleries (Doran 2012). Her methods of working are at times illegal, including theft, breaking and entering, and destruction of property, and she often uses found, everyday materials in the creation of makeshift assemblages with DIY characteristics (Kelsey 2010 9, 11; O’Brien et al. 2010 5, 24, 42, 76). Lidén plays with language through using puns in titles, and with music by incorporating existing songs into her work or by producing music herself (Kelsey 2010 14; O’Brien et al. 2010 26). Some of her found materials are her personal belongings, while other materials are scavenged from the streets of cities such as Stockholm, Berlin, Dublin and New York (ibid. 5, 24, 42, 76).

Lidén disrupts the codes of conduct imposed by the constructed urban milieu and capitalist interests, and does so both within and outside of the gallery space. Such interruptive work include the 2003 video Paralyzed (see Figs. 17-18), in which the artist disrupts the decorum on a commuter train by breaking out into a series of untamed dance movements, rolling over seats and hanging from luggage compartments (Kelsey 2010 11). In a single night in 2002, Lidén disrupted commercial communications by pulling down every form of advertising she could find in the centre of the city of Stockholm, from posters to billboards (Noble 2011), creating an idea of an advertisement-free urban space (Kelsey 2010 9).
In *Bajki (Post)*, the artist stole a Swedish post-box and set up her own alternative postal service, which she operated over the course of a year. Lidén personally delivered the posted letters for free by bicycle, bus or by hitchhiking across Sweden (O’Brien et al. 2010 22), disrupting the established, commercial systems of communication. Lidén’s playful *Elda för Kråkorna* [*Heating for the Crows*] exhibition at Reena Spaulings Fine Art in New York in 2008 (see Fig. 16) aimed to challenge ideas of how the conventional gallery functions (Doran 2012). The title of the show is a Swedish expression used when criticising a misuse of money or materials. The expression suggests that to open the windows of a fully heated house and not turning off the radiators provides heating for the crows: a pointless waste of resources. In setting up *Elda för Kråkorna* [*Heating for the Crows*], Lidén partitioned off a part of the gallery space such that only birds could enter it. She encouraged pigeons to come in through an open window by placing bird feed in the sectioned-off space. Human subjects were thus refused access to parts of the space; architecturally, visitors could experience the space only from its outside, and hear the sounds of the pigeons moving around the exhibition space above (O’Brien et al. 2010 62). I understand Lidén’s methods of working as being part of an active subversion of the dominant systems of thought that govern forms of behaviour, living, and communicating, as well as of the ways in which art is created and experienced. I will return to Lidén’s practice through my explication of O’Sullivan’s Deleuzean framework.
O’Sullivan’s Deleuzean Framework

Relationships between the new forms of art practices highlighted by O’Sullivan and Deleuzean thought may be distinguished by considering sets of Deleuzean concepts through methods and works of art. O’Sullivan outlines seven Deleuzean concepts that he has understood as key to the new practices, and to their aim to disrupt established forms of thought and ways of working. The concepts include the encounter (which O’Sullivan at first refers to as aesthetics), affect, the production of subjectivity, the minor, the virtual, the event, and mythopoesis (2010 196-204). I shall discuss these concepts as elements of a Deleuzean methodology.

O’Sullivan begins outlining these chosen Deleuzean concepts by discussing the encounter / aesthetics. This is what O’Sullivan sees as being that which brings about a two-fold ‘rupturing quality of art’ (2010 196), and what I have understood as a key characteristic of Klara Lidén’s work. Firstly, the element has the ‘power to break our habitual ways of being and acting in the world’ (ibid.), and secondly, yet simultaneously, this element is also characterised by newness (ibid.). Lidén frequently and deliberately aims to disrupt routine behaviours and systems that define and encourage these behaviours. However, she also creates something new through her critique: she offers an alternative to the established systems she attempts to unsettle. What this part of the discussion leads to is O’Sullivan’s definition of aesthetics as equivalent to the Deleuzean disruptive and creative concept of the encounter. The encounter, with etymological roots in the ‘meeting of adversaries’ (Harper 2001), poses a clash, a surprise, an abrupt moment violently causing thought – a form of experience possibly viewed as an experience of change, an experience of becoming from which we emerge. Brian Massumi explains this process as a form of product of a reversal of space-movement relationships: ‘When the relation between space and movement inverts, so does the relation between ourselves and our experience. Experience is no longer in us. We emerge from experience. We do not move through experience’ (1998 16-17). This approach is similar to those of both Bergson and Deleuze, as they too understand the lived moment as a germinal event from which we emerge. That is, we do not pass through or endure time; we are produced by experience in a continuous state of becoming.

The aesthetics – or the encounter – of contemporary art is, O’Sullivan claims, found in the engagement with a two-pronged approach of disruption and creation. On the one hand, it is critical of and opposes conventions and the representative, and may at times be defined as ‘parasitical’. The definition comes from how it may emerge from an ‘already existing body’ such as the institution (ibid. 197). This description could fit the post-modern art practices of the 1980s and 1990s. However, whereas these practices had critique as a point of departure and motivation, the current practices defined by O’Sullivan as new and inherently Deleuzean more closely focus on the ‘production of worlds’ [for a people to come] and the creativity of thought (ibid.). Moments and operations of critique in these new, contemporary practices are coupled with moments and
operations of affirmation [of something new] and creativity, possibly ‘germinal’ [in producing the new] (ibid.). The two motions are part of the disruptive and renewing force of the concept of the encounter and O’Sullivan uses this Deleuzean idea to define contemporary aesthetics.

*Affect*, the second Deleuzean concept identified by O’Sullivan as part of a set of useful components in thinking about contemporary art, may be seen as the product of the disrupting-affirming encounter (2010 198). For Deleuze, affect is different from emotion, as he distinguishes affect as a form of intensity, as a transposition from one condition to another, and as a *becoming* (1997a 181). In drawing on Deleuze, O’Sullivan understands affect as the ‘intensive quality of life’ (2010 197); to him it is a bodily response ‘at the level of matter’, causing movements from one register to another (2001 126). In relation to art, O’Sullivan perceives *affect* as the effect the work of art has on the body and the body’s ‘*duration*’. As such, affects need to be *experienced* and cannot be ‘read’ (ibid.). As I discussed in an earlier part of this Juncture, the term *duration* is, in the writings of Bergson and Deleuze, considered as a ‘transition of change’ through which the experiencing body gains a ‘composite of space and duration’ (Deleuze 1968/1991 37). Affect may be understood as generated through a *response* to the experience of the encounter; a force which causes a subjective moment of significant personal change (Al-Saji 2000 56). O’Sullivan adds that for Deleuze and Guattari, the work of art, as any other entity or individual, may in itself exist as an affect (2010 198), a ‘bloc of affects’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/1994 164), or ‘a bloc of becomings’ (O’Sullivan 2006 318). The objective of causing ‘affective ruptures’ (O’Sullivan 2010 198) features as a key element in contemporary art practices, where artists generate new, alien assemblages that ‘break with typical ways of thinking and feeling’ (ibid.). Lidén has demonstrated such an approach to art making through her entire oeuvre; she operates within various registers in order to produce alternative ways of thinking about the world and the way in which systems – and art – function. This approach may be understood through the ways in which she blurs life and art, subverts the idea of the gallery, and creates alternatives to existing systems. She does so in order to present what O’Sullivan calls ‘new affective assemblages, that are different to those we are more familiar with’; ‘irrational points ... that open up to something different’ (ibid.). The new practices tend to operate on semi-conscious levels and registers. They sit in contrast to the kinds of practices aiming to communicate messages or knowledge.

This kind of art is, according to O’Sullivan, engaged in an active, non-conventional form of ‘production of subjectivity’. It aims to depart from and possibly disrupt existing, dominant types of subjectivity (2010 199). For O’Sullivan, our subjective, continual engagement with the processes of becomings is an *aesthetic* experience. In other words, becomings derive from fundamental encounters that break with habitual forms of thought. In the new forms of art O’Sullivan investigates he understands the ‘production of subjectivity’ (ibid.) as being two-fold. Works produced through these new practices offer alternative permutations of affect that may serve as ‘models ... for our own subjectivities’ (ibid.); in so doing, the very same practices may
also disrupt existing and dominant forms of thought. The kind of practice involved in this form of production of subjectivity may therefore be understood as political, yet without its being part of a defined political apparatus and its established methods of communication. I would argue that most practices questioning and offering possibilities outside those of dominant forms of power are in fact political, however covert their operations may be. On the surface, my practice may not be perceived as political, yet I critique and offer alternatives to established forms of expression, dominant thought and the representation of memory. Lidén interrogates and simultaneously offers alternatives to established forms of thought, habits and art practices. As alternatives, these may produce subjective changes in the ways in which we consider ourselves, our lives and our relationships with others. Guattari suggests that alternatives to dominant thought produce ‘new universes of reference’ (Guattari in O’Sullivan 2010 200). Thus, in forming relations to such new materials, new subjectivities are produced.

The fourth Deleuzean concept O’Sullivan identifies as valuable in thinking about contemporary art practices is that of the minor (2010 200). This is a concept I have thought through and applied in my art practice critiquing and posing alternatives to dominant images of memory. A minor group always operates from within a major one, and it claims its expressive space through mutations of the major. Deleuze’s key example of the minor is the writings of Franz Kafka as a minor literature. The minor borrows the language of the major, then uses it in a different manner; it is a form of stuttering of the major language. In the case of Kafka, we see a form of literature for what Deleuze considers as ‘a people to come’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1975/1986). Deleuze, though, sees each of various forms of creativity – art, science or philosophy – as a form of thought that ‘calls for a new people’ (Roffe 2005a 294). Written within a certain cultural field, Kafka uses a particular form of language only to cause a rupture, a rift, a stutter that breaks with the major expressions.

Writing in German, living in Prague, a city from which Kafka felt disconnected, further reflected in his relationship to his Jewish heritage, and working within a machine he despised, Kafka inhabited the fringes of his contemporary literary world. Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari explain stutters and stammers the German language through ‘constructing a continuum of variation, negotiating all of the variables’ in order to ‘make it “wail”, stretch tensors through all of language, even written language, and draw from it cries, shouts, pitches, durations, timbres, accents, intensities’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1975/1986 115). In Kafka: Towards A Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari discern four different forms of languages closely linked to the spatial: vernacular language, vehicular language, referential language, and mythic language (Deleuze and Guattari 1975/1986 23). Vernacular language [spatially indicating the idea of here] is that of the local and the rural, while the vehicular language [indicating the notion of everywhere] is that of the dominant, official, urban, governmental and bureaucratic (ibid.). Referential language [implying the over there] is ‘the language of sense and culture’, and mythic language [suggesting that which is beyond] refers to expressions of the spiritual or religious (ibid.). These four forms of languages are not
fixed, and their status and positions may shift (Deleuze and Guattari 1986 24). In Deleuze and Guattari’s example of the minoritarian writings of Kafka, the vernacular language [here] is the Czech language, while the ‘paper language’ (ibid. 19) of Prague German is the vehicular, dominant language [everywhere]. Yiddish [over there] is understood as the referential, cultural language, and Hebrew as the mythic [beyond] (ibid. 23). Dr Damian Sutton and Dr David Martin Jones further discuss the sense of a deeply critical presence evident in Kafka’s stutterings, as well as in the creation of his peculiar scenarios, as part of a form of ‘critique of the colonial situation in which he wrote’ (2008 xv). Charles Stivale describes the stuttering of the minor as a process of ‘various forms of mutations’; a ‘dispersal, fragmentation and discontinuity’ found not only in Kafka, but also in Marcel Proust (2010).

Deleuze and Guattari indicate that major and minor language are not ‘two different languages but rather two usages of functions of language’ (1980/2004 115) or even ‘two possible treatments of the same language’ (ibid. 114). That is, the minor language or expression operates from within and stutters that of the major. It is a matter of:

[M]aking language stammer rather than stammering in speech ... [t]o be a foreigner, but in one's own tongue, not only when speaking a language other than one's own. To be bilingual, multilingual, but in one and the same language, without even a dialect or patois. To be a bastard, a half-breed, but through a purification of race

(Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004 115)

That is, it is a matter of creatively using a form of encounter in language in order to disrupt one's own language or form of expression from within; then, a process of de-territorialisation that breaks with ‘habitual formations and dominant signifying regimes’ is set in motion (O’Sullivan 2007 69). A practice of stuttering and stammering is not limited to literature or writing; Deleuze and Guattari merely point out examples so to highlight the manner in which minor groups may operate in order to claim a presence. O’Sullivan uses the concept of the minor in thinking about contemporary art practices, and defines three characteristics of the operations of this concept. Firstly, the minor stutters and stammers the language of the major, or the dominant: it disrupts a given system through subverting the language, structure and configuration of that system. Secondly, as the minor is positioned in relation to the major through a construct of power, the concept of the minor is inherently political. Finally, O’Sullivan defines the minor as being collective and as the precursor for a people, a community, and an audience to come (2010 200). In art history certain works may be regarded as encounters to have caused profound reconsiderations of what art is and how it may be experienced. O’Sullivan perceives these encounters as being generated by ‘minor practices’ that de-territorialise major traditions through ‘stammerings’ from within the major (2008a). Examples of such shifts in the context of art may, for example, be discerned in various avant-garde art movements throughout the twentieth century.
They consist of movements operating in the fringes of their contemporaneous culture, posing encounters in the context of what constitutes art. As contemporary artist and writer David Burrows notes, an example of the de-territorialisation of the work of art through the event of the encounter may be distinguished in the use of the readymade (2008 119-120). The readymade provides a disruption to how art is considered (ibid.), shaking discourses surrounding the art object and the role of the artist. Critic Nicolas Bourriaud sees such events as part of major shifts in the twentieth century; a violent disruption, a ‘jolt ... out of tradition ... a cultural exodus, an escape from the confines of nationalism and identity-tagging, but also from the mainstream whose tendency is to reify thought and practice’ (2009 2). It is what we may consider, in Deleuzean terms, a de-territorialisation of the work of art or art practice.

In *Notes towards a Minor Art Practice*, O’Sullivan outlines five ways in which minor and major languages of art practices may be understood (2008). Firstly, he gives the example of the major, international language of modernism, and identifies feminist and post-colonial practices as minor in relation to this. A second way in which these practices may be recognised is through relationships between modernism, on the one hand, and the stutterings and stammerings of its ‘other [alternative] voice[s]’ and groups, on the other, uttered through the dissenting voices of the Dadaists, Futurists and Situationists (ibid.). O’Sullivan then considers major art media – painting, sculpture and drawing – and the minor practices that ignored the canvas and the gallery: ‘different speeds’ of practices36 ‘at the cusp of modernity / postmodernity’ (O’Sullivan 2010 194) and the de-territorialisations of happenings, performances and similar non-traditional art forms (O’Sullivan 2008). One could argue that the turning away from the fixation on the medium – art practices that are traditionally *defined by* their medium or materials – is another point in art history where minor art practices refused to utter the language of the major, and caused a stuttering, with an encounter as its ripple effect. Another way in which major and minor practices may be understood is by considering the relationships between the vehicular language of the increasingly international, globalised art world, and the vernacular language of the local or the regional. This may, consequently, also mean considering the minor as operation outside of, or against, the Capitalist focus of the international art market. Finally, a minor art practice may be understood as taking on non-representational qualities, or even ‘push up against the edges of representation; it bends it, forcing it to the limits and often to a certain kind of absurdity’ (ibid.).

*Non-recognition* features as a significant factor in the creation of the event of the encounter. Within the domains of art, this manifests itself in de-territorialisations of dominant, structured notions of what art is, how it is to be encountered, what its purpose and status are, and so forth. Subsequent, critical de-territorialisations, those preoccupied with the shifting of *minor* art practices and fringe practices from the margins to the centre of discourse surrounding art, and disrupting

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36 O’Sullivan gives the examples of Allan Kaprow’s *Happenings* and Carolee Schneeman’s performances in his chapter *From Aesthetics to the Abstract Machine* (2010 194).
the striated space of the already existing, dominant practices, could perhaps be considered as further encounters. Through their very being, these in some measure and at some point pushed thought regarding their purpose and status beyond its then boundaries. Eventually, however, the readymade – and other examples of minor art practices and their forms of operation – became re-territorialised or recuperated; the new and minor was accepted, and thereupon a recognisable approach to art making may be distinguished as part of a method within major practices. These shifts, from margin to centre, minor to major, from rupture to recognition, ultimately form new structures for approaches to art, placing the new free, alternative concepts and methods into a yet again striated, regulated space. O’Sullivan explains that a re-territorialisation always follows de-territorialisation, and a minor art practice therefore needs to be regarded as ‘always in process, as always becoming’ (2008). Only a different rupture of that space may lead to a new encounter of that approach; perhaps it is an already known material or method yet, as an event, it is experienced differently.

Elements of the minor may be distinguished in Lidén’s work, specifically in Der Mythos des Fortschritts (Moonwalk) [The Myth of Progress (Moonwalk) and Bajki (Post)]. The disrupting acts of stuttering and stammering of the minor may be understood in Lidén’s 2008 video installation Der Mythos des Fortschritts (Moonwalk) (see Figs. 19-20). The video depicts Lidén, lit by streetlights, moonwalking down the streets of Manhattan after dark. The ominous act of striding backwards into the unknown of the dark streets of New York is contrasted with the absurdity of the very activity of moonwalking, given its obvious references to popular culture, Michael Jackson’s 1983 record Billie Jean and the accompanying music video (also set in an urban environment at night). The slowness of Lidén’s movements is further contrasted with the speed at which cars are seen travelling past in the foreground and background of the video. A stuttering of the major language of popular culture takes place as Lidén disrupts the moonwalk’s expected pop soundtrack with the melodic, repetitive and hypnotic piano-based track recorded by the Swedish trio Tvillingarna (Burns 2011), corresponding with the measured movements of Lidén’s body.
In Bajki (Post), Lidén used the existing major system of the Swedish postal service by providing an alternative service that also delivered mail. However, hers was not a commercial postal service competing with the major service, as a major service; mail was delivered through Lidén’s project, although according to interests different from those of the Capitalist market. The artist stuttered and stammered the language and operations of the major through stealing and claiming possession over one of its post-boxes, setting up a free postal service, and by personally delivering the post or – in the case of international post – arranging for friends travelling abroad to deliver the letters when they could (O’Brien et al. 2010 22). Lidén’s Bajki (Post) may be perceived as having a ‘future orientation’ (O’Sullivan 2010 200) and as resonating with desires to create alternatives to existing systems both in society and in making art; a practice for a world yet to exist (Deleuze and Guattari 1975/1986). What O’Sullivan calls for in his emphasis on the minor in art practices is a utopian art that rebels against dominant forms of expression and summons a future audience (2010 200-201).

The fifth Deleuzean approach O’Sullivan identifies as part of particular emerging art practices is the focus on the virtual. O’Sullivan compares Deleuze’s understanding of philosophy as a device through which the virtual may be actualised with O’Sullivan’s own perception of art as a form of ‘actualising machine’ (O’Sullivan 2010 201), found on the ‘cusp between any given present and the future’ (ibid. 205). Art, according to O’Sullivan, is pregnant with potential, and involvements in art practices are consequently involvements in the actualisation of this potential (ibid. 201). This potential may take the form of actualised virtual spaces and ‘unfamiliar durations’ (ibid.) outside those of spatialised clock-time. It therefore presents new aggregates of ‘space and duration’ (Deleuze 1968/1991 37) for the body to experience. In art practices, this may manifest itself in disruptions of conventional expressions of time, sequence and narratives, through the creation of new experiential spaces. Methods used in such creations may include intentional slippages of time, creations of new rhythms, removals of clock-time, and disturbances of time-space constructs. The actualisation of the virtual involves a form of experimental approach in the presentation of ‘new assemblages – new refrains’ (O’Sullivan 2010 206), and of thought materialised. Perhaps most forms of creation may be understood as such, as mobilisations of the virtual into the actual. However, I believe O’Sullivan’s emphasis is on the term ‘new’; new forms of art that pose as encounters, causing affect and new thought to take place. In this context, I understand Lidén’s overnight displacement of all commercial posters and billboards in the centre of Stockholm (Noble 2011) an example of such an actualisation of thought. The inhabitants of Stockholm woke up to an urban space transformed while they were sleeping, and became Lidén’s immediate audience. Her intervention fell outside that of the conventions of art and where art is traditionally found. It blurred boundaries between life and art, and disrupted the commercial systems of communication that saturate most capital cities.
O’Sullivan’s sixth Deleuzean concept that he wishes to apply in thinking about contemporary art is the event. O’Sullivan emphasises the importance of the experience over the reading of art works, as he understands art history as a field dominated by deconstructive and semiotic readings of art. O’Sullivan sees such approaches to art as hegemonic, and he expresses his desire to disrupt and pose alternatives to these so as to free art from systems of signification (O’Sullivan 2001 126). As an alternative to deconstructive approaches to art, O’Sullivan thinks of art as an unpredictable event through which one may encounter affect; an ‘event site’ as a ‘point of exile where it is possible that something, finally, might happen’ (ibid. 127). The event is defined by activity and fluidity, and is charged with possibility of actualisation of the virtual. Furthermore, the event is a concept towards the circumvention of representation, and places its focus on the affective experience over the communication of meaning and the reading of the work.

Closely related to the notion of the event, O’Sullivan puts forward a seventh concept as a present driving force in contemporary art practices, mythopoesis (O’Sullivan 2010 203). Mythopoesis is the making of myths, a production of fictions. These, O’Sullivan proposes, may be used in the making of art in order to produce new and different perceptions (O’Sullivan 2007 146), and in the ‘production of possible worlds’ (ibid. 143). The concept is used in such practices as a method, what O’Sullivan refers to in a Deleuzean sense as a ‘machine’ (O’Sullivan 2007 119). It works towards creating alternative understandings of and connections with the world and, consequently, ‘a different ... altered consciousness’ (ibid.).

O’Sullivan also understands the use of mythopoesis in contemporary art practices as a way of counteracting recent art history’s emphasis on deconstruction and communication of meaning; the dominant positioning of the work of art as signifier to be read by an audience (2007 144). Mythopoesis as a method thus has a dual function. Firstly, this form of myth-making involves a ‘myth-breaking’ and a ‘scrambling of codes’ of existing myths (ibid. 146), and may even involve references to or bastardisations of earlier myths in new arrangements (ibid. 147). The interference caused by mythopoesis may involve the disruptive acts of stuttering and stammering of the minor, as indicated in O’Sullivan’s outline (above) of the fourth concept included in his proposed framework. Secondly, mythopoesis produces new fictions, proffering alternative forms of thought ‘from another place, another time’ (ibid. 146) that break with habitual modes and accustomed ‘space-times’ (ibid. 119). As a method of actualising the virtual in art practices, the concept may support the creation of new space-times and new domains, and lead to an unfolding of ‘non-human worlds’ (ibid.): a ‘space-time without others’ (ibid. 96). O’Sullivan’s and Burrows’ uses of mythopoesis and disruptive acts of stuttering and stammering in Plastique Fantastique take the form of invented rituals and ceremonies, made-up symbols stuttering commercial logos, and assemblages of shrines for the future, such as the 2006 Plastique Fantastique Shrine for the People-yet-to-Come (Plastique Fantastique 2006).
There are thus two simultaneous forces in mythopoesis, both of which reflect Deleuze’s approach to philosophy as its being a creative act, a critique of myth parallel to the creation of new myth (O’Sullivan 2007 144). The uses of mythopoesis in art practices that O’Sullivan defines as Deleuzean may be understood through their uses of fabulations and productions of alternative experiences, and not, O’Sullivan stresses, in the creations of yet another narrative to be read by a viewer (ibid. 147). He draws on Deleuze, who directly instructs artists in their practice to prevent the construction of any narrative that serves as a ‘private story’, and to avoid definitions of what is ‘real’ and what is ‘fictional’ (Deleuze in O’Sullivan 2007 148). Instead, artists should form a ‘double becoming’ with their characters, in moving towards these characters and also letting the same characters move towards the artist (ibid.). The products of mythopoesis are thus neither impersonal nor private; rather, they encourage the blurring of boundaries between actuality and fiction, the personal and the political, art and life. In an art practice, the blurrings may be understood as ‘apersonal’, that which O’Sullivan terms ‘transhuman’, or that which ‘connects us to the world’ (O’Sullivan 2007 50). What mythopoesis offers is an escape from established constructs, towards new sets of conditions, questions and audiences yet to come (O’Sullivan 2007 146). This is hence an important concept in relation to my research, as I seek new ways of thinking and making art about memory yet to do so without creating closed, private narratives.

Art as Actualising-Machine

O’Sullivan, in the spirit of Deleuze, calls art an ‘actualising-machine’ operating beyond representation (O’Sullivan 2007 29). This is a machine with the ability to actualise the virtual. O’Sullivan suggests that the art practice may be considered as located between the actual and the virtual, working within a particular space or field, against the organisation, regimented nature or representational machinery of that space or field (ibid.). In this art practice, the encounter is understood as the ‘creative moment’ of a ‘possible world unfolded’ (O’Sullivan 2007 1-2). It constitutes the fracturing of one form of existence during the creation of another so as to break with the known or the already discovered, the recognised or the stereotypical; thus, a ‘real experience’, reflecting thought and encouraging thought (ibid.) is created. The artist could here be considered the ‘rebel subject’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004 414) actively seeking to remain in the detrerritorialised space of the margin, by both continuously drawing ‘new subjectiv[ies] forth’ (O’Sullivan 2008b 98) and engaging in a perpetual process of becoming-rebel subject. Such an artist, Nicholas Bourriaud suggests, is involved in various acts of metamorphoses, transmuting concepts and constructed symbols; they ‘transport them from one point to another’ (2009 13). The art practice operating beyond representation, as put forward by O’Sullivan, may function as a space within which one may creatively experiment with and explore concepts and experiential materials such as space/s, scents, sounds, images, objects, and relationships. The ‘learning to undo things, and to undo oneself’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004 442) positions this practice as being critical of set systems, understandings, hierarchies or ideas. Shifts between the minor and
the major in contemporary art may, for example, be understood as a certain use of found materials differing from that of the traditional notion of the readymade; a use Bourriaud calls ‘the art of postproduction’ (2002 13). Bourriaud notes that increasing numbers of contemporary artists work with already existing artefacts, data and products as they ‘interpret, reproduce, re-exhibit, or use works made by others or available cultural products’ (ibid.), in their own modes, ones that are new and that diverge from the manner in which the readymade is usually encountered.

The new manners of working, Bourriaud asserts, depend upon the interlacing of the artist’s own work with those of others, and result in encounters that eradicate ‘the traditional distinction between production and consumption, creation and copy, readymade and original work’ (Bourriaud 2002 13). The focus is no longer on the material itself; rather, it is on the notion of:

[W]orking with objects that are already in circulation on the cultural market, which is to say, objects already informed by other objects. Notions of originality (being at the origin of) and even of creation (making something from nothing) are slowly blurred. (Bourriaud 2002 13)

Using ‘already produced forms’ (Bourriaud 2002 16) may, amongst other procedures, involve acts of sampling, combining, choosing, taking apart or in other ways recycling manufactured products, cultural artefacts, found materials (ibid. 18, 21). As Bourriaud notes, the work of art in these particular forms of practices is ‘no longer an end point but a simple moment in an infinite chain of contributions’ (ibid. 21). The disturbance in the unfamiliar familiarity forms an integral part of the creation of the art encounter. The notion of the encounter may thus manifest itself in contemporary art practices the uses of particular, well-known materials, concepts or sites in unknown, never-experienced situations or events. There needs to be something strange in the familiar, unfamiliar in the known, so to cause a simultaneous rupture and assertion; an encounter.

Although rejecting representation, a minor art practice may still make use of forms of representation. Much as the encounter may include already known materials or notions arranged in new juxtapositions, the minor art practice is ‘always in process, always as becoming, new forms breaking with the old whilst also making use of them’ (O’Sullivan 2007 73). Such a concept may

37 Bourriaud points out in the beginning of his work Postproduction - Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprograms the World, that ‘the prefix “post” does not signal any negation or surpassing’ (2002 S), but that it communicates a virtual or actual place in which processes or operations take place; ‘it refers to a zone of activity’ (ibid.).
38 Bourriaud’s examples include works by Mike Kelley and Paul McCarthy (using actors to re-enact performances by the artist Vito Acconci), Rirkrit Tiravanija (using works by Olivier Mosset, Allan McCollum, Ken Lum and Philip Johnson), Pierre Huyghe (using projections of Gordon Matta-Clark’s work), Swetlana Heger and Plamen Dejanov (incorporating bought works of art and design) and Jorge Pardo (installations featuring works by Alvar Aalto, Arne Jakobsen, and Isamu Noguchi), as the works of these contemporary artists utilise found materials in a manner that reflects Bourriaud’s notion of the art of postproduction (ibid. 14-15).
39 Bourriaud gives the interesting example of the art exhibition The Raw and the Cooked, curated by Dan Cameron and Claude Levi-Strauss, to illustrate this point. Bourriaud explains that the show ‘included artists who transformed materials and made them unrecognizable (the cooked), and artists who preserved the singular aspect of these materials (the raw)’ (2002 28).
be impetuously interpreted as or associated with key expressions within some forms of post-modern art or a number of twentieth-century avant-garde movements (Burrows 2008 119-120) (Bourriaud 2009 2): ideas of the use of materials or concepts from other contexts, a montage of sorts, a bricolage, pastiche, appropriation, in commenting on art history, popular culture, art itself, amongst other things. However, I see this de-territorialisation as something much deeper than that, less precise in terms of the materials themselves; a rethinking of concepts and materials, a thinking anew through art, veering away from the beaten path in order actually to create and not just critique, to actualise virtualities other than those already in place, and to construct an encounter that violently shocks us into thinking about a particular idea. The presence of the encounter or the ‘negation of the existing language’ is, O’Sullivan notes, vital in the creation of something new (2007 76); it is hence also imperative that the art practice with such desires remain minor, and in a continuous process of becoming.

The art practice that remains active in the margin of dominant culture is one described by O’Sullivan as ‘operating “beyond” representation’; it takes the form of both the point of the encounter and the actual encounter itself (2007 2). Involved as I am in what I see as a minor art practice, I am attempting to present alternative notions and expressions of memory whilst simultaneously actively affronting, disrupting and subverting major discourses and settled ideas of what our experiences of memory and the past constitute, as well as how these concepts are thought of, expressed and represented. One of the elements of such an approach is a deliberate focus on the minor discourse of non-traumatic personal memory, as opposed to the major domains of trauma in memory studies. The presence of this minor area of the personal experience of memory is manifested in my practice through considerations of the remembered-yet-undocumented, the focus on the apersonal, and the blurring of actual and fictional narratives. Such consideration requires a stuttering of ideas of pastness and memory, and a stammering of how these may be expressed. I shall return to these concepts in a discussion on my installation Disruptive Desires in Juncture III.

I have used my practice-based research to investigate how the ideas of the encounter and the assemblage may be used in the experiential environments of installations. I am interested in how both the experiencing body and the installation may be understood as assemblages. Much as the encounter, a creative event that may only be felt or sensed, my work’s aim is to create an affective experience, that which Deleuze would have called a ‘block of sensations’, a ‘bundle of affects’, an affective assemblage, and a constellation of forces (O’Sullivan 2007 43, 50, 53, 58). In seeking such an approach, my practice focuses on the physical, bodily and mentally affective experience rather than on the reading or interpretation of the artwork as such; the overall aim is that I create an encounter in which we ourselves as ‘bundles of affects’ (ibid. 50) feel and sense. However, a reading is in all probability also part of the experience.
In moving away from the use of the metaphor and its significations or sets of meanings, I am instead moving towards a form of practice that places emphasis on what the art work does, rather than what it means. In the subject of my work, the affective experience is not the creation of a re-experience of something in the past, but of something of pastness experienced anew; in essence, the very expression of the work needs to break with traditional notions of how notions of the past may be or should be expressed. Although the encounter entails a new experience that produces new thought, it is not limited to new or previously unknown (art) materials, ideas, objects or formula. An encounter could therefore involve elements of Bourriaud’s notion of ‘postproduction’ by using ‘already produced forms’ (2002 13, 16) such as found objects or already existing artworks. As a consequence, it could encapsulate the ‘zone of activity’ held by such notions. The encounter may therefore contain concepts or matter already discovered. These are, though, placed into a new context, a new light, connecting with other assemblages, in juxtaposition with new combinations, permutations and states of affairs. They create an inclusively new experience.
This photograph is part of my photographic series Hunting Towers (see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 220-259).
It is thus repeated in Juncture IV: Portfolio (see Fig. 165, p. 247).
Memories like this came back to me in the disused Ladies’ Waiting-Room of Liverpool Street station, memories behind and within which many things much further back in the past seemed to lie, all interlocking like the labyrinthine vaults I saw in the dusty grey light, and which seemed to go on and on for ever. In fact I felt, said Austerlitz, that the waiting-room where I stood as if dazzled contained all the hours of my past life, all the suppressed and extinguished fears and wishes I had ever entertained, as if the black and white diamond pattern of the stone slabs beneath my feet were the board on which the end-game would be played, it covered the entire plane of time.

(Sebald 2002 192-193)

The first Juncture of this thesis may be thought of as a way of distinguishing a dominant image of thought, and the second Juncture as a way of defining creative devices to be used in the dismantling of that dominant image of thought. The current Juncture focuses on experiments with and uses of the creative devices developed in the second Juncture, and my explorations of memory via the experience of making and receiving artworks. This Juncture presents the framework I developed from this experimentation in practice, building on the writings of Gilles Deleuze, Henri Bergson and Simon O’Sullivan, as I have introduced and discussed in the previous two Junctures. Furthermore, Juncture III focuses on how my experiments with the concepts included in the framework developed by O’Sullivan (as presented in Juncture II) have manifested themselves in my research. My research activities are comprised of the work I have produced through my practice, and how my various levels and kinds of involvement in these processes have led me to an alternative approach to memory: memory as event. I shall present a set of strategies in this third Juncture, ones to have helped me to develop an art practice that approaches concepts of memory without per se attempting to represent memory. Juncture III is to show how I have interrogated ideas of memory then developed my concept of the memory-event through my practice, and what elements characterise this concept of the memory-event.

Throughout my research project, I have produced a number of experimental bodies of work in my art practice. Their aim was to critique and offer alternatives to dominant notions of memory. Visual images and descriptions of these works have been included in Juncture IV: Portfolio of this thesis, to provide an overview of the experiments. The bodies of work include three photographic series of work: Hunting Lodges (2009 – current day; see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 198-219), Hunting Towers (2007 – current day; see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 220-259), and Majorna (2006; see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 324-341). I have also created a series of installations throughout this research project: Aftermath (2009; see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 260-273);
Luffare Narratives (2009; see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 274-281); Déjà Perdu (2009; see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 294-301); Journeys Back (2008; see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 302-311), and a video entitled Burning (2007; see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 312-323). These may be understood as products of creative thought-experiments with which I have engaged through my practice. My practice-based research culminated in a large-scale installation in December 2012, entitled Disruptive Desires (2012; see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 150-196), exploring memory in relation to undocumented yet remembered events.

This Juncture will firstly introduce key elements and methods of working that are vital to my art practice. I shall discuss how activities of travelling back and forth between the UK and Sweden have been important to my exploration of memory, and how I have come to focus on the minor practices of the Swedish hunting community in my investigation of expressions of personal memory. This discussion includes a profile of the Swedish hunting community. The works I am including as manifestations of these methods include the photographic series Majorna, Hunting Lodges and Hunting Towers, and the installations Aftermath and Luffare Narratives. Following these discussions, I shall introduce and elaborate on Disruptive Desires, which marked the culmination of this research. Finally, I shall present a framework, built on O’Sullivan’s proposed methodology, for practices wishing to pose alternatives to dominant ideas of memory. Furthermore, I will distinguish what I have come to term the memory-event as one such alternative to established theories of the mnemonic.

Working though the Journey and the Undocumented: Majorna

Poets claim that we recapture for a moment the self we once were when we revisit some house or garden in which we lived when young. Such pilgrimages are extremely hazardous and they end as often in disappointment as in success. Those fixed places, which exist along with the changing years, are best discovered in ourselves.

(Proust 1920-21/2002 88)

As stated, part of my working method includes travelling back and forth between the UK and my native Sweden. I gather material in Sweden, and bring it to London, where I use this material in my practice. The material ranges from photographs and filmed footage to found objects and Swedish soil. I decided on this working method in the early stages of this research project. Unable mnemically to connect to the past through my family photographs, I saw this as a form of physical and mental active performance; a thought experiment, carried out in order to investigate with what, exactly, I am able to form subjective, mnemonic connections.
This decision has turned into series of journeys between the UK and Sweden. The journeys may be considered as practical thought experiments, as serial operations towards attempting to create connections with my past and with my memories of that past. The endeavour demands a ‘physical mobilization’ (Kwon 2000 57); by way of explanation, it is a physical rather than a psychic journey.

A first attempt was a journey to the city of Göteborg on Sweden’s west coast where I grew up, an attempt that eventually led to a sense of a non-return to a previous place of residence. This resulted in my 2006 photographic series Majorna (see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 324-341). The affective elements and what I had hoped to return to were no longer present, and the return as such was incomplete. I navigated through the area of Majorna, where I spent a large part of my childhood, and photographed various locations that figured as significant elements in my formative years40. In Majorna, I learned about independence and self-reliance, games, negotiations and interaction with others, friendship, allegiances and betrayal, the culturally conventional and the abnormal, death and the everyday, love and pain. However, photographing the area and its courtyards and apartment blocks, streets, parks, public spaces and schools that were once part of my extended playground became meaningful only in the moment, in the event of the journey. The photographic images produced expressed not the memories of the spaces and objects depicted, as I may initially naively and nostalgically have hoped (the first cigarette; the first kiss; the first fist fight; see Figs. 22-23), but appeared empty of memory triggers, and the actuality of the non-return of the journey back became strikingly apparent.

40 From the age of four to fourteen (1982-1992).
The idea of the return has come to serve as a key feature in my work, as it has turned out to be both a virtual and an actual futile return; I cannot go back to my place of birth as it was. This futile return may be understood through the promises of the mnemonic device. The memory trigger offers only one sense of a return to what-has-been, a metaphysical but never a physical return to the past; it states the Barthesian ça-a-été (Barthes 2000 76) – the that-has-been – but does not bring the past moment into the present.

The physical mobilisation involved in the journeys to Sweden has failed to result in a pinpointing, locating or grasping of memories of past moments. Instead, it has highlighted the changing, ever-increasing temporal distance separating the present instant from moments of the past. If we return to Bergson’s illustration of the cone, this ‘exile’ from the past or gap between present and past moments in time is generated by the continuous flow of plane P. The gap is sensed through point S, the feeling body or what Deleuze may have called the bundle of affect (O’Sullivan 2007 50); this is because it is in connection both with memories of past events and with the present created by the moving plane P: an experience from which point S emerges rather than endures.

My journeys back and forth between the UK and Sweden reflect my sense of displacement as an expatriate, where my idea of home is formed between these two countries. I am Swedish, yet I am no longer part of Swedish culture. My grasp of the Swedish language has been deteriorating over an extended period of time. I speak my mother tongue with hesitations and incorrect grammar, and I stumble over words. Without knowing it, I make up new words that make no sense. I live in Britain, and I lack a full native understanding of British culture. Having lived in different English-speaking countries, I speak with several accents at once. This is not a state of homelessness, but a form of dwelling in what Caren Kaplan calls ‘the intermezzo zone’ (Kaplan 1998 89). James Meyer understands this state as a site of mobility with its own form of subjectivity, utilised by artists such as Martha Rosler, Gabriel Orozco, Mark Dion, Renée Green, and Klara Lidén in their respective practices (Meyer 2000 32). Meyer recognises that the artist as a moving or travelling subject is ‘thoroughly historicized’ and burdened by middle-class, modernist associations of ‘the artist in exile’ (Kaplan 1998 28). Miwon Kwon explains that such assumptions of the travelling artist are attached to notions of power and privilege, limited to those who can financially manage and sustain a practice with such demands (Kwon 2000 57). The traditional figure of the exiled artist is described by Kaplan as being predominantly male, ‘melancholic’, ‘nostalgic’, and in an unforced state of exile (Kaplan 1998 41). Historically, s/he is usually a Euro-American bourgeois expatriate involved in a form of voyeuristic mining of ‘the foreign’ for ‘artistic gain’41 (ibid. 41), driven by what John Durham Peters calls a ‘romance of the road’ (1999/2006 152). Furthermore, Kaplan notes that ideas of nostalgia are rooted in the suggestions that it is natural to be at home, thus the exile

41 Adorno, in Minima Moralia, however, sees the art practice as a form of inevitable ‘refuge for the homeless’ in the most ‘non-sentimental’ sense, Kaplan reveals (118-119). This ‘homeless’ status appears to apply to all human subjects; however, it is doubtful whether it can truly be considered as such. Perhaps it primarily applies to Western subjects. Adorno declares how current existence is ‘rootless’, as ‘dwelling, in the proper sense, is now impossible ... The house is past’ (ibid.).
suffers from a homesickness bounded in nostalgia (1998 33). The roots of the word ‘nostalgia’ supports such relations from a linguistic point of view; ‘nostalgia’ derives from the Greek words ‘nostos’, meaning a ‘return home’, and ‘algos’, meaning a ‘painful condition’ (ibid.; Durham Peters in Sunderburg 2000 151). Furthermore, in his article on memory and literature, critic Craig Raine quotes Kundera, who defines nostalgia as ignorance, stating that it is ‘the suffering caused by an unappeased yearning to return’ (2008). As associations of the ‘melancholic’, ‘nostalgic’ figure described by Kaplan (1998 41) may haunt and complicate art practices that utilise travels or journeys as a part of a working method, a clear rejection of these notions of the artist in exile is imperative. Other expressions of exile and movement focus on relationships with the road that are far from romantic; they are usually art practices reflecting the state of the refugee and other forced forms of exile, along with associations of home as that ‘impossible object’ (ibid.). Kwon remarks in One Place after Another: Notes on Site Specificity (2000 38-63) how more recent art practices show evidence of an ‘unhinging’ of those practices. It consists not of a disadvantageous ‘turning back to a modernist notion of the siteless, nomadic art object’; rather, it allows for a re-invention of ‘site specificity as a nomadic practice’ (ibid. 47). The re-invention involves a mobilisation of ‘the site as a discursive narrative’, which ultimately demands an ‘intensive physical mobilization of the artist’ in the production of projects in different places, brought together ‘from “elsewhere”’ (ibid. 51, 54).

**Working through Practices of Hunting: Hunting Lodges and Hunting Towers**

In pursuit of my desire to explore memories without physical forms of representation such as photographs and other records, I began to investigate what kinds of memories I do have of events that were never documented. Having grown up in Sweden, a country where hunting is a common activity among farmers and the rural working class, and witnessed the traditions, rituals and practices surrounding hunting, I wanted to explore personal memories from that part of my childhood. I wanted to do so through the a personal notion present in the personal work of others, and wanted my engagement with such expressions to function as a form of active performance: one reaching beyond merely reflecting on these works, and actively and creatively responding to them (Deleuze 1990/1997b 122). The exploration led to my engagement in two ongoing photographic projects entitled Hunting Towers, depicting structures erected for the purposes of 42 However, this modernist notion is not be confused or associated with the contemporary artist in forced exile; the notion of the artist in forced exile deals with a set of entirely different issues, those Said would have associated with an ‘inhumane’ and ‘intolerable’, ‘unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home’ (The Mind of Winter 49).

43 The focal points within such practices range from examinations of different experiences of movement, as in Anna Sandgren’s 2007 installation Travelling and Transportation at Malmö Art Academy (Sandgren 2010) or Lize Mogel’s Migration Routes project (Mogel 2009), to experiences of longing and estrangement in the works of Mona Hatoum or Ana Mendieta. I see these focal points as being fundamentally different from my own; my practice is concerned neither with psycho-geographical notions of movement and mapping, nor with the complex problems of forced exile and migration.
Hunting towers are found scattered across rural Sweden, carefully positioned by hunters in fields and at the edges of forests. Although anyone may climb up, enter, sit in, and occupy these towers without permission from the hunter or hunting team who built them – activities I took part in as a child, they are purpose-built structures for the act of killing; viewing, hiding, waiting, aiming, watching, firing, from an elevated point. They have become strange non-loci that I now visit; common unregulated structures, unmarked on maps. While they form a position in space, the structures are often portable and moved to different locations, or are replaced as they deteriorate: markers of locations that constantly shift. The hunting towers are usually constructed using available materials – spare pieces of wood, sheets of corrugated Plexiglas, fabric, camouflage nets, plywood, MDF and other materials close at hand. Their shapes vary from tower to tower. The so-called hunting lodges (for examples see Figs. 24-25) range between anything from small cottages to shed-like structures, and serve as meeting points, somewhere to warm up in winter. The lodges are often also abattoirs, and places where traditional celebrations take place. These are often co-owned by the local hunting team or a number of members of that team, who all contribute to building maintenance.

A continuous dialogue about hunting took shape once I contacted individual hunters who are part of hunting teams in a county in the west of Sweden. However, I have primarily been working with Bäreberg hunting team, who operate near where my father lives in Västra Götaland county. They have shared stories and local anecdotes with enthusiasm, shown me around hunting areas, opened up hunting lodges and hunting headquarters, and invited me to gatherings: meetings, the slaughter of shot game, and celebratory wild boar roast parties. One of the hunters to whom I have been speaking owns a local scrap-yard and army surplus business, and is also employed as a hunter and tracker by the county. He is regularly called out to track down wild animals injured by cars in road accidents or to put down large animals. He has shown me the hunting lodge belonging to the hunting team of which he is a member.

This hunting lodge is a small, traditional residential cottage located along a narrow country road. Various hunting-themed paraphernalia are found inside the hunting lodge – a wild boar skin, a comical painting of a moose and a sleeping hunter, a map of the local hunting territory, schnapps bottles in the shape of bullets, curtains in a multi-coloured moose motif, glass ornaments depicting moose or hunting scenes, and a handmade diorama of a forest tableau. Through their ubiquity, these hunting towers and hunting lodges form important parts of my identification with the Swedish landscape. They have an effect on the Swedish psyche, and feature in my memories of my
childhood. Elements of, reflections on or relations to my photographs of these hunting towers and hunting lodges appear in numerous installations, as they form a fluid point that never attempts to represent – rather, they provide a portal to – expressions of personal memory.

**Identifying the Swedish Hunting Community**

While the Swedish hunting community is not in itself unique, it differs substantially from, for example, the British or American hunting scenes⁴⁴. Hunting has been part of Swedish tradition for thousands of years, and recent research shows that two thirds of Swedes are descendants of early hunters rather than of farmers (Skoglund et al. 2012). Due to socio-economic factors (Heberlein 1991) hunting has moved from forming a core part of major learned social behaviour (Heberlein 1987), part of everyday life throughout Sweden, to a minor practice that appears to become stronger the further away it is from densely populated areas (Lindberg 2010 11). In low-density, rural areas the practices are still part of the everyday, as the local hunting community forms its own co-culture operating within that of the larger, dominant Swedish culture. The members of the hunting community in Sweden are primarily farmers, blue-collar workers and others who reside in the countryside and low-density areas (Ericsson 2008; Lindberg 2010 11, 18). They hunt mainly moose, wild boar, hare and deer (Mattsson et al. 2008), and often work together in teams in order to cover and organise themselves within larger hunting territories. Their activities include the construction of hunting towers, the purchase and maintenance of hunting lodges,

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⁴⁴ There are differences between these hunting communities; however, a commonality is that numbers of active hunters in the US, Europe and Sweden appear to be in decline, as discussed in Erik Lindberg’s recent report (2010). Furthermore, Lindberg’s research suggests that this is due to a shrinking rural or low-density community, and an increasing number of people relocating to urban areas (ibid.).
the construction or facilitation of abattoirs, and wildlife preservation, amongst other practices. In order to become a hunter, an annual government-issued hunting licence is required. For this, an examination has to be taken, and gun licences are needed when purchasing and carrying rifles and other firearms (Lindberg 2010 7). Thousands of Swedes are sitting the exam each year, predominantly people in the 20-35 age group; approximately 25% of those sitting their hunting licence examination each year are women (Kjellsson 2006 19). However, the number of active hunters in Sweden is falling – only three per cent of the Swedish population hunt (Ericsson 2008). Although the meat from the wild animals they kill is eaten, it is not for survival as such that the hunt takes place; however, it is not considered a sport, killing for fun, either – it is something else.

Recent research into attitudes towards and forms of participation in Swedish hunting communities show an emphasis on their place in wildlife management and preservation, and a dependence on rural tradition and related learned social behaviour (Lindberg 2010 4, 5). In conversations with a number of hunters, it has become clear that even the hunters themselves cannot define why they hunt; it is a part of life, of being a part of a community, a shared experience that is highly valued. However, this is a community rarely visible in contemporary Swedish culture. Their activities are often not represented in the dominant cultural productions in Sweden. They have become a fringe group, operating from within, yet situated outside of, what Deleuze would have called the ‘dominating signifying regime’ (O’Sullivan 2007 69).

**The Swedish Hunting Community as Minor**

Placing the contemporary Swedish hunting community in focus requires a form of deliberate blurring of the dominant culture of which it is a part. This is a form of fragmentation or disarrangement that re-directs the attention away from the culturally understood point of convergence. That is, as a group, hunters are considered away from the dominant, or what Deleuze discusses as major, towards the very edges of that culture, the margins, the borders, the fringes – a spatial territory inhabited or occupied by minor groups. Deleuze talks about major and minor in terms of thought; however, he discusses these notions via examples found in language, in literature and in other culturally dependent disciplines. We may use these terms in everyday language, but Deleuze is not speaking about numbers, about quantities. Instead, he wants to speak about the relationships between the central images of thought and the peripheral; the dominant, culturally agreed upon notions, values and systems in relation to alternative notions, values and systems – and it is via the use of these two terms that he is able to do so.

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45 According to recent research, there has been an increase in the number of females who apply for hunting licences every year (Kjellsson 2006 19; Lindberg 2010 18); however, only about 5% of Swedish hunters are female (Mattsson et al. 2008 4).
46 A report by the Swedish Government Rural Department shows that approximately 260,000 people register for or renew their hunting licences each year in Sweden (Landsbygdsdepartementet 2012).
The hunting community and their forms of expression could be considered as a minor group, operating along the margins of what can be understood as contemporary Sweden. At certain points in history, though, they would have been considered the very centre of Swedish culture. This community has now been pushed to the edges of it, and remain minor despite the prevalence of hunting in rural areas. Dominant culture, or the major, Deleuze and Guattari warn, puts forward a singular, normative discourse and representation of itself; at times it may appear to, yet does not necessarily, allow for a representation of a co-existence of multiplicities. In terms of the Swedish hunting community and their expressions, we see the major as that which is generally accepted as constituting Swedish culture. As such, the major may be understood as that which is represented within this culture, and the manner in which it represents itself. As a group on the outskirts of the dominant culture, the hunters form a minor group that, despite its numbers, are for the most part invisible in dominant cultural representations. The various components of the major culture function so as to uphold, confirm, reflect and maintain its values; in Deleuzo-Guattarian terms, these are machine-like. The institutionalised archives produced by and within the dominant Swedish culture may also have machine-like functions as part of what theorist Jean Hillier calls ‘the Heritage machine’ (2010): a machine, in a spirit of upholding, confirming, reflecting and maintaining ‘major’ values, that produces via its archives, collections, museums and other institutions bound to notions of history, a sense of a univocal, or a ‘universal past’ (ibid.). Deleuzo-Guattarian thought encourages a sense of polyvocality – a multiplicity of singularities that speak at once.

The conventions and traditions of institutionalised archives, museums and other forms of representations of singular history and experiences in contemporary Sweden tend to ignore the peripheral minor groups, such as the hunting community. Though there are occasional references in the media to the hunting community from time to time – in recent years primarily in relation to bear sightings in the south of Sweden, or the issue of wolves killing sheep and other livestock – they remain absent from discussions, productions and forms of representations of the dominant culture. Nevertheless, through the limitations of such institutions, this minor group is able to stutter the major language. In place of a presence in established, government funded arenas47, the Swedish hunting community has created their own alternative museums and galleries, places of exchange and communication via online image and video sharing sites, blogs and discussion forums (for examples see Figs. 26-27). Members of the hunting community produce records and reflections on their experiences, although these are rarely present in the archives of this dominant culture. In recent years members of the hunting community have indeed formed alternative archives for themselves, connecting not just with each other, but also with other hunting communities via online platforms such as blogs, image sharing sites, forums.

47 Though there are government funded hunting and fishing museums in Norway, Finland and Denmark, Sweden does not yet have such a museum. A motion was put forward to the Swedish parliament in 1990-1991 to fund a hunting and fishing museum (Sveriges Riksdag n/d), however, the outcome of this request is unclear. There is, however, one small independent hunting and fishing museum outside the village of Dorotea in Sweden. Though unrelated to the Swedish hunting community, there is also a museum dedicated to the hunting activities of the Swedish royal family called Kungojaktmuseet Älgens Berg in the west of Sweden (www.algensberg.com).
and video sharing sites such as YouTube. The stuttering here is that of the language of the major archive, museum or collection; the forms in which these activities result are those utilised by such institutions. The hunters’ communications are suddenly found in a different context, operating according to something other than the regulations set by the major. The hunting community carefully documents its practices and reflects on these via the written word, photographs and filmed footage. The records are presented, to some extent, in a recognised manner; they copy, borrow and simulate already existing systems of organisation and presentations. The galleries of images, dated records, edited video clips and other materials are organised and presented in such a way that the dominant culture knows how to engage with them.

The fact remains that the hunters’ contributions simultaneously ignore and to some extent undermine the major hierarchies and traditions of the culture from which they derive. A new system has been formed, one not found as an oppositional force to that of the dominant, but as operating on a different plane, on the edge. It remains, though, within the dominant culture. The multiple archive has no curator, editor, private view, entrance fees, and no particular order in which to access its contents. Any singular member of the community can contribute, document, write, edit, upload, share – and their images, texts, and footage are shared alongside major documents. Other minor expressions do similarly in what, some would argue, is a much less hierarchal structure, and in a much flatter, rhizomic manner.

The user-friendly interface of many of the minor sites has encouraged wider participation; the gap between the professional and the amateur is becoming less apparent. Perhaps we could say that a new form of literacy is seen through these sites. A certain new sense of fluency – visual and textual – can be distinguished, not only in the way members of the hunting community are
able to access these documents or comment on them, but are also able to create their own documents as well as archives. This is a state of multiplicities, multiple histories, even anti-history, and polyvocal expressions that form connections with other forms of expressions, minor as well as major. The fluid archives – blogs, image galleries, and video sharing sites – encountered online offer a multiplicity of alternative images of culture, thought, experiences and expression, and I see the stutterings they contain as healthy ruptures in and vital alternatives to dominant forms of representation.

The hunting community is not the only minor group that operates in the margins of dominant Swedish culture; that is to say, they are by no means an exception. However, their relationships between forces and intensities, and between dominant and alternative thought featuring in my research project appear also to be present in the particular rural community I met, and they provide an example which I believe is vital when discussing such matters. Their online points of convergence provide not only exchanges of experiences via verbal, textual or visual means; they also form testing grounds, laboratories for creation and experimentation. They advocate expressions of or reflections on experiences. By engaging in these forms of exchange, this minor group actively poses an alternative image of thought, an alternative image of culture. The hunting community’s forms of expression, created within major culture, speak the language of the major culture, and causes by its mere existence a rupture from within it. It speaks of a different image within a major machine wishing only to produce and reproduce one form of image.

Through online platforms, the current hunting community in Sweden is connected with hunters in other parts of the world, sharing similar and also different experiences. They form, through these alternative archives of their various activities and practices, a network of multiple singularities, an online nervous system through which developments that concern them are communicated, shared and spread faster than ever. The connective body, distancing itself from the dominant ‘heritage machine’ of major culture (Hillier 2010), is in a continuous process of creating its own archive, a reflection of its own history and its own experiences; a new image, an alternative image, existing alongside that of the dominant form of representation. Through its flat organisation, it could be said that the multiple singularities constituting this body become somewhat anonymous, albeit a constructed anonymity. Foucault would say that anonymity creates a better surface of contact for the reader, because the name or status of the author does not position itself between the reader and the text, or between the reader and the image (Thoburn 2010). Indicated by the activities, practices and expressions of the hunting community is the existence of an alternative system that operates within, communicates with and at the same time, to some extent, disregards the major system, its values and its structures. Instead, this group positions a different set of values and structures. While there exist hierarchies within the hunting community as well, these do not necessarily correspond with the forms of hierarchies found in major culture.
The hunters’ absence from major representation suggests, in major terms, a non-existence. Only through collective practices are the hunters able to claim a form of presence, even if that means a peripheral presence. They form what Deleuzean scholar Nick Thoburn calls a ‘polymorphoeous communal being’ with ‘a fragmented personality’ (2010); they act as a single body, a multitude, an irreducible multiplicity. For Deleuze, this entails a form of becoming, a becoming-other – or here, a becoming-hunter, in a continuous state of becoming as it is always placed in relation to the dominant: that which it is not.

Narratives of personal memories, and to some extent national identity, inhabit my Hunting Towers and Hunting Lodges works. They may be understood as micro-narratives, and co-extensively a personal. Through their connections to general human affects and a part of a grander narrative, a human narrative, they communicate with one voice the personal in synchronicity with another voice, communicating the general. As discussed in Juncture II, the term ‘apersonal’ (O’Sullivan 2007 50) is not intended to communicate ideas of the cold, unemotional, apathetic or dispassionate notions of the impersonal. Instead, the a personal is a form of production of subjectivity. It articulates the connective line that ‘connects us to the world’ (O’Sullivan 2007 50) and to other subjective singularities. Mieke Bal discusses narrativity from the point of view of the narrative as a subjective ‘account … of a series of interconnected events’ (2000 8). The suggestion, then, of a micro-narrative may imply a minor narrative within a dominant, yet subjective, larger narrative: an individual expression amongst the multiple. The Hunting Tower and Hunting Lodges series, looking at particular and subjective experiences, speak of the existence of the micro-element within an ever-expanding narrative. They were created not in order to represent or attempt to communicate those narratives, but as attempts to connect to, or highlight, other micro-narratives, other subjectivities. As bundles of affects, as Deleuze calls the human subject, we are connected to the world via affect, and more importantly, via its a personal characteristics (O’Sullivan 2007 50). In practice, these connections form the communicative network emanating from and in between individuals, or in and between myself and an audience, in the terms of my art practice, in a rhizomic dialogue. Such a dialogue exists not in the work, in the audience or in me, but in the shifting space between these. It could be read as an attempt not only to connect with a past or a place, but as an attempt at connecting with other bundles of affects.
Aftermath

I created in December 2009 an installation entitled Aftermath. It attempted to express suggestions of memory via affect. In Aftermath, I drew on ideas of personal and alternative narratives, minor practices and expressions of the Swedish hunting community, and aimed to create a sense of that which is absent yet present, near yet distant (see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 260-273). I entitled the installation Aftermath because I thought of the work as a form of reaction or repercussion to a situation following an event or occurrence; a multiple and parallel chain reaction of consequences, an outgrowth, a residual after-effect.

The installation consisted of a number of co-existing elements in an enclosed, darkened space heated to an uncomfortable temperature; a laptop computer displaying a loud, looped video consisting of found hunting-related YouTube footage, and two simultaneous projections of still photographs from a Swedish hunting lodge on opposite walls, projected respectively onto a set of stag antlers and a wild boar skin. One of the slides depicted a set of antlers mounted on a wood-panelled wall inside the hunting lodge, and was projected on top of actual stag antlers fixed to one of the walls of the exhibition space, creating a peculiar repetition or doubling, and sense of a present absence (see Fig. 28). A wild boar skin clung onto the opposite wall. It was layered with a corresponding cross-projection of a photograph from the same hunting lodge, in this instance depicting a boar skin spread across wood-panelling, and with a similar effect (see Fig. 29). As the space had been continuously heated to a high temperature for the two weeks leading up the show, the wild boar skin began to release a musty odour, and it became increasingly uncomfortable to spend extended periods of time in the space.

Placed on the floor, the laptop computer played a ten-minute continuous video of YouTube clips. The video consisted of three unrelated yet connective parts. The first part showed a grainy, quiet piece of footage, shot at dusk by a Swedish hunter, of a single wild boar devouring bait provided by the hunter. The static clip exposed the last few minutes of the boar’s life before it was suddenly ended with a single, very loud shot from the hunter’s rifle. This initial, short clip was followed by a longer piece of footage of Swedish hunting videos set to the Bruce Springsteen song The River, which speaks of what is colloquially referred to as shotgun weddings, traditions and repeated personal narratives brought on by young love and lust in countryside America. Emotionally resonating with certain elements of rural American culture, an established connection between Swedish country life and twentieth-century America is evident in this particular choice in accompanying music.

48 'I come from down in the valley where mister when you’re young / They bring you up to do like your daddy done / Me and Mary we met in high school when she was just seventeen / We’d ride out of that valley down to where the fields were green... / Then I got Mary pregnant and man that was all she wrote / And for my nineteenth birthday I got a union card and a wedding coat / We went down to the courthouse and the judge put it all to rest / No wedding day smiles no walk down the aisle / No flowers no wedding dress / That night we went down to the river / And into the river we’d dive / On down to the river we did ride’ (Springsteen 1981).
The connection extends in some aspects to include lifestyle and outlooks, self-perception and projection, practices and activities. As forms of visual self-representations of the hunt, the hunters and related customs, these parts reveal some of the elements regarded by this particular minor group as important: the values, passions, elements and systems of their joint practice: male and female hunters, their dogs, closeness to nature, the wait and anticipation, and the community. The last part of my video included a short homemade film of two children playing, pretending to be hunters, in their back yard. The footage contains a dialogue about hunting for moose. The clip shows elements of childhood rarely reflected upon or documented: the immersion in the game, values and dreams, alternative narratives and forms of expression; becoming-hunters.
I continued to explore notions of subjective memories and undocumented moments in my 2009 video installation *Luffare narratives* (see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 274-281), a video which later became part of the *Disruptive Desires* assemblage in 2012. In *Luffare narratives*, I attempted to discuss memory, personal and also shared memory, with a particular emphasis on undocumented yet remembered moments. *Luffare* is a Swedish word that could be translated as *vagrant*, *vagabond*, *itinerant*, *drifter*, *rambler* or *wanderer*. The installation was based on a made-up childhood game that my friend Tom and I used to play when we were growing up in Sweden. The video *Luffare narratives* entails a discussion between Tom and I about this game. As children, we were deeply engaged in this *luffare* game; we at first pretended to be, and then in our minds became, *luffare*; walking along country roads, sleeping in barns, stealing fruit, jumping on trains to other places... As children, we lost track of time. The game began to extend into or blur with everyday life. I often fell asleep at night as my *luffare* character: on a freight train, in an unlocked shed, by the side of the road, or in the loft of a barn. These remembered moments are without physical representations, yet they are some of the most potent memories of my childhood. I would argue that by placing particular emphasis on representations of certain events, major over minor, the represented or documented events tend to be given a sense of urgency and weight, whilst the undocumented are awarded merely a sense of the unimportant, the insignificant, the trivial. My aim with *Luffare narratives* was to experiment with these correlations: the smudged territories between actual events and fiction, relationships between the undocumented or the invisible and the representation, cultural values and personal memory, and the resulting activities of fantasy and *becoming; becoming-luffare*.

Filmed on location in Sweden, *Luffare narratives* is a part-re-enactment, part-fictional and theatrical reflection on this invented childhood game of *becoming* the culturally *minor* characters of vagrants and vagabonds. The video installation at Wimbledon College of Art (see Fig. 30) included three simultaneous, skewed projections of moving images on a continuous loop. Two of the projections showed filmed footage of Tom and me walking down Swedish country roads with knapsacks over our shoulders, whilst a third, overlapping projection depicted Tom and me sitting in a field by the side of the road, engaged in a reflective conversation, eating raw potatoes and almonds, mimicking whilst simultaneously engaging in our childhood game. Approximately 28 minutes in length, the third projection included an impromptu dialogue about the game from within the game, in which differences and similarities, slippages and absences, personal and poignant moments in memory became apparent.

49 Although the re-enactment itself is not a process central to my work, it may be worth mentioning a few approaches to art making that do use the re-enactment process as a central force. They can, for example, be found in Pierre Huyghe’s *The Third Memory*, Jeremy Deller’s *The Battle of Orgreave*, or Rod Dickinson’s *Milgram Re-enactment / Waco Re-enactment / Jonestown Re-enactment*. However, *Enactments – Luffare narratives* can also be seen as related to the revisiting of locations, which could perhaps be closer to works such as AK Dolven’s 2000 video piece *looking back* (Dolven 2007), and notions of lived space and the passing of time, rather than as the explorations of re-enactment mentioned.
Subtitles accompanied the conversation as we talked about how the luffare game was constructed, becoming luffare, and what the imagined characters may have appeared like, how these characters invaded life outside of the game, and specific memories from engaging the game. Translated and subtitled for the exhibition, the impromptu discussion took place in Swedish, and was both part of and reflective of the luffare game. The conversation revealed points where personal memories of the same events converge and others where they diverge and contradict one another; differing and similar points of view; absence and presence of memory; present and past states of being and thinking about home, movement and belonging, memory, games and role playing. The rural location was accentuated via the visuals, and through background sound elements, too; at times there was overwhelming birdsong, the sound of a dog barking, a rooster crowing, or a car driving past.
The *luffare* game was a romantic idea: an active form of becoming-*luffare*, Kerouac-like characters unconcerned about tomorrow. Even though it may lack representation, it forms a significant part of the memories of my childhood. The installation reflected on the remembered moments, yet its aim was not to represent these. Instead, I searched for an approach to discussing memory in which the vehicular, major language is dismissed in favour of the vernacular, minor language. I offer a reflection on the local and the personal, the micro-language of individual life, the language that despite its minor status is able to communicate. *Luffare narratives* is hence not about the past. It is about the present through the past. This notion is echoed a discussion in the journal *Image and Text* on art practices; here, the past is seen as an alternative route to a particular destination as ‘re-enactments by artists don’t really speak about the past but they speak about the present by taking a detour via the past’ (Tello 2008).

*Luffare narratives* relates to personal memories. However, it also forms lines to other ‘blocs of sensation’ (Deleuze 1968/2004 180; O’Sullivan 2007 43) via the apersonal. It contains the idea of remembered games and forms of role-play, or becomings, that children engage in. The activity of becoming-*luffare* at various speeds alternated with a range of other becomings: becoming-mouse, becoming-orphan, becoming-wolf, or becoming-warrior. A form of stuttering involved in *Luffare narratives* is found in the disruption of explorations of memory and how memory may be expressed. Memory is explored not through themes of cultural or social memory, but through the apersonal of the personal, suggesting a ‘fluidity of subjectivity, identity and spatiality’, an entity Kwon calls a ‘migratory model’ in place of ‘strictures of fixed place-bound identities’ (2000 57). This model, Kwon suggests, introduces ‘possibilities for the production of multiple identities, allegiances, and meanings, based not on normative conformities but on the non-rational convergences forged by chance encounters and circumstances’ (ibid.).
Disruptive Desires

As discussed in Juncture II, O’Sullivan understands a particular contemporary art practice as reflective of Deleuzo-Guattarian thought. As a form of thought or a practice, this can be understood as a ‘fluid dynamic system’ that can – and must – be connected to ‘different regimes and registers’ (O’Sullivan 2007 32); an ‘event site’, a ‘point of exile where it is possible’ that something, finally, might happen’ (ibid. 45). ‘Happen’ here implies a change, a shift, a transformation, a movement, an act. Somethings comes into being, something becomes, within a creative space. Brian Massumi calls this creative space ‘the seeping edge’ (1996 217-39) between ‘the virtual and the actual’, which O’Sullivan understands as found ‘between the existing state of affairs and a world “yet-to-come”’ (O’Sullivan 2007 105) – where transformation happens. An art practice placed on this ‘seeping edge’ (Massumi 1996 217) could be considered as a practice that deals with the actualisation of virtualities; this practice, as O’Sullivan suggests, lets materials propel us ‘beyond the actual’ and ‘into the virtual’, in order later to re-emerge ‘with new actualisations’ (O’Sullivan 2007 105.). However, I would argue that it is not merely materials’ deriving from actuality that causes this immersion into the virtual; something else causes a desire to express, not to re-present, concepts already existing within the virtual. This kind of practice involves, perhaps, a form of practical thinking, one creating an urge to set other thought processes in motion. It embodies an ambition to create a real encounter, a creative moment, and one that ultimately coerces thought.

As a part of my PhD research and thesis, my exhibition Disruptive Desires (see Fig. 31) took place in the Crypt of St Mark’s Church Kennington in London in December 2012 (see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 150-196). The ambitions of this show were, via my practice, to explore some of the ideas presented in my PhD thesis and to facilitate so-called art encounters, as distinguished by O’Sullivan (2010 196). In this way I attempted to disrupt existing assumptions of the functions of memory and to generate new possibilities for expressing the mnemic. The title of the show, Disruptive Desires, directly reflects these intentions. The installation brought together various elements – videos, sounds, objects, and smells – and used the space of the Crypt similarly to the contemporary art practices Simon O’Sullivan speaks of as ‘affective assemblage[s]’ (2010 198-199). This notion of the art installation as a form of assemblage in the Deleuzean sense, as a collection of any number of entities or parts of entities into a singular event or situation which can cause various affects (Heckman 2002), can be seen in other recent research projects and writings on contemporary art, including Marion Tubb’s recent thesis Assemblage-based Installation: Affects and Interpretations (2010)50.

50 Tubb’s Master’s dissertation looks at how Deleuzean concepts of assemblage, affect, de-stratification and repetition may be thought through in contemporary installation art practices. Tubbs draws on Fine Art practices, philosophy, history and science, and addresses problems that arise in attempts to create meaning in art through uses of ‘bywords and clichés’ (Tubbs 2010).
This type of contemporary practice ‘turns away from the habits and impasses of the present, offering up new assemblages – new refrains – to those that surround us on an everyday basis’ (O’Sullivan 2010 205). This is a kind of art practice through which one’s life is treated as a work of art (Deleuze 1995 95) and through which new possibilities are sought in interactions with others and other elements (O’Sullivan 2006a 1).

One of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s ambitions with A Thousand Plateaus (1980/2005) was to create a form of assemblage, without organisation, that could pull into itself any number of affects, elements and other assemblages, or could enter into and move within, become through, entirely new or different assemblages (Heckman 2002). Assemblage is a well-known term in art practices, in which various objects, parts or elements are brought together in the formation of works of art. The initial idea of the assemblage in art may be understood as having emerged from the conceptual works of Marcel Duchamp, whose practice presented new ways of thinking about and experiencing art. Furthermore, this method of working may be distinguished in the assemblages of found objects in art practices throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, in artworks made by Dadaists, through Conceptual artists in the 1970s, the neo-conceptual art of the 1980s and 1990s and, as discussed by O’Sullivan, current object-based practices (2010 189-207). O’Sullivan approaches the term assemblage in his writings on art through a Deleuzean angle and definition. Here, assemblages are understood as spatial entities in which various elements may ‘aggregate together’ (O’Sullivan 2007 27) in the actualisation of new possibilities and in the proffering of alternative perspectives (ibid. 29, 67). This concept of assemblage connects the various elements that aggregate within it, and also opens up to other spaces inside and outside itself (ibid. 34),
feelings and states of mind (ibid. 155). The assemblage is hence not necessarily an assemblage because it is constructed from found objects; it is an assemblage as it forms aggregates with different elements in the space within which it operates, with the world around it, with the feelings and experiencing bodies of visitors and the artist, and with the affects it produces (O’Sullivan and Stahl 2006 148-152).

The aspiration in using the idea of the assemblage in *Disruptive Desires* was to avoid stratification, ordering(s) and singular, dominant understandings. Instead, it created an affective encounter for the reader. Deleuze stated in *Negotiations* that the two collaborators wanted to consider *A Thousand Plateaus* more as a book in the form of ‘a little cog in a much more complicated external machinery’ (Deleuze 1990/1997b 8) ready to be set in motion and used by its reader, and less as a vessel full of signs and signifiers there to be read and their meanings transferred to its reader (Protevi 2010 2). I chose to approach *Disruptive Desires* with Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of the assemblage-book in mind. I perceived the assemblage as an entity that can be approached from any direction; it also has the capability of generating multiplicities of affects and becomings (Heckman 2002). The process of *becoming* is important in relation to the idea of the assemblage, as becoming is a form of de-territorialisation that may take place in an assemblage, which provokes a process of transformation, interchange or flight that occurs between the different, disparate parts of the assemblage (ibid.).

I used these two concepts of the *assemblage* and *becoming*, defined by O’Sullivan as ‘catalysts’ (2010 189-207), in making *Disruptive Desires*. My aim was to produce affective encounters, new becomings and alternative understandings outside those of the dominant forms of thought outlined in Junctures I and II of my thesis. I wanted to create an art assemblage by disconnecting various elements from their previous functions then to mobilise these such that the different elements could be brought together with other, disparate elements into new assemblages. Together, they would thus counteract a dominant reading of the exhibition. My intention was to make art about the subjective experience of memory while avoiding, and indirectly disrupting, dominant approaches, expressions and understandings of the subject matter. I wanted to create an affective art assemblage resonating with difference and open to different becomings. I also wanted to make art exploring what I think of as memory in itself (see Juncture I, p. 45) – the concept of memory without the burdens of sadness or elation, without clichéd representations and implications of trauma and potential catharsis, without the melancholy of nostalgia, and without the involvement of a search for Truth, veracity or a rectification. For Deleuze as for O’Sullivan, the primary function of art is to generate an affective event, an encounter that will ultimately ‘push us out of our habits of perception’ (Smith and Protevi 2013). The encounter lies in a work of art that ‘produces an effect on the nervous system, not the brain’. Such approaches to art making I aimed to apply in my practice when working on *Disruptive Desires*.
It was important to me that the installation was not immediately read as art about memory, or as an exhibition attempting to transfer meaning or knowledge; its primary function was to generate affect. I was interested in the a-personal memory of human as well as non-human forms; the memory of animals, the memory of objects, the memory of assemblages; the memory of the non-specific; the changing memory.

Having spent the past few years visiting, writing about and making art related my subject of the practices of the traditional Swedish hunting community around which I grew up, I wished to reflect on this group through the assemblage of the installation *Disruptive Desires*. As a minor group operating on the periphery of contemporary Swedish culture, this is a group currently rarely represented outside of itself. I became interested in how their absence from major culture appears to have resulted in corresponding absences – in major representations – of their current practices and rituals, cultural significance, traditions, and values.

*Disruptive Desires* as an installation art assemblage came together in the space of the Crypt of a large church. My multiple, disparate elements formed my exhibition-as-assemblage: objects, videos, projections, sounds and smells. The building and other elements such as the subterranean space, smells of damp and mulled wine, echoes, darkness, visitors and worshippers, choir members and homeless inhabitants formed part of this specific ‘assemblage’ (O’Sullivan 2010 190). A set of stairs located on the side of the church led down to the entrance to the crypt. The double doors opened up into a central space with a long, narrow corridor on either side, each
leading off in opposite directions, creating a 48-metre-long continuous space. The entire Crypt was windowless. The exhibition made use of the darkness it provided. Two video projections could be seen on entering the central space of the Crypt (see Fig. 31). One projection was of a radiant, warm-toned medium format photograph that took inside a hunting lodge in Sweden, depicting a wood-panelled meeting room with a folding office table and chairs. This image is part of a series of photographs from hunting lodges and abattoirs in the west of Sweden (see Fig. 45, p. 157). The photograph of the hunting lodge was back-projected onto a white sheet of vinyl, visually dividing the central space in two. The other projection, a looped 9-minute 53-second video, entitled Hunting Songs (see Fig. 32), was projected onto the entirety of the back wall of the central space. This video depicted Kennington Community Choir singing hunting-themed drinking songs in Swedish, written by Bäreberg’s hunting team, the team of hunters with whom I have been in contact since 2007. The loud sound of the choir’s singing emanated from a set of speakers placed directly on the floor in front of the projection, and echoed the length of the crypt. As one’s eyes adjusted to the darkness of the space, one became aware of other objects in the space and the relationships these formed with one another, especially when moving within the assemblage of the exhibition.

Antlers of various kinds were attached straight onto the white-painted brick walls in the first half of the central room; roe deer, moose and fallow deer antlers pointed out from the wall surface, as if approaching the space from inside the walls, as if coming from elsewhere. To the centre-left of the same room stood a folding office table and six chairs. These were positioned in front of, and lined up with, the similar-looking table and chairs depicted in the back-lit still slide projection (see Fig. 44, p. 157), creating a curious sense of perspective as the tables and chairs overlapped and then appeared to slide apart as one moved around the room.

There is a popular tradition in mainstream Swedish culture of modifying the lyrics of songs known to most Swedes for parties and celebrations, to tailor them to the occasion. These occasions include the customary crayfish parties in August, midsummer celebrations in June, weddings, birthdays, graduations, and other formal events. The songs are often sung during meals, creating a rhythm to the event and a sense of unity at the traditional long tables. The participants in the parties will be given the new lyrics with an indication of the appropriated tune – often photocopied and placed next to each plate along the table – only on the night of the event; they will sing together to the best of their ability. I filmed members of Kennington Community Choir singing a set of these types of songs in Swedish. Prior to making Hunting Songs, I contacted the choir leader of Kennington Community Choir and asked if they would be interested in singing a number of songs that my local hunting team in Sweden had written for their celebratory hunting events. The songs were all in Swedish. We agreed on three different songs the choir leader believed the choir could learn and sing. The three songs are about hunting, dancing, eating and drinking with friends, about the forest, about friendship and about the communal spirit, set to the melody...
of three well-known Swedish songs: *Turalleri Turallera* by the 1920s Swedish singer and lyricist Gustav Fonander; the Swedish troubadour Evert Taube’s 1923 song *Svarte Rudolf*, and the theme song to the TV-adaptation of the Swedish story of *Pippi Longstocking*. This appropriation and application of elements of popular culture and mainstream traditions into the hunting team’s own vernacular practices form a strange stuttering of the language of dominant Swedish culture. This is one instance in which I have experimented with the concepts of stuttering and stammering of the dominant language as a strategy in my research. My aim with this specific video was to further develop and create these kinds of stutterings.

The resulting set of songs generated by the hunting team’s songs-South London choir assemblage produced further – both literal and conceptual[51] – stutterings, as these informal drinking songs are sung not only by members of a choir with a more formal singing practice, but are also sung in the Swedish language by non-Swedish participants who have no understanding of the language in which they are singing. While most of the lyrics are still comprehensible to a Swedish listener, their emphasis and pronunciation have altered. Deleuze would describe this as a shift in the pattern of differential relations of an individual language (Smith and Protevi 2012). I see the forms of utterings such as those made by the Bäreberg hunting team as articulations of the minor, stuttered from the margins of contemporary Swedish culture.

As a group without organisation – or perhaps it would be more correct to address the hunting community as consisting of multiple singular and local clusters of hunters, the participants have formed alternative ways of representing themselves, their customs and their values. Deleuze and Guattari’s describe minor literature as operating in the margins of the major cultures in which they are found. The minor expressions by Bäreberg’s hunting team are also formed from a minoritarian position on the fringe of dominant Swedish culture. The expressions themselves are nonetheless constructed in a major language (Deleuze and Guattari 1975/1986 16).

Having grown up around this fringe group, I had several aims: I wanted to focus on how connections and thoughts are shared, then to take into consideration issues of power and value in relation to memory and representation, any significance of an absence of representation in this regard, and how this particular group creates and generates alternative territories and ways of expression. From the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari, I have come to see that the creation and performance of the songs by the Bäreberg hunting team as political expressions that open up and generate a new space. The new space jars with the representations of dominant Swedish culture, and the minor expressions made within that space by the Bäreberg group of hunters are not unlike those in minor literature described by Deleuze and Guattari as uttering that of ‘another possible community...

51 By conceptual, I am referring to the concept of the stuttering of dominant language as put forward by Deleuze (with a particular focus on the writings of Franz Kafka). See Juncture II (pp.80-81) for further details
another consciousness and another sensibility’ (ibid. 17). The stuttering of major language by a minor group is an act of de-territorialisation that confronts representation (ibid. 21), frees new lines of flight (ibid. 17) and generates new territories (ibid. 18). Hence, minor forms of literature - or in this case, minor songs - are the vehicles or routes towards achieving de-territorialisation.

In approaching the songs re-written by Bäreberg's hunting team in terms of Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the vehicular, ‘paper language’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1975/1986 19) outlined in Juncture II, the vehicular language is that of standard Swedish, while the re-written lyrics, choice of words, and presence of a rural tone indicate the vernacular. The tradition of re-writing lyrics to familiar songs for celebratory occasions, primarily crayfish parties, weddings, birthdays and retirement parties, could also be seen as a practice belonging to the vehicular. The stuttering exercise of this tradition at a party held by a rural hunting team may instead be perceived as vernacular. The referential, cultural language is evident in the choice of songs, as the songs chosen are deeply rooted in Swedish culture and are well known to most Swedes. In place of the religious, the mythic language is present in the references to ancient, spiritual connections to nature and to the forest, and in thanking for its sacrifice the killed animal.

Entirely new words formed in the event of the performance and during the making of the video. Other words merged or changed into other words [for examples, the lyric all the gang is here changed to all the gang ah-aa]. A new language without accepted meaning emerged. This is a form of language Deleuze and Guattari describe in their work on Kafka, one that has been ‘torn from sense’ (1975/1986 21), lacking or else with muddled signifiers and meanings, and one which performs an ‘active neuralization of sense’ (ibid.). The spoken Swedish language is greatly dependent on tone and tonal emphasis, and the slightest change in tone has a significant impact on the listener’s perception of the speaker’s state of mind. In Hunting Songs, tone and emphasis appear to stumble and fall on odd words, hence changing the emotional implications. In doing so, the cheerful salute becomes a deadly serious matter, the joyous drink in the forest turns into melancholy, and an expression of friendship and unity becomes overdramatically jovial. While this is only noticeable to those with an understanding of the Swedish language, it is another form of stuttering and stammering emerging through the performance and the video.

Hunting Songs was filmed in the central space of the Crypt prior to the opening of the exhibition. Once edited, the video was projected back into the same space in which it was filmed. A strange optical overlapping occurred: the overlapping of walls, light fittings, laminate floor and the arched ceiling altered the perspective and proportions, and appeared to extend and stretch the dimensions of the room into the wall and beyond. Various forms of auditory overlapping were included: the sound of the choir singing echoed through the catacombs of the crypt during the filming; hence, it generated a slight doubling of the recorded sound.
Projected back into the space, the sound echoed once more throughout the Crypt. During the private view of the exhibition, members of the choir who had appeared in the video entered the Crypt and mingled with the guests, before organically grouping together – much as does a flash-mob – and started singing live to the recorded video behind them. This added a third overlay of repeated sound, as well as a sense of the presence of the kind of act for which these songs were intended. Furthermore, after participating in the video and in the performance at the private view, the choir has since made these three hunting songs part of their repertoire; the songs have once more been wrenched out of another context and merged with other assemblages, independently of the Hunting Songs video or the Disruptive Desires installation. One such performance of the hunting song was at a choir service at St Mark’s Church Kennington, and another took place at the A Choir of Our Time event at the Southbank Centre’s Royal Festival Hall in London in June 2013 (Southbank Centre 2013).

The visual and audio elements of the Hunting Songs video were occasionally separated, during which gaps a different video, entitled Up Around the Bend (see Fig. 33), commenced in a space towards the end of the western corridor. At this point the visitor was surprised by a sudden loud blast of sound (see Fig. 43, p. 156 for a floor plan). A television sitting on a shipping crate in the middle of a carpeted, octagonal space screened a video set to the band Creedence Clearwater Revival’s song Up Around the Bend (Creedence Clearwater Revival 1970). On the floor in front of the television, arranged as if in the process of approaching the screen, was a complete wild boar skin, its snout to the glass of the screen and its trotters climbing the crate. A trail of dried leaves was scattered behind the wild boar, looking as though they had been dragged in by the forceful movement of the creature. The two videos, Hunting Songs and Up Around the Bend, were looped so as to alternate. After the choir had sung the three hunting songs, the opening riff of Up Around the Bend would start; then, the choir would appear to be performing in silence. As soon as the loud Up Around the Bend video finished, the choir could be heard singing hunting songs again in the central space of the Crypt. There were differences in speeds and movements present: between the boar skin, leaves and the looped video, the audible and the muted sound, and between the brightness of the screens and the shifting shadows in the space.
For the video *Up Around the Bend*, I filmed myself sitting on a chair, draped in a wild boar skin, whilst playing an online, first-person shooter game called *The Hunter*. With the wild boar’s head over my face as a mask or second skin, I was looking through the empty eye sockets where the boar’s eyes had once been. I entered into a form of hybrid or assemblage with the boar, forming – rather than an extension of myself – a new entity, a new character. The legs and trotters were tied to my wrists and hands, as I played the game using a video game controller. While filming the video, the visuals of the game were projected back onto me-as-wild-boar as I played the game that created strange overlays: the human as boar, the hunter and the hunted; the boar as human, the hunter and the hunted; the movement of the boar-human as I was playing the game, and the jerky movements of the visual images of the game.

The game *The Hunter* allows its players to create a playlist of songs to which to go hunting, and one of those songs included Creedence Clearwater Revival’s 1970s track *Up Around the Bend*. I was interested in this strange game assemblage that emerged. *Up Around the Bend* as a separate element, taken out of its original context of 1970s Vietnam War-era America, merged with the current world of online simulations of hunting and killing in a new form of arrangement. However, the merging of this song and the practices of hunting appeared to have taken place in a yet another context: *Up Around the Bend* was part of my parents’ music collection, and played frequently as I grew up around the hunting community in the west of Sweden. Because part of my strategy in my practice is to focus on the kinds of memories that have no form of documentation, I chose these elements.
The intention with the video was to use ideas of *becoming* as an event. It became a formation of an emerging beast-hunter assemblage, a concept perhaps most directly referred to in Deleuze and Guattari’s tenth plateau in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, entitled 1730: *Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible* (1980/2005 232-309). On this plateau, the authors speak of the political relations of such becomings, stating that there is

> [A]n entire politics of becomings-animal, as well as a politics of sorcery, which is elaborated in assemblages that are neither those of the family nor of religion nor of the State. Instead, they express minoritarian groups, or groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of recognized institutions, groups all the more secret for being extrinsic, in other words, anomic.

>(Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2005 247)

The political element of *becoming* may be used and thought through in a number of situations, such as a becoming-woman, becoming-prisoner, becoming-other. Sorcery can in Deleuzean terms be understood as a de-territorialising practice of resistance to modes of representation and habits. Given two factors: firstly, I am considering the Swedish hunting community as a minoritarian group and their positions as they operate on the ‘fringe of recognized institutions’ (ibid.) and secondly, I am searching for ways of uprooting certain forms of thought, this became of particular interest to me. I was drawn to similar kinds of becoming-other, primarily the various European practices of ‘wilder men’, visualised through the photographic work of Charles Fréger (2012) (see Figs. 34-35).
The practices involve a form of metamorphosis from human to animal or to a monstrous other, as people in various places – from Scotland, France and Portugal to Finland, Germany and Greece – become goats, wild boar, bears, devils and men of straw, by wearing the skins, hides and antlers of animals or the leaves and straw of mythical creatures (ibid.). They include the Bulgarian goat skin beast Babugeri, the Italian horned Schnappviecher, and the Romanian Ursul bear. Other similar practices are represented in Axel Hoedt’s recent photographic Once a Year series of Swabian-Alemannic carnival participants in certain towns in Germany, wearing masks of animals, beasts and mythical characters (Hoedt 2013). Although both series contain visually intriguing photographic images and visualise many rituals to which documentation is not central (Keany 2010), I am more interested in the depicted, assembled creatures themselves, and in the cultural practices involved52. Across these practices, the wearing of animal skins as a form of mask invokes a sense of fear and magic; a presence and a simultaneous absence. Within the participation in this metamorphosis, a strange form of recognition of otherness takes place; then, the participants see in their mirrors ‘the face of a stranger, a wild impossible sister appearing’ (Kuemmel 2009). The process of becoming-animal, as described by Deleuze and Guattari in their tenth plateau, is not one concerned with resemblance, mimicking, a ‘correspondence between relations (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2005 237) or a progression or evolution (ibid. 238); it is an actual process (ibid.) of entering into an assemblage with something else (ibid. 233), the process itself of becoming the other.

_Becoming_ is here the actualisation of a splitting which ‘moves a system from one zone of its phase space to another’ and causes a mutual de-territorialisation, and a subsequent entry ‘into a symbiosis’ (Protevi 1999 1), a new assemblage. Deleuze and Guattari make it clear that the processes of becoming-animal are not imaginary and are not part of pretending to be or imitating an animal. They are ‘perfectly real’ (1980/2005 238). While mimesis is about one entity changing into another, becomings are about that which takes place in-between, in the middle of things, which to Deleuze is much more interesting. The reality of becoming lies in the idea of becoming in itself, as a process that ‘lacks a subject distinct from itself’ (ibid.). Becoming-animal, Deleuze and Guattari elaborate, is not about becoming an animal, but ‘always involves a pack, a band, a popular ... a multiplicity’ (ibid. 239) as ‘every animal is fundamentally a band, a pack. That it has pack modes, rather than characteristics, even if further distinctions within these modes are called for’ (ibid.). My video _Up Around the Bend_ is not about becoming a wild boar or a hunter. Rather, it suggests involvement in the process of becoming a singular53 of wild boar [with wild boaring as a pack mode], or a _blast of hunters_ [with huntering as a pack mode], as a result of a fascination with these pack modes (ibid. 240).

52 A preoccupation with these practices may also be gathered through some of the artist Nick Cave’s series of Soundsuits (Cameron et al. 2010), an ongoing series of work with rather overt references to the animal costumes worn in these different European rituals. Although I am wearing a wild boar skin in _Up Around the Bend_, to define the work as art incorporating animals would be too simplistic. Artists such as Jane Alexander, Marcus Coates, Annika Larsson, Mark Wallinger, and Joseph Beuys have directly incorporated the bodies, skins and references to animals in their work; however, I do not understand these as metamorphoses into these animals and beasts.

53 _Singular_ being the collective noun for wild boar.
This form of becoming sits in shifting relation to other becomings, elements and assemblages; that is, ‘multiplicities of symbiosis and becoming’ (ibid. 249) of wild boars, residential lawns, grunts and human flesh – wild boar skins, interior house walls and fires – hunter’s boots, dogs and wild boar carcasses – kitchens, wild boar intestines and music – wild boar ears, ticks and hazelnut trees (ibid. 250). Even though I was wearing a boar skin, the explorations of these relationships and forms of becomings in Up Around the Bend have little to do with resemblance or exteriors. As Deleuze and Guattari keep emphasising in the tenth plateau in A Thousand Plateaus, focusing on resemblance is not the primary objective in becoming-animal. The focus is directed instead onto an intensity, an individual – human or non-human as an ‘infinite multiplicity’ (ibid. 254), one that ‘enters into composition with other ... intensities, to form another individual’ (ibid. 253).

Through a set of open double doors, in a small, carpeted room with an arched ceiling along the corridor leading towards and/or away from the Up Around the Bend video, was a projection of my 2009 video Luffare Narratives (see Fig. 36). This video, as discussed previously in the current Juncture, features dialogue between a childhood friend and me about memory, imagination and the representation of experienced events. In Disruptive Desires, the video was projected directly onto the painted back brick wall of the room in the crypt, and was enlarged so that the edge of the projection sat flush against the carpeted floor. This generated a sense of an extended space, where the old, patterned carpet met the dry grass and reeds visible in the video. English subtitles stretched across the top of the moving image; they warped dramatically on the right-hand side as the arches in the ceiling distorted the projection. The projector and speakers were placed on a small flat trolley on wheels in the middle of the floor. Behind the trolley stood three low, soft chairs to sit on. I chose to include this video as an element of the installation, as it very directly brings...
up questions surrounding personal memory and representation. The video was wrenched out of its previous context and installation of the work at Wimbledon College of Art, where it was shown alongside two silent, overlapping videos in a large square space as part of a group exhibition. By becoming an element of Disruptive Desires, Luffare Narratives connective relationships were formed with the boar in Up Around the Bend, with the antlers protruding from the walls in the central space of the crypt, and in the hunting songs echoing through the corridors of the darkened space.

The silent, back-projected Bait Cam video (see Figs. 37-38) was located towards the end of the catacomb leading eastwards from the central space of the Crypt, directly opposite Up Around the Bend. The 30-minute looped video consists of a multitude of short, 10- to 15-second clips of filmed footage retrieved from a bait camera, set up in two different rural locations in Sweden. Bait cameras, also known as trail or game cameras, are used for a range of purposes. Their main use by hunters and nature preservationists is to monitor how many different species and numbers of those species there are in a specific area. The camera is fitted with a motion sensor, triggered as soon as the animals in the area approach the food – the bait – placed on the ground in front of the lens. Additionally, an infrared light is activated by the motion sensor if any movement is detected after dark. The devices can be left on location for weeks at a time; the recorded footage is stored on an SD memory card. The hunter from the hunting team with which I have been in contact over the past few years gave me access to the footage he had recorded on his bait camera at its various locations. Many hunting teams are actively involved in wildlife preservation, as they feel they have an ethical responsibility towards the natural world in which they are active. This long-standing relationship between the hunter and the hunted is built on a sincere sense of respect and gratitude towards the animal’s sacrifice, which may have appeared paradoxical to me (as I am a vegetarian), had I not grown up around hunters who openly express this attitude.

Wild boar, deer, moose and birds are seen moving around, eating and grazing in Bait Cam. In some instances, the camera’s motion sensor was triggered by other movements: those of a flapping leaf caught on the camera lens, the falling of heavy snow, and a car driving by in the distance. A time and date code flashes up on the screen at the beginning of each individual clip. The projection screen had been placed directly behind a wrought-iron gate, creating an illusory distance between the fence-like bars of the gate and the filmed landscape visible in the video. The moving wild animals suddenly appeared to be physically present in the actual space of the crypt, an illusory actualisation of the virtual. It became unclear whether the gate/fence was there to separate or protect either the animals or the viewer.

54 The artist Jana Sterbak explored relationships between human and animal subjects, and those of technology and nature in the making of art, through her 2003 video From Here to There. The footage in From Here to There was filmed through a small medical camera fitted to the body of a Jack Russell Terrier running through a snowy landscape. The video served to critique a range of assumptions of vision and the camera, subjectivity and visual images, as well as the artist’s control over the creation of the image (Locke 2003 99-110).
The video clips filmed at night using infrared light were particularly affective, as the darknesses of the footage and of the crypt merged. The animals took on radiant, white, ghost-like figures, at times reduced to sets of staring, glowing eyes in the dark. A fallow deer with a single antler strides right past the camera and out of sight. A curious wild boar presses its snout up against the lens. Two deer fight in the background. The infrared light frightens a singular of wild boar so they scatter and disperse in different directions. A red leaf becomes stuck to the lens and triggers the motion sensor for an extended period of time. Birds peck at the bait on the ground. A small car drives past. A blazing white moose emerges out of the dark.
The Principles of the Memory-Event

When I started this research project, I set out to propose a vacillating and tentative, a more spatial, event-like, experience-focused, and a less static manner of speaking of memory. The alternative suggestion of memory would define the experience of the mnemic as a memory-event. The notion is based on ideas of the subject as one in a continuous state of becoming, a perpetual form of becoming in every moment; of memory as affect transpiring from experience, and of the subject’s unceasing emergence from experience of both the present and memories of the past. In developing my concept of the memory-event, I have utilised the Deleuzean framework developed by Simon O’Sullivan in his response to contemporary art practices that challenge, re-think and renew thought, and ways of operating and producing work (see pp. 78-86). As discussed in Juncture II, the framework depends on seven Deleuzean concepts; the encounter, affect, the production of subjectivity, the minor, the virtual, the event, and mythopoesis (O’Sullivan 2010 196-204). The uses in this thesis of the concepts the virtual and the event are as stated in the introduction (see p. 13) more subtle than those of the other five defined Deleuzean concepts, yet these two concepts are vital to the formation of this thesis, and the alternative suggestion of memory that the thesis puts forward: the memory-event. O’Sullivan’s Deleuzean framework has been instrumental in developing ideas and working methods in order to re-think ideas of memory, as distinguished through the discussions contained in my research in this, the third Juncture.

Carrying out the research has generated a new concept of memory, an alternative to dominant theories of memory as outlined in Juncture I. The new concept brings with it the potential for new, creative explorations of the mnemic. I have termed my concept the memory-event. It emerged from thinking of memory through the writings of Deleuze and Guattari, Bergson, and contemporary writers such as O’Sullivan and Massumi, as demonstrated throughout the thesis. The concept of the memory-event stresses the pulse of process, becoming, and emergence as vital, underlying stipulations: both those underpinning the affective tonality of the experience of the lived moment, and those of the mnemic activity. We emerge from experience, memories emerge from experience; we do not pass through experience, memory is a process not an object, an aftermath (the world is a process). The presence emerges in every moment, continuously. It is felt as a moment ‘at the cusp’, ‘just-beginning-to-stir’ (Massumi 2011 3), even though there are no actual moments as such, only ‘between-times, between-moments’ (Deleuze 2001 29). The process of the memory-event demands an activity of connecting and discarding, one that repeats itself with differences, mutations, through the activity of recollection, one that transforms and transmutes (Deleuze and Guattari 1987/2004 23); it forms transitory lines with points only to break them, shift them and form new lines to new points; memory-as-event.
The concept of the memory-event is seen not as an archival entity; it is as one of constant process and development. The foundation of this memory-event is an attitude towards the lived moment as one of sensation and affect [to be is to be in affect], and it takes place through a form of affective activity that reflects the lived experience. The emphasis on event further expresses an approach to memory that de-centres ocularcentricty and similar hierarchal structures to thought. Instead, it commands an understanding of the mnemic as an abstract configuration of the multisensory, lived moment. In such a moment, senses, thoughts, understandings, circumstances, spaces, the actual and the fictional all merge. They form shifting compositions at various speeds. ‘Experience is a continuum’, writes Massumi (2011 57), as expressed via Bergson’s cone. The significance of affect in this approach, less ocularcentric than those of major notions of memory, is the proposition of a conceptual shift from the visual to the affective. The often dominant ocularcentric discourses surrounding memory and the past are discarded by the concept of the memory-event; they are primarily those preoccupied with ideas such as the eikon in memory, memory-images, and static pictures or places, often located in fields of theory related to photography and other visual media, as was outlined in the first Juncture of the thesis.

The memory-event’s status as a form of event may be understood through its focus on activity and experience (O’Sullivan 2001 126) of memory, superseding the kinds of representational forces that suggest a freezing of perceptions in memory. The memory-event adopts the suggestion put forward by Bergson and Deleuze that the metaphysical regions of the past co-exist with the present (Deleuze 1968/1991 61, 63); it ‘insists with the former present’ and simultaneously ‘consists with the new or present present’ (Deleuze 1968/2004 103). This is an event of ‘affective tonality’ (Massumi 2011 113) and ‘sensations and blocs’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/1994 185) through which memories may be considered as constantly unfolding in parallel to the unfolding of the present. As it is a state through which ‘something new transpires’ (Massumi 2011 82, 84), a new experience emerges. As an event, memory may be considered as fluid, active and unpredictable; an abstract phenomenon charged with potential and affect. In thinking the memory-event via Deleuze and Bergson, the activation of memories occurs through an active ‘leap’ (Deleuze 1991 56-57) into an element of the past. This element is part of a past understood as a ‘complete past’ (Guerlack 2007 43), an ‘entirety of memory’ (Olkowski 1999 110). The leap taking place in recollection is an active jump across the ‘gap from one event to the next’ (Massumi 2011 108) and summons up blocs of pasts that co-exist with present states (O’Sullivan 2006a 3). As an event, memory is thus given an ever-becoming and changing form, as it ceaselessly emerges from experience.
Considering memory as an event does not depend upon perception. The concept opens up thought for forms of memories that exist without visual elements or other perceptions, and may proffer an alternative solution to representation of memory. It could be achieved by making time and space, recollection and perception, inseparable (Deleuze 1968/1991 22, 37). That is, the affective experiences of life produce subjective changes, becomings, which, I claim, generate memories. The emphasis on becoming is further reflected a passage in Paul Ricoeur’s in *Memory, History, Forgetting*. Here, he discusses situations through which: ‘[O]ne has … experienced … learned … These situations imply one’s own body and the bodies of others, lived space, and, finally, the horizon of the world and worlds, within which something has occurred’ (2004 36). This is further understood in the production of subjectivity as the embodiment of the ‘accumulations of our actions’ (Hickey-Moody 2013 82). My proposition of the memory-event thus includes a consideration of life and the experiences of life as their being affective rather than being purely perceptive; an experience that causes a ‘transition of change’ (Deleuze 1968/1991 31): affect.

The memory-event confronts the ‘false beliefs’ in linear ideas of memory (Deleuze 1968/1991 61-62), by summoning Bergson’s notion of ‘durée’; a ‘transition of change’ that provides the assemblage of the body with an experience of ‘a composite of space and duration’ (Deleuze 1968/1991 37). As such, this concept ignores the linearity of clock-time in favour of a ‘non-chronological time’ (Sutton 2009 68). Furthermore, the fluidity of the memory-event rejects the construct of the moment, the punctuation of points in what Deleuze terms the ‘immensity of empty time’ (2001 29), as life has only ‘between-times, between-moments’ (ibid.). In addition, the memory-event challenges dominant suggestions that memories are contained in the brain or in ‘something else’ (Guerlac 2007 45). Instead, a memory ‘exists in itself’ (ibid. 46). My concept also opens up the field of art practice for pursuing thought outside those of the dichotomies of memory and forgetting, Truth and fiction. It does so partly by understanding forgetting as an incorrect leap into a past region (Deleuze 1991 62), and partly by defining the memory-event as a ‘subjective assemblage’ (O’Sullivan 2010 190), shifting with the continuous affective of life in which memory, fiction, imagination, thoughts and perceptions merge.

These ideas consequently have an impact on how the concept of the memory-event may be utilised in art practices. By placing emphasis on experience, change and affect over representation, this is an art practice that confronts what O’Sullivan distinguishes as the hegemony of deconstructive and semiotic approaches to thinking about and making art (O’Sullivan 2001 126). The mobilisation of the memory-event is a form of practice that turns away from the transference of meaning, a practice of meaning-making. It leads towards the activity, the doing, of art, and aims to avoid – even disrupt – what O’Sullivan calls ‘straightforward signifying regimes’ (O’Sullivan 2010 190).
As may be distinguished in Junctures II and III of the thesis, affect is for Deleuze that which causes changes in the body, and signifies changes to what this body or ‘assemblage’ can do (Hickey-Moody 2013 80). By making affect one of the key characteristics of the memory-event, I am emphasising the notion of change in memory, and in the experiencing body. In defining this concept, I also wish to reiterate O’Sullivan’s relevant point that affects cannot be ‘read’; they need to be experienced (O’Sullivan 2001 126). The affects generated and activated in memory thus form the subjective and abstract phenomenon of memories.
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Fig. 39  *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2007
45 cm x 45 cm D-type print

This photograph is part of my photographic series *Hunting Towers*
(see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 220-259)

It is thus repeated in Juncture IV: Portfolio (see Fig. 150, p. 232)
Conclusion

This practice-based research set out to seek new frameworks within which to explore concepts of memory in contemporary installation art practices. Its aim is to present alternative expressions of memory to those in dominant representations. The central question underpinning this research may be understood as: How may established theories of memory be disrupted and re-thought through a contemporary art practice? The Conclusion outlines the intentions of my thesis, summarises its findings, puts forward a set of principles for utilising the memory-event, and proposes selected extensions of the research beyond this current study. Firstly, I address the aims and objectives, and discuss the functions of the thesis. I then reflect on and review discoveries made in each Juncture. Following my outline of these findings, I discuss the significance of the research; next, I address my concept of the memory-event as developed through my engaging in practice-based research. I thus propose four key principles of the memory-event, principles inherent in and necessary to the application of this concept in art practice. I close the Conclusion by defining the boundaries of the inquiry, and offer a set of propositions concerning how this research may be expanded upon beyond the thesis.

The Purpose of the Research

This study commenced in response to what I perceive as assumptions and misconceptions of memory, which I believe direct and limit how memory is expressed and understood in art and in language. In my rejection of typical assumptions and misconceptions, the thesis has critiqued the forms of thought thus produced. As my research has shown, the dominant forms of thought include the ocularcentric belief that the phenomenon of memory is a primarily visual experience, which furthermore assumes inherent relationships between photographic images and memories. The aims of this thesis are distinguished through a two-pronged approach:

1) To critique and develop strategies for unsettling the assumptions and misconceptions of memory, with a particular focus on disrupting ocularcentric approaches to memory;

2) To explore and develop a creative alternative model of memory.

The thesis has intertwined a number of theoretical perspectives within a critique of what I have defined as the image of memory. In so doing, it has utilised propositions developed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari for breaking with this image of thought. Specifically in the context of this thesis, I have drawn on the artist, theorist and Deleuzean scholar Simon O’Sullivan’s recent writings on Deleuzean thought and contemporary art practices.
In pursuit of the aims of this thesis, three key objectives have guided my research. Firstly, the thesis has sought to identify and critique prevalent metaphors of memory so as to reveal how confusions between metaphor and memory have taken place. Secondly, I have utilised a Deleuzean framework developed by O’Sullivan specifically for contemporary art practices. O’Sullivan created the framework for artists involved in contemporary art practices, those individuals who wish to break away from conventional and habitual forms of thought. I chose to use this as a method to aid me in disrupting and posing alternatives to what I have identified as a dominant image of memory. The third objective of my research was creatively to use my art practice as a space through which to think through concepts, develop ways of disrupting and avoiding representations, and produce expressions of memory alternative to those of dominant practices.

Functions of the Research

The directions proposed by this research and demonstrated throughout my thesis are those of dissidence and disruption. I thus aimed to create a thesis functioning as an encounter: as a disrupting and creative force that breaks with dominant assumptions of memory and puts forward alternative ideas. This has resulted in a critique of existing ideas, dominant themes and metaphors of memory (as symptoms of major ideas), alongside a development of an event-based concept of memory. In disentangling concepts of memory from metaphors, representation and purely visual experiences, I suggest that the experience of memory is an affective becoming; in other words, it is a bodily affect in response to the ‘intensive quality of life’ (O’Sullivan 2010 197). In turning away from representation and generalisations, I emphasise the production of the subjective experience of memory. I understand this as duration, a ‘transition of change’ (Deleuze 1968/1991 37) through which the production of subjectivity is in a continuous process of becoming. This means that memories, the subject or the subjective experiences of memories, are not static; rather, they are in a state of constant change. This perspective contrasts sharply with suggestions of memory as being purely image based, material and fixed. I have also developed a perception of the act of remembrance, the leap into the past (Deleuze 1968/1991 56-57), as a form of becoming. This becoming is a mobilisation of memories and a past co-existing with one another and with the present. The act of remembrance is not, for example, a ‘nostalgic return to childhood’, but a summoning of ‘blocs of childhood’ through ‘becoming child’ (Deleuze and Guattari in O’Sullivan 2006a 3).

The research may also be thought of as a minor thesis focusing on alternatives to the ideas of major writings on memory. Deleuze and Guattari use the concept of the minor to discuss power and power-relations between subordinate or marginalised groups and dominating major forces. In terms of this thesis, however, minor is understood through O’Sullivan’s application of the concept (2010 200); as a contrasting and disruptive collective force within, yet moving independently from and at times against, the forces of major thought. It is thus minor in relation
to marginalised thought (about memory), rather than actual collective groups of individuals. As outlined in Juncture I, the dominant discourses include writings on memory in relation to trauma, conflict and cultural memory (Huyssen 2003 8). Many dominant ideas of memory coerce binaries of distinctions between personal and collective memory, and between memory and forgetting. Instead, I propose a turning away from such distinctions; I ask whether they have indeed enabled a fuller understanding of memory and how memory functions. Turning away from forms of binary thought entails thinking beyond the personal and the collective, and instead thinking the apersonal. It means a reconsideration of the ‘false belief’ (Deleuze 1968/1991 61) suggesting that forgetting is the opposite of memory. I discuss it through applying Bergson’s theory, which holds that the totality of the past co-exists with the present. As Deleuze explicates in his book Bergsonism, the entirety of memory exists alongside the present thus the act of recollection requires an active leap into the past. Failure to remember is the result of an incorrect leap, and one then has to leap again until the ‘correct leap’ leads to the region one is searching for (Deleuze 1968/1991 62).

The concept of the minor is also useful in thinking about one of the key focal points of my research: the Swedish hunting community. As introduced in Juncture II, a minor group operates within a dominant, major system, is collective, and stutters the vehicular language of the dominant (O’Sullivan 2010 200). The term ‘minor’ is not to be confused with the everyday use of the word minority, and does not assume a difference in quantity. Relationships between minor and major are instead defined through power. A minor group may in fact be larger in number than the major group, yet still operate as a minor collective. This may most easily be understood through differences in gender and patriarchy, or in class inequality, where a ruling group may be smaller than or equal in number to the subordinate group, yet is considered major in terms of power. Hunters may not be minor in all contexts, however. The Swedish hunting community may be understood as a minor collective as they are – for the most part – unrepresented in Swedish mainstream culture, cultural productions, media, politics and records of recent history. The group operates within current major Swedish culture and utilises the language, forms of communication, commerce and infrastructure of the major, yet stutters these so to reflect their own focal points and practices. I have used my research as a form of ‘actualising machine’ (O’Sullivan 2010 201): a device with a future orientation for actualising new ideas and aggregates. Summoning the concept of the event in my research means a creation of a space for actualisation, in which ‘something, finally, might happen’ (O’Sullivan 2001 127). This means an emphasis on an action, a form of doing, rather than meaning-making and interpretation.

What I have therefore borrowed from O’Sullivan is the notion of placing a greater value on the bodily experience than on the reading of works of art. By doing so, the value of the art work is in its ability to produce affective experiences in the visitor, in place of the established systems of semiotic or deconstructive interpretations. This is an important concept in my search for ways of escaping those established systems of signification in art dealing with memory, as the notion
of the event may pose alternatives to and liberate art about memory from set ways of creating and experiencing art (ibid. 126). The seventh concept included in the framework developed by O’Sullivan, mythopoesis, has helped me to counteract dominant thought through the dual activity of myth-breaking and myth-making. Mythopoesis confronts common binaries in memory discourse, including true / false memories, or differences between memory and imagination. Furthermore, in its potential for creating new ‘space-times’ that may open up to ‘non-human worlds’ (O’Sullivan 2007 96, 119), the use of mythopoesis in my research has resulted in a focus on memory in itself. It constitutes an idea of apersonal memory, a concept of memory in its own right, and possibly not part of human memory.

Structure and Findings

This thesis consists of four interrelated Junctures. They map out the processes of the study. Each Juncture articulates parts of these processes, and focuses on the specific objectives (set out above) that have helped me towards achieving the aims of my research.

Juncture I set out to address the first objective of my research, and presented an overview of the principal assumptions of memory being challenged in the thesis. I demonstrated how such assumptions are part of a widely encompassing image of thought, that which I defined as an image of memory. Furthermore, Juncture I distinguished among and interrogated the representative forces of metaphors, then defined metaphors of memory as symptoms of a general image of memory. In support of this claim, Juncture I presented a development of metaphors of memory, from Antiquity to current expressions, and focused on image-based metaphors in particular. This objective was set so to help meet the first aim of the thesis: to critique and develop strategies aimed at unsettling assumptions and misconceptions of memory. This helped me to discern how a new concept of memory may be formed, and to which existing norms of portraying memory in art this concept may pose alternatives.

Juncture II formed the second phase in the process towards consolidating the thought and in addressing the aims of this thesis. In response to the problems outlined and critiqued in the first Juncture, Juncture II encompassed the second objective. It presented strategies, principles and approaches key to this research. The process included a consideration of Henri Bergson’s radical Matter and Memory (1896/1988), and Deleuze’s work Bergsonism (1968/1991), which presented principles of time, space and memory underpinning my discussion in the thesis. This second Juncture also introduced a method, used in my research, for re-thinking existing notions of memory: a critical and creative framework developed by Simon O’Sullivan as a method towards renewing thought in art practices. The framework encourages a dual approach to disrupting existing thought. One aspect is an active critique; the other is a creative response that produces
alternative thought. As discussed, O’Sullivan draws on seven Deleuzean concepts in establishing this framework; they include the encounter, affect, the production of subjectivity, the minor, the virtual, the event, and mythopoesis. I applied the concepts of this framework in order to help me break with the defined image of memory, to re-consider existing models of memory, and to generate alternative ideas. Juncture II thus aided me in addressing both the first and second aims of this research; it proposed a strategy for disrupting assumptions and misconceptions of memory, which could then be used to explore alternative models of memory.

Juncture III focused on the third objective set out in this research. It demonstrated how I have used my art practice to re-think concepts, experiment with means and manners through which to unsettle forces of representation, and explore alternative and creative approaches to expressing memory. In Juncture III, I distinguished the working methods upon which my practice is contingent, including notions of memory in relation to journeys, undocumented events and practices of hunting. Further, Juncture III discussed how these may be explored in relation to the Deleuzean concepts proffered by O’Sullivan as a method for achieving this. Juncture III discussed bodies of work and installations integral to my development of alternative ideas of memory, including the photographic series Majorna, Hunting Lodges and Hunting Towers, and the installations Aftermath, Luffare Narratives and Disruptive Desires. I presented a profile of the contemporary Swedish hunting community, whom I have identified as a minor group operating along the margins of current Swedish culture, and on whom I have focused heavily throughout my research. The study on the hunting community culminated in my exhibition Disruptive Desires. Preparing the exhibition became the process through which I was able directly to address the aims of this research. Juncture III of the thesis thus explores the installation in greater depth. Disruptive Desires set out to unsettle assumptions of memory while simultaneously exploring and developing alternative ways of expressing notions of memory through installation art. In response to this creative research, I developed a creative alternative model of memory that I have come to term the memory-event, as outlined in Juncture III. The concept was generated through explorations in my practice, as well as through the utilisation of O’Sullivan’s framework in thinking about memory and in approaching memory through my practice. The memory-event thus emerged as a strategy for unsettling assumptions and misconceptions of memory, for displacing ocularcentric theories of memory; it also allowed for alternative expressions of memory to emerge. The alternatives include the potential considerations of expressing non-sensory memories, non-human memories, and memories for an audience ‘to come’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1968/1991 109).

I chose to interrogate considerations of memory through a series of exploration in my practice. Therefore, I have structured my inquiry into memory through these explorations, so as to assist me in the development of an alternative concept of memory. Juncture IV of this thesis provides visual and textual details of the experimental bodies of work produced in my practice throughout this research. The bodies of work range from photographic series to installations and videos.

**Significance of the Research**

The significance of this research lies in the fact that it marks a separation from forms of thought dominating the ways in which the phenomenon of memory is understood and expressed in installation art practices. Instead, it offers an alternative form of practice, made explicit through this thesis. This new practice actively resists the use of metaphors, overused references and clichés. It aims to work against systems of signification that insist on directing the meanings of works of art. The new practice also avoids the prevailing themes of memory discourse, including trauma, abuse or nostalgia (Huyssen 2003 8). Furthermore, through the practice I attempt to address the personal via the apersonal: affect, that which connects us to the world, and to one another. The aim is to create space in which art practices may use a concept such as memory in new and unrestricted ways, and will thus generate affective rather than representational art experiences. This original contribution of my thesis to existing knowledge includes a critique of the assumptions and metaphors of memory, where metaphors are understood as symptoms of what Deleuze defines as an image of thought (1968/2004 164). In relation to this research, I define this as an image of memory, given how it governs the ways in which memory is understood and expressed. Corresponding with this critique, I offer an alternative approach to thinking about memory in art practices: the memory-event. The concept resists representation. Instead, it considers the phenomenon of memory to be an affective event. The originality of this research is also evident in the way in which I have utilised O’Sullivan’s Deleuzean framework in my research and in my installation art practice, in my search for new ways of making art about memory. This is not a form of art practice approached by O’Sullivan; this thesis thus offers a novel application of his framework. Furthermore, the research introduces a consideration of memory in relation to what I define as the minor practices in the context of hunting. New insights into the activities of the Swedish hunting community, through a thorough exploration and analysis of such practices, are revealed.

I have demonstrated how my research culminated in the installation *Disruptive Desires*, and how the development of its preparation helped me to work out and define the presented alternative concept of memory: the memory-event. I developed the concept in order to account for the processes of affect and becoming which are, I believe, necessary components of memory and
to the experience of the mnemonic. In *Disruptive Desires*, I reflected on the Deleuzean framework promoted by O’Sullivan (2010 196-204). Through it, I was able to think the *memory-event*. My wish and aim was to create an *art event* (O’Sullivan 2001 126) with a ‘rupturing quality’ (O’Sullivan 2010 196); an encounter, or what O’Sullivan distinguishes as being that which defines the aesthetics of contemporary art (ibid.). As discussed, the encounter consists of two simultaneous forces. Firstly and in relation to my research, the encounter is used to critique ‘typical ways of thinking and feeling’ (ibid. 198) in relation to memory and how ideas of memory are raised in art practices. Parallel to this critique is a creative search for and actualisation of virtual, alternative ‘ways of thinking and feeling’ (ibid.), and manners in which memory may be explored in art. *Disruptive Desires* critiqued the ‘false problems’ of dominant theories of memory (Deleuze 1968/1991 54); their falsity lay in accepting individual memories as being static, thus interpretable and transferable through visual representations. My thesis suggests this is a far from sustainable perception. One of the problems, from its reflection of an over-arching image of thought that govern ideas of memory, is the production of a generalisation of memory. What I wanted to emphasise is that memory cannot be generalised or represented. Memory is multiple, in a continuous process of becoming, and part of a multiplicity of subjective becomings. Memory, Deleuze notes in *Cinema 2: The Time Image*, ‘is a voice which speaks, talks to itself, or whispers, and recounts what happens’; that which the voice as memory narrates are ‘more voices’ (1985/1989 49), other subjectivities that may aid subjects to link with and form connections among them.

*Disruptive Desires* actively resisted representation via the common ‘systems of signification’ (O’Sullivan 2007 144) of dominant practices. The installation achieved this through questioning the dominant assumptions of the relationship of photographs to memory, and by refusing to use common visual and object-based signs denoting the mnemonic. I used in assemblages images and objects not commonly understood as related to memory, and I included elements that enabled other voices to emerge: apersonal voices, non-human voices, fictional voices, and voices speaking of the un-documented. I avoided strategies for connoting memory in art practices, such as employing faded personal or found family photographs layered with media footage, or the inclusion of physical objects understood as metaphors for memory. Such are seen in the practices of artists such as Christian Boltanski, Annette Messager, Lorie Novak, Ben Rivers, Louise Bourgeois, Wilma Hurskainen, Miyako Ishiuchi, Tatana Kellner, Erik Kessels, Zoe Leonard, Rosy Martin, Sarah Miles, Michael O’Brien, Chiharu Shiota, Jo Spence, Annelies Strba, and Carrie Mae Weems. Alternative representations of memory require a careful, critical attitude towards the use of family photographs and other purely visual media, historical images, commemorations, testimonies, historical records, a focus on traces and marks, filing cabinets, archives and other forms of storage like structures, old domestic objects and furniture, and personal or found possessions related to childhood.
In the examination of memory through art, I have found certain approaches particularly constructive in seeking alternatives to dominant forms of thought: Tacita Dean’s suggestions of multiple temporalities, Pierre Huyghe’s focus on the everyday experience, and Sung Hwan Kim’s disregard for and entanglements of actuality and the fictive. I thus used new forms of materials so as to discuss through them not the insular, the isolated and personal narrative, the nostalgic or the traumatic, but memory in itself. I sought the apersonal memory that forms the space between the personal and the general: the portal through which I attempted to raise new ideas of the mnemic. *Disruptive Desires* emerged from and responded to a form of thought developed throughout my research. In this thought, the past is considered, through Bergson’s theory of an ‘entirety of memory’ (Olkowski 1999 110), to be in co-existence with other pasts and with the present, to be continuously created. The theory sits in opposition to understandings of memory as a static entity that can be represented through art. In this context, *Disruptive Desires* also rejected and aimed to disrupt the forces of signification inherent in dominant approaches to art. The disruption may be understood through my emphasis on the creation of an *affective event* over the traditional reading of the work of art (O’Sullivan 2001 126). My emphasis reflects my interests in what art does rather than what it means; its bodily and experiential affect, instead of conventional forms of meaning-making and invitations to interpretation through signification. Affects that I set out to generate were those of new becomings; that is, acts of re-thinking memory, subjectivity and ways in which art about memory may be experienced. In my opposing of dominant forms of thought, major and ocularcentric ideas of memory and the prevailing themes of trauma in memory discourse (Huyssen 2003 8), I understand my practice and position as minor. My aim was to generate alternative approaches to thinking about one’s position in the world by presenting ideas and expressions of memory that differ from that of the general or dominant. I set out to stutter and stammer the major languages of memory discourse and traditions of deconstructive or semiotic readings of art works (O’Sullivan 2001 126), thus to disrupt dominant forms of subjectivity (O’Sullivan 2010 199) and established assumptions and ‘myths’ (O’Sullivan 2007 146) of memory and art about memory; simultaneously, this would prompt the production of other, new subjectivities (O’Sullivan 2010 199). I also aimed to blur the boundaries of actuality and fiction in memory, doing so by actively incorporating the *fabulations* of mythopoesis into the creation of new and alternative perceptions (O’Sullivan 2007 146). I understand mythopoesis as being a disruptive and creative tool possibly utilised by a minor practice in acts of stuttering and stammering. The results could be both to break with existing myths and to generate new myths. In this way, alternative thought, practices, processes and ideas emerge. I have used this in my practice to interrogate and disrupt established ideas of memory, alongside my creation of other ideas and forms of expression. The creation of these new propositions for thinking about memory may hence offer ‘space-times’ (ibid. 119) differing from those already established through habitual approaches to thought; the propositions open up thought to new territories, and offer ideas of memory in itself, non-human memory and forms of ‘space-time without others’ (ibid. 96).
A New Approach to Memory: the Memory-Event

The concept generated by this research as an alternative approach to memory is the memory-event, as outlined in Juncture III. The research has sought to propose new ways of thinking and making art about memory, ones challenging typical assumptions, common sense (Deleuze 1968/2004 164-213), and ‘habitual modes’ of thought (O’Sullivan 2007 50). It is important to question established forms of methods for approaching memory, and to propose alternatives. Without such a critique, ‘false’ assumptions (Deleuze 1968/1991 61) may continue to guide and limit both thought and practices, the products of which may serve only to maintain these assumptions. There may be a danger that an unceasing chain of thinking and producing the same ideas time and again may result, leading not to new appreciations of memory, but to a lack of thought and a continued reliance on clichés. As Lynn Berger noted, and as has been demonstrated in this thesis, clichés may take the forms of expressions, images, objects, signs and symbols (Berger 2011 182). In relation to memory, such clichés include suggestions of memory as a ‘container of old experiences’, with photographs as memories and ‘souvenirs of experience’ (ibid. 180). For Deleuze, the act of representation generates clichés (1989 20), thus a confrontation with clichés also entails a confrontation with representation. Alternative approaches to memory, ones that challenge representation, assumptions and metaphors of memory, may thus serve to disrupt clichés and to offer different ways of thinking and making art about the mnemonic experience.

The significance of this research is the creation of a new, unconventional way of thinking about memory: the concept of the memory-event. The concept directly challenges currently-held assumptions and simultaneously proposes alternative strategies for approaching memory. The memory-event has emerged from the framework for thought utilised in this research, and from explorations into different ways of making work about memory in my practice. The concept is not another metaphor of memory; rather, it is a model through which memory may be approached and re-thought. It is simultaneously a theorem of memory, and a process towards thinking about memory; a tool for critique and a device for art practices. I think of the utilisation of the memory-event as a form of mobilisation, setting in motion thought, methods and approaches that will stimulate the creation of new thought and new experiences.

To activate the process of the memory-event in art practices means to approach memory from sets of fundamental principles and avoidances. It discovers new routes to thought and to making. This is thus a series of parallel disruptive and creative motions. As one prime conclusion to this research, I extend a set of guiding principles for thinking and mobilising the memory-event. The first principle is to avoid limiting the mnemonic phenomenon to a primarily visual experience. Instead, the abstract potential of memories is embraced. Doing so requires a consideration of the mnemonic as a potentially poly-sensory, non-sensory, asensory, and affective experience. It also demands a critical approach to the dominance of vision and its accepted representation in
Western thought, then critically to detach memory from vision, memory from visual images, from the optics of the eye, and from the camera lens. Such an approach facilitates a separation in thought between photographs and memory, and between visual perception and photographic images. This confrontation with ocularcentricity does not seek to deny the possible existence of visual elements in memories; however, it flattens the traditional hierarchy of the senses (Stewart 1999 20; Jay 1993 34-35). That is, it deems visual elements a potential part of the mnemonic experience yet not the dominant part, and it allows the visual to merge with other sensory or non-sensory experiences. This principle has been adopted into my practice, most notably through the installations produced throughout this research. I used the approach in creating she felt empty in my hand, which included a large, three-dimensional structure in the shape of a hunting tower, an audio recording of the sound of breathing, and growing grass sprouting from a patch of Swedish soil (2009; see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 294-301). The experience of the installation was thus poly-sensory: an assemblage of possible visual, auditory, olfactory, haptic and spatial perceptions. I continued to investigate this principle in Aftermath (2009; see Juncture III pp. 105-106; Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 260-273). This installation also consciously introduced temperature (heat) as an element. It placed particular emphasis on sound, through exaggerated audio elements, and explored ways of distorting the visual by projecting images of objects onto three-dimensional objects – sometimes two-dimensional images of the objects themselves. Disruptive Desires (2012; see Juncture III pp. 110-123; Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 150-196) focused on producing an affective experience by using space and distance in concurrence with visual, auditory, haptic and olfactory senses. At times, these conflicted with one another. They blurred and overlapped.

The second principle of the memory-event is to adopt Bergsonian considerations of memories as co-existing with the present, and as part of a past that pushes the present into being. Such an approach to thinking about memory challenges the linear theories that understand memories as consecutive and static moments or points generated by the present. The memory-event thus also opposes suggestions of memories as ‘frozen’ moments (Flusser 2000 2) or memory as a storage unit for impressions. Instead, it gives preference to a notion of memory as consisting of abstract, fluid, mutable and affective events. The memory-event thus approaches memories as generated by affects: continuous changes, becomings, to our beings, to the production of our subjectivities. Affects cause changes in and to the experiencing body. Furthermore, this principle opposes perceptions of recollection as an act of reconstructing the past in the present, as held by theorists, artists and writers using the method of memory work; they include Annette Kuhn (2002) and Marianne Hirsch (1999). The principle instead considers Bergsonian and Deleuzean suggestions of recollection as constituting an active ‘leap’ into a region of a co-existing past (Deleuze 1991 56-57) and summoning blocs of pasts (O’Sullivan 2006a 3).
As part of an alternative approach to thinking about memory, the principle persuades against the use of testimonies and closed personal narratives (to be re-constructed in the present). It encourages methods of *fabulation* through mythopoesis (O’Sullivan 2007 147), causing blurrings and slippages of time, space and memories to take place. It does so in order to obstruct habitual readings of ‘personal stories’ in works of art (ibid.), and via the apersonal to generate new, open and affective events in the experiencing body.

The third principle involves an active circumvention of representations of memory or individual memories in art practices. The mobilisation of this principle in an art practice necessitates a deliberate act of turning away from dominant desires to represent, to interpret and to ‘read’ the work of art (O’Sullivan 2007 144). This entails acquiring an attitude towards the creation of art such that it becomes an actualisation of virtualities, with the ambition to create affective assemblages for the experiencing body to encounter. This may require critical re-considerations of the mnemonic experience so as to avoid assumptions of memory, as well as avoiding the uses of existing representations produced by such assumptions. The objective for utilising this principle is to produce an affective experience, and to sidestep existing systems of signification (O’Sullivan 2001 126). The aim for this affective experience is to allow for other potential ideas of memory to arise, in the artist and the audience experiencing the artwork. A germinal space is created, through which alternative notions of memory may emerge. In the avoidance of representation, it is thus important to refrain from using metaphors, signs, symbols, references and other materials recognised and understood in habitual systems of signification as related to memory (and encouraged to be *read as memory*).

A useful tactic in evading representation is to engage in an ‘active dismantling’ (Lecercle 2010 68) of existing assumptions of memory, and to do so by focusing on notions of non-recognition. In practice, this may mean a method of using new or existing materials in unfamiliar ways, so as to disrupt dominant systems of signification. Such a disruption may take the form of a stuttering and stammering, a ‘scrambling of codes’ of these systems (O’Sullivan 2007 146), in the simultaneous use of mythopoesis both to break with existing ideas and to generate new possibilities through the affective experiences of artworks. The potential that may emerge from a practice utilising such tactics is the creation of art *encounters* that uproot habitual forms of thought regarding memory; these cause alternative expressions of memory to form. It is also important that new materials or new combinations are sought, should a particular material then start to become recognised (re-territorialised) as being related to memory. As such, this art practice defines itself as *minor* (O’Sullivan 2008), continuously seeking the margins, the ‘seeping edge’ (Massumi 1996 217-39) where new actualisations of the virtual may take place. Therefore, the art practice utilising this principle resists ‘proscribed narratives of contemporary art’ (Bradley 2007); it produces unrecognised expressions, perhaps not for an existing audience, but for ones ‘yet to be brought into being’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/1994 109).
The fourth principle of the memory-event is to seek the minor discourses of memory in place of prevalent major themes, as highlighted by Huyssen (2003 8). This involves pursuing subjects, forms or elements of memory outside those frequently focused on by dominant discourses. What I mean by this is a deliberate concentration on the insignificant, the banal, the mundane, the everyday, the abstract, the undocumented, and the undervalued in art practices attempting to express the mnemonic. The mere mobilisation of the memory-event in thinking about memory through an art practice is a preventative measure against repetitions of what has already been discovered. It enables other voices to emerge, speaking of alternative experiences of memory. The emergence may take place via a focus on what O’Sullivan the apersonal, the ‘transhuman’ (2007 50) in an art practice that connects different subjective ‘bundles of affects’ to one another, to other assemblages and to the world (ibid. 50, 53).

The memory-event may thus offer an escape, a line of flight, out of existing systems of thought that hold a particular image of memory in place (as outlined in Juncture I). It allows for the freedom to move towards alternative expressions, theories, concepts and practices. It may free not only domains of memory from assumptions of the doxa; it also frees those art practices that deal with memory from habitual modes of operation. The medium of photography, too, is freed from expectations of storing or ordering memory, representing vision and representing experienced events. The memory-event presents an approach to thinking and making art about memory that both critiques and offers alternatives to existing ideas and expressions. In doing so, it frees thought and art practices from the limitations on ideas of memory imposed by existing assumptions.

Summoning the memory-event in art practices may hence offer new ways of expressing and reflecting on the mnemonic. The potential in such new expressions may be understood in terms of creative encounters which, through a ‘rupturing quality’, break with ‘habitual ways of being and acting in the world’ (O’Sullivan 2010 196) and cause a subjective moment of significant personal change (Al-Saji 2000 56). The concept encourages alternative understandings of memory that oppose dominant expressions of the mnemonic. As such, the memory-event may through its stutterings, its stammerings and its mutations of such dominant expressions form new models for subjective becomings (O’Sullivan 2010 199) and allow for ‘other [alternative] voices’ (O’Sullivan 2008).
Beyond the Thesis: Future Potential

My research has proposed a new concept of memory, the memory-event, which I have developed and explored through my art practice. The further exploration here demonstrates how the processes involved in applying this concept could be used in, then extended through, forthcoming practice-based research projects based on yet beyond the boundaries of the thesis.

I therefore conclude this thesis with three propositions for future extensions of the research. These offer expanded processes of investigation for the focus of my thesis. Building on the findings of and understandings gained from my thesis, I shall explore the possible impact of the context of location on the experience of artworks, and shall do so by exhibiting my works relating to hunting in Sweden. I wish to do so in order to investigate further what forms of stutterings and stammerings may emerge from directly confronting the major culture that ignores and marginalises the hunting community. I would like to continue to work closely with the hunting community, and to involve its members in the creative process. In continuing to explore how the memory-event may be applied in provoking alternative ideas and expressions of memory, I propose a consideration of how ‘pure’ memory may be explored via the critical and creative processes of the memory-event. The potential area of extended research emerged through my engagement with this thesis, and took shape through working out Disruptive Desires.

I also see potential in extending the foreground of my research through working with others, practitioners and writers, to explore how the memory-event may be incorporated and developed so as to offer re-considerations of the mnemonic in practices and domains outside my own. The proposed extension could take the form of exhibitions and publications focusing entirely on the development of alternative expressions of memory, all based on the concept of the memory-event. I wish to do so in order to investigate further what forms of stutterings and stammerings may emerge from directly confronting the major culture that ignores and marginalises the hunting community. I would like to continue to work closely with the hunting community, and to involve its members in the creative process. In continuing to explore how the memory-event may be applied in provoking alternative ideas and expressions of memory, I propose a consideration of how ‘pure’ memory may be explored via the critical and creative processes of the memory-event. The potential area of extended research emerged through my engagement with this thesis, and took shape through working out Disruptive Desires.
This photograph is part of my photographic series Hunting Towers (see Juncture IV: Portfolio pp. 220-259)

It is thus repeated in Juncture IV: Portfolio (see Fig. 151, p. 233)
Juncture IV: Portfolio

Introduction

This Juncture is in ten parts. It makes explicit the practice elements of my PhD thesis. These culminated in a major exhibition, Disruptive Desires, which took place in the Crypt of St Mark’s Church Kennington, London in December 2012. I approach Disruptive Desires in Part 1 of Juncture IV, before exploring other exhibitions and individual series of work made during my PhD studies. Part 1 introduces Disruptive Desires with a double-page digital photograph taken from the point of view on entering the installation. This image is followed by a description of the installation and its elements, with a series of visual illustrations. The illustrations include a floor plan of the Crypt so as to give an idea of its size and dimensions. There are photographs and video stills of the installation and the private view. Part 1 also includes sections detailing the location of the exhibition (pp. 172-182), and the experimentation that took place during the development of Disruptive Desires (pp.184-196). A DVD containing video documentation of the process of creating Disruptive Desires is found towards the beginning of my thesis (see p. 2) and the full videos included in Disruptive Desires are found in Appendix I (see p. 343)

Parts 2-10 address each series of my work, exhibition or individual art-work, created prior to Disruptive Desires. These have been arranged in separate sections distinguished by a double-spread image of the work in question with its corresponding numbered Part and title. I have chosen to address the most recent work first, then to present the items in reverse chronology towards the earliest practice-based piece of research accomplished for my PhD studies. The works, series, videos and installations have helped me think to through my practice, experiment with ideas, develop ways of working, and to test concepts, such as the memory-event, in practice. Therefore, Parts 2-10 may be understood as developmental work, practical thought experiments, and explorations that informed my thinking when creating Disruptive Desires.

Each Part is introduced in written text providing details of the context and details of the work, when and how it was made, its significance in relation to my thesis and the thought processes involved in my PhD project; as applicable, details are given of where the work has been shown. Some of the works in this Juncture are addressed in the main body of my thesis. However, in order to provide consistency, transparency and structure, I shall provide their respective backgrounds in Juncture IV: Portfolio. Pages of images and details about each of them follow the introductory texts to each body of work. The images are of the art works produced as part of the research involved in my PhD studies. In this Juncture, the images are accompanied by various additional materials: maps, floor plans, invitations to exhibitions, the works of others, and scanned pages from my journal. I have provided this additional material so as to provide understandings of contexts, how I have been thinking-through-practice, and the spatial relations and dimensions of the installations.
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Part 1:
Disruptive Desires
Part 1: Disruptive Desires
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Fig. 41 Disruptive Desires, digital photograph, 2012

Digital photograph of an installation view from the exhibition Disruptive Desires, from the point of view of entering the exhibition

This photograph is repeated in this Juncture (see Fig. 44, p. 157)
Part 1:  
*Disruptive Desires*, installation  
The Crypt of St Mark’s Church Kennington, 2012

My research culminated in my installation *Disruptive Desires* in the Crypt of St Mark’s Church Kennington, London in December 2012 and formed part of my PhD submission and examination. This Part focuses on *Disruptive Desires* and is divided into three sections: documentation on the completed installation, followed by a section with details of the location of St Mark’s Church Kennington and its Crypt, and a section with visual records of practice-based experiments that I carried out in the Crypt in the lead-up to presenting *Disruptive Desires*. Video documentation of *Disruptive Desires* is found on the DVD included towards the beginning of the thesis (see p.2).

This exhibition aimed to explore ways of making art about memory, ones that did not apply the common ‘systems of signification’ (O’Sullivan 2007 144), such as metaphors and other recognisable signs that supposedly connote the mnemonic. I wanted both to test how my concept of the memory-event could be thought through via my practice, and to do so in the context of my memories of growing up around the Swedish hunting community. As discussed in Juncture III of the thesis, I approached the making of *Disruptive Desires* as an assemblage, in bringing together various elements: objects, videos, sounds, smells, space, and also human subjects as ‘bundles of affect’ (O’Sullivan 2007 50) entering the exhibition. I have borrowed the applications of these Deleuzean concepts of assemblage and affect from Simon O’Sullivan, who used them in his creation of a conceptual framework for contemporary art practices (2010 198-199) aiming to bring together elements into an event that generates affects (Heckman 2002). My use of such concepts was defined in Juncture II and further explored in Juncture III of my thesis.

The installation consisted of several interconnecting parts. The video *Hunting Songs* was projected onto the back wall of the central space of the Crypt. This video features Kennington Community Choir singing – in Swedish – a set of hunting songs, written by Bäreberg’s hunting team. The video was filmed in the same space of the Crypt in which it was projected in *Disruptive Desires*. The audio from *Hunting Songs* alternated with a separate video, *Up Around the Bend*, screened on a TV monitor in an octagonal space along the western catacomb, a video also filmed in the Crypt. In this latter video, I am seen wearing a wild boar skin while playing an online hunting game called *The Hunter*. During the filming of *Up Around the Bend*, the visuals of *The Hunter* were projected back onto me as I was sitting on a chair, draped in the wild boar skin, playing the game.
The video was accompanied by a soundtrack chosen for while playing *The Hunter*: Creedence Clearwater Revival's 1970s song *Up Around the Bend*. The 28-minute video *Luffare Narratives*, entailing a dialogue with a childhood friend about games we used to play as children, was installed in a space along the western catacomb.

In the central room of the Crypt was a digital projection of a still photograph taken inside a hunting lodge. The photograph depicted a meeting room with folding office tables and chairs (see Fig. 45). I placed a similar table and six chairs, arranged similarly to those in the photograph, in front of this projection. A momentary illusion of objects extending into or out of the photograph, as the tables and chairs visually overlapped, was thus created. This artifice became apparent when visitors moved around the space.

A fourth video, *Bait Cam*, was screened on a continuous loop in the catacomb opposite *Up Around the Bend*. The video consisted of edited footage from a bait camera, triggered by a motion sensor, set up in a rural location in Sweden. This shows a range of wild animals. It was projected behind a closed gate in the Crypt, which created an illusion of depth and a presence of the animals depicted.
sara andersdotter  
disruptive desires  

contemporary art installation  
the crypt at st mark’s church kennington  

8 dec – 16 dec 2012  
[sat & sun only: 8, 9, 15, 16 dec, or by appointment]  

private view: thursday 6 dec 2012 [6-10 pm]  

glowing eyes appear in the dark. luminous creatures dart past. a wild boar becomes the hunter.  
i become the boar that becomes the hunter. peeking through the gaps in the vinyl table cloth, i can see large boots move around the table. stainless steel bowls on the counter. anna’s kitchen smells of coffee, diesel and blood. the two dogs bark in a frenzy: the actual and the imagined blur and smudge. i am frightened yet excited, having become the boar, having become the hunter.  

notions of the recollected, the fictive, childhood memories, imagination, affect and desire ooze, bleed and seep into one another. the subjective and the vernacular fall in to focus. reflections on these notions reverberate through the dark spaces of the crypt of st mark’s in kennington, in the swedish installation artist sara andersdotter’s exhibition ‘disruptive desires’. sara is a london-based artist and researcher who has been exhibiting nationally and internationally since 1999. her work is primarily installation based and searches for ways of discussing the affective encounter of memory through the creation of experiential environments. this installation forms the final part of sara’s practice based phd project at the university of the arts london, which seeks to question and uproot desires to represent memory and the past, and the manner in which memory is considered and expressed in art practices.  

Fig. 42 Disruptive Desires press release, 2012
Fig. 43 Disruptive Desires, floor plan, 2012. Floor plan of the Crypt of St Mark’s Church Kennington detailing locations of the elements of the installation.
From my photographic series *Hunting Lodges* depicting rural hunting lodges and abattoirs in the west of Sweden. This photograph was projected in the central space of *Disruptive Desires*. 
Fig. 46 Disruptive Desires, digital photograph, 2012. Installation view (close-up).

Fig. 47 Disruptive Desires, digital photograph, 2012. Installation view. Photograph by Carole Evans.
Fig. 48 *Disruptive Desires*, video still, 2012. Installation view on entering the central space of the exhibition.

Fig. 49 *Disruptive Desires*, digital photograph, 2012. Installation view taken from the back wall (facing the entrance) of the central space of the Crypt.
Fig. 50 Disruptive Desires, digital photograph, 2012. Installation view of the projection of my video Hunting Songs projection

Fig. 51 Hunting Songs, video still, 2012
Fig. 52 *Disruptive Desires*, digital photograph, 2012
Photograph of the projection of *Hunting Songs* onto the back wall of the Crypt, taken during the private view. This photograph depicts a visitor to the private view exiting the bathroom, which was located through a door in the back wall. Photograph by Carole Evans.

Fig. 53 *Disruptive Desires*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of Kennington Community Choir performing in the Crypt during the private view. Photograph by Carole Evans.
Fig. 54 Disruptive Desires, video still, 2012. Installation view of the video screening of Up Around the Bend.

Fig. 55 Disruptive Desires, video still, 2012. Installation view of the video screening of Up Around the Bend. Still from footage filmed by Tom de Ville.
Fig. 56 Disruptive Desires, video still, 2012. Close up of the video screening of Up Around the Bend

Fig. 57 Disruptive Desires, video still, 2012. Close up of the video screening of Up Around the Bend
Fig. 58 Disruptive Desires, digital photograph, 2012
Installation view when approaching Up Around the Bend. Photograph by Carole Evans.
Fig. 59 *Disruptive Desires*, video still, 2012. Installation view of the corridor facing the video projection of *Bait Cam*. Still from footage filmed by Tom de Ville.
Fig. 60 Disruptive Desires, digital photograph, 2012. Installation view of the screening of Luffare Narratives.

Fig. 61 Disruptive Desires, digital photograph, 2012. Installation view. Photograph of a visitor viewing Luffare Narratives at the private view. Photograph by Carole Evans
Fig. 62 *Disruptive Desires*, video still, 2012. Installation view. Close-up of the screening and subtitles of *Luffare Narratives*. Still from footage filmed by Tom de Ville.

Fig. 63 *Disruptive Desires*, video still, 2012. Installation view of the screening of *Luffare Narratives* (close-up).
Fig. 64 Disruptive Desires, digital photograph, 2012. Installation view of the video projection of Bait Cam
Fig. 65 *Disruptive Desires*, digital photograph, 2012. Installation view of the video projection of *Bait Cam*. Photograph by Carole Evans
Fig. 66 Disruptive Desires, video still, 2012. Installation view of the video projection of Bait Cam. Still from footage by Tom de Ville

Fig. 67 Disruptive Desires, video still, 2012. Installation view of the video projection of Bait Cam
Fig. 68 Disruptive Desires, digital photograph, 2012. Installation view. Photograph of visitors viewing the video projection of Bait Cam at the private view. Photograph by Carole Evans
Disruptive Desires: Location Details
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Fig. 69  *Entrance to the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012

Location photograph detailing the entrance to the Crypt of St Mark’s Church Kennington, where *Disruptive Desires* took place

This photograph is repeated in this Juncture (see Fig. 77, p. 178)
Disruptive Desires: Location Details

This part of Juncture IV: Portfolio provides visual details of the location and venue where Disruptive Desires took place. St Mark’s Church Kennington, is situated in South London, directly across from the Oval underground station, and sits among three busy roads and one quiet residential street. The 48-metre long space of the Crypt is located directly beneath the church itself (see Fig. 75, p. 177), thus stretches from east to west. The Crypt takes the form of two narrow corridors, a larger central space and multiple smaller spaces branching out from the two corridors (see Fig. 43, p. 156).

I made contact with the Vicar, the Reverend Stephen Coulson of St Mark’s Church Kennington. The Crypt was at this point hardly ever used, and the Vicar welcomed a creative use of the space. I was not interested in the religious connotations of the Crypt, although was drawn to its underground location, its spaces – useful for projections – and its structure and configuration, as these allow for a wide range of creative possibilities. Furthermore, the Crypt, as well as the Church above, have a certain makeshift aesthetic and contain a mix of architectural styles. The pillared frontage of St Mark’s Church came later than the main building, and its style dramatically differs; also, a dome has been added to the original structure. The Crypt has been painted in various colours, an ill-placed boiler has been fitted through the ceiling, and the flooring varies from laminate floor through painted concrete to carpet. I was given access to the entirety of the Crypt, aside from two rooms along the western catacomb (used for storage) and one room along the eastern catacomb that contained a large boiler for providing heat to the Church above. The Reverend Coulson gave me the freedom to use the space as I wished, as long as I complied with health and safety regulations and did not create artworks that would be upsetting to the members of the Church.

The following pages contain images of St Mark’s Church Kennington, its vicinity and its Crypt, in which Disruptive Desires took place.
Fig. 70 St Mark’s Church Kennington, Google Earth photograph, 2013
View from the front entrance to St Mark’s Church

Fig. 71 St Mark’s Church Kennington, Google Earth photograph, 2013.
View from the side of St Mark’s Church
Fig. 72 St Mark’s Church Kennington, digital photograph, 2012
Front entrance

Fig. 73 St Mark’s Church Kennington, digital photograph, 2012
Entrance to the Crypt

Fig. 74 St Mark’s Church Kennington, digital photograph, 2012
Exhibition sign outside the Crypt

Fig. 75 St Mark’s Church Kennington, digital image, 2013. An outline of the Crypt in blue over a Google Earth image of St Mark’s Church from above to show scale and proportions
Fig. 76 *St Mark’s Church, Kennington*, digital photograph, 2012. View from the south side of St Mark’s Church

Fig. 77 *St Mark’s Church, Kennington*, digital photograph, 2012. View from the northern side of St Mark’s Church and steps leading down to the Crypt

Fig. 78 *St Mark’s Church Kennington*, digital photograph, 2012. View of the western side and front of St Mark’s Church

Fig. 79 *St Mark’s Church Kennington*, digital photograph, 2012. View from the northern side of St Mark’s Church

Fig. 80 *St Mark’s Church Kennington*, digital photograph, 2012. View of the eastern entrance to the Crypt

Fig. 81 *St Mark’s Church Kennington*, digital photograph, 2012. View of the southern entrance to the Crypt
Fig. 82 St Mark’s Church Kennington, digital photograph, 2012
Photograph of the central space of the Crypt

Fig. 83 St Mark’s Church Kennington, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of the eastern catacomb of the Crypt

Fig. 84 St Mark’s Church Kennington, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of a gate in the eastern catacomb
Fig. 85 St Mark’s Church Kennington, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of a room in the eastern catacomb

Fig. 86 St Mark’s Church Kennington, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of a room in the eastern catacomb.

Fig. 87 St Mark’s Church Kennington, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of a room at the end of the eastern catacomb.

Fig. 88 St Mark’s Church Kennington, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of a room in the eastern catacomb.
Fig. 89 *St Mark’s Church Kennington*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of the western catacomb (facing west)

Fig. 90 *St Mark’s Church Kennington*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of a room in the western catacomb

Fig. 91 *St Mark’s Church Kennington*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of a room in the western catacomb

Fig. 92 *St Mark’s Church Kennington*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of an octagonal room in the western catacomb
Fig. 93 St Mark’s Church Kennington, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of an octagonal room in the western corridor.

Fig. 94 St Mark’s Church Kennington, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of the southern exit and a room at the end of the western catacomb.

Fig. 95 St Mark’s Church Kennington, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of the western catacomb (facing east).
Disruptive Desires:
Experiments in the Crypt
Previous pages (pp. 184-185)

Fig. 96  *Disruptive Desires*, digital photograph, 2012

Photograph of the projection of *Bait Cam*, taken while experimenting in the space
Disruptive Desires: Experiments in the Crypt

This element of Juncture IV: Portfolio focuses on the experimental stages in the creation of my exhibition Disruptive Desires. I gained access to the Crypt at St Mark’s Church Kennington in October 2012, and experimented in this subterranean space over a number of weeks.

The Crypt at St Mark’s Church Kennington is formed by a 48-metre-long continuous space. Entrance to (and exit from) the Crypt is through a set of double doors into the large and open central room. Long catacombs lead off on either side. I brought in equipment such as projectors and speakers so that I could experiment with projecting images in various spaces throughout the Crypt. I filmed both Up Around the Bend (see Figs. 54-58, pp. 162-163) and Hunting Songs (see Figs. 50-52, pp. 160-161) in the central space of the Crypt, and investigated various ways of showing these videos in correlation with the videos I produced outside of the space of the Crypt, Bait Cam (see Figs. 64-67, pp. 168-170) and Luffare Narratives (see Figs. 60-63, pp. 166-167), sound, still images and objects.

Prior to gaining access to the Crypt at St Mark’s Church Kennington, I had spent a long time looking for a suitable space in which to show work towards the final stages of my PhD studies. I was searching for a large space that could accommodate video projections, yet one structured so as not entirely to separate the various elements of the exhibition from any another. I wanted the space to allow for various sensuous overlappings, connections and disturbances. It had to be a space that could facilitate relationships between objects, spaces, visuals, sounds and smells.

Some of the elements of Disruptive Desires were created prior to gaining access to the Crypt, while other elements were developed in the space itself. Only when I had spent some time experimenting in the space of the Crypt could I determine how Disruptive Desires was going to come together. As indicated, the following pages contain photographs documenting the various forms of experimentation I carried out in the Crypt from October to December 2012.
Fig. 97 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph a projection of *Luffare Narratives* onto a bed sheet in a room in the western catacomb.

Fig. 98 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph a screening of *Luffare Narratives* on a TV in a room in the western catacomb.

Fig. 99 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph a projection of *Luffare Narratives* onto the curved ceiling of a room in the western catacomb.

Fig. 100 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph a projection of *Luffare Narratives* onto the back wall of a room in the western catacomb.
Fig. 101 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph a projection of *Luffare Narratives* onto a side wall in a room in the western catacomb.

Fig. 102 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph a projection of *Luffare Narratives* onto a bed sheet in a doorway to a room in the western catacomb.

Fig. 103 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of a projection of *Luffare Narratives* onto the back wall of a room in the western catacomb.

Fig. 104 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of mounted antlers in the central space of the Crypt.

Fig. 105 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of experimentation with double ended screws in the mounting of antlers in the central space of the Crypt.

Fig. 106 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of a projection of *Bait Cam* onto a sheet in the eastern catacomb.
Fig. 107 Experiments in the Crypt, digital photograph, 2012
Photograph of experiments with overlapping projections in the central space of the Crypt

Fig. 108 Experiments in the Crypt, digital photograph, 2012
Photograph of testing projections of a still image in relation to a table and chairs in the central space of the Crypt
Fig. 109 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012
Photograph of a projection of *Bait Cam* down the western catacomb

Fig. 110 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012
Photograph of a projection of *Bait Cam* along the eastern catacomb
Fig. 111 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012
Photograph a projection of *Luffare Narratives* onto the back wall of the central space of the Crypt

Fig. 112 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012
Photograph of projecting Bait Cam onto a purpose built back-lit screen in the eastern catacomb
Fig. 113 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of my computer screen in rendering videos as I was experimenting with alternating video sound in the Crypt.

Fig. 114 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of a screening of *Up Around the Bend* on a TV monitor.
Fig. 115 Experiments in the Crypt, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of experiments with the wild boar skin in juxtaposition with the screening of *Up Around the Bend* on a TV monitor.

Fig. 116 Experiments in the Crypt, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of testing different still images in juxtaposition with moving images in the central space of the Crypt.
Fig. 117 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of projecting *Bait Cam* through the gate situated in the eastern catacomb.

Fig. 118 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of projecting *Bait Cam* through the gate situated in the eastern catacomb.
Fig. 119 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012. Photograph of experiments in the use of double ended screws in attaching antlers to the walls of the central space of the Crypt.

Fig. 120 *Experiments in the Crypt*, digital photograph, 2012
Photograph of a projection of *Up Around the Bend* onto the back wall of the central space of the Crypt.
Part 2:
Hunting Lodges
Previous pages (pp. 198-199)

Fig. 121  *Hunting Lodge*, colour slide, 2009

From my photographic series *Hunting Lodges*
depicting rural hunting lodges and abattoirs in the west of Sweden

This photograph is repeated in this Juncture
(see Fig. 125, p. 204)
Part 2: Hunting Lodges, photographic series
2009 - ongoing

I commenced my photographic Hunting Lodges series in 2009, alongside another ongoing project, Hunting Towers (see pp. 220-259). As the title of the series suggests, the elements of Hunting Lodges depict various hunting lodges. The series includes photographs of different yet related facilities, spaces, surroundings and an abattoir. Many of the hunting lodges show signs of interaction, collaboration, unity: meeting rooms that smell of coffee, regional maps on tables, handwritten notes on the walls, photographs, hunting-related décor and bottles of schnapps on the tops of cupboards.

The photographs in this series of work were all taken on medium format colour slide film, and the hunting lodges I have photographed are all located in the county of Västra Götaland in the west of Sweden, where I grew up. Some hunting lodges are former cottages or sheds, others are purpose-built huts in which hunters can gather for meetings or for shelter during the hunting seasons. Some of these structures are private and owned by members of a hunting team, while others are communal, unlocked and for public use (although also used by the local hunting team).

The hunting lodge closest to where I grew up now has an abattoir in an adjacent building. Despite this, many hunters choose to bring the shot game home to skin and butcher. When I was growing up, my friend’s parents used to clean and carve wild game in their kitchen during the hunting season, and to prepare the meat and intestines for freezing. Stories of how the particular animal was tracked and eventually shot were told as hunting dogs barked madly around us in the kitchen; different cuts of meat were placed in different stainless steel bowls; the hunters drank and thanked the animal for its sacrifice and for providing the family with meat. As my own family is vegetarian, the handling of meat was otherwise unknown to me, and the practices I was witnessing were unfamiliar yet formed acutely recognisable elements of the rural culture of which I was a part.

The practice of photographing these hunting lodges – where local hunting teams meet to plan ahead for the hunting season, to socialise, to celebrate and to warm up on cold days – became part of my meetings and discussions with local hunters. I see the photographs in my Hunting Lodges series as individual artworks that can be shown separately or as a series; however, I have primarily used the photographs in this series as parts of different installations.

55 Most recently, my Hunting Lodge photograph (see Fig. 125, p. 204) was shown at the Studio One Gallery in a group exhibition entitled Orchestrated in 2012.
56 Examples of such installations include my 2009 installation Aftermath (pp. 260-273) and my 2012 exhibition Disruptive Desires (pp. 150-196).
Fig. 122 Map of Västra Götaland county, map of photographed hunting lodges, 2013

Image of a Google Earth map over parts of Västra Götaland county, Sweden, where I have visited and photographed hunting lodges. The small town Nossebro is near where I grew up in Sweden, and I have marked Nossebro in red as this tends to be the central point around which I hunt for hunting lodges. I have marked local hunting lodges in yellow.

Fig. 123 Bärebergsvägen, Google Earth photograph, 2013

Google Earth image of one of the key roads I have been travelling along to find hunting lodges.
Fig. 124 *Hunting Lodge*, colour slide, 2009, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print; projected to various sizes
Fig. 125 *Hunting Lodge*, colour slide, 2009, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print; projected to various sizes
Fig. 126 *Hunting Lodge*, colour slide, 2009, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print; projected to various sizes
Fig. 127 *Hunting Lodge*, colour slide, 2009, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 128 Hunting Lodge (list), colour slide, 2009, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 129 *Hunting Lodge (moose hide)*, colour slide, 2009, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 130 Hunting Lodge (moose hide), colour slide, 2009, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 131 Hunting Lodge (abattoir), colour slide, 2010, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 132 Hunting Lodge (abattoir), colour slide, 2010, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 133 *Hunting Lodge (abattoir)*, colour slide, 2010, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 134 *Hunting Lodge (map)*, colour slide, 2010, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 135 Hunting Lodge, colour slide, 2011, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 136 *Hunting Lodge*, colour slide, 2011, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 137 Hunting Lodge, colour slide, 2011, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 138 Hunting Lodge, colour slide, 2011, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 139 *Hunting Lodge*, colour slide, 2011, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 140 *Hunting Lodge (bait)*, colour slide, 2011, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Part 3: Hunting Towers
Previous pages (pp. 220-221)

Fig. 141  *Hunting tower*, colour slide, 2007
        45 cm x 45 cm D-type print

    From my photographic series *Hunting Towers*

    This photograph is repeated in this Juncture (see Fig. 146, p. 228)
Part 3: Hunting Towers, photographic series
2007- ongoing

My ongoing photographic series Hunting Towers, photographed on medium format slide film, was commenced in 2007 and has become a central element in my research. The series focuses on physical structures referred to as hunting towers, raised and utilised by hunters and hunting teams active in the area in which the towers are positioned. Hunting towers provide advantages in visibility for the user and, depending on the structure of the tower, may also provide shelter, a seat and a surface on which to lean and steady one’s rifle. The purpose-built structures are constructed out of various materials available to the hunters who build them, such as wood, metal and sheets of corrugated plastic; they may be covered in camouflage nets or painted in a camouflage pattern. The structural forms of the hunting towers vary. They usually incorporate an elevated platform on which to stand or sit, with covered sides providing shelter, and a ladder leading up to it. Hunting towers are placed in strategic positions (as agreed upon by the hunting team) where wild game is most likely to be seen. The locations of the towers are often at the edges of forests where the woods meet open fields, on hills and raised ground, or near trails and paths made by wild animals. Most of the towers are, however, portable; hunters may move them into more seasonally relevant positions at different times of the year. Despite the dramatically different and at times adverse weather conditions, hunting towers are often left in situ throughout the year. The Right to Roam law in Sweden allows anyone to enter others’ forests, pick berries and mushrooms there, swim in their lakes, hunt and fish (with a licence), and camp, all on their land. Therefore, although hunting towers are built and owned by hunting teams or individual hunters, others may enter, sit in and use these towers at will.

The hunting towers I photographed are all located in the Swedish county of Västra Götaland, where I grew up. The towers featured throughout my childhood, yet these important places of play and imagination are entirely absent from family photographs from my childhood. This is key to my motivation for my entire research project. To my friends and me, the hunting towers in our local area became spaceships to take us travelling, castle turrets, fortresses and trees to occupy, and monsters to fight. At some point, we remembered their original purpose. Then, hunting towers became symbols of death and killing. My photographs depict a range of different hunting towers, and have been shown in a range of different contexts and formats.

If brought together in a grid formation, the focal point of the series may be visually reminiscent of some of the collaborative works of the German photographers Hilla and Bernd Becher (Lange 2007). However, the conceptual basis for my work differs substantially from the Bechers’ ‘typologies’ (ibid. 1) of industrial buildings, as do our respective methodologies in practice.
I see the photographs that make up *Hunting Towers* as individual images, as well as images forming a series of work; my aim is not to create formal typologies of variations of a structure and generate a data bank or encyclopaedia of hunting towers. My interests from which *Hunting Towers* emerged are more closely related to the practices of hunters and hunting teams in rural Sweden, their makeshift methods of construction, and the presence of these hunting towers (constructed by a minor group in Sweden) in the landscape of everyday life. In other words, the presence, physicality and visuality of these hunting towers may be understood as symptoms, signs, and manifestations of the fringe practices of this minor group of hunters within dominant Swedish culture.

57 Photographs from my *Hunting Towers* series have been shown in different group exhibitions, from *Mirror for the 21st Century* at BECA in New Orleans through *The Art of Research: Research Narratives* symposium show at Chelsea College of Art to *WAVE: Borders & Edges* at Wimbledon College of Art. Some of the photographs from *Hunting Towers* were in 2009 also part of an installation entitled *Journeys Back*. 
Fig. 142 Hunting Towers, digital photograph, 2010
Two prints of Hunting Towers on the walls of my studio at Wimbledon College of Art

Fig. 143 Hunting Towers, digital image, 2014. Visual proposition for an exhibition of Hunting Towers
The area of Sweden in which I have been photographing hunting towers since 2007

Fig. 144 Västra Götaland county, Google Earth map, 2013
Fig. 145 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2007, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 146 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2007, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print; 40 cm x 40 cm D-type print
Fig. 147 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2007, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 148 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2007, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 149 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2007, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 150 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2007, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 151 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2007, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 152 Hunting Tower, colour slide, 2007, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 153 Hunting Tower, colour slide, 2007, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 154 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2008, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 155 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2008, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 156 Hunting Tower, colour slide, 2008, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 157 Hunting Tower, colour slide, 2008, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 158 Hunting Tower, colour slide, 2008, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 159 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2008, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 160 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2008, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 161 Hunting Tower, colour slide, 2008, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 162 Hunting Tower, colour slide, 2009, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 164 Hunting Tower, colour slide, 2009, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 165 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2009, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 166 Hunting Tower, colour slide, 2010, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 167 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2010, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 168 Hunting Tower, colour slide, 2010, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 169 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2010, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 170 Hunting Tower, colour slide, 2010, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 171 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2011, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 172 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2011, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 173 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2011, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 174 Hunting Tower, colour slide, 2011, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 175 Hunting Tower, colour slide, 2011, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 176 Hunting Tower, colour slide, 2011, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Fig. 177 *Hunting Tower*, colour slide, 2011, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print
Part 4: Aftermath
Fig. 178 Aftermath, digital photograph, 2009

Installation view of the projection of a photograph from inside a hunting lodge over a set of antlers mounted to the wall.
Part 4: *Aftermath*, installation
Wimbledon College of Art, 2009

In my installation *Aftermath*
(2009), I brought together two still slide projections of photographs from inside hunting lodges, a set of antlers, a wild boar skin, a photograph of a map created by the Bäreberg Hunting team – the hunting team local to where I grew up in Sweden - indicating where game had been shot, and a looped video, shown on a laptop on the floor, of found hunting-related videos from YouTube. *Aftermath* was my attempt at bringing together into one installation various working methods in my practice-based exploration of ideas of memory. I became interested in the use of the term *aftermath* as a possible way of referring to memory or the mnemonic experience – and the idea of both memory and the installation as an aftermath of an event began to emerge. I used disparate, gathered materials, projections of my photographs taken in Sweden, three-dimensional objects, and footage found via social media. I used and developed these working methods further in my exhibition *Disruptive Desires* in 2012, where I brought together projections, found video footage, popular media artefacts and three-dimensional objects in the forms of antlers and a wild boar skin.

In *Aftermath*, I began to experiment with the overlapping effect of projected images and objects. I mounted a set of large deer antlers on one of the walls of the room in which *Aftermath* took place, then proceeded to project, over these, a photograph I had taken in a hunting lodge in Sweden, depicting a set of deer antlers. The projection of the deer antlers over the physically present, three-dimensional deer antlers was intended to create a strange, doubling effect, as the image enveloped the object and the object protruded seemingly from within the projected image. On the opposite wall, I hung a wild boar skin. Similarly, on the wall directly across the room I projected a photograph from a Swedish hunting lodge. This photograph depicted a wild boar skin hanging on a wood-panelled wall. The boar skin in the projected image enveloped the actual boar skin on the wall of *Aftermath*. This again created a doubling effect: the boar skin was shown absorbed in the image while it simultaneously appeared to be bulging out from the image. I also wanted to involve other sensory elements, and experimented with temperature. I heated the room to an uncomfortably hot temperature, which to me seemed to resonate with the sensation of the extreme temperature differences in Sweden between the indoor environment and the outdoor climate. As a consequence of heating the room, the wild boar skin began to release a musty odour. A looped video played on a laptop on the floor of the room. This video was constructed out of three found videos on the online social media site YouTube. The first was a seemingly silent bait hunting video of a wild boar eating. The sudden, booming sound of the hunter’s rifle broke the silence, as he shot the eating boar. This video was followed by a longer one: various pieces of footage compiled by a Swedish hunter. The original maker of the video had chosen to set it to Bruce Springsteen’s song *The River*.

*Aftermath* was part of my Confirmation/MPhil to PhD upgrade submission at Wimbledon College of Art in 2009.
The last element of the looped video was a short film made by two Swedish children playing at being moose hunters. The video comprises two boys with toy rifles, talking about and pretending to be hunting, and appears to have been filmed in a garden. The videos I chose to use in Aftermath reflected my growing interest in the non-hierarchal, unstructured and unconventional records and archives created online by hunters and hunting communities. I saw their expressions via audio-visual media as attempts at generating their own accounts of their culture, where no or few forms of representations of their practices exist in dominant Swedish culture. The focal points are hence those of the hunters, not of a non-practising curator, and they become noticeable in the footage: being in the forest before the sun rises, wide stretching landscapes, female and male hunters drinking coffee, excited dogs – alongside Bruce Springsteen, a connecting line between rural Sweden and the countryside of America.
Fig. 179 Aftermath, scanned journal page, 2009
Scanned page from my journal detailing the floor plan of the installation
Fig. 180 Aftermath, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view on entering Aftermath
Fig. 181 Aftermath, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view.
Fig. 182 Aftermath, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view
Fig. 183 *Aftermath*, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view (close-up).
Fig. 184 *Aftermath*, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view.
Fig. 185 Aftermath, video still, 2009
Video still from a found YouTube video that were part of the installation

Fig. 186 Aftermath, video still, 2009
Video still from a found YouTube video that were part of the installation
Fig. 187 *Aftermath*, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view of a map created from photographs of Bäreberg hunting team’s map, detailing where wild game had been shot.

Fig. 188 *Aftermath*, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view (close-up) of a pin inserted into the map in Fig. 188.
Screen capture of a YouTube page where a hunting video has been uploaded by a Swedish hunter. The title, *20taggare*, means *20 pointer* referring to the number of points on the moose bull’s antlers. Other have commented on the video, asking for details of how the moose was shot, and commenting on the hunter’s ability to shoot and the performance of the hunting dog (Wox20 2011)
Part 5:
Luffare Narratives
Previous pages (pp. 274-275)

Fig. 190 *Luffare Narratives*, digital photograph, 2009

Photograph of the landscape and road where I filmed *Luffare Narratives*
My installation *Luffare Narratives* was part of a large, college-wide exhibition at Wimbledon College of Art in 2009. *Luffare Narratives* was installed in a square space and consisted of three simultaneous video projections and one accompanying sound track. Upon entering the exhibition space the viewer faced a single projection across the entirety of the wall straight ahead, and an overlapping video on the wall to its left of what I refer to as the *conversation element* of *Luffare Narratives*. The conversation video element, later part of my 2012 solo exhibition *Disruptive Desires* in the Crypt of St Mark’s Church Kennington (see Figs. 60-63, p. 166-167), entailed a 28-minute long dialogue between a childhood friend, Tom, and me. This dialogue took place in Swedish and the video is accompanied by English subtitles across the top of the projection. The other two videos were silent. One of these two projections overlapped the conversation element of the installation. One of the silent videos depicts Tom and me walking towards the camera along a country road with knapsacks across our shoulders; the other silent video depicts us walking away from the camera along the same road. These two silent videos were looped to play continuously and simultaneously to the conversation element of *Luffare Narratives*.

*Luffare* is a Swedish word meaning rambler, wanderer or vagrant. Although Tom is not my brother by blood, we grew up together as if siblings, and played various games which entailed playacting or the becoming of something or someone else: wolves, mice, trolls, orphans, elves, and *luffare*. As *luffare* characters, we wandered along Swedish country roads with knapsacks full of apples, raw potatoes, nuts and raisins. We stole apples from gardens and were chased away by angry farmers; we slept in barns and caught freight trains across the country, all in the matter of a few hours or however long we played the game. Neither of us knows how often we played this game, how long we played *luffare*, or how far from my father’s house we actually ventured. The conversation between Tom and me that forms the core of *Luffare Narratives* took place and was filmed on a field near where we grew up in Sweden, and near where we played *luffare*. The conversation was an impromptu discussion about the *luffare* game. I knew what I wanted to talk to Tom about while filming. However, I wanted Tom’s responses to be as direct and immediate as possible, and I had not told him beforehand that a conversation was going to be part of the video. *Luffare Narratives* was filmed in the spring of 2009 in the Swedish countryside, and aside from the recorded conversation between Tom and me, the sound track also includes almost continuous birdsong, sound distortions from the wind, and the sounds of cars driving by.

59 For a further elaboration on *Luffare Narratives*, see pp. 107-109 of the thesis
In *Luffare Narratives*, we talk about the memories we have of the game itself while eating raw potatoes, nuts and raisins: the act of becoming someone else, the immersion into the game that we both experienced, real life outside of the game, the difficulties in discerning what elements of the game were real and what was imagination, how we perceived ourselves as *luffare*, and how this game crossed over to other games. We also discussed the lack of documentation of this and other games we played; how, despite its absence from our family albums, the *luffare* game was an important element in our formative years, and how we perceive ourselves today in relation to this particular game.
Fig. 191 *Luffare Narratives*, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view.

Fig. 192 *Luffare Narratives*, video still, 2009
Fig. 193 Luffare Narratives, scanned journal page, 2009. Scanned page from my journal, showing two digital photographs of the three projections that were part of the installation.
Fig. 194 Luffare Narratives, screen captures, 2009.
Screen captures of Luffare Narratives with subtitles
Part 6:  
**Déjà Perdu**
Previous pages (pp. 282-283)

Fig. 195  *Déjà Perdu*, digital photograph, 2009

  Installation view (close-up)
Part 6: Déjà Perdu, installation
The Centre for Drawing, Wimbledon College of Art, 2009

My installation Déjà Perdu took place at the Centre for Drawing at Wimbledon College of Art in 2009. As part of the exhibition programme at the Centre for Drawing, I was also asked to give an artist’s talk about the exhibition, my PhD research and my recent papers at conferences and symposia in May 2009. I made a number of memory-related references through my use of the title of the installation, Déjà Perdu, meaning ‘already lost’. Firstly, I wished to use the term Déjà Perdu as a link to the eerie, semi-mnemonic sensation of experiencing a situation one feels is already experienced and remembered; a déjà vu, meaning already seen. The title Déjà Perdu also makes references to Marcel Proust’s book À la recherche du temps perdu (In Search of Lost Time). I wanted to create this link to In Search of Lost Time as I had begun to interrogate its repeated, and in my mind cliché-ed, use by writers, artists and other researchers performing various kinds of work on and into memory. Furthermore, it is the frequent use of the well-known passage in In Search of Lost Time – the one where the protagonist dips a petite madeleine into a cup of lime tea and experiences a surge of memory – that led to the inclusion of my phrase ‘choking on the madeleine’ in the title of my thesis, as well as in a number of conference papers.

Déjà Perdu was on the one hand an exhibition in its own right. However, I also saw Déjà Perdu as an opportunity to test how ideas of memory can be used in installation art. Thus, on the other hand, it is (much as are my other, subsequent installations) also a piece of research: a testing-out, an actualisation of virtual ideas, a working out of methods and concepts through practice. Déjà Perdu was installed in a dimly lit, roughly square room with domestic features – carpet, a mantelpiece, built-in bookshelves and a bay window. My exhibition Déjà Perdu consisted of a single projection of a found, square format slide depicting a hunter with shot game (see Fig. 203, p. 291), a box of Swedish soil (see Fig. 202, p. 290), a set of small frames with found text (see Fig. 200, p. 289), one frame packed with Swedish soil, a small stuffed bird on the ledge of the mantelpiece (see Fig. 201, p. 289), and ten small wooden light boxes fitted with early twentieth-century glass negatives of men and women in uniform (see Figs. 204-205, pp. 292-293).

The found slide originated from a lot of slides I purchased from an American slide collector, and the projection of this image was positioned close to the ground, directly above a box of Swedish soil. I placed the slide projector as close as possible to the wall onto which it was projecting, creating a glowing bright image at which one had to squint in order to see. The small frames on the mantelpiece contained lines or short passages about memory taken from twentieth-century sources of fictional writing (see Fig. 200, p. 289), as alternatives to the passage on the madeleine. I placed the little bird on the edge of the mantelpiece, as if it were about to take off, and I saw it as being on the verge of something, at a turning point where something may happen.
The glass negatives in the light boxes were placed in two glowing rows on the floor, directly across the room from the found slide of the American huntsman. To some extent, the light boxes resembled coffins, much as Boltanski uses images, metal tins and lights. I bought a crate of glass negatives from a market in Paris, and decided to use the portraits of uniformed subjects in an attempt at drawing links between the idea of the soldier and that of the hunter. However, the inclusion of the glass negatives in this way seemed to be doing the opposite of what I was aiming for, and as if I were myself falling into the very trap I was critiquing. Instead of putting forward new ways of making installation art about memory, I felt that by using old, found portraits in this manner, I had reverted back to a very traditional and recognised method of approaching the subject of memory. My realisation of my contradictory use of these glass negatives helped me critique and develop my practice such that my work would explore new ways of expressing the experience of memory in a more considered manner.
Fig. 196 Déjà Perdu, exhibition invite, 2009

Fig. 197 Déjà Perdu, scanned journal page, 2009. Floor plan of the installation.
Fig. 198 Déjà Perdu, digital composite photograph, 2009
Digital composite photograph of the installation

Fig. 199 Déjà Perdu, digital photograph, 2009
Photograph of elements of the installation, including a box of Swedish soil, a projection of a found slide of a hunter, a set of small frames with text, a frame with Swedish soil and a small stuffed bird
Fig. 200 Déjà Perdu, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view (close-up).

Fig. 201 Déjà Perdu, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view (close-up).
Fig. 202 Déjà Perdu, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view (close-up).
The slide was projected onto a wall in the installation.
Fig. 204 Déjà Perdu, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view (close-up).
Fig. 205 Déjà Perdu, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view.
Part 7:

she felt empty in my hand
Fig. 206 *she felt empty in my hand*, digital photograph, 2009

Installation view (close-up).
I began to explore the idea of the undocumented moment more fully in my 2009 installation *she felt empty in my hand* at Wimbledon College of Art. I wanted to make work about the experience of a memory of a moment without a representation. As I see the act of the familial photographic documentation as a value-endowing act – a practice of distinguishing, highlighting and demonstrating what moments are deemed personally and culturally important – I wanted to use my practice to reflect on personal, important moments that were never photographed or documented in my childhood. The absence of this form of documentation is not due to parental neglect; rather, I see my desire to focus on the undocumented as a symptom of my fundamental disagreement with the associations of importance and worth given to the act of photographic documentation. In my considerations of this subject matter, I found some seemingly unbridgeable contradictions. Some of the contradictions include those between the subjective sense of the significance of particular moments for the individual, as well as the cultural documentary standards of what has been deemed general important moments. I see an imbalance in placing emphasis on moments acknowledged as culturally significant – birthdays, graduations, holidays, and gatherings – by a habitual practice of photographing these, while the subjective understandings of the significance of other moments lack representation altogether. This imbalance forms a key focal point in my research.

*she felt empty in my hand* concentrates on one such moment, a moment I deem important in that it lacks any form of representation: the apersonal realisation that life will come to an end. Although the moment of this understanding is subjective, the realisation itself is a significant one shared among most individuals. Rather cliché-ed, I understood what death meant as I held my dead pet bird in my hands as a child. One of my birds had killed the other, and I found the small green bird on the bottom of the cage one morning. It was the sudden lightness of the bird that struck me; the little body felt hollow, empty, and I imagined this was due to its soul having left the body. Contradictorily, she seemed both – and neither – present and absent.

The installation *she felt empty in my hand* made use of contrasting senses. It consisted of a life-sized wooden hunting tower-like structure, a square patch of living grass grown in the exhibition space on soil brought over from Sweden, a small stuffed bird and a bare light bulb hanging above the grass. A recording of the sound of breathing emanated from the enclosed space at the top of the tower structure. While birds could be heard outside, I emphasised the interiority of the exhibition space by covering the windows with paper. A strange feeling of experiencing the outdoors indoors was consequently created. The sound of breathing as a sound of life emitted from the top of the tower, and the living grass on the floor space of the installation were contrasted by the stillness of the small, dead bird lying on the grass under the continuous yellow glow from the bare light bulb.
Fig. 207 *she felt empty in my hand*, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view.
Fig. 208 *she felt empty in my hand*, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view (close-up).
Fig. 209 *she felt empty in my hand*, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view (close-up).
Fig. 210 *she felt empty in my hand*, digital photograph, 2009. Installation view (close-up).
Part 8: Journeys Back
Previous pages (pp. 302-303)

Fig. 211 Journeys Back, digital photograph, 2008
   Installation view.

   This photograph is repeated in this Juncture
   (see Fig. 217, p. 311)
My installation *Journeys Back* was part of a group exhibition called *Going Up West* in Greenwich in 2008. *Journeys Back* consisted of four individual vitrine style, Plexiglas-fronted cabinets. The cabinets were mounted next to one another in a row on a bare concrete wall in a darkened space. Each vitrine contained a different colour photograph of a hunting tower, borrowed from my photographic series *Hunting Towers* (pp. 220-273), a series of work which I had commenced the previous year. Each cabinet was fitted with a bare light bulb. On the bottom of each vitrine and under the photographs of the hunting towers, was a small mound of Swedish soil that I had brought over from Sweden. I placed grass seeds in the soil and watered the soil before sealing the vitrines. The lights were on a timer, providing 12 hours of light and heat, followed by 12 hours of darkness. Over the course of the three-week exhibition, the grass seeds sprouted and grew inside the vitrines on the wall.

I see *Journeys Back* as my first installation-based form of experimentation undertaken during my PhD studies. I see it as an instrumental element in the development of my working methods and in the ways I bring disparate materials together. I had started working on my *Hunting Towers* series, and although I appreciated the photographs as works in their own right, I was keen to use these images as part of an installation. I was also eager to use the Swedish soil I had brought over to the UK from Sweden, which was sitting in bags under my bed at the time (that is, I was literally sleeping on Swedish soil in London). My experiments with the growing of grass in *Journeys Back* later developed and became a significant element in my following installation *she felt empty in my hand*, which took place in 2009. *Journeys Back* also saw my first practice-based investigations into methods of overlapping, layering and the creations of conflicting contrasts, which were to return in both my 2009 installation *Aftermath* and my 2012 exhibition *Disruptive Desires*. Such methods can be distinguished in the creation of contained three-dimensional landscapes inside the vitrines in the form of miniature hills, placed in relation to the flat two-dimensional photographs pinned to the back of each cabinet. A strange sense of depth occurred, as if the two elements of the mound and the hunting tower, the image, were to scale or at an actual distance from one another. This banality was gradually yet increasingly emphasised throughout the course of the exhibition, as the grass grew and the strands of grass grew out of proportion to the image in the background. The sense of perspective and perception of scale consequently became more and more distorted: the landscape seemingly near, yet distant. My interests in these types of relationships and forms of layering where one element is both part of and separate from another one, part actual, part imaginary, both/neither present and/nor absent, emerged through the working-out of *Journeys Back*. 
Fig. 212 Journeys Back, digital photograph, 2008. Installation view.
Fig. 213 Journeys Back, digital photograph, 2008. Installation view.
Fig. 214 *Journeys Back*, digital photograph, 2008. Installation view.
Fig. 215 Journeys Back, digital photograph, 2008. Installation view.
Fig. 216 Journeys Back, digital photograph, 2008. Installation view.
Fig. 217 Journeys Back, digital photograph, 2008. Installation view.
Part 9: Burning
Previous pages (pp. 312-313)

Fig. 218 *Burning*, video still, 2007
Part 9: *Burning*, video
78 minutes, 2007

In the early summer of 2007, I made a 1-hour 18-minute video, which I entitled *Burning*. *Burning* depicts the actual burning of a wooden structure, from ignition through to full blaze, down to the last flickers of light. The video was filmed on location, near my father’s house in Västra Götaland county in Sweden. I approached the making of *Burning* as an initial, practice-based investigation into some of the ideas and methods my PhD project focuses on and utilises. These ideas include my fascination with the subjective appreciation of moments of personal value, the important yet undocumented moments. Around the age of ten, my friends and I destroyed a hunting tower belonging to my father’s neighbour. The memory of this event is closely related to moments of my understanding of what hunting towers are used for, of the tower as a symbol of power and authority, and of how hunting teams function in the organised killing of wild animals. Destroying the neighbour’s tower was a rebellious act against a traditional rural culture with which we as children did not agree.

Through reading Deleuze and contemporary writers on Deleuze, I became interested in the idea of the *event*, and I wanted to think through this concept *via* the event of *Burning*. I was also interested in notions of creative destructions and how, by destroying one entity, another is created. The destruction of the wooden structure with fire created ash. I was initially interested in using the ash I swept up after filming the burning of the wooden tower. However, I soon realised that the process of using one material generated through the destruction of another appeared to be leading me in a dramatically different direction from where I was aiming. I never used the collected ash.

By June 2007, I started to look in Västra Götaland county for hunting towers to photograph for what was to become my *Hunting Towers* series. *Burning* became an important work in the processes of thinking about my relationships to the landscape, to the hunting towers themselves and to the people who use them on a regular basis. For *Burning*, I wanted first to build and then to burn down a hunting tower-like structure on my father’s neighbour’s land. As it turned out, it was not until I approached the neighbour about the filming of *Burning* that he finally found out what had happened to his hunting tower about 20 years previously... I built the wooden structure in my father’s yard, took it over to the neighbour’s, set it up in a field, and waited for nightfall. Using a high-definition video camera on a tripod, I focused on the tower and the landscape within which I had placed it. My father helped me to start the fire. The top of the wooden structure was filled with smaller sticks, as kindling, and the tower caught fire quickly. The fire burned fiercely in the summer night, then slowed down as the tower was reduced to a mass of glowing embers. I filmed the entirety of the event of the burning of the wooden structure, alongside my family and my father’s neighbour.
Fig. 219 *Burning*, scanned journal page, 2007

Scanned page from my journal including digital photographs and a mind-map of ideas.
Fig. 220 *Burning*, digital photograph, 2007
Photograph taken while building the wooden structure which I set fire to and filmed as it burned to the ground
Fig. 221 *Burning*, digital photograph, 2007
Photograph of transporting the wooden structure to the filming location
Fig. 222 *Burning*, digital photograph, 2007
Photograph of the wooden structure at the filming location
Fig. 223 *Burning*, video still, 2007
Fig. 224 *Burning*, digital photograph, 2007
Photograph taken while filming. Photograph by Mari Jensen.
Fig. 225 *Burning*, digital photograph, 2007. Photograph taken while filming. Photograph by Mari Jensen.
Fig. 226 Burning, digital photograph, 2007.
Photograph of the burned coal on the ground the day after filming
Part 10: Majorna
Previous pages (pp. 324-325)

Fig. 227 Majorna (gate), colour slide, 2006
25 cm x 25 cm D-type print

Photograph from the series Majorna

This photograph is repeated in this Juncture
(see Fig. 236, p. 337)
My series of photographs entitled *Majorna* was photographed on medium-format colour film on location in the city of Göteborg, Sweden. This was the first piece of practice-based research I engaged in for my PhD studies. Majorna is a neighbourhood in the harbour city of Göteborg on Sweden’s west coast, where I lived with my mother during my formative years. This part of Göteborg used to be inhabited by harbour workers and shipbuilders from the 16th century onwards, and the name may refer to an old term meaning *the Cabins or the Huts* (Hallén et al. 2007).

The blocks of flats where I grew up were built in the 1920s. Each block of flats was designed so as to incorporate an enclosed green courtyard in its centre where one could hang washing out to dry, clean rugs, socialise and have parties, and where children could play safely. Majorna has in recent years become a popular middle-class area of Göteborg; then, it was a predominantly working-class neighbourhood up until the late 1990s, and many of my classmates’ parents worked in the local factory manufacturing electric goods. I spent my childhood in Majorna, and this is the geographic area in which I (*via* the interaction with others) learned about important elements such as independence and the social hierarchies that children form, about friendship and betrayal, love and heartache, about violence and death. Majorna was an important component in my developmental years, yet there are very few photographs taken during my childhood that feature the area. This can be seen as an example of the form of gaps between photographs and subjective memories in which I am interested. I therefore treated *Majorna* as a form of thought experiment: if I am unable to mnemically in recent years connect with the photographs in my family album, what would happen if I travelled back to this neighbourhood (for the first time since my teenage years) and photographed it?

I did exactly that: I went to Majorna in the autumn of 2006, soon after enrolling as a research degree student, wishing to think-through my ideas of the undocumented and relationships to subjective, important memories *via* my art practice. I walked through the neighbourhood, down familiar streets, through courtyards of blocks of flats I used to live in, and around schoolyards of schools I attended as a child. Many parts of Majorna had changed since the 1980s and early 1990s, so my walk through Majorna became an event in itself: an event through which memories emerged.
I took photographs as I made my way through the area. However, I became more interested in the subjective mnemonic affects Majorna had on me. Among other elements, these affects were triggered by the spatial dimensions surrounding me: (the width of the streets; distances between buildings; open spaces; steep stairs leading up to a school), the various smells (elm tree leaves rotting on the ground; muddy fields; the musty odours of the courtyards), the visual impressions (street lights suspended between blocks of flats; the colours of buildings; trams moving past), the textures (tiled roofs; peeling paint on front gates; knobbly, uneven tarmacked pavements) and the sounds (the cawing of seagulls; the screeching noise of trams coming around corners; the dull sound of a large wooden gate closing behind me). I returned to London with a series of photographs void of human subjects, depicting various spaces around the area of Majorna.

As with my family photographs, the photographs in my Majorna series cause a sense of recognition in me. I do not, though, see these images as containers of memory. Each photograph in Majorna is an image in its own right, with personal and emotional relations. These photographs are not physical memories. The mnemonic affect took place in the event of the journey and in the walk itself. I came to realise that the notion of a representation that encapsulated my subjective memories was futile, as was the attempt physically to return to a space that has become virtual. This was the (non-)experience of the memory event.
Fig. 228 Majorna, colour slide, 2006, 25 cm x 25 cm D-type print
Fig. 229 Majorna, colour slide, 2006, 25 cm x 25 cm D-type print
Fig. 230 Majorna, colour slide, 2006, 25 cm x 25 cm D-type print
Fig. 231 *Majorna (first kiss)*, colour slide, 2006, 25 cm x 25 cm D-type print
Fig. 232 Majorna (60 metre track), colour slide, 2006, 25 cm x 25 cm D-type print
Fig. 233 Majorna (the steepest hill), colour slide, 2006, 25 cm x 25 cm D-type print
Fig. 234 Majorna (gym), colour slide, 2006, 25 cm x 25 cm D-type print
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Fig. 237 *Majorna*, colour slide, 2006, 25 cm x 25 cm D-type print
Fig. 238 Majorna, colour slide, 2006, 25 cm x 25 cm D-type print
Fig. 239 Majorna, colour slide, 2006, 25 cm x 25 cm D-type print
Fig. 240 Majorna, colour slide, 2006, 25 cm x 25 cm D-type print
Appendix I:
Additional Materials

DVD of videos included the installation *Disruptive Desires*:

- *Bait Cam*
- *Up Around the Bend*
- *Hunting Songs*
- *Luffare Narratives*
Appendix II:
Glossary

These brief definitions of terms are in addition to explanations of concepts in the Junctures of this thesis

Affect

This term refers to the process of changes in a body’s ability to act, as a result of events or situations experienced (Colman 2005 11). It is different from feelings and emotions, and Deleuze defines affect as a form of intensity (1997 181). Affect may also be understood as a response to an encounter, causing a significant moment of change from one register to another (Al-Saji 2000 56). Gregg and Seigworth note that affects are in fact similar to the ‘force or forces of encounter’ (2010 1). Affects are ‘moments of intensity’, O’Sullivan emphasises, which cannot be ‘read’; they can only be experienced (O’Sullivan 2001 126).

Assemblage

This concept expresses the forms of networks that are created in the ‘convergence’ (Toscano 2005 40) of materials such as forces, entities, bodies, situations, and events (Bonta and Protevi 2004 55). Examples of assemblages include the philosophical concept of the rhizome and other spaces in which ‘aggregates’ may form (O’Sullivan 2007 27). Bonta and Protevi explain how assemblages may be understood in nature; in the ways different species form relations and enter into mutual states of becoming (2005 15). Examples include those between the predator and the prey (2005 15), between the (human) rider and the horse (ibid. 50), or between the orchid and the wasp (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2005 294).

Becoming

Becoming can be understood as a process of change, a state of emergence or transition (Deleuze 1991 37), which Massumi defines as a ‘process of production of the new’ (2011 2). Existence, as a continuous process of change, may thus be understood as a form of becoming (Roffe 2005 295). Becoming is the shift between registers; that which emerges in the creation of new assemblages.
De-territorialisation / re-territorialisation

The limitations to thought, and thus the threats to new thought, may be understood as a ‘gridded’ space of territorialised, striated space which confines thought to travel within certain parameters (O’Sullivan 2007 29). O’Sullivan calls these spaces ‘territorialised regimes of thought’ (ibid 34). De-territorialisation is the act of disrupting those restrictions; an ‘asignifying rupture’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2005 9), with the aim to free the space through which thought may travel and open this space up into a free space, ‘smooth space’ (O’Sullivan 2007 80-81). For O’Sullivan, the most powerful aspect of art is its (potential) ability to deterritorialise (ibid 67). If deterritorialisation may be understood as the ‘dissolution’ of order, reterritorialisation may be understood as a subsequent ‘reinstitution’ of order (ibid 183), which create, once again, a territory within which thought may move. O’Sullivan states that the act of deterritorialisation is ‘always accompanied by [eventual] reterritorialisation’ (ibid 73).

Encounter

Deleuze’s notion of the encounter can be expressed as a form of disruption of thought; a rupture or break in habitual thinking or modes of being that ‘can only be sensed’ (Deleuze 2004 176). The encounter is that which commands, demands, compels us to think. Deleuze introduces this concept in the following manner: ‘Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter’ (ibid 139). The encounter is thus a moment, an event, which causes a fundamental change; affect.

Event

The concept of the event is the constellation of forces into a space of possibility in which something new may occur (O’Sullivan 2001 126). This is a space in which various elements may interact (Stagoll 2005a 87), and the ‘genesis’ of change and new thought (ibid. 88). That is, the event is not the ‘happening itself’ but the germinal potential that the event extends (ibid.); the event may give rise to new assemblages, new becomings.

Expression

This thesis uses the term expression in relation to the creation of artworks. The emphasis in this use is on creation; an expressive, creative process that operates beyond communication alone and aims to . Massumi explains that the term expression is conventionally connected to ‘content’ and the traditional expectation is for the expression to reflect content in order to make communication possible (2002a 3). Expression may therefore be understood as related to representation, and Massumi warns against its ‘straight-jacketed potential’ (ibid 4). For Deleuze and Guattari, content and expression are not one and the same (ibid 8), but two distinct forms.
My use of the term expression in discussing the creation or reception of works of art, is an indication of a wish to move away from communication as such, and towards the affect that the work generates. O’Sullivan addresses this form of expression as a form of becoming, through which the artwork is ‘not a representation but rather the expression of a specific world-view’ (2007 55).

**Fabulation**

Fabulation is an inventive act of myth-making through which events are created, and for Deleuze, this forms a vital element in artists’ relationships to their audience (Bogue 2010 19). It is an act of ‘legending’, of becoming-other, of ‘experimenting on the real’, and creating ‘a people to come’ (ibid 9, 10) to express alternative experiences. It may be part of breaking with existing legends and myths by proposing alternatives, or creating entirely new myths for a people who do not yet exist. For Deleuze, this is dissimilar from fiction (Brito 2009 10), and expresses a disinterest true / false dichotomies (Bogue 2010 13). Furthermore, inn place of the work of art as a readable representation, Deleuze and Guattari understand artworks to be involved in active acts of fabulation 1991/1994 168).

**Minor / major**

Minor – and its oppositional force, major – indicate relationships between dominant and alternative or marginalised thought, groups and practices (O’Sullivan 2010 200). Minor does not necessarily reflect quantities or numbers, but the term refers to hierarchal relationships of power. An example may be that of ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2005 101). The minor operates ‘from within the major’ (O’Sullivan 2007 71), where its position is generated through a becoming-minor (ibid.). Deleuze and Guattari use the idea of minor science in A Thousand Plateaus (1980/2005 364), and minor literature in their discussion on the works of Franz Kafka, as a form of literature that emerged in the margins of his contemporaneous literary culture (Deleuze and Guattari 1975/1986). The major may also be understood as a form of standard, in relation to which minor groups may emerge. The concept of major may be understood through how standards such as ‘adult-male’ cause individuals or groups who are not part of this major group to enter into a state of becoming minor (Lorraine 2005 150).
Plane of immanence

This term is also referred to as the plane of consistency (Marks 1998 47), and is understood as the philosophical realm within which concepts may be created (Deleuze and Guattari 1994). The Latin origin of the word immanence, meaning ‘to remain within’ (Mowson 2008 4), suggests that a plane of immanence takes the form of a platform, world, milieu or space that is self-contained and self-reflective (Smith and Protevi 2013). The plane of immanence thus provides sets of conditions under which concept developed may exist (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004 xv).

Representation

Representation may be understood as that which stands in for, and signify, something other than itself, and may serve to mediate ideas, information and knowledge. The concept of representation features in a long history of what WJT Mitchell terms a ‘critique of culture’ (1994 6) or O’Sullivan understands as a ‘crisis of representation’ (2007 12), and has been analysed through various disciplines from philosophy to literature, to political science, to art. For Deleuze, representation depends on and reflects preconceived ideas, common sense and ‘fixed norms’ (Marks 2005 227), by assuming links between the representation and the concept, object or subject represented. The problem with such assumed relations in representation, is that these limit thought to certain boundaries. On this basis, O’Sullivan understands a representation as an ‘object of recognition’ (2007 1), which needs to be disrupted in order for thought to take place.

Rhizome

The concept of the rhizome refers to a system of thought that enables multiple entry points and a multiplicity of connections to various points to form. The term rhizome originates from botany, and describes a form of usually horizontal root system as found in plant species such as ginger, iris and violets (The American Heritage Science Dictionary n/d). However, the philosophical concept of the rhizome, as developed by Deleuze and Guattari in the first plateau of A Thousand Plateaus, is a much more abstract notion that introduces the idea of a flat and non-hierarchal, multi-connective, bodiless assemblage with no beginning or end, and formed between, rather than within, points (2004 3-28). This concept is one that encourages mutable connections across forms of thought, practices and states, so to maximise thought.
Virtual

‘The Real’ can in Deleuzean thought be understood as consisting of the two aspects of the virtual and the actual (Boundas 2005 296). This virtual is an ‘ideal’ yet real (not actual) aspect of ‘the Real’ (1968/2004 208). In Bergsonism, Deleuze quotes Proust, who states that the virtual is ‘real without being actual, ideal without being abstract’ (1966/1991 96). The virtual is here understood as an ‘incorporeal event’ that may belong to a ‘past that can never be fully present’ (ibid 297). O’Sullivan calls the virtual the ‘realm of affects’ (2007 55), which does not need to be ‘realized’ (Deleuze 1966/1991 97), but may be actualised. For O’Sullivan as for Deleuze, the actualisation of the virtual is a creative, event-like act of becoming (ibid 97, 98; O’Sullivan 2007 103). As opposed to the real which is found in ‘the likeness of what is possible’, the virtual does not mimic ‘the virtuality that it embodies’ but instead creates ‘its own lines of actualisation’ (Deleuze 1966/1991 97).
Appendix III: Exhibitions, Conference Papers and Other Research Activities

This Appendix details participations in research activities throughout this study, through which I have presented my practice-based research in exhibitions, conferences and other publications:

Solo Exhibitions

2012  *Disruptive Desires*, The Crypt, St Mark’s Kennington, London, UK

2009  *Déjà Perdu*, The Centre for Drawing, Wimbledon College of Art, London, UK

Group Exhibitions

2012  *Orchestrated*, Studio One Gallery, London, UK

2010  *W.A.V.E Borders & Edges*, Wimbledon Space, London, UK

  *Facing Fear*, Sotiri prize 2010, Lindart Cultural Centre, Tirana, Albania

2009  *CCW Festival (Luffare Narratives installation)*, Wimbledon College of Art, London, UK

2008  *Journeys Back, Going Up West, Occupy My Time*, London, UK

  *Urban Space* (in collaboration with P. Glavey), Sao Paolo, Brazil

  *Urban Space* (in collaboration with P. Glavey), NewLife festival, Berlin, Germany

  *Mirror for the 21st Century*, BECA Gallery, New Orleans, USA

Publications

2010  ‘Déjà-experiencé – Pastness, Personal Narratives, Memory and Metaphorlessness discussed through a practice-led Research Project’, Chapter in: *Narrative, Memory & Ordinary Lives*, Huddersfield: the Narrative & Memory Research Group, the University of Huddersfield
Conferences, Symposia and other Papers

2010

Minoritarian Experiences: the Stuttering of Alternative Archives, ‘(De) Constructing the Archive in a Digital Age’ symposium, School of the Arts, The University of Loughborough, UK

2009

Déjà-experiencé: Memory & Past-ness Considered Through a Practice-Led Research Project, ‘Photography, Archive & Memory’ day symposium, Centre for Research in Film and Audio Visual Cultures, Roehampton University, London, UK


Choking on the madeleine: issues of the metaphor for memory considered through a practice-led research project, ‘Self, Memory and Expression’ conference, Portuguese Association for Anglo-American Studies (APEAA) 30th annual conference, Porto, Portugal

Choking on the madeleine: issues of the metaphor for memory considered through a practice-led research project, ‘Spring Research Symposium’ at the University of the Arts London, UK

2008

Journeys Back, ‘The Art of Research: Research Narratives’ symposium, Chelsea College of Art, UK

Choking on the madeleine: issues of the metaphor for memory considered through a practice-led research project, ‘21st Century Anxiety’ conference, chaired by WJT Mitchell, The University of Nottingham, UK

2006

The ‘Mnemonic Space’, ‘Summer Research Symposium’, the University of the Arts London, UK
Guest Lectures and Artist Talks

2010  Presentation on practice based research and the PhD process,  
The University of the Arts London, UK

2009  Guest lecture on my current PhD research into philosophical notions of memory  
and the past to MA Fine Art students at Central St Martin’s, The University of the  
Arts London, UK

          Guest lecture on my current PhD research into philosophical notions of memory  
and the past to MA Digital Media at Kingston University, London, UK

          Guest lecture on my current PhD research into philosophical notions of memory  
and the past to MA Fine Art students at Wimbledon College of Art, The  
University of the Arts London, UK

2006  Guest lecture on my PhD research into memory, identity & family photographs, 
Thames Valley University, Ealing, UK

2005  Guest lecture on my research into memory, identity & family photographs, 
Thames Valley University, Ealing, UK
Visual Documentation

Fig. 1  
**Hunting Lodge (abattoir)**, colour slide, 2010, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print  
Cover

Fig. 2  
**Hunting tower**, colour slide, 2007, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print  
8-9

Fig. 3  
**Hunting Tower**, colour slide, 2008, 45 cm x 45 cm D-type print  
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Fig. 4  
Diagram of metaphors of memory  
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**Ça-n’a-pas-été (album)**, colour photograph, 2005, 15 cm x 10 cm C-type print  
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**Ça-n’a-pas-été**, colour photograph, 2005, installation view  
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**Klara Lidén**, *Disruptive Desires*, digital photograph, 2012, installation view  
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**Klara Lidén**, *Disruptive Desires*, digital photograph, 2012, installation view  
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Fig. 49  
**Klara Lidén**, *Disruptive Desires*, digital photograph, 2012, installation view  
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**Klara Lidén**, *Disruptive Desires*, digital photograph, 2012, installation view  
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**Klara Lidén**, *Disruptive Desires*, digital photograph, 2012, installation view  
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