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The Logic of Corporate Communication Design

Design coordination and the shifting materiality of practice for consultant graphic designers in post-war Britain, 1945–1970

David Michael Preston

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

University of the Arts London, Central Saint Martins

September 2018
ABSTRACT

The development of programmatic corporate communications in Britain is attributable to a cluster of post-war designers who used graphics to furnish groups of artefacts with a ‘family likeness’. As their commissions progressed from the odd artefact to the all-embracing corporate policy, they formed groups to pool their talents and increase their capacity for work. The dynamics of practice subsequently shifted in ways we are yet to fully comprehend, for those who have addressed the subject have focused on the proliferation of the 1980s at the expense of earlier ‘pioneers’. Moving emphasis away from what was designed, to how it was designed, this research answers the question, how did emergent programmatic approaches to design impact dominant patterns of practice? Although the project is rooted in design history, the outlook is unorthodox in seeking to develop a reciprocity between past and present concerns, thus alluding to the futural significance of history.

The research approach was practice theoretical. The research strategy addressed how post-war design consultancies responded to developments in the corporate domain. From a pilot study, three representative design groups were selected for further investigation by means of original archival research and semi-structured interview. In each case the way of practising corporate image-making was examined from the perspective of particular technical entities mobilised within that practice – these entities included files, diagrams, reports and manuals.

Most designers continued to depend on advertising commissions throughout the 1950s, but by explicating the logic of their practice some were able to claim legitimacy for their work and seek jurisdiction over the field. Though many designers resisted codification, others embraced scientific rationality head on, materialising the logic of design in mundane technical entities and ruling relations over their clients, employees and collaborators. Graphic design subsequently became a tenable profession, but as it gained in credibility, practitioners from other domains (e.g. design management and entrepreneurship) sought to compete for jurisdiction.

This thesis argues that post-war designers played fundamental roles in establishing graphic design consultancy as a recognisable profession and core element of the marketing mix. The technocratic patterns of practice they set in place paved the way for branding to proliferate in the 1980s.
The impetus for this project developed way back in the summer of 2003 as a result of my involvement in a project to catalogue F.H.K. Henrion’s personal poster collection. For this opportunity I must thank Henri’s widow Marion Wesel Henrion, as well as Michele Jannuzzi of design studio Jannuzzi Smith. The resulting undergraduate thesis I produced on Henrion’s posters was supervised by Dr Catherine Dixon, and benefitted from the input of Richard Hollis and Robin Kinross, all of whom I am thankful to. It is from this modest beginning that the more major project presented here emerged.

I am grateful to my initial doctoral supervisors at the Royal College of Art, Professor Jeremy Aynsley and Jane Pavitt, who helped set in place the foundations from which the research could later flourish. I am especially indebted to my subsequent supervisory team of Dr Jamie Brassett from Central Saint Martins and Professor Sean Nixon from the University of Essex. Together they helped me to nurse the project through a difficult patch, coming along just as I needed them to pick me up and help me along my way. If it were not for their patience and support the project may have petered out entirely.

I want to offer my deepest thanks to those colleagues and friends who have offered enthusiasm, support and feedback along the way. Of particular note are: Catherine Dixon, Paul Rennie, Rathna Ramanathan and Phil Baines, along with my long-term collaborator and friend Ruth Artmonsky who has maintained a consistent interest in the project from the very beginning. I am equally grateful to those colleagues and academics who have offered up ideas and support in many different guises, including but not limited to: Alan Baines, Rebecca Wright, Rebecca Ross, Peter Hall, Paul Finn, Sheena Calvert, David Crowley, Teal Triggs, Rick Poynor, and Nicolas Maffei.

Thank you to those who gave up their time to be interviewed for this project, some of whom who have sadly since passed. I am especially thankful to: Pat Schleger, Alan Parkin, Chris Timings, and John McConnell, but I must also thank John Miles and Bernard Cheese for giving up their time to talk to me about changes during the period more broadly.

I wish to thank my parents for their persistent support and belief in me. My late father passionately encouraged my interest in the arts and would be rightfully proud of my achievement. Finally, I must thank my beautiful partner Tamsin, and our wonderful children Oren and Althea, who have shared with me in the sacrifices made to complete a project of this nature.
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ABBREVIATIONS

The full titles of the following organizations are given on their first appearance in the thesis. On all subsequent references only the acronym is employed, except when it is felt necessary to remind the reader more fully of the organization.

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<td>ANT</td>
<td>Actor Network Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Design and Industries Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRU</td>
<td>Design Research Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAT</td>
<td>History of Advertising Trust</td>
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<td>HDA</td>
<td>Henrion Design Associates</td>
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<tr>
<td>HS&amp;A</td>
<td>Hans Schleger &amp; Associates</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Industrial Design Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLM</td>
<td>Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. (Royal Dutch Airlines)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNER</td>
<td>London &amp; North Eastern Railway</td>
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<td>M&amp;C</td>
<td>Mather and Crowther</td>
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<td>MARS</td>
<td>Modern Architecture Research Group</td>
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<td>MFDI</td>
<td>Michael Farr (Design Integration)</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Information</td>
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<td>RSA</td>
<td>Royal Society of Arts</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Society of Industrial Artists</td>
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<tr>
<td>STS</td>
<td>Science and Technology Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>V&amp;A</td>
<td>Victoria &amp; Albert Museum</td>
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Introduction

The ‘end of the ideas poster’ and the shift from artefacts to systems

In London, 1959, the British graphic designer F.H.K. Henrion is said to have presented a poster design proposal for Gleem toothpaste to his client, the American advertising firm Erwin Wasey. This painterly design (Fig. 1), featuring a swirl of toothpaste squeezed directly from the tube to form a perfect white smile was not exceptional in and of itself, being strongly representative of the kind of jobbing work that had been typical of commercial artists in pre-war Britain; yet this rather unremarkable design would come to signify a remarkable moment in this German émigré’s career. The story goes that Henrion’s client responded to the proposal by claiming that the design was ‘too good’ for them (Henrion, 1990). What they needed, apparently, was not a strong individualistic ideas poster, but rather an altogether simpler design, featuring the actors from the television commercial and constituting one part of a total holistic campaign.

Perhaps the most curious aspect of this anecdote is the surprise with which Henrion greeted the news, recognising the incident as ‘the end of the ideas poster’ (Henrion, 1990). Having completed his first holistic brand identity scheme in 1953 for Pest Control of Cambridge, the disdain with which he greeted the withering status of the individual design artefact is baffling. The irony that he had been forcefully championing the merits of a coordinated approach to design – later referred to as corporate identity – for at least five years seemingly lost on him. Not that the incident held him back, far from it. Over the coming decade Henrion went on to develop a reputation as a ’pioneer’ of corporate design (Woodham, 1997), cementing his reputation with several high profile international design jobs, not least the corporate image programme for the Dutch airline, KLM (Shaughnessy, 2013), and the publication of the seminal text book Design Coordination and Corporate Image (Henrion & Parkin, 1967).
Why begin this thesis with Henrion’s pithy anecdote about the end of the ideas poster? Well, the rise of the all-encompassing corporate communications programme at the expense of the heroic individual design artefact emphasises a shift that is central to the premise of this thesis. For, as I go on to show, the emergence of programmatic corporate image-making during the post-war period in Britain was interlinked with several other changes occurring during the period, which, when combined, had a significant influence on the development of how design would come to be practised in the future. This research thus aims to critically interrogate how the emergence of programmatic corporate image-making was linked with: firstly, a trend towards consultant group practice; and secondly, with the development of graphic design as a recognised activity of work. My aim in tracing these interconnections is to better establish how the materiality of graphic designers’ work changed as corporate image-making became a central tenet of their practice. Given these ambitions, I have set out the aims and objectives of my research as follows:
Aim 1: To critically interrogate the relationship between corporate image-making, group practice and graphic design professionalism within post-war Britain.

Obj. 1.1: Drawing on the extant literature, track the development of programmatic corporate image making in Britain; consider the corresponding growth of graphic design professionalism and the normalisation of group practice.

Obj. 1.2: Complete a pilot study to map those British consultant design groups active during the period of study (1945–1970); select a small range of case studies for further focused research.

Obj. 1.3: Scope out the available archival resources relevant to each case study.

Obj. 1.4: Conduct semi-structured interviews with surviving practitioners who practiced as members of the selected consultant groups.

Aim 2: To track how the emergence of corporate image-making impacted the materiality of practice for British graphic design consultants of the post-war era.

Obj. 1.1: Drawing on the extant literature, establish the typical practice-based routines of British graphic designers active in the 1940s.

Obj. 1.2: Trace the historical development course of the consultant design groups in question, with particular reference to their organisational structure and the patterns of their practice.

Obj. 1.3: From the initial scoping of archival resources identify and analyse technical entities (i.e. inscriptions of practice) mobilised in the performance of corporate image-making work.

Obj. 1.4: Compare and analyse the ways and means of corporate image-making practice running throughout the selected case studies to identify changes in the overriding patterns of graphic design practice.

The emergence of programmatic corporate image-making

Throughout the 1950s and 60s the all-encompassing design programme with its holistic approach to the corporation came to take on ever-greater significance for those design practitioners with any genuine sense of commercial ambition (Middleton, 1967; Kinross, 1988). The dominant phrase used to describe corporate image-making during the period was ‘house style’, a phrase which had become prevalent in the mid-1950s, later being superseded by the term ‘corporate identity’. According to design methods pioneer Bruce Archer (1965), design underwent a transition during this time away from a sculptural or artefactual paradigm, towards a more technological and systematic one. So, while some organisations, such as London Transport and The London & North Eastern Railway, had made attempts to coordinate their appearance before the war, these efforts were an exception to the rule. Most organisations operating in the first part of the century had neither the capital, the infrastructure, nor the awareness to commission design programmes of this nature and it was not until the post-war period
that such ideas were realised on an unprecedented scale (Blake, 1986). This study begins therefore in 1945, when opportunities for designers to embark upon such programmes began to emerge as a response to the burgeoning culture of reconstruction that followed the end of WWII.

I have anchored my research around the term ‘corporate image’ in order to emphasise the concerted efforts of designers to control the aesthetic appearance of an organisation.1 Whereas ‘corporate image’ serves to underline the visual characteristics of an organisation’s identity, by comparison the term ‘corporate identity’ is thought to emphasise the more behavioural aspects of the organisation’s identity (Olins, 1979). Moreover, as ‘corporate identity’ was not a common term in Britain until the 1970s (Shaughnessy, 2014a), well after the period of study concentrated on here, it was deemed misleading to apply it to my own study period. Similarly, although the term ‘brand’ was used to refer to brand-name-products throughout the twentieth century, ‘branding’ as an activity only came to the fore towards the end of the century (Blauvelt, 2012; Shaughnessy, 2014a), and thus, again, it would be misleading to speak of the ‘branding’ of the 1950s and 60s. One phrase that did gain popularity in the 1950s was ‘house style’ (Davis, 1956), but I have chosen to avoid this term too given that it is synonymous with the very early phase of corporate image-making that emerged after the war and was beginning to be outmoded by the 1960s. Instead I sought to apply a more appropriate terminology that would align with the period bracketed in my study (1945–1970), and as corporate communications scholar John M.T. Balmer (2010, p. 11) explains: ‘In business contexts, the period from the 1950s to the 1970s resulted in an upsurge of interest in the concept of the corporate image.’2 Furthermore the use of ‘corporate image’ can be seen as a nod to Henrion and Parkin’s (1967) seminal work

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1 It is important to note that in recent years ‘corporate image’ has often been understood – particularly by corporate communication scholars – in terms of the public perception or impression of a brand, as opposed to the brand’s aesthetic appearance (Balmer, 2010).
2 Balmer (2010) suggests that the heightened interest in ‘image’ at this time was linked to particular factors including, the English economist Kenneth Boulding’s (1956) book *The Image*; the activities of the Opinion Research Corporation in the US; the work of Burleigh Gardner of Social Research Inc. in the US; and the writing of Pierre Martineau (1958) who undertook corporate image studies for the Chicago Tribune. Balmer (1998) also writes extensively on the different conceptualisations of ‘corporate identity’, identifying seven different approaches, four of which note the importance of graphic design.
Design Coordination and Corporate Image, which has been considered the first significant book in the field (Shaughnessy, 2013).³

In its focus on branding practices in the post-war era this thesis addresses the underestimated significance of post-war graphic designers who spearheaded the development of innovative new programmatic approaches to corporate design in Britain.⁴ While many scholars (Julier, 2000; Arvidson, 2006; Moor, 2007) have recognised the importance of the 1980s in terms of the impact of brands on society, generally the period that preceded this has been overlooked, with scholars such as Moor (2007, p. 30) downplaying the significance of early pioneers like Henrion, suggesting that they were simply ‘ahead of their time’.⁵ Through the empirical work of this thesis I will look to contest this assertion, arguing that practitioners such as Henrion played a critical role in establishing the patterns of corporate design practice that were deepened in the following decades. As such I contend that the 1950s and 60s have been erroneously overlooked. My supposition being that although branding had by the 1980s reached unprecedented levels of significance as a symbol of social, cultural and economic capital, it was the earlier era that had set in place the foundations from which the ultimate idea of the brand as a form of ‘new religion’ could proliferate.⁶ In this sense, while those scholars who have focused on the 1980s (Julier, 2000; Arvidson, 2006; Moor, 2007) have served to underscore the powerful effects of neoliberalism (Julier, 2017; Escobar, 2018), my work can be seen as an attempt to address a pre-history of such neoliberal design practices.

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³ Henrion and Parkin (1967) suggest that ‘corporate image’ was simply an American term for ‘house style’, and so in choosing to adopt this term I also underline the increasingly global understanding of branding practices that began to occur by the mid-to-late-1960s.

⁴ Woodham (1997, p. 141) labels Henrion as a ‘pioneer in the field’ of corporate identity but fails to scrutinise or develop this assertion.

⁵ Much scholarship has focused on the role of brands in society (Lury, 2004; Aronczyk & Powers, 2010), with attention directed to the impact of consumerism and changing patterns of brand consumption, together with their potential to shape personal and collective identities (Lury, 1996). This scholarship has tended to centre on the importance of the 1980s as a time when the significance of the brand took on new and unprecedented levels of significance, with Arvidson (2006) arguing that the brand was first established as a central component of the social fabric during this period. He posits Bret Easton Ellis’s (1991) text American Psycho as an example of the manner by which brands had become aligned to the pursuit of life-style and self-realisation, and thus, imbricated as a central part of global popular culture.

⁶ In his review of the V&A exhibition brand.new, Stephen Hayward (2001, p. 147) draws attention to the design firm Fitch’s reference to brands as ‘the new religion’. Though a later reference from around the turn of the century, the concept of brands as a symbol of worship helps to establish the important position brands would come to occupy in contemporary society.
Even before the war had ended plans were in place to meet the increase in demand for design services that would follow, with the consultancy Design Research Unit (DRU) having been conceived precisely to address such opportunities. By 1946 DRU were embarking upon their first comprehensive corporate image programme for the photographic company Ilford (Fig. 2), this would constitute the first of many such schemes carried out by them over the coming decades (Blake and Blake, 1969). Even before the war had ended plans were in place to meet the increase in demand for design services that would follow, with the consultancy Design Research Unit (DRU) having been conceived precisely to address such opportunities. By 1946 DRU were embarking upon their first comprehensive corporate image programme for the photographic company Ilford (Fig. 2), this would constitute the first of many such schemes carried out by them over the coming decades (Blake and Blake, 1969). Even before the war had ended plans were in place to meet the increase in demand for design services that would follow, with the consultancy Design Research Unit (DRU) having been conceived precisely to address such opportunities. By 1946 DRU were embarking upon their first comprehensive corporate image programme for the photographic company Ilford (Fig. 2), this would constitute the first of many such schemes carried out by them over the coming decades (Blake and Blake, 1969). Programmes such as these were distinct from the typical identities of pre-war, in that they set out to consolidate a vast network of design artefacts through the application of a specific palette of visual elements. So, whereas most pre-war identity schemes had

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7 DRU were not alone in embarking upon their first corporate image scheme as early 1946, for during the very same year Hans Schleger’s studio had also begun work on their own scheme for the sock maker W. Raven and Company (Schleger, 2001).
typically consisted of little more than a trademark repetitively badged across a range of artefacts, the post-war schemes gradually sought to apply more sophisticated, nuanced and controlled aesthetic codes that would include a broader palette of visual elements. As design consultant and journalist Alec Davis (1956, pp. 17–25) explained at the time, this meant moving away from an over-reliance on the trademark or symbol in order to incorporate ‘colour’, ‘pattern’, ‘borders’ and ‘lettering’ as other important factors within a unified corporate image (Fig. 3).

In the years that followed, British designers embraced these comprehensive corporate image programmes, actively promoting the idea that they could coordinate a client’s design and marketing collateral. As a consequence, the scale of design commissions began to grow relatively rapidly. As Michael Middleton (1967, p. 82) explains:

In a complex world the unit of design tends to grow ever larger, embracing not merely individual objects but whole ranges of objects. A ‘corporate identity programme’ will bring, buildings, products, printed matter and all of the aspects of an organisation into a common design framework.

In order to tackle the inherent complexity of such large design programmes, practitioners adapted their working methods to enable them to work more efficiently.
Over time a distinctive discourse emerged around the discipline, as well as codified methods and processes that would enable more practitioners to embrace the new practice. One such example was the work of Henrion and Parkin (1967), who labelled the activity of creating a corporate image programme as ‘design coordination’, an act which they described as an attempt to control and order a series of branded design artefacts.\(^8\)

As a visual extension of the graphic trademark the development of corporate image-making has often been attributed to graphic designers more than those of a product, or architectural persuasion, for example. As Davis (1956, p. 19) explains:

> The basic [house] style will probably be created by an individual, though he may be guided by many others. It is likely that he will be primarily a typographer or graphic artist; theoretically it is also likely that he may be an interior decorator or a colour consultant, but in practice, this seldom seems to happen.

Davis’s contention that graphic designers took a lead in the development of corporate image-making is one that I will look to scrutinise further within this thesis, as I attempt to understand how and why the practice developed in the particular ways that it did.

**The trend towards consultant group practice**

As designers progressed from conceiving artefacts singly, to conceiving them serially, the alignment of multiple designs became a key role for the designer, but the scope of such programmes grew quickly and soon overwhelmed individual freelance practitioners. In order to manage the challenges presented by the complex multiplicity of the corporations they worked for, many practitioners grouped together into teams in order to share their skill sets and enhance their capacity for work. According to Middleton (1967, p. 85) the concept of group practice in design took root as a direct response to the development of corporate image-making, and with ever-larger design programmes moving ‘beyond the capacity of the individual designer’, collaboration became an inevitable by-product.\(^9\) This direct interlinkage between the growth of

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\(^8\) Although on the inside flap of their book Henrion and Parkin (1967) had claimed: “’Design coordination and corporate image’ is the title chosen by the authors to describe the activity which creates a house style’, Henrion would later reveal that they had wanted to call the book simply ‘Design coordination’ but were forced to add ‘and corporate image’ at the request of their American publisher (Bos, 1994).

\(^9\) Middleton (1967) is the only scholar I have identified to have directly linked the increase in group practice with the proliferation of corporate image programmes.
corporate image and group practice is one I will look to examine in the thesis in order to test whether there is any validity to the claim.

As the number of practising design groups increased, so too did the relative size of these groups, with this surge towards group practice (Middleton, 1967) leading to changes in the fundamental dynamics of an occupation that had previously relied on practitioners who had worked in relative isolation to one another.\(^{10}\) Alongside the shift to group practice there developed a need to formalise working design processes and routines in order that practitioners could work more productively together as part of a collective innovation process, with the impetus of the Design Methods Movement (Cross, 1993) to codify the design process emerging in parallel with these developments (Alexander, 1964; Archer, 1965; Jones, 1970). The practice of corporate image making thus came to represent more than simply the coordination of a multitude of design objects, for in most cases the workforce had to be coordinated and managed in tandem with any attempt to align a system of design artefacts.\(^{11}\) Although Henrion and Parkin (1967, 1968) primarily use the term ‘design coordination’ to emphasise the alignment of design artefacts, I argue that the concept should also be understood as one concerned with the alignment of the design workforce, as well as being an act that seeks to control the processual complexity involved in managing such programmes. In this respect, design coordination can be said to involve both the physical act of designing, and the administrative direction of such work, with this duality being a consistent thread throughout this thesis.

The notion of design coordination shares some similarities with what British design theorists Julier and Moor (2009) have referred to as ‘the management of design’, which, they suggest, should not to be confused with ‘design management’. Here they argue that whilst design management tends to be linked to the optimisation of design performance within organisations, the management of design refers instead to ‘the everyday structuring and coordination of design processes’ (Julier & Moor, 2009, p. 4). This project develops from this idea, focussing on the first, formative stage of corporate image-making activity in Britain. It explores in detail the operational methods, group

\(^{10}\) Describing the conditions of designers in the early half of the twentieth century Milner Gray (1980) recalls that they were typically working in isolation.

\(^{11}\) F.H.K. Henrion and Alan Parkin (1968) allude to the importance of coordinating the workforce in an article for the Design and Industries Association Yearbook. This will be discussed in greater detail in the second case study.
structures, and client-designer relations of those practitioners most heavily involved in the establishment of the new programmatic approach to design identity. Through a series of case studies, the role of certain key groups and individuals will be investigated in order to establish the role they played in defining the practice of corporate image-making in Britain during the post-war period.

The development of graphic design as a recognised activity of work

As Triggs (2009) has established, many histories of graphic design have privileged concerns around visual communication, tracing their lineage far back to the ancient caves of Lascaux (Meggs, 1983; Drucker and McVarish, 2009); by comparison this project is framed from the perspective of graphic design’s development as a recognised activity of work. Although some practitioners in the US and the UK are known to have deployed the term ‘graphic design’ in the first half of the twentieth century (Dwiggins, 1922; Raffe, 1927), the term was not widely adopted in Britain until the mid- to late-1950s after the Royal College of Art had introduced their new ‘School of Graphic Design’ in 1948 under Richard Guyatt’s stewardship (Frayling, 2007). 12 Both Kinross (1988) and Stiff (2009) have argued that graphic design only emerged as a distinct form of work in Britain during the post-war era. Here they distinguish between earlier commercial art practices, which Stiff characterises as ‘picture making for business’ (2009, p. 4), and the emergence of the new graphic design as a more technocratic and organisationally motivated form of design, wherein acts of planning, coordinating and specifying came to the fore. Here Stiff (2009, p. 9) aligns the emergence of graphic design with the emergence of group work, describing a move away from design activity as a purely personal experience – ‘one man and his crayon or airbrush’ – towards a collaborative, shared practice in which team working was key. 13

The surging interest in corporate communication design after WWII was closely interlinked with the concerted efforts of practitioners to professionalise design. So as British ‘commercial artists’ of the pre-war period began to embrace a new identity as

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12 Paul Shaw’s (2014) research on Dwiggins’s significance is notable here, with Shaw arguing that his role has been erroneously overstated.

13 For Stiff (2009, p. 9), exhibition design, and especially the exhibition division of the Ministry of Information, had been absolutely critical in leading a ‘generation’ of designers towards the ‘small-business model of graphic design practice’.
‘graphic designers’, they sought to assert their independence from interrelated, but distinct occupations such as advertising and printing (Kinross, 1988; Stiff, 2009), thus gaining jurisdiction (Abbott, 2010) over their own field of work. Embracing the opportunities of corporate branding was a means by which to enable more direct working relationships with their clients, enabling them to transform graphic design into a more tenable and stable occupation, cutting out the intermediaries who had commonly managed their work.

Surprisingly few scholars have investigated design as a form of work in the post-war era, with those who have drawn attention to the period often emphasising a liberated form of creative expression and subversiveness (Breward and Wood, 2012a) at the expense of more corporate or institutional labour. Design historians Breward and Wood (2012b) go as far as to claim that British design has been defined by its ‘subversive spirit’ ever since the 1960s. Design theorist Rick Poynor (2004a, 2004b), meanwhile, has focused on graphic design since the 1960s, charting the work of those businesses small enough to retain some degree of personal or creative freedom. But in valorising ‘independent’ and ‘subversive’ practice at the expense of commercial work, Poynor (2004a, 2004b) constructed a history of British graphic design relatively devoid of the corporate. These approaches have posited design as something akin to art, but in seeking to expunge the corporate, they have tended to overlook the occupational basis upon which design work has usually been founded.

This thesis develops from the contention that graphic design historians’ preoccupation with aesthetic developments within the field have undermined our understanding of how the routines and practices of design work have developed over the last century. Efforts to emphasise graphic design as a creative or artistic act, have, I argue, led to the sense of designing as a form of labour to be largely overlooked. So, while we know much about the ebbs and flows of various design movements across previous decades (Meggs, 1983; Enric Satué, 1988; Hollis, 1994), as well as the significant contribution made by individual design heroes (Wilkins, 1992), far less is known about the ways in which designers’ day-to-day practice routines have been conducted, or how they have developed over time. The focus of scholars on design artefacts and their impact on society has thus led to the patterns of working practice to
be largely ignored.\[^{14}\] This study constitutes an attempt to address the lack of attention directed towards the history of practice.\[^{15}\] It focuses on a key 25-year period of British design history from 1945–1970, during which the working methods of graphic designers were radically transformed as they adopted more systematic approaches to design in order to manage increasingly complex corporate communication design commissions (Henrion & Parkin, 1967). Furthermore, this study will move beyond what design management scholars Paul Paulus and Bernard Nijstad (2003, p. 7) describe as ‘a long history of viewing creativity from an individualist perspective’.

The material artefacts and apparatuses that developed in result of the codification of design practice will constitute a central subject of study within this project, as I direct my attention towards the ‘materiality of practice’ (Shove et al., 2007). By reference to surviving historical artefacts used by design practitioners in the performance of their work, I will seek to develop a more materially aware understanding of design practice during the post-war period. Here I move focus away from the design artefacts produced as a result of the design process, turning my attention instead towards the tools and apparatuses developed to carry out this work.

Those studies that have considered the impact of tools and technology on the enactment of design work have often centred around the capacity of tools for mark-making of various kinds (Twyman, 1970, 2013; Laing & Saunders-Davies, 1986; Labuz, 1993). Be these the apparatus used to develop or extend our mark-making capabilities, from the pencil or airbrush (Laing & Saunders-Davies, 1986), to the computer (Labuz, 1993); or those deployed to enable these marks to be reproduced on mass, with particular reference to printing technology (Twyman, 1970, 2013). Generally speaking this tendency has developed from the aforementioned preoccupation with the aesthetics of design, seeking to understand how tools have impacted the appearance and production of design artefacts. By comparison, I focus in on the tools deployed by

\[^{14}\] One notable exception to this tendency is Paul Stiff’s (1996) detailed account of the role of specification as a practice that influenced the development of graphic design. Stiff’s focus on specification tends towards an emphasis on the print production process, looking at how graphic designers communicated with those print specialists responsible for reproducing their artwork. By comparison my work focusses less on the material production of design work; looking instead at the organisational culture of design as a practice and examining how designers sought to organise themselves and communicate with their clients.

\[^{15}\] When I refer to practice, I refer to ‘practical and routine activity, embodied procedures, the material and instrumental aspects of life and mechanisms for the transmission of culture into action’ (Warde, 2014, p. 284). I will go on to examine Practice Theory in much greater detail in the ‘Theoretical Framing’ section of this thesis, p. 40.
corporate design practitioners to substantiate their work as a legitimate form of knowledge production and more than simply an aesthetic veneer. As such, the tools examined in this thesis have been used by practitioners to better define design problems, to rationalise their responses to these problems, or to organise the work flows of design mark-makers, for example. In examining these tools, I will endeavour to ‘de-script’ (Akrich, 1992) and decipher, the patterns of activity embedded within them, in order to establish a clearer picture of the practices in question. This will require me to extrapolate what data I can from the tools in question in order to piece together a fuller understanding of how day-to-day practice unfolded within each of the three case studies under scrutiny. Here I adopt a practice theoretical approach (Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, Cetina & Von Savigny, 2005; Nicolini, 2012) to the study of graphic design history, underscoring the relevance of how ways of practising have changed over time.

To account for the working routines of design groups active during the period I will investigate the micro-practices of a small number of representative practitioners, thus ‘zooming in’ (Nicolini, 2009) on practice in order to establish how designers responded to the challenges and opportunities of corporate design work. Through a process of ‘zooming out’ I will then seek to draw connections between the various group practices under study, before speculating about their impact on subsequent patterns of practice. In so doing I adopt what Nicolini (2012, p. 13) terms the ‘strong approach’ to practice. Here I seek to address criticisms levelled at ‘weak approaches’ to practice-based study that have been accused of producing rich descriptions of everyday work, but little value in terms of the meaning of that work, what makes it possible, and why it is performed in the way that it is. By comparison the ‘strong approach’ attempts to move beyond pure description in order to understand the broader significance of the practice.
Locating corporate image-making in the post-war socio-economic context

From ‘austerity’ to ‘liberation’

It is notable that many historical studies of the twentieth century can be distinguished by certain strong thematic concerns, with particular arguments recurring so regularly that they have developed to become recognisable tropes. Commenting on this phenomenon, design historians Conekin, Mort and Walters (1999, p. 4) opine that the historiography of post-war Britain has projected ‘a series of comfortable and familiar images of the period which are intrinsically recognisable’. They identify the following themes that they claim have set the terms of enquiry: economic growth and modernisation; the decline of the British Empire; the development of political consensus; affluence; the rise of the welfare state; and concomitant patterns of social stability. Here I will seek to situate the development of corporate image-making practices in relation to such themes.

While Britain had once been considered an economic super-power, factors such as the decline of the Empire and the end of the industrial revolution, gradually saw Britain recede into the background, with North America taking centre stage as the new global super power. The study of Britain’s economic decline is well developed, if highly contested. Notable works here include Wiener’s (1981) cultural critique: English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850–1980, written from the perspective of Margaret Thatcher’s Britain; and Rubinstein’s (1993) counter-thesis, Capitalism, Culture and Decline in Britain, 1750–1990. These studies constitute macroscopic attempts by scholars to understand Britain’s transition from an industrial super-power to a relative also-ran, underlining economic historians’ preoccupations with what Rubinstein has described as ‘the central question of post-1870 British history’ (2001, p. 348). There is little consensus within this domain, with scholars debating the severity of Britain’s economic decline and the reasons behind it. Historians Black and Pemberton (2004) have claimed that this preoccupation with various notions of national decline has hindered our understanding of post-war Britain. In their text, An Affluent Society?: Britain’s Post-war ‘Golden Age’ Revisited, they argue that affluence is in fact a more productive lens through which to examine the period, claiming that a focus on the domestic, rather than the international, would help to further our grasp of the cultural
implications of ever-increasing post-war consumerism. Crafts and Mills (1996) support this view, using statistical evidence to argue that the trend rate of economic growth was actually more rapid after 1950 than it had been prior to 1940.16

Design historical accounts have tended towards more microscopic approaches to socio-economic history, with Maguire and Woodham (1997) concentrating on the ‘Britain Can Make It’ exhibition of 1946 in order to account for the cultural politics of design in the post-war era. Maguire (Maguire & Woodham, 1997, p. 30) describes the interwar period in Britain as one beset with structural weaknesses, citing the following factors as impediments to growth:

The chronic lack of investment, the plethora of small-scale producers, the almost total absence of marketing skills and strategies, the outdated technology and distrust of formal education, the myriad market structures and stress on marginal product differentiation.

Furthermore, Maguire (Maguire & Woodham, 1997) argues that British manufacturing practices lagged well behind those of America during the 1940s and that with nine million Britons either in the armed forces or directly producing for them, Britain became ill-equipped to meet the demands of peacetime production. The key to industrial regeneration after the war was seen to lay in the recapturing and development of export markets, but this would depend on a rapid increase in productivity. Whereas American manufacturing exhibited high levels of standardisation, in Britain the ‘virtual absence of standardization’ was allied to higher costs and lower productivity (Maguire & Woodham, 1997). Britain’s economic troubles only worsened after the war, with the nation becoming increasingly dependent on America. Having taken a substantive loan in the immediate aftermath of the war, the initiation of the Marshall Plan in 1948 further concretised Britain’s deep reliance on their transatlantic neighbours. These economic difficulties carried through into the domestic realm too, where the extension of rationing above and beyond war-time levels clearly indicated the severity of the problems.

The theme of austerity has been one that has strongly coloured much historical study of the post-war era. In his trilogy of books covering the arts in Britain from 1939 to 1975, cultural historian Robert Hewison (1977, 1981, 1986) divides the post-war

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16 In other work, Mills (2012, p. 9) suggests that whilst Britain experienced ‘its fastest-ever economic growth’ between 1950 and 1973, ‘relative economic decline proceeded at a rapid rate vis-à-vis its European peer group’. This decline, he suggests, continued until the 1970s, when increased competition helped to reverse Britain’s relative economic decline.
epoch into two fundamental periods split between the immediate austerity of recovery, and the liberating creative expression of the 1960s – this divide has developed to become a deeply entrenched one that is mirrored across much of the literature in the field, as I will go on to show. Building on the notion of popular myths, Hewison (1986) concludes his series by explaining that each of the decades he has studied has its own ‘moment of myth’. These myths, he argues, retain a certain validity in the sense that they reflect an imaginative, rather than a literal truth. So, in the 1940s the myth centres around ‘the pride and communality of suffering during the Blitz’; whilst in the 50s it surrounds ‘the aggressive ambition of the Angry Young Man’; and finally, in the 60s, he argues that it was the idea of ‘Swinging London’ that came to typify the period (Hewison, 1986, p. 76). Though he sees the popular myth of the ‘Swinging Sixties’ as being attributable to a shorter period of the decade running from 1963 to 1967, Hewison also acknowledges that the influence of this so-called ‘Swinging’ period continued well into the following decade. He draws attention to the fact that the hedonistic stereotype of the Sixties as ‘a time of pleasure, of colour after the drab austerity of the Fifties, of growing affluence, of cultural confidence and expansion’ (Hewison, 1986, p. 55), developed alongside another strand of personal liberation, that which he refers to as ‘the oppositional culture of the underground’ (Hewison, 1986, p. xiii).

Similarities can be seen here in the work of historian Arthur Marwick (1982), who, writing during the same period as Hewison, frames the austerity of the immediate post-war period around notions of ‘social consensus’. Like Hewison, he characterises the sixties as a time of ‘freedom’ that precedes later ‘troubles’ of the seventies. Further parallels are found in the work of social historian David Kynaston (2007, 2009, 2013), who, in his more contemporary series of texts has suggested that British society continued to live in the shadow of the war until around 1957. Whilst the first four volumes in his series are characterised around the notions of ‘austerity’ (1945–51), and ‘family’ (1951–57), his most recent work centres around ‘modernity’ (1957–62), projecting an image of British society dominated by a new-found materialism. The rise of consumerism that Kynaston (2013) articulates is closely imbricated with the burgeoning pop- and counter-culture that Hewison has elaborated on, for these emergent cultural scenes that emphasised personal liberation were dependent on new

found patterns of material consumption, despite often proclaiming to be directly opposed to such ideas. Hewison (1986, p. 303) claims that the affirmative and celebratory tempo of change during the sixties was not sustainable in the long term, having been founded on fantasy based on the illusion of ‘unending economic expansion’. Here he emphasises the ambiguity and tension present during the decade, particularly between hedonistic ideals and the realities of what he describes as ‘a society in decline’ (Hewison, 1986, inside dust flap).

Within the more specific field of design history the theme of modernisation has been particularly well presented, with Christopher Breward and Ghislaine Wood’s (2012a, p. 30) work in this area relatively typical. In their catalogue for the V&A (Victoria & Albert Museum) exhibition, ‘British Design from 1948’, they argue that the Second World War had an immensely powerful impact on the social, economic and physical fabric of Britain, explaining that a new culture of design emerged after the war which was characterised by a drive towards ‘modernization’. Though they claim that the 1951 Festival of Britain, epitomised this progressive and utopian vision of a modernised Britain, they go on to suggest that the Coronation of 1953 provided a reminder of the power and taste of traditional British values, hence drawing attention to the tensions that were present during the period between progressive ideals of modernisation and nostalgic values of the past.18 Their account portrays the 1940s and 50s as a period in which designers were determined to create a new and better world, underlining the social imperatives of design practitioners active during the period. However, the ‘optimistic, democratic and highly principled’ attitudes of these practitioners are said to have waned over time, with Breward and Wood (2012a, p. 16) emphasising the ‘tendency towards individualism and creative anarchy’ that transpired in the 1960s, 70s and 80s.

In dividing this period of history into two distinct eras (the 1940s–1950s, and the 1960s–1980s), Breward and Wood re-emphasise the major themes of their exhibition: reconstruction and revolution – two of the most readily recognised tropes of British design historiography which can be seen to mirror Hewison’s divide between austerity and liberation. Breward and Wood suggest that the ‘subversive spirit’ prevalent in the

18 Although Conekin et al. (1999, p. 1) agree that Britain was, during the period, divided between the values of the past and the future, they contend that the Coronation alone, came to exemplify these two conflicting states.
latter period was particularly significant in the ongoing development of design practice, coming to define the field (2012b). This so-called ‘subversive’ strand of practice has received considerable attention from design historians, not only in broad survey exhibitions of design, such as the V&A’s, but equally in more focused studies of graphic design too, most notably Poynor’s ‘Communicate’ exhibition (2004a) and catalogue (2004b). I will attempt to debunk the idea that subversiveness has defined British design since the 1960s, demonstrating how in actuality patterns of practice within design tended to become more routinised and formulaic from the 1960s onwards. So, although Britain may have come to be regarded as a country of subversive design and designers, my research suggests that, for the most part, graphic design as a practical activity became increasingly conformist in the decades following the war.

I am mindful not to further reinforce a polarity between commercialism and independence/subversiveness, for in practice there is an inevitable overlap between these realms. For example, while Ken Garland – a key figure in Poynor’s independent design project – has been much-heralded as an ethical, independent graphic designer, he has himself downplayed this dimension of his work, highlighting that his practice has been multi-faceted, embracing both social and commercial concerns (Shaughnessy, 2012). An example of Garland’s commercial prowess can be found in the extensive work he completed for Michael Farr’s design management business during the 1960s (for more information on Farr see the testing case presented in Appendix 2, p. 330).

**Americanisation**

As a result of the ongoing economic challenges of the post-war period the sophistication of the American industrial system with its more well-developed management theory, production methods, marketing skills, and productivity, became increasingly alluring to policy makers in Britain, with Maguire (Maguire & Woodham, 1997, p. 35) suggesting that national survival depended on ‘the fastest possible adoption of much of the American system’. Although the notion of ‘Americanisation’ has often posited as a direct process of imposition through which American marketing methods were imposed, or at least adopted wholesale, in practice the lineage of influence is less straightforward. Throughout its history, design consultancy has, we are told, largely mirrored the business approaches and organisational strategies found in the advertising industry, albeit with some years’ time lapse. Thus Julier (2000) explains how an
American model of practice had been established in advertising in the first half of the twentieth century that was later ‘transplanted’ from the US to Britain, primarily through the expansion of American offices into Europe. Others have explored the extent to which American models of practice influenced Britain, with Nixon (2013) arguing that the channels of influence were not unidirectional as is often thought to be the case, and that American advertising practices had in actuality taken distinctive directions in Britain, with less of a ‘wholesale transfer’ taking place, and more a reworking and hybridization occurring.\(^\text{19}\) Still, patterns of practice established in the US clearly had a role to play on the development of advertising and design in Britain, which is unsurprising given the complex political and economic relations between the two nations during the period.

In her historical review of consultant design practice, design historian Penny Sparke (1983) suggests that America led the way in relation to the establishment of independent design consultancies conceived to serve the needs of corporate clients. So while American design practitioners like Raymond Loewy, Walter Dorwin Teague, and Norman Bel Geddes had developed multi-disciplinary design consultancies in America in the 1920s and 30s, practitioners in Britain were much slower to adopt these ideas in any serious way, with the trend for group practice only really becoming noticeable in Britain by the mid-to-late 1950s.\(^\text{20}\) Julier (2000) suggests this discrepancy was likely due to the smaller, less affluent economic market of Britain by comparison to the wide and stable distribution base of America. During this period the culture of American design was beginning to encroach on traditional British values and design from the US was perceived by many Britons to act against the interests of consumers and society as a whole, employing as it did, principles such as built-in obsolescence and superficial styling.

Many design practitioners were equally concerned by this commercially-oriented nature of American industrial design, with Maguire and Woodham (1997, pp. 126–7) explaining that ‘few (if any)’ members of Britain’s Council of Industrial Design had agreed with the influential American, Raymond Loewy’s assertion that, ‘aesthetics

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\(^{19}\) Nixon (2013) also underscores the fact that American advertising practices had already been influenced by the ideas of Europe, with émigrés from the continent bringing over new ideas about motivation research, modernism and the functionalism of Bauhaus, for example.

consists of a beautiful sales curve shooting upwards’. Designers in Britain had become aware of the concerns around Americanisation through the design press, with commentators like the American, Edgar Kaufmann Jr. (1948), warning Britons of the perils of superfluous commercially-driven styling. Practitioners in Britain were equally anxious about the infiltration of North American competitors into the marketplace, with the industrial designer Loewy having set a precedent for success during the inter-war years. As a result, they were, on-the-whole, slow to follow the commercial lines of the US model, with Maguire and Woodham (1997) citing the design group Bassett Gray as the lone pre-war exception to this rule – this group, founded in 1922, would later evolve to become the Design Research Unit (who are studied in detail in the third case study of this thesis, see p. 212).\(^{21}\)

Much of the early antipathy to American commercialism was directed towards product and industrial design, but by the 1950s, critics from within North America itself had begun to turn their attention towards the commercialism of advertising and graphic design. For example, Canadian cultural theorist Marshall McLuhan (1951) sought to reveal the symbolism behind various communication design artefacts, whilst underlining the wider implications of such works on society. Vance Packard (1957), meanwhile, sought to expose the secrets of the advertising industry in his seminal text, *The Hidden Persuaders*, documenting how psychological techniques were used in post-war America to manipulate consumers and induce desire for products. The techniques Packard described can be traced back to the work of public relations pioneer Edward Bernays, who had been one of the first to develop these strategies, publishing his earliest book on the subject in the early 1920s (Bernays, 1923). It was Packard’s text that brought these morally questionable practices firmly into the public eye, gaining notoriety as an early anti-consumerist doctrine, not just in America, but also in Britain, where the book gained popularity following its publication in 1960.

While British advertising practitioners had been willing enough to adopt the American advertising practices, albeit on their own terms (Nixon, 2013), the design community had greater difficulty reconciling the ‘hard sell’ tactics of American consumer culture with what they saw as the serious social purpose of design (MacCarthy, 1986). This explains the relatively slow development of consultant design

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\(^{21}\) Bassett Gray transmuted first to become ‘Industrial Design Partnership’ in 1935, before later regrouping after the war as the Design Research Unit (DRU).
activity in Britain. Sparke (1983) and Julier (2000) both cite the period from the late-1950s to the mid-1960s as the key period in which group practice found real momentum in Britain. Julier (2000) points to a raft of design consultancies founded between 1959 and 1965 (singling out James Pilditch’s Allied International Designers as pace-setters), but largely overlooks those groups founded in the 1940s and 50s, preferring to focus the lion share of his energy on the 1980s, a period he has scrutinised again in his most recent text which focuses on the neoliberalisation of design (Julier, 2017). Sparke (1983) meanwhile has acknowledged the isolated instances of consultant design in Britain during the 1940s, but skirts over development in the 50s as a whole. She contends that consultant design in Britain emerged out of the graphic design scene, just as it had done earlier in America. Yet in practice the key American practitioners had come from a range of backgrounds in theatre, advertising, graphics, fashion and furniture design (Gantz, 2014). From this base they each adapted their careers in order to capitalise on demand from the market, developing a commercialised form of industrial design that centred around the aesthetic ‘streamlining’ of products (Meikle, 1979). The development of consultant group practice in America thus stemmed from a group of applied artists with differing backgrounds who had increasingly aligned themselves with the design of industrial products.

In Britain, by comparison, it appears that the move towards group practice was allied to the development of corporate image-making work. This is a supposition I intend to test through the empirical work of this thesis. Furthermore, within this project I will consider how various design practitioners responded to developments in the Americanisation of British culture, with particular attention directed to how the imperatives of practitioners changed over time and how these shifting attitudes impacted the patterns of their day-to-day practice.

**Professionalism**

During the 1960s and 70s attitudes of British designers (both graphic designers and designers in a broader sense) can be seen to have diverged significantly as the discipline became more established as a central tenet of the marketing industry. Many of the shifting perspectives of the period are reflected in practitioners’ differing attitudes towards professionalism. Although the professional body of designers, the Society of Industrial Artists (SIA), had been founded as early as 1930, membership reached
unprecedented levels after the war as the status of the designer began to improve and opportunities in the industry expanded. The surge of interest in design professionalism had, by the 1960s, led to questions emerging around the ethics of professionalism and precisely whose interests the Society ought to serve. Many of the older generation who had been members prior to the war continued to be cautious of the influence of American commercialism on the development of the British scene. But while some supported the need for designers to meet the demands of society in order to be considered legitimate and responsible professionals, others were more motivated by the commercial opportunities opening up within the industry (Blake, 1965).

The SIA put in place a strict code of conduct forbidding its members from certain ungentlemanly or aggressively business-like behaviour, including a ruling that prohibited self-promotional activities (Armstrong, 2014). Such policies were not popular with all members though, with some of the younger generation questioning what they saw as the Society’s staid and reserved attitudes to competition. Furthermore, there was a sense in which the principles of the Society protected those more established members, reinforcing the status quo and thus limiting opportunities for entrepreneurial young designers trying to find a rung on the ladder. While some of the younger generation felt constrained by the strict code of the Society – Terence Conran is noted to have been forced to withdraw his membership in 1963 for an infringement to the ruling on advertising and self-promotion, having been caught touting his services through printed advertisements (Armstrong, 2014) – other newcomers failed to see the relevance of professional status and questioned the increasingly commercial imperatives of the profession.\textsuperscript{22}

Ken Garland’s (1964) oft-cited ‘First Things First’ manifesto has been canonised for its open and direct critique of the increasing commercialism within design and advertising of the 1960s; but Garland’s call-to-action was also, in part, a response to the apathy in which he held the SIA’s professional project. ‘First Things First’ (Garland, 1964) had initially been aired at an event at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, entitled ‘Why you should join the SIA’. Growing tired of the what he saw as the ‘prophetizing’ of

\textsuperscript{22} Though the intention had perhaps been to make an example of Conran, in practice the turn of events transpired to bring the legitimacy of the SIA under more scrutiny, for Conran went on to show that it was perfectly possibly to survive as a designer outside the constraints of the SIA, providing an unequivocal example that one could actually be more prosperous outside the confinement of the Society and its strict code of conduct (Armstrong, 2014).
the older generation, Garland (cited in Armstrong, 2014, p. 63) recalls how he been ready to leave, but instead decided to ‘write down what he really thought about design’. At the conclusion of the meeting when he read out his ideas they proved to be divisive among the audience, though many had encouraged him to publish his provocation, which he later did (Armstrong, 2014). Critiquing the commercial motives of the profession, Garland called for a reversal of priorities, whereby high-pressure consumer selling would be shunned in favour of, what he called ‘more useful and lasting forms of communication’ (Garland, 1964). In airing his views Garland’s motivation was, he argues, not to position design in opposition to advertising or commerce, or to seek the abolishment of high pressure advertising entirely, but rather to remind designers of their political and ethical responsibilities. In this sense he sought to steer a course towards a more socially-conscious form of design. Given that the SIA’s professional project claimed to be motivated by the betterment of society (Gray, 1970; Middleton, Lord & Pilditch, 1971), it is ironic that Garland sought to reject the SIA as an institution, while simultaneously championing many of the very same ideas it promoted. This course of events can be seen to reflect the shifting identity of the SIA as an organisation that battled with conflicting perspectives as it drew in a steadily increasing body of membership (Armstrong, 2014).

As graphic design began to gain traction as a recognised professional activity the practice went through a gradual process of increasing commercialisation from which the highly prized cultural capital of commercial art came to be challenged by more explicit drives towards the imperatives of economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986). Within this thesis I examine the different ways in which designers have practiced corporate image-making in order to determine how ‘matters of concern’ (Latour, 2004) driving the patterns of practice developed over time.
Chapter structure and introduction to cases

This thesis begins by explaining the practice theoretical perspective of the project. First, I set out some of the key ideas of the practice approach, before examining how practice theory has been mobilised by scholars working within design. In so doing I draw attention to the key principles that have informed the theoretical basis of this research. Next, I go on to explain how this research project has been designed, working through the structure of the collective case study approach, the chosen unit of analysis, and the rationale behind the selection of specific cases. I then go on to explain the methodology of the research by focussing on the methods of archival research and semi-structured interviews and my intention to triangulate qualitative data from these two distinct sources. Next, I look to consolidate the hybrid nature of this practice/historical research, situating the historiographic strategy of the project in relation to the concerns of design historians. First, I examine deficiencies typical within graphic design historiography, before explicating the scope of this particular enquiry in terms of past, present and futural value. Here I develop on the idea of 'reciprocity' (Blauvelt, 1994a) to elaborate my position as a researcher and practitioner located between historical enquiry and contemporary practice.

Within the literature review I look to examine more closely how corporate image-making has been covered to date, thus identifying common tropes in corporate communication design scholarship. I look at the overriding obsession with logos and the typical heroic, pro-corporate nature of many accounts. I then seek to question the relationship between branding design discourse and the more academic body of literature around corporate communications and marketing. Finally, I examine how those accounts that have recognised branding design as a systematic endeavour, tracing how the lineage of the programmatic approach has been accounted for.

Before finally launching into the detailed accounts of practice that constitute my case studies I develop a clearer understanding of how the discourse of corporate image-making developed in Britain around the middle of the twentieth century by analysing a series of texts published between 1933 and 1956. This account of literature deployed within the design community helps to develop a fuller picture of the context in which the case studies that follow play out. The range of formative texts studied here also serves to underscore the efforts of practitioners to codify the emergent practice of
corporate image-making and thus develop a distinctive and robust rhetoric from which the practice could further flourish.

The first case study examines the corporate image-making practice of design group Hans Schleger & Associates (HS&A) during the 1950s. It begins by establishing the formation and development of this consultant design group, tracing their origins to the individual commercial art practice of Hans Schleger. I explore Schleger’s early career, before going on to examine the nature of the group’s operation and their reliance on intuitive and reflective methods. By examining the working relationship between HS&A and the advertising agency Mather and Crowther (M&C) in their collaborative corporate image work for the fishmonger Mac Fisheries, I draw attention to the ‘ruling relations’ (Smith, 2001) between advertising and design practitioners of the 1950s.23 Referencing a pair of M&C Guard Books (catalogues of advertising work compiled to record ongoing campaigns) stored at the History of Advertising Trust (HAT) I trace the triadic relationship between HS&A, their client Mac Fisheries, and the advertising agency acting in their capacity as an intermediary. By closely examining the programme of Mac Fisheries adverts designed by HS&A under M&C’s stewardship we begin to understand the relationship between early British graphic designers and the advertising profession that they were often dependent on. We also see how corporate image work was impacted by such relations, as well as building a better understanding of how commercial artists like Schleger adapted their outlook to such commercial opportunities.

The second case study explores the systematic corporate image-making methods of Henrion Design Associates (HDA) during the 1960s. Examining the material apparatus of HDA’s practice I show how they sought to ‘scientise’ corporate image-making in order to enhance the legitimacy of their work. In so doing I seek to understand how the tenability of graphic design was changing in relation to shifting dependencies with the advertising business. Looking at tools HDA developed and mobilised in their work for The Post Office, Blue Circle Cement, and KLM, we see clear 

23 Feminist sociologist Dorothy E. Smith (2001) explores how texts and images can mediate, organise and construct particular social relations. For Smith (1990, p. 6), the concept of ‘ruling relations’ refers to: ‘the complex of extra-local relations that provide in contemporary societies a specialization of organization, control, and initiative. They are those forms that we know as bureaucracy, administration, management, professional organization and the media.’ As such, Smith was particularly interested in how texts (in an expanded sense) are able to reproduce standardised forms of control, management and communication.
attempts to rationalise the design process as well as to legitimise the creative act. Here I draw connections between the work of HDA and the ideas of the Design Methods Movement (an initiative to develop more robust and scientific conceptualisations of the design process, characterised by figures such as Bruce Archer, John Chris Jones and Christopher Alexander) in order to show how HDA’s work reflected concerns within the broader design community of the era. I also question HDA’s attempts to codify the design process as well as the reductive and simplistic nature with which they frame rational and intuitive design methods. Although HDA were led by the established commercial artist F.H.K. Henrion, here we develop a contrasting narrative to that of Schleger and his group, with the case of Henrion providing a more marked account of the changes that occurred in the transmutation of the commercial artist into the graphic designer. While Schleger strongly rejected the technocratisation of design, by comparison, Henrion led his group towards a more codified, technically rational form of practice. So, whereas the case of HS&A focuses largely on the ends (i.e. the end products of a design coordination process), the HDA case speaks of the coordination of the means of the production (i.e. the tools mobilised to control the process and those involved in its performance).

The third case study examines the corporate image-making practices of the Design Research Unit (DRU) during the 1950s and early 60s. Various project reports and manuals are scrutinised in order to explore how the group’s practice developed as they embraced corporate image-making as a key tenet of their business operation. I examine a range of documents created between 1950 and 1964 in order to build an understanding of how various material apparatuses were mobilised by the group in order to strengthen their working relationships with their clients and develop more robust claims to legitimacy for their work. I seek to develop an understanding of the DRU’s purported non-hierarchical and transparent working culture, looking at ruling relations within the governance of the group, and also in their communications with their clients. Furthermore, I seek to understand the development of corporate image standards manuals that enabled DRU to assert control at a distance over other creative practitioners working outside their immediate studio context but still involved in the implementation of their ideas. So, whereas the case of HDA speaks predominantly of the systematic coordination of the design process, the DRU case evidences how relations between client and designer were strengthened by material artefacts produced to aid designers in their communications with their clients.
In the conclusion I look to ‘zoom out’ from the detailed accounts of practice in an attempt to draw connections between the three cases studied. I trace my steps back to the initial objectives of the research in order to review progress made in addressing these founding questions and concerns. Finally, I consider the contribution to knowledge made by the project as a whole before going on to identify opportunities for future research.
Theoretical Framing

Practice theory

Introduction to practice theory

This research will map how the materiality of practice changed as graphic design developed from a discipline concerned primarily with individual virtuosity (of both designers and their designs), to one where coordination of effort and cumulative design effect became key. As design coordination emerged as a dominant paradigm for design consultants working in post-war Britain, the ontological status of the designer was transformed. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the developing processual complexities of design practice, I draw upon a range of theory from different disciplines, including: Management and Organisation Studies (MOS), Science and Technology Studies (STS), anthropology, ethnography, and the sociology of the professions.

My interest in the fields outlined above can be broadly linked under the umbrella of ‘practice theory’, an approach that emphasises process and performativity, turning attention to the tangible materiality of practice, as opposed to the outputs of any such practice. This theoretical positioning aligns well with the objectives of my research, which moves focus away from the study of individual design artefacts and instead towards the study of design as a complex nexus of different activities. Here I follow a theorisation of practice in which practices are fundamentally understood as socially meaningful patterns of action (Adler & Pouliot, 2011), with the patterning or routinisation of action being key.

According to Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger (2015, p. 449–50), the practice approach privileges not only process and performativity, but also recognises the potentially collective nature of knowledge. This is a particularly important point for my project, as I am concerned with the collaborative turn within post-war graphic design wherein group practice became increasingly commonplace; recognising the design process as a collective act is thus a core axiom of my project. Bueger and Gadinger (2015) posit that practice-theoretical approaches tend to endorse action as a form of knowledge too, and again, this is important to the positioning of my project which is
concerned with tacit (as well as explicit) forms of knowledge within the design process. Theorist Donald Schön (1983) refers to this knowledge embedded in the performativity of a practice as ‘knowing-in-action’. This particular idea comes to the fore in the first case study presented here on Hans Schleger & Associates, where Schleger and his team display a resistance to codified or explicit articulations of practice.

Social theorist Andreas Reckwitz (2002) sets out the distinctive features of practice theory in relation to other forms of social and cultural theory. For Reckwitz practice theory is one of three core forms of cultural theory, the others being ‘culturalist mentalism’ and ‘textualism’. As Reckwitz (2002, p. 245) explains, each of these schools of thought conceptualise the ‘smallest unit’ of social theory differently. So, while practice theorists locate the social within practice itself, mentalist theorists locate the social inside the human mind as they understand culture as a mental and cognitive phenomenon. According to Bueger and Gadinger (2015), who have developed on Reckwitz’s framework in their own work, the mentalist approach is exemplified by scholars such as Max Weber, Alfred Schütz, Edmund Husserl, Ferdinand de Saussure, and Claude Levi-Strauss. By comparison textualism locates the social within discourse, with scholars who typify this approach including Clifford Geertz, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Niklas Luhmann, Paul Ricoeur and Roland Barthes (Bueger and Gadinger, 2015). In their exposition of Reckwitz’s ideas, Bueger & Gadinger (2015, p. 451) explain that:

Practice theory embraces the importance of [both] mentalist and textualist ideas, yet suggests locating shared knowledge in practices. The focus is neither on the internal (inside the head of actors), nor on the external (in some form of structure). Instead, scholars see practice as ontologically in between the inside and the outside. They identify the social in the mind (since individuals are carriers of practices), but also in symbolic structures (since practices form more or less extra-subjective structures and patterns of action).

Furthermore, Schatzki (2002) suggests that practices are ontologically more fundamental than language and discourse. This sense of practice theory as an approach that acknowledges the importance of the minds of the practitioners, as well as the structures and discourses within which they operate, sits well with my research, as a study of corporate design as a process must consider both the internal and external operations of practitioners in order to provide an account of any meaningful depth.

One benefit of the practice approach is said to be in its potential to address a tendency towards irreducible dualisms, such as those of the: actor/system, social/material, body/mind and theory/action. It is not the intent of practice theory to
resolve these dualisms, as organisational theorist Davide Nicolini (2012) explains, but rather to move beyond them and to open up potentially more dynamic opportunities.\footnote{In his article on the ‘anti-design-historian’ design historian Kerry Purcell (2015) draws on Slavoj Žižek to underscore the possibilities that lie between poles: ‘Žižek directs our attention to the productive gap between opposites, rather than a traditional focus on the polarity of opposites or a desire to synthesize’ (Purcell, 2015, p. 56).} One such duality within my research plays out between the designer and the design artefacts that they produce. This interplay between the active coordination of the design workforce and the conscious coordination of their design outputs presents a knotty complex of alignment and misalignment. Adopting a practice theoretical approach will allow me to transcend this intricate and overlapping tangle of practitioners and their artefacts, shifting the focus away from either designers, or their designs, in order to gain a richer comprehension of how practice itself developed during the post-war era; here I am building upon Nicolini’s (2012) contention that the basic unit of analysis for understanding organisational phenomena are practices, rather than practitioners.

The notion of a practice centred approach goes against the grain of most ‘mainstream’ graphic design history (by which I refer to texts widely accessible to professionals and students of the discipline, as opposed to academic, peer reviewed papers or publications), where the model of the extensively-illustrated hagiographic monograph of the heroic individual practitioner has long been amongst the most dominant.\footnote{Examples of this approach include publisher Lund Humphries’ monographs on designers Abram Games (Games et al., 2003) and Hans Schleger (Schleger, 2001), as well as Unit Editions’s texts on F.H.K. Henrion (Shaughnessy, 2013) and Ken Garland (Shaughnessy, 2012).} This approach has tended to lead to relatively one-sided, acritical perspectives that seek to position the protagonists as pioneers at the forefront of their field. Such is the dominance of this tendency to focus on individuals, that design historian Bridget Wilkins (1992) was driven to argue for ‘No more heroes’.

In her article for Eye magazine, Wilkins (1992, p. 4) explains how the ‘hero approach’ to design history, ‘singles out individuals and emphasises the designer not as a communicator but as a personality’. Within this mode, she explains that, ‘life stories and anecdotes predominate’, tending to be ‘presented in a linear way, from birth to education to eventual maturity’ (Wilkins, 1992, p. 4).\footnote{Wilkins (1992, p. 7) went on to question why design history tended to be so obsessed by appearance, arguing for the ‘need to explain not “what it looks like” but “why it looks the way it does”’.}While my research focuses on industry-leading practitioners, it does so with a view to examining their day-to-day approach to practice in a more detailed way, concentrating on technical entities and...
how they are mobilised by practitioners in the performance of their work – in other words, rather than focussing on design artefacts as a product of the design process, I focus on the design apparatus that enable this practice to happen. Equally, my project moves emphases away from the individual graphic design practitioner, or ‘hero’, and towards the group, offering a critical re-examination of the way that group practice in design has been understood.

The reason my research centres on industry leading groups and figures (as opposed to forgotten or unheralded ones) is that commercial success is a central concern of this project which is interested in the tenability of graphic design as an independent and financially viable profession. The groups studied here were amongst the very first professional design groups in Britain and each represents a pioneering business enterprise of particular note. Design Research Unit, first established in 1943 is widely considered the first consultant design group in Britain (Sparke, 1983); meanwhile, Hans Schleger (1898–1976) and F.H.K. Henrion (1914–1990), have been put forward by design historian Robin Kinross (1990) as exemplary cases in the transmutation of the commercial artist into the graphic design professional.27

Scientific rationality and the technical entity as inscription device

To provide a rich and detailed insight into the historical practices outlined above I will use technology as a means to evidence processual complexity. By ‘technology’ I refer not only to technical machines, but rather to an expanded definition of technology as a system that involves ‘organisation, procedures, symbols, new words, equations, and, most of all, a mindset’ (Franklin, 1999, p. 3). This expanded notion of technology aligns well with Actor Network theorists’ conceptualisation of ‘inscription’, where material entities have been prefigured (or scripted) with certain affordances, conditions or knowledge (Akrich, 1992).

In this study the technological entities I investigate will include catalogues, manuals, tools, diagrams, specifications and formulas.28 In focussing on these kinds of entities I am championing the significance that such ‘things’ can have in establishing the

27 For more on the rationale behind the selection of these groups please see the ‘Research Design’ section of this thesis, p. 57.
28 For more detail on the specific entities in question see the ‘Methodology’ section of this thesis, p. 64.
patterns and routines of practice. Here I respond to philosopher Bruno Latour’s (1992) earlier contention that studies of organisational systems have historically been analysed almost exclusively without reference to the volumes of stuff involved. As management Professor Alex Preda (1999, p. 353) explains in his article ‘The turn to things’, things and artefacts have historically tended to be treated as ‘marginal, irrelevant or passive’ in terms of the production of social order. Such ‘things’, Preda argues, need to be reconsidered as active rather than passive social entities, as they have the capacity to: ‘bind human actors and participate in developing specific forms of social order because they allow for common practices to develop, stabilise and structure time’ (Preda, 1999, p. 351).

Though academics from a broad range of disciplines have sought to develop on the ideas of Latour and other STS scholars working in the area of Actor Network Theory (ANT), such as Law (2009) Callon (1986) and Akrich (1992), the notion of a practice-theoretical study of graphic design history told through the means of technical entities remains unprecedented. In order to interpret those technical entities implicated within the design process I draw upon the ANT conception of inscription. In their study of the scientific laboratory as a site of knowledge production Latour and Woolgar (1986, p. 88) cite Derrida (1977) in order to explain that the act of inscription is ‘an operation more basic than writing’, which can be understood to: ‘summarize all traces, spots, points, histograms, recorded numbers, spectra, peaks, and so on’. The powerful agency of inscriptions lies in the fact that they are commonly regarded as ‘having a direct relationship to “the original substance”’ (Latour & Woolgar, 1986, p. 51), and as such, their legitimacy tends to be accepted as a given. Latour and Woolgar’s particular interest lies in the ‘inscription device’, which they define as: ‘any item of apparatus or particular configuration of such items which can transform a material substance into a figure or diagram which is directly usable by one of the members of the office space’ (Latour & Woolgar, 1986, p. 51). Central to the power of the inscription then, is its relative durability when compared to thought or speech (Law, 1992).

As Latour (1983, p. 161; original emphases) explains, no matter the subject under scrutiny within the context of the laboratory, inscription devices remain fundamental to the communication of arguments by practitioners:

The only way they [scientists] can talk and not be undermined by counter-arguments as plausible as their own statements is if, and only if, they can make the things they say they are talking about easily readable. No matter the size, cost, length, and width of the instruments they build, the final
end product of all these inscription devices is always a written trace that makes the perceptive judgment of the others simpler.

While Latour’s work was founded upon critiquing the production of knowledge in the scientific laboratory, the ideas and principles he and his colleagues have developed have since been deployed in more far reaching contexts. Indeed, Latour (1986) himself argues that the file, as a form of bureaucratic inscription, can be understood to link economics, politics, sociology and the hard sciences. As such, the notion of inscription is thus a means to investigate power in a range of different contexts. Furthermore, according to Latour (1986, p. 27; original emphases), the rationality attributed to bureaucracy has been wrongly traced to the mind of bureaucrats, when in actuality it is their files – or their cascading inscriptions – that are more fundamental:

A man is never much more powerful than any other – even from a throne; but a man whose eye dominates records through which some sort of connections are established with millions of others may be said to dominate. This domination, however, is not a given but a slow construction and it can be corroded, interrupted or destroyed if the records, files and figures are immobilised, made more mutable, less readable, less combinable or unclear when displayed. In other words, the scale of an actor is not an absolute term but a relative one that varies with the ability to produce, capture, sum up and interpret information about other places and times.

Developing the idea of the inscription device, Akrich (1992, p. 208) argues that, ‘like a film script, technical objects define a framework of action’, and as such, they are programmed with certain affordances.29 According to Panourgias (2007, p. 63), it is the researcher’s job to, ‘“de-script” the various inscriptions and programmes of action embodied in particular sociotechnical arrangements’. It is through this act of de-scripting that all kinds of researchers are able to gain entry to the black boxes of practice. Thus, my role as the researcher in this project is to de-script the various inscriptions mobilised in and around the design practices selected for study. One of the key facets of an inscription-focused approach is the ability to address potentially disturbing material differences between the tools that are involved in a practice – thus, one is able to investigate a wide range of different artefacts from a single consistent viewpoint. This is significant for my study as the tools mobilised by design coordination practitioners vary greatly in their materiality.

29 Psychologist, James Jerome Gibson (1966) defined an affordance as what the environment provides or furnishes the animal. Meanwhile, design scholar Donald Norman (1988) later appropriated and popularised the term in the context of human–machine interaction, referring particularly to those action possibilities that are readily perceivable by an actor. In Norman’s view, an affordance explains why our perception of the environment leads to a particular course of action.
Practical rationality and the ineffability of practice

Given that inscription is a process concerned largely with the emergence and legitimisation of explicit, codified knowledge, it can be accorded with the framework of scientific rationality (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). While I have accounted for this dimension of practice above, it is equally important to make reference to aspects of practice that are often understood as more difficult to capture or codify – here I refer, at least in part, to Michael Polanyi’s (1966) conception of ‘tacit knowledge’ as a form of knowing that is difficult or impossible to communicate in words. The work of Donald Schön (1983) has been particularly influential in this realm. Schön looks at the way that practice is understood in professional contexts, and more precisely, what it means to practice as, and think like, a creative professional. Outlining how traditional understandings of professional knowledge have been powerfully shaped by what he calls the dominant model of technical rationality, Schön explains how minor professions emerging in the twentieth century sought to raise their status by modelling themselves on the ‘learned’ or ‘major’ professions of medicine and law. With technical rationality promoting the idea that professional activity is ‘instrumental problem solving made rigorous by the application of scientific theory and technique’ (Schön, 1983, p. 21), these so-called minor professions sought to develop robust and rigorous bodies of knowledge from which the aspiring professionals practising within their domains could draw upon.

Paying particular attention to the actions of architectural design practitioners, Schön (1983) questions the overbearing dominance of technical rationality, showing how, in practice, professionals are faced with many atypical, or ‘wicked problems’ (Rittel, 1973) that depend on a form of reflective thinking if they are to be addressed, if not resolved, to anything like a satisfactory standard. Schön’s (1983) conception of ‘reflective practice’ thus promotes the idea that professional knowledge presents itself in multiple forms, and that knowledge that emerges ‘in-action’ has as equal claim to validity as any a priori knowledge applied by rote.

Schön (1983) is by no means the only scholar to explore the role and meaning of reflection, with his ideas clearly interlinked with John Dewey’s (1933) earlier work, as well as having overlaps with the theories of scholars such as Michael Polanyi (1966), Joseph Schwab (1969) and Jürgen Habermas (1974). Also notable here is David A.  

50 Donald Schön (1983) refers to technical rationality as opposed to scientific rationality.
Kolb’s (1984) experiential learning cycle, which includes reflection as one part of a four-way learning process rooted in experience. Notwithstanding the broader interest in reflection as a concept, Schön’s notion of ‘reflective practice’ has proven especially significant, impacting scholarship across a wide range of disciplines, with attention coming from the fields of social work, nursing, teaching, and organization science (Thompson & Pascal, 2012) – such has been the interest in reflective practice that there now exists a journal dedicated to the subject (Ghaye, 2000).

Reflective practice has been especially significant in terms of scholarship in teaching and learning. In this respect, Max van Manen (1977) developed his own theory of reflective development, taking in three levels of reflection: technical, practical and critical. According to Van Manen, technical reflection is the most basic mode where practitioners concentrate on the effectiveness and efficiency of achieving predetermined goals. In practical reflection meanwhile, the processes or means by which the goals can be achieved, their underlying rationale and outcomes along with the goals themselves are subject to analysis, examination and assessment. In the final mode of critical reflection, moral and ethical considerations come to inform and impact practical reflection (Sellers, 2013). Van Manen (1991) later developed further theories of reflective practice in an attempt to account for its temporal nature, with this new theory taking in three different types of reflection: anticipatory, contemporaneous and retrospective. Aside from Van Manen’s (1977, 1991, 1995) work, there is a breadth of scholarship in the area of pedagogic research, including the work of Hatton and Smith (1995), Zeichner and Liston (1996), Valli (1997), and Grushka, McLeod and Reynolds (2005), to name but a few examples.

In spite of the widespread influence of Schön’s work, it has not been without its detractors. It is perhaps the openness of Schön’s ideas that has led them to garner such interest from a range of fields, but this trait has also left his work open to critique. One such case comes from educationalist Stephen Newman (1999), who regrets the ambiguity and baggage of Schön’s ‘reflective practice’, preferring instead either ‘critical practice’ (Tomlinson, 1995) or ‘practical philosophy’ (Elliot, 1991, p. 51). Furthermore, while Gilroy (1993) broadly accepts Schön’s notion of reflection, he argues that more empirical research is needed to further develop and clarify his ideas. Thompson and Pascal (2012) support this position, arguing that the theory base underpinning the subject has remained surprisingly underdeveloped. Elsewhere others (Eraut, 1995; Van
Manen, 1995) have suggested that Schön’s work does not take full account of the practical issues which practitioners face.

These criticisms of Schön’s work do not seem to have stemmed the flow of interest in reflective practice, with the concept proving to be an important one for management and organisation scholars too (Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). In this respect, Schön’s work has strong overlaps with ‘practice theory’ (Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 2002; Nicolini et al., 2012) – a popular realm of interest for scholars studying organisations. Scholars in this area have built on Schön’s work to delve more deeply into the philosophical underpinnings of his ideas. So, for example, management and organisation scholars Jörgen Sandberg and Haridimos Tsoukas (2011) work to carefully delineate between two alternative frameworks that they refer to as ‘scientific rationality’ and ‘practical rationality’ – with their scientific rationality being comparable to Schön’s technical rationality. In so doing, they suggest that theories of practice have commonly failed to grasp the logic of practice. So, rather than producing knowledge that helps to advance the practice, typical scientific theorisation has tended to become distant from the actualities of the practices that it seeks to describe and capture, thus failing to ‘do justice to the logic underlying practice’ (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011, p. 341). Sandberg and Tsoukas are keen to point out that both scientific- and practical- rationality are concerned with theory and practice in equal measure, but that each posits a distinct relationship between the pair. So, while scientific rationality makes practice derivative of theory (with practical relevance becoming ‘more abstract and less rich’ as a result), practical rationality makes theory a derivative of practice and is therefore ‘more reflective of the “richness” of practice’ (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011, p, 339).

In other work Tsoukas collaborates with Dvora Yanow (Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009) to embellish Schön’s (1983) concepts of reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action. Yanow and Tsoukas (2009) infer that knowledge develops from different forms of awareness which are prompted by the punctuation of practice by ruptures of varying severity. So, while minor ruptures (referred to as ‘malfunctions’) are dealt with almost subconsciously, more major ones (referred to as either ‘temporary’ or ‘complete breakdowns’) require careful deliberative reasoning and logic to be handled. Most of these states of surprise occur in what Schön refers to as the ‘action present’, with the
exception of the complete breakdown which moves practitioners into a more removed mode of engagement akin to Schöhn’s reflection-on-action.\textsuperscript{31}

Yanow and Tsoukas’s (2009) own account of reflection-on-action is conceptualised as a rather reactive mode of engagement. Such is the nature of the rhetoric of ‘breakdown’ that there is an inference that something broken has been identified that needs to be fixed. In practice, not all practitioners wait for a complete breakdown to reflect on their action, they may instead habitually reflect outside the action present in order to take a more proactive approach to the iterative development and refinement of their practice. This perspective accords with Van Manen’s (1991) ‘anticipatory’ mode of reflection, that looks forward rather than back.

In other work Tsoukas (2002, p. 1) has argued that certain forms of tacit knowledge are so deeply imbricated in practice that ‘they cannot be “captured”, “translated”, or “converted” but only displayed and manifested, in what we do’. Here he cites Polanyi’s (1966) conceptualisation of the tacit in order to contest Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) oft-cited theory that knowledge emerges at the intersection between tacit and explicit forms of awareness.\textsuperscript{32} In critiquing their work, Tsoukas (2002) shows that he is sympathetic to the idea that practical rationality is often ineffable, or in other words, can be too great or extreme to be expressed or described in words. As such, we are cautioned to remember that practice is often embodied and performative and thus difficult, or sometimes impossible, to explicate. These concerns about the nature of knowledge production are important for my research as I am directly concerned with the matter of how design practitioners legitimise and articulate the value of their work to other involved stakeholders.

\textsuperscript{31} Precisely when the ‘action present’ begins and ends is an ontological question open to interpretation and could be considered a weak point in Schöhn’s (1983) conceptualisation of reflective practice. Van Manen’s (1991) distinction between ‘retrospective reflection’ on past experiences and ‘anticipatory reflection’ on future experiences is arguably more precise, with his ‘contemporaneous reflection’ being most comparable to Schöhn’s reflection in action.

\textsuperscript{32} This dispute around the potential convertibility of tacit knowledge seems to come down to different conceptualisations of the nature of tacitness. While Tsoukas (2002) argues that tacit knowledge is characterised by its fundamental ineffability, Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) conception of the tacit seems more aligned with conventional understandings of implicit or unarticulated knowledge, whereby a non-codified awareness can be converted into a codified, explicit form.
Jurisdiction and the ruling of relations: ‘zooming out’ and ‘zooming in’

In my attempt to understand the power struggles inherent within different corporate image-making practices I adopt two supplementary concepts from sociological scholarship. The first is social theorist Andrew Abbott’s (2010) notion of ‘jurisdiction’, which emerges from his study of the systems around which professions evolve. Simply put jurisdiction can be understood as the relative control a group of practitioners have over a certain contested domain of work. In the case of my project I use the term to explore how graphic designers sought to develop the practice of corporate image-making in order to increase their independence from interrelated professions and gain a stable footing in the burgeoning marketing scene of the post-war era. In this sense the concept is useful as it allows me to consider macroscopic power-relations between competing but related professions, thus it allows me to ‘zoom out’ (Nicolini, 2012) and to see how graphic design, as an emergent profession, related to other competing practices, as well as the broader contextual scenario.

Particularly relevant here is the interlinked relationship between advertising and graphic design, where questions of jurisdiction and professional status are especially poignant. Using Abbott’s (2010) conceptualisation of professional jurisdiction thus allows me to examine how graphic designers sought to gain in status and establish their practice as a respectable profession. As Fournier (2010, p. 69) explains by reference to Abbott, ‘the professional project involves not only an occupational group appropriating a field as its exclusive area of jurisdiction and expertise, but also the making of this field into a legitimate area of knowledge of and intervention on the world’. Fournier (2010) thus emphasises that it is not enough to focus on jurisdictional ‘turf wars’, but instead that one must consider how a particular field has been legitimised. In this sense I will pay particular attention to design practitioners’ efforts to present their practices as legitimate.

The second concept I draw on is sociologist Dorothy Smith’s (2001) notion of ‘ruling relations’ which will allow me to consider power-relations at a more microscopic level, thus enabling me to ‘zoom in’ (Nicolini, 2012) on the nuance and detail of how the patterns of graphic design practice were changing. Much of Smith’s (1990, 2001) work has focused on the role of ‘texts’, that is in an expanded sense which includes: ‘words, numbers or images that exist in a materially replicable form’ (Smith, 2001, p. 164). Smith examines how the circulation of texts of various kinds has impacted the
organisation and governance of social life. As Kinsman (1995) explains in reference to Smith’s work, ‘regulatory work is textually mediated’, and as such, ‘textual mediation is a crucial aspect of the contemporary social organization of ruling’. Smith thus uses texts as a means to examine power relations from the common ground perspective of daily life, recognizing the importance of replicable material inscriptions of power. Campbell and Manicom (1995) claim that Smith had earlier referred to ‘accounts’ rather than ‘texts’ in her teaching, suggesting that Smith’s conceptualisation of a ‘text’ can usefully be interpreted as an inscribed record of a particular account of an event. Here Smith’s work echoes Latour’s and Woolgar’s (1986) interest in inscription and the potential for material artefacts – and especially what Latour (1986) refers to as the ‘immutable mobile’ – to exert control at a distance. In other words, both Smith and Latour are interested in how texts (or inscriptions) control practitioners in a range of different scenarios, whether localised or externally situated.

While Abbott’s (2010) ‘jurisdiction’ speaks to questions of power and control across the competitive professional marketplace (or across complex networks of interlinked practices), Smith’s (2001) ‘ruling relations’ is helpful in terms of understanding power and control within a particular micro practice. As Campbell and Manicom (1995) explain, Smith moves away from the typical scholastic position which looks down on one’s subject from above, to a stance where she locates herself in the common ground of daily life. Within my study this means deploying the idea of ‘ruling relations’ to examine how designers increasing sought to ‘rule relations’ over employees within their own design groups. This involves investigating how the three consultant groups under study – Hans Schleger & Associates, Henrion Design Associates and the Design Research Unit – managed the expectations and activities of their employees.

Further to this, I am particularly interested in the changing working relationships between designers and their commissioning clients. Smith’s work proves useful here too, as it enables one to move from the nuance and detail of practice within one particular organisation, to the organisation’s practice more broadly and particularly how it interlinks with other stakeholders and organisations – what Nicolini (2012) refers to as the expanded ‘practice net’. This is especially important as it helps me to move from the ‘zoomed in’ descriptive mode of studying an organisation, to a more explanatory, contextualised mode of exposition, where the acts of one organisation are framed from a more holistic, ‘zoomed out’ perspective.
Practice theoretical approaches to design

The ‘turn’ to practice that a number of scholars have elaborated upon – see The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory edited by Schatzki, Cetina & von Savigny (2005) and Nicolini’s (2012) Practice Theory, Work, and Organization: An Introduction – has not gone unnoticed within design scholarship, with a number of noteworthy scholars having worked with the theory. In The Design of Everyday Life (2007) Elizabeth Shove, Matthew Watson, Martin Hand and Jack Ingram sought to build on the arguments of scholars such as Latour (1986) and Preda (1999) by underlining the potential for a more materially aware examination of design, and in particular, product design. They place their emphasis on the forgotten agency of design objects (or what they call ‘nonhumans’), their interrelationship with humans, and the critical role they play in shaping and informing social life. They argue that due to persistent pockets of inattention from scholars there is a need to explore ‘how things are implicated in the development, persistence and disappearance of patterns and practices of everyday life’ (Shove et al., 2007, p. 3). From their perspective, this work is necessary in order to: reconsider things as more than just carriers of semiotic meaning, to reflect on how objects and practices co-evolve, and to consider how interrelated complexes of stuff (rather than just individual objects) influence patterns of practice.

Having established a clear conceptual framework for their work, Shove et al. (2007) go on to use this structure as a means to situate a range of case studies on subjects such as kitchen appliances, DIY culture, digital photography, as well as the material culture of plastic. It is interesting to note that Shove et al. (2007, p. 19) approach design from an expanded perspective, so rather than focussing specifically on the design profession, or designer objects, they take design to refer to ‘the ways in which practices and their constituent elements are contingently and provisionally knotted together’. Having said this, they do at times narrow their focus to industrial design, as per chapter six of their text which examines theories and practices of product design. In their introduction Shove et al. (2007) set out the potential for practice theory to be used as a means of interpreting design (in the broader sense). This is important for my work as it substantiates my own position in terms of the relevance of practice theory for understanding design. Their lack of attention on either graphic design or branding presents a clear opportunity for me to build on their work, while also developing original and distinctive research covering new areas of scholarship.
Julier (2007) also mobilises practice theory in order to argue for an enriched approach to the design process. Here he urges design practitioners to consider more fully the scenarios and networks within which the artefacts they are designing will be utilised. Not only does he encourage designers to consider the real-world practices of users when using their designs, but further, appeals to them to go beyond a focus on the individual end user and think in terms of social ergonomics; or in other words, to consider the social behaviours that design objects facilitate. More broadly speaking, Julier (2007) promotes the value of practice theory for the study of design, noting its potential to address not only commercial, but also social and environmental concerns. He suggests it might even help to resolve, what he calls, the ‘schism’ between the standardisation of Modernism and the individualism of Postmodernism:

Arguably, High Modernism concerned itself with all objects and people being equal and therefore homogeneous. Postmodernism promoted the idea that individual taste and experience mattered before social processes and activities. Practice theory’s dogged focus on ordinary, routine processes acknowledges the specificity and diversity of human activities rather than reducing them to single, aesthetic denominators. Equally, it reinvigorates a commitment to the importance of the social networks that make everyday life hum. (Julier, 2007, p. 49)

Elsewhere, design scholar Lucy Kimbell (2009) uses practice theory to suggest that our understanding of ‘design activity’ must be broadened in order to incorporate all of the actors involved in the process; not only the designer, but also commissioning clients, managers, users and other implicated parties. I would further this, by adding that both designs and design tools, could equally be considered fundamental actors within design contexts, and as such, must be factored into this equation. The sense in which design scenarios can be understood as complex socio-technical assemblages links back clearly to the work of STS scholars, as Kimbell (2009) acknowledges.

Kimbell sets out two practice-related concepts for understanding design in terms of ‘design thinking’. The second of these, ‘designs-in-practice’, aligns closely with Julier’s notion of the designer’s designs, or outputs, when ‘live’ in the world. This emphasises the emergent qualities of design when travelling from the site of conception and specification, to the site of production, and ultimately, the site of consumption. Kimbell’s first concept, ‘design-as-practice’, aligns directly with my study, in that it refers to the activity of designing. Kimbell (2009) argues that the resources of practice theory offer a potent means to investigate and better understand what we mean when we speak of design thinking. As she explains:
Design-as-practice mobilizes a way of thinking about the work of designing that acknowledges that design practices are habitual, possibly rule-governed, often shared, routinized, conscious or unconscious, and that they are embodied and situated. Design-as-practice cannot conceive of designing (the verb) without the artefacts that are created and used by the bodies and minds of people doing design. This way of thinking of design sees it as a situated and distributed accomplishment in which a number of things, people, and their doings and sayings, are implicated. (Kimbell, 2009, p. 10)

In terms of contemporary scholarship in the field of corporate identity, or branding, it is difficult to identify any body of literature that takes a critical perspective towards what Kimbell refers to as ‘design-as-practice’. As explained in the following ‘Literature Review’, there is a wealth of scholarly research available that centres on brand management and marketing; however, this business-minded, strategy focused canon of work is far removed from the typical literature that surrounds corporate graphic design practice. By comparison, this design-led work tends to focus on showcasing the latest, most visual work – for reference, see blogs such as Creative Review, or Brand New.

Design project manager turned academic AnneMarie Dorland (2009), provides one particularly incisive and frank counterpoint to the status quo, in her text: ‘Routinized Labour in the Graphic Design Studio’. Though not explicitly framed as taking a practice theoretical approach, Dorland’s account of the hoop-jumping routinisation of one contemporary Canadian design agency certainly shares the ideological and methodological spirit of practice theory. By observing and interviewing a selection of designers from one particular company, Dorland depicts a portrait of daily practice in stark opposition to the common conception of the design studio as a place of creative freedom and expression. Here instead is a dysfunctional and at times deceptive culture where designers’ design not for the needs of the end-users stated in the project briefing documents, or even for their clients, but rather for the stylistic whims of those colleagues directly managing their practice. Given that these colleagues (typically mid-level project managers) have often had little specialist design training, the integrity of the expertise provided by such businesses is clearly compromised as a result, as Dorland (2009) herself implies.

It is possible to take Dorland’s vision of corporate design – a highly routinised, risk-averse and misaligned practice – as the ‘end-game’ of the technocratic tendencies that seem to have to develop between 1945 and 1970 in Britain. Yet in spite of the

33 In developing her interest in the subject into a doctoral thesis, Dorland (2016) has since framed her work explicitly as having taken a practice theoretical approach.
salience of her particular study, given that Dorland’s insights are derived from a single case study of one design agency in Canada, a slight note of caution must be raised in considering how relevant her findings are for the rest of the sector.

_Studio Studies: Operations, Topologies & Displacements_, edited by Farias and Wilkie (2015), focuses upon the design studio as a site of cultural production. Of particular note here is Ariztía’s chapter which examines the role of references in the creative advertising studio (in Ariztía’s work the word ‘reference’ refers to particular cultural touch points – often embodied in image form – that are mobilised in order exemplify or symbolise a particular idea). A sociologist by training, Ariztía (2015) deploys concepts from STS and ANT, leaning heavily on the Latourian notion of ‘inscription’ in order to explore the role of references in mobilising and materialising the qualities of creative ideas. In summarising a debate planned to mark the _Studio Studies_ book release, Julier (2016) recounts how, according to Wilkie, the text develops on the premise that STS, as well as social and cultural theory more broadly, have to date ignored the studio, preferring to focus on the laboratory instead. Wilkie’s (2010) doctoral thesis is also noteworthy here, in its sustained effort to approach the study of design (and particularly the notion of User Centred Design) from the perspective of STS.

The recent scholarly activities in this area are encouraging, as they suggest a growing interest by design researchers to develop on the work of sociologists and particularly STS scholars. Though Dorland’s (2009) work focuses on graphic design from a practice theoretical perspective, scholars of graphics have been particularly slow to develop on these ideas, with the examples I have identified focussing on product design (Shove et al., 2007; Wilkie, 2010) and advertising (Aritzía, 2015). None of the instances I have highlighted have taken a historical perspective to the subject, though the Design History Conference of 2008 on ‘Networks of Design’, is worthy of mention here. Focussing on the relationship between ANT and design, the organisers argue in the conference proceedings (Glynne, Hackney & Minton, 2008) that although ANT is beginning to be mobilised within design studies, it is less developed in design history. As such, my study can be seen as a direct attempt to begin to address this lacuna. An important aspect of my work can therefore be seen as the contribution to historical knowledge empowered by contemporary practice theory. Yet this would be to overlook the practical dimensions of the work, and in fact, the contribution of this thesis can be
considered threefold in the sense that it draws together particular historical-, theoretical-, and practical- contributions to knowledge.
Research Design

Structure: The collective case study

To guide my research, I have adopted a qualitative case study strategy, with a view to obtaining detailed information about the workings of several design consultancies. As management scholar Robert Gephart (2004) explains, qualitative research approaches are the most appropriate when seeking to describe and understand processes. My intention in choosing a case study strategy is to seek what design scholars Guy Julier and Liz Moor (2009, p. 4) describe as ‘a deeper understanding of the processual complexities of design’. In selecting this strategy, I adopt a distinct mode of study to more conventional design management approaches, within which, as Julier and Moor (2009) explain, models of ‘best practice’ tend to emerge from the analysis of a range of different scenarios. According to Robert E. Stake (2005, p. 443), the adoption of a case study strategy is, contrary to popular opinion, ‘not a methodological choice, but rather a choice of what is to be studied’. Here, Stake (2005) emphasises the notion that cases may be studied by various different means and methods, but that ultimately, they are a device by which research is designed and structured, a viewpoint that Norman Blaikie (2009) supports in his text Designing Social Research.

For Stake (2005), a case study approach can take one of three distinct forms: intrinsic, instrumental, or collective. Stake’s ‘intrinsic’ model is based on the assumption that the case in question has special inherent value in and of itself and is studied primarily because of this particular interest value. In contrast, ‘instrumental’ cases are chosen to provide insight into an issue, or to obtain a better understanding of something else, perhaps to support a developing generalisation or theory. Finally, ‘collective’ cases are also instrumental, but form part of a joint study, in which several cases are researched that together represent a phenomenon, population, or general condition. Others have developed their own classifications, with Robert K. Yin (2003) promoting the sampling logic of single case studies and dividing these into either: critical, extreme or revelatory case types. According to Blaikie (2009), single case models
are useful for descriptive approaches, whereas multiple case models privilege a more explanatory mode of enquiry.

Within this research I adopt a collective case study model. The individual cases under scrutiny may well exhibit intrinsic value, but fundamentally they will be selected as instrumental examples that together, are representative of a more general phenomenon. One of the key features of instrumental cases is that they facilitate our understanding of something else. In my project this ‘something else’ is the shifting materiality of practice for graphic design professionals after World War II. Hence my choice of cases is made with a view to advancing our understanding of this shift. I have chosen to focus on a number of case studies across different sites in order to capture this phenomenon, for while single case study models are often limited to a descriptive role, the multiple case model can facilitate a more explanatory mode of research and insight.

In taking a collective approach I am mindful to treat each individual case with the requisite rigour and attention in order to develop the kind of meaningful and detailed depiction that Clifford Geertz describes as ‘thick description’ (1973). But as Stake (2005) explains, with collective case study research there is a potentially damaging tension in existence between the will to build theory through grand generalization and the necessity to commit enough attention to understand each individual case fully. Key here is to remember that whilst each case should be scrutinised and detailed, the intent of these endeavours is to pursue the larger, external interest. According to Blaikie (2009, p. 191), one of the core aims of collective case studies is the development of theory generated from the set of cases, that it is hoped, ‘will apply to an even wider collection of such cases’. Nevertheless, Stake (2005, p. 452) argues that when selecting cases, the primary criterion should be the ‘opportunity to learn’, as opposed to the relative representativeness of the case itself. Ultimately, it is evident that there is a fine balance to strike when selecting cases that are appropriate for investigating the research question as effectively as possible.
Unit of analysis and selection of cases

In my study the unit of analysis will be particular ways of practising corporate image-making within certain design practices. In order to select which groups will constitute my case studies I have conducted a pilot study of twenty-one design companies from a list put together from empirical research in the journal *Art & Industry* and the Council of Industrial Design’s magazine, *Design*. Three groups were selected for further study (see Table 1), on the basis that they exemplified particular pragmatic criteria, while also enabling me to map out how different corporate image-making practitioners sought to rule relations over their clients, competitors and colleagues. In this sense, the selection of cases has been governed by both practical and theoretical concerns, with the theoretical link being that all of the practices provide interesting examples of the quest for jurisdiction through ruling relations. In pragmatic terms the following selection criteria were of foremost concern:

1) *The group was active for ten years or more during the period of 1945–1970.*

Although the concept of the corporate design programme had existed in Britain prior to WWII, the development and actualisation of the concept did not come to any real significance until the early 1950s. My decision to begin this study immediately after the war allows me to consider the transitional period within which groups of practitioners began to form together as active business concerns. I have made a choice to exclude groups formed after 1960 as this will ensure that I am able to obtain a viable amount of operational data in relation to my study period which concludes in 1970. My intention is to explore the inauguration and development of corporate image-making as a group practice, rather than the later proliferation within contemporary society from the 1970s onwards. Whilst corporate design companies can be seen to grow in size, significance and number from 1970, it is my contention that this earlier period of corporate design activity has more potential in allowing us to understand how the materiality of graphic design consultancy emerged and evolved. Here I have excluded several important firms from my study, including Wolff Olins (Olins, 1995; Roberts, 2001) and Minale Tattersfield (Myerson, 1990; Sandino, 2005), on the basis that they were both formed in 1965. Though both firms have been subject to oral history research (see, Roberts, 2001, and Sandino, 2005 respectively), there remains a clear need for these companies to be
studied further in order to fully understand their influence. Given that these consultancies only began to come to the fore at the very end of my study period, I suggest they are best understood as strong cases for future research.

2) *The group was founded-in and operated-from a base in Britain.*

The choice to focus on design practice within a single nation was taken partly in acknowledgement of the cultural distinctions between practices performed across different countries and continents, and the sense that a global survey may be overly ambitious and too thinly spread. This consideration of depth versus breadth resulted in the decision to focus solely on Britain, whilst contextualising these British efforts in relation to comparable global developments. This allows enough scope to develop the necessary detailed analysis of everyday practice routines. Focusing on the development of corporate image-making in Britain allows me to build upon my own existing studies within this area too, harnessing my pre-existing knowledge (Preston, 2004, 2011, 2014). This decision rules out the inclusion of the companies of American practitioners Raymond Loewy (Loewy, 1979), who was known more for industrial design, and Walter Landor (Landor Associates, 1993; Gallagher, 2009), who developed premises in the Britain after earlier success in the United States.

3) *The group comprised of at least five employees at some point during the period.*

As it is the intention of this study to explore the dualistic relationship between design groups and the groups of design artefacts they produced (their corporate image programmes), individual practitioners and companies of less than five staff members have been excluded from the research. This has ruled out one-man teams who operated with the odd assistant as and when necessary. Although there are a number of individual freelance practitioners who made a name for themselves as corporate image-makers – H.A. Rothholz (2008b) is a notable example – the output of these designers is relatively insubstantial by comparison to the groups formed during the same period. Given the limited resources at their disposal these individuals simply struggled to influence the patterns of practice to the same degree as larger consultant groups who had larger resource pools to draw upon and often more public exposure.

4) *The group was commercially significant, highly regarded within the design industry and contributed to the development and codification of the discipline.*
As I am interested in the tenability of graphic design as an independent and commercially viable profession, I will focus solely on those groups who achieved commercial success during the period of 1945–1970. Given the difficulties of acquiring company records that indicate economic performance, this metric is gauged largely on the profile of the groups’ clientele. In terms of the regard in which the group were held, I have considered to what extent they received coverage within the design press of the day and whether any employees held positions of authority in the industry (as, for example, presidents of relevant organisations or societies). In terms of their role in developing and codifying the discipline, I have considered to what extent they were regarded ‘pioneers’ in their field and whether they published texts or spoke publicly about the discipline. I have excluded Banks and Miles (Department of Typography & Graphic Communication, n.d.; Myerson, 2002) on the basis that whilst they were well regarded and commercially significant, they contributed less to the codification and conceptual development of the discipline.

5) A major proportion of work created by the group during the period could be considered corporate image-making, with a particular emphasis on visual unification. As it is my intention to explicate the relationship between corporate design programmes and graphic design professionalism, I have chosen to focus on companies operating within these domains. This criterion excludes Crawfords advertising agency (Schwarzkopf, 2008), who despite carrying a reputation for the pedigree of their graphic work, operated within the realm of advertising. Other companies ruled out here include multi-disciplinary organisations that provided graphic expertise as a small component of their offering, for example: Gaby Schreiber (1991, 2009), Lucien & Robin Day (2000), Conran Design Group (Conran, 2016) and the companies of Richard Lonsdale-Hands (Sparke, 1983). One group that were under serious consideration for selection were Michael Farr (Design Integration) (MFDI hereafter). Given that corporate image-making was only a partial element of MFDI’s offering they did not strongly fulfil this criterion. Furthermore, they were only founded in 1961, which means that they were not operational for ten years during my study period. However, given the potential to learn from this example I have included it as a testing case in the appendix of this thesis (see Appendix 2).
6) Sufficient research material is available on the group in the form of archival documents and published works.

Given that 'opportunity to learn' (Stake, 2005) represents a key aspect in case study selection, it is important to consider the availability of access to empirical data about the group in question. Thus, ideally archival documents, and to a lesser extent, published works, should be accessible in relation to the group’s activities. I have excluded Allied International Designers on the basis that no archive of works is accessible – while company director James Pilditch (1961, 1970) published his own texts, his design consultancy has not been written about extensively. Likewise, while an archive exists on the work of Willy de Majo (2009), the archive was not made available to me as it was still in the process of being sorted and catalogued.

Having analysed the initial sample of twenty-one groups (Table 1), the three selected cases going forward in this study are: the Design Research Unit, Henrion Design Associates and Hans Schleger & Associates. These groups fulfil the practical selection criteria most resoundingly and will offer a broad cross-section of different ways of practising corporate image-making. As such they are appropriate instrumental examples, that together, represent the general phenomenon under study. Excluding those groups formed after 1960 will enable me to more carefully interrogate what Kinross (1988) refers to as the transmutation of graphic design practitioners after WWII. This is an important consideration given that this thesis is concerned with the shifting materiality of practice for graphic design consultants during the post-war era.
Table 1) Case selection analysis.

Fields marked in green indicate fulfilled criteria, orange represents partial fulfilment, red represents unfulfilled selection criteria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Heavily active during the period 1945–70</th>
<th>Founded-in and operated-from a base in Britain</th>
<th>At least five employees at some point during the period</th>
<th>Highly regarded in the industry and commercially significant</th>
<th>Large proportion of corporate image (visual unification) work</th>
<th>Research material available from archives (and published works)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Design Research Unit (1943)</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaby Schreiber Associates (1943)</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Typographical Designers (1945)</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. M. de Majo Associates (1946)</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henrion Design Associates (1948)</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans Schleger &amp; Associates (1954)</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woudhuysen Ltd. (1954)</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks &amp; Miles (1958)</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied International Designers (1959)</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Orange</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDMW (1959)</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Green</td>
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<td>Orange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.A. Rothholz &amp; Associates (1960)</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Farr Design Integration (1961)</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken Garland &amp; Associates (1962)</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kinner Calvert Associates (1964)</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Orange</td>
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<td>Orange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSAh Design Ltd. (1964)</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Orange</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minale Tattersfield (1964)</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Orange</td>
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<td>Orange</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wolff Olins (1965)</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Green</td>
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</table>
Methodology

Although the key protagonists behind the formation of the three selected case groups have each passed away, removing the opportunity for direct-from-source data collection, two key sources of data remain available to me: archival documents (including published texts authored by the protagonists) and first hand oral accounts from those that worked alongside, or in competition with these groups. Here I will describe how I intend to collect and employ these two forms of data.

Archival documents will be employed as material evidence of practice, and in particular the processual complexity of this practice. As such, I have selected a key technological tool, or set of tools, for each case study as a means by which to examine that particular practice in action. As previously explained, I refer to Franklin’s (1999, p. 10) expanded definition of technology as ‘a system’ that involves ‘organisation, procedures, symbols, new words, equations, and, most of all, a mindset’. Hence, I have sought to select technological entities that embody the procedural routines and organisational mind-sets of the groups in question, while also taking into account whether these ‘things’ provide the requisite ‘opportunity to learn’. The technological entities I employ are as follows:

1) For the Hans Schleger & Associates case study, a set of advertising agency Guard Books (catalogues compiled to record the development of a specific advertising campaign) have been selected to collect data about the triadic working relationship between the advertising agency Mather and Crowther, Hans Schleger & Associates (HS&A) and their commercial client, fishmonger Mac Fisheries. Particular attention will be paid here to the coordination of design artefacts within HS&A’s corporate image system for Mac Fisheries.

2) For the Henrion Design Associates case study, a range of methods and tools (including visualising tools, indexing systems and workflow plans) developed by Henrion and his colleagues have been selected as a means to collect data about the manner in which design groups were adapting to new project demands, in terms of the coordination of design artefacts (non-humans) and the organisation of the design workforce (humans).
3) For the Design Research Unit (DRU) case study, a group of project reports and manuals created by DRU have been selected to collect data about the manner in which specification documents and files influenced the development of corporate image-making practice. Particular attention will be paid to the nature of communications between DRU and their clients and collaborators.

As previously explained, Shove et al. (2007) have employed practice theory to study the underplayed importance of designed artefacts in everyday life with a focus on product design. My project, by comparison, will shine a light on the role that the technological entities listed above have played in the development of design practice itself. When I refer to practice, I refer to the everyday activities of designers at work: their actions, habits and rituals. Schatzki’s (2002) conceptualisation is useful here. He defines a practice as a bundled set of activities hierarchically organised into nexuses of doings, sayings, tasks and projects. Elsewhere, communications scholar John Postill (2010, p. 10) refers to Schatzki when suggesting that most practice theorists define practices as simply ‘“arrays of activity” in which the human body is the nexus’.

As I seek to understand different ways of practising through the lens of technical entities, I will, as far as possible, attempt to question and challenge these representations of action. As I am reliant on historical representations of practice (as manifested in material stuff), it is imperative to consider how much slippage there is likely to have been between the representation and the reality of that activity. It is equally important to take into account the active role that designers have played in shaping the ways in which their practices have been understood; many companies have used their approach to practice as a marketing tool in publicising their business, and as such, each representation needs to be treated with caution and criticality.

While material technology will form the base of each of my case studies, I will draw upon other material artefacts to support my arguments, these include the physical outputs of design coordination programmes, i.e. graphic design works sometimes referred to as ‘collateral’. As this thesis positions itself as ‘a history of practice’, as opposed to a ‘history of objects’ (Margolin, 1996), I am mindful to avoid over-emphasising the importance of these outputs of the design process. After all, the value they have in revealing data about the processual complexity of practice is relatively
negligible when compared with the rich data embedded in the tools and procedures that influenced their production (Akrich, 1992; Panourgias, 2007). It is equally important to note that while the technological objects may be critical actors in my study – constituting the means by which I view practice – I am not telling a history of these objects either, but rather the history of design practice that they enable.

While the technological entities I have identified are an important concern in my thesis, I am not solely dependent on them; for this is where first-hand oral accounts come into frame. I have identified a number of practitioners who worked with the organisations targeted in my case studies (whether employed directly by them or subcontracted as external agents). To gain insight from these individuals, qualitative semi-structured interviews (Spradley, 1979; Minichiello, Aroni & Hays, 2008; Blaikie, 2009) will be conducted over the course of this research to glean insights about the practices in question. Although these interviews have the potential to provide qualitative data that would otherwise be unattainable (as well as some limited quantitative data), the accounts provided are liable to be biased or distorted by the passing of time, providing only fragmentary evidence. It is important to acknowledge that interviewees will not provide ‘a passive depository of facts’, but rather, as oral historian, Alessandro Portelli (1998, p. 69) explains, in drawing on their memories, they will be engaged in ‘an active process of creation of meanings’. This does not negate the value of the data they provide, but rather it serves to underline the importance of the researcher’s particular means of interpretation. Thus, it is important to factor in the possibility of bias, consider the motives of the interviewee, as well as their relationship to the subject of the interview, with particular caution required when interviewing those who may have a particularly strong reason to promote, critique or defend the subject (Charlton, Myers & Sharpless, 2007).

A number of factors influenced the decision to adopt a semi-structured interview method, as I will explain here, but first I should acknowledge that my interview method sits at the intersection of three distinct domains of practice: oral history (Charlton et al., 2007; Portelli, 1998; Abrams, 2010), the ethnographic interview (Spradley, 1979) and the expert, or elite interview (Mikecz, 2012). As such, I draw on theoretical principles and practical know-how from these distinct domains to develop a robust and appropriate method. Whilst my interviews are fundamentally historical in nature, oral history methods (Oral History Society, n.d.; Charlton et al., 2007; Portelli, 1998; Abrams, 2010) are not the most effective means of gathering the focused insights
that I seek, as I will go on to explain. Although my interviewees are experts on the subject under scrutiny, as they are no longer actively engaged in their practice, the interview method and structure must be designed to reflect this, ruling out a strict adoption of the ‘expert interview’ method (Mikecz, 2012) which is conceived to address practising professionals. To develop the ideological base of my approach I build on observations from the ethnographic interview method (Spradley, 1979) and what Arch G. Woodside (2010) calls the long interview, as I will go on to explain here.

Towards the beginning of this study I conducted an initial pilot interview with Alan Parkin (a design consultant who worked with Henrion Design Associates, the central subject of my second case study), trialling the methods of oral history, as specified by the Oral History Society’s introduction to the subject taught at the British Library (Oral History Society, n.d.). After embarking on these trials, I found that the resultant interviews lacked clear direction, which in turn, led to the production of vast quantities of impertinent data that failed to address my research questions with any sense of urgency. This pilot revealed that the relatively passive, unstructured interview approach championed by the Oral History Society (n.d.) was unsuitable to obtain the data I required. So, rather than extensively surveying the respondents, I decided that more structure and direction were required with the interviews in order to ‘mine’ the respondents for the particular data I sought to gather (Woodside, 2010).34 Semi-structured interviews were adopted precisely for this reason, as they allowed me to direct interviewees to the issues and concerns pertinent to my research and collect the necessary data in an efficient manner. These semi-structured interviews were conducted using a pre-planned list of questions appropriate to each specific interviewee (see Appendix 1). Although I was keen to direct respondents to the key issues, I avoided leading questions that might encourage a certain response. So, whilst each interview was based around a set of predetermined questions, as the interviewer in each case, I choose to omit, or add to the pre-planned agenda, depending on the specific situation and the responses of individual interviewees. Questions and areas of discussion were planned on a subject-by-subject basis, though in some instances common questions were raised with multiple interviewees where appropriate.

34 When discussing the ‘long interview’ method, Woodside states that the intention is ‘not to survey the lives of respondents, but to mine them’ (2010, p. 263).
Establishing a shared understanding and trust with the interviewee within a short period of time was a critical challenge to overcome and meant being well-prepared and as knowledgeable as possible about the interviewee’s working life prior to the interview. As Robert Mikecz (2012, p. 482) explains in relation to the interviewing of elites, the success of the interview ‘hinges on the researcher’s knowledgeable of the interviewee’s life history and background’. As such, according to Mikecz (2012), it is important to behave as an ‘informed outsider’ in order to communicate that you are a competent and worthy dialogue partner. Flick (2009, p. 168) reiterates this point, claiming: ‘the need for interviewers to make clear in the interview that they are also familiar with its topic is in general a condition for successfully conducting such [expert] interviews.’ In this sense the fact that I am a practicing graphic design practitioner with several years’ experience helped to develop a shared sense of trust with the interviewees.

As the interviewer, I adopted a neutral but empathetic and encouraging tone with my interviewees. As Spradley (1979) explains in relation to the ethnographic interview method, it is important for the interviewer to develop and maintain a rapport with the interviewee in order to retain their active cooperation. As such, I took care to avoid introducing new discursive prompts too rapidly, in order to stop the interview becoming ‘more like a formal interrogation’ (Spradley, 1979, p. 58). Although I have not explicitly conducted an ethnographic study, Spradley’s (1979) principles remain pertinent to my enquiry. He suggests that the ethnographic interview shares many features with the friendly conversation, pointing out the following key differences: ‘turn taking is less balanced’ (i.e. the interviewer asks almost all the questions); ‘repeating replaces the normal rule of avoiding repetition’ (i.e. the interviewer pursues subjects of particular interest); ‘expressing interest and ignorance occur more often but only on the part of the ethnographer [...] in place of the normal practice of abbreviating, the ethnographer encourages expanding on what each person says’ (Spradley, 1979, pp. 67–68). The notion of a ‘friendly conversation’ (Spradley, 1979) appears at odds with the oral history method where the interviewer is encouraged to remain a largely silent facilitator for the interviewee’s stories. In my role as interviewer I was aware that I held a strong influence over the subject of the dialogue with my interviewees and as a result I did my utmost to avoid influencing the actual opinions expressed by the interviewees.

Given the partiality of any material gleaned from semi-structured interviews, it was decided that recorded oral accounts would be used primarily as a supplementary source – Blakie (2009) classifies this as an embedded method, in as much that it is
supplementary to the core method. As such, this data is used in conjunction with the empirical data captured from the archival material. Here I conduct what Denzin (1989) refers to as 'between-method' methodological triangulation – in other words the data produced from multiple methods is compared through triangulation.\(^{35}\) Although I am using the interviews as a supportive and complementary method, this is not to say that the archival material does not have its own deficits. As Durepos and Mills (2012, p. 255) explain, ‘archives are socially constructed sites, which are manicured according to the conventions of archivists and house limited documents, archives can be understood as concealing as much as they reveal’. In view of this, the rigour and rationale with which this qualitative archival data is interpreted is clearly key to testing the validity of my findings. My goal was to triangulate between the archival research and data gleaned from semi-structured interviews in order to test the validity of both sets of data.

\(^{35}\) Although I am using only two different methods of data collection this can still be described as triangulation (Denzin, 1989).
Historiographic strategy

Common deficiencies of graphic design history


The problem of method in the construction of narratives is particularly acute in the field of graphic design history. Various publications have brought attention to the subject of graphic design history, but have not marked a course for the full explanation of how graphic design developed as a practice.

In highlighting the lack of attention given to the evolutionary development of practice – as opposed to design objects, movements, styles or people – Margolin lends weight to the imperatives of my own research, which seeks to position practice centre stage. In focussing on practice, I seek to establish how social, technological and ideological changes impacted on the ontological development of corporate communication design practice during the post-war period in Britain.

According to Margolin (1994, p. 234), the narrative texts he assesses are ‘particularly attentive to visual quality’, with each being ‘propelled along by changes in the look and form of designs’. The notion of personal aesthetic judgement informing the selection of featured designs is problematic, but as Blauvelt (1994a, p. 208) explains, traditionally design historians have tended to ‘cater to an art historical tendency in which the things closest to paintings, like posters, get shown’. Within this mode design artefacts are selected which ‘testify to the value of good design’ (Blauvelt, 1994a, p. 208), leading Fry (1988) to label such an approach as a model founded on connoisseurship.

Margolin (1994) emphasises that unsubstantiated moral judgement has had too great an influence over the choice of method and subject matter that design historians have chosen to adopt. Here he directly contests Adrian Forty’s (1993) assertion that the judgement of quality in design is central to the enterprise of design itself, and thus, equally fundamental to design history. Given that my research builds on the premise
that studies of disciplinary progress have leant too heavily on aesthetic, as opposed to practice theoretical concerns, I am generally sympathetic to Margolin’s viewpoint. Graphic design historians’ preoccupation with image has only exacerbated the lack of understanding of the wider relevance of the discipline, further reinforcing the misconception that it is a field concerned with little more than a surface-level veneer. Forty’s (1993) claim that design historians must consider the relative value of design work is clumsily rendered, being bogged down by what I would argue is an overly simplistic argument around ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ design. But his premise that design historians must make evaluative judgements about design retains some validity. Instead of asking how ‘good’ a design is in relation to other designs, I suggest that design historians ought to consider to whom and to what design is ‘good’ for; for example, does the design in question benefit the economy, the labour force, society, or the environment more broadly?

The question of objectivity has long coloured discussion around the subject of history more broadly, with scholars debating just how factual any historical narrative can claim to be. Theorists, such as Hayden White (1980), follow Hegel’s philosophical belief in the past as a present construction that provides a sense of order, coherence and closure that is purely imaginary. Linda Hutcheon (1989), meanwhile, has gone further in arguing that a distinction cannot be made between fact and fiction, and that essentially, all history is fiction. The subjective/objective debate brings into question the methodological framework upon which design historical studies have been based – a subject Fallan and Lees-Maffei (2015) have covered in some depth. As already explained, graphic design historians have often framed their work around their own unarticulated agendas and tastes. Novelty has been highly prized, with scholars tending to obsess over what came first, with the first incidence of particular achievements being regarded as especially important.

The sense of the image, or visual, driving the historical narrative is particularly problematic on a number of levels, not least in terms of its insular, blinkered, self-serving nature, for such an object-oriented strategy of stylistic successions has also tended to lead to uncomplicated, linear stories that present technological and professional progress as faites accomplis. In summarising the merits of such an approach, Victor Burgin (quoted in Margolin, 1994, p. 209) explains how art and design history can ‘legitimate careers and commodities’; a benefit he frames as ‘history writing as [professional] underwriting’. This brings an important issue to the surface, that is, the
danger that in bringing practice and history closer together (as I intend to do), history can be deployed to substantiate the motives and agendas of practitioners. As opposed to using history as a crutch to prop up practice, instead I endeavour to critically evaluate, and so re-interpret, the ways in which ‘heroic’ design practitioners have been represented. Instead of focussing on the outputs of their creative work, I focus instead on the act of work itself, seeking to understand how the work was organised, what the motives behind the work were, and who was involved in influencing the direction of the work in question.

The scope of historical enquiry

Margolin (1994) is particularly sensitive to the disciplinary specificity of activities in and around graphic design practice. He claims that typography, art direction and illustration have tended to be collapsed into one over-arching narrative approach to the subject that has little interest in disciplinary specificity. I would add the more established disciplines of advertising and printing to this list of inter-related but differentiated activities, as well as a core subject of this study, corporate branding. Margolin (1994, p. 243) argues that instead of collapsing these activities into one tightly held linear narrative, we should be explaining ‘how the various activities that fall within the construct of graphic design are differentiated’. This stance that acknowledges and explores the tensions between activities has potential to be more revealing than the default position which holds these activities together in a false concordance. As such, my research will pay particular attention to the interrelationships between advertising, graphic design and corporate branding in an attempt to explicate the complex historical entanglements of these activities.

Aside from the question of quite how specific and narrowly defined historical studies of graphic design ought to be, there remains a broader debate as to whether graphic design history should be considered as a facet of the broader domain of design history, and as such, whether it should be developing upon the methods established by scholars working in this more expansive field or employing its own subject-specific methods. According to Lees-Maffei (2009), ever since the 1970s design historians have sought to develop the status of design history as a tenable discipline distinct from the long-established model of art history. By comparison, the more specific field of graphic design history is relatively under-developed, with Blauvelt (1994a, p. 206) describing the
field as a ‘proto-discipline’, then later rueing that earlier ‘deep interest’ in the field seemed to have waned, or even stalled entirely (Blauvelt, 2010). Yet in spite of the relative infancy of graphic design history, Blauvelt (1994a) argues that rather than adopting the universal, umbrella-approaches of design history, the subject would be better served by more subject-specific approaches tailored to its specific historical contexts.

My historiographic approach is informed by the aims and objectives of my research, and given that this project is led by a concern for design-as-practice (Kimbell, 2009), I have identified that it shares as many commonalities with practice theory (Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, Cetina & von Savigny, 2005; Nicolini, 2012) – which can be understood as a strand of Management and Organizational Studies and is closely related to Science and Technology Studies – as it does with the theory and methods of design history. As such, I will employ a tool kit approach that leans heavily on the work of practice theorists such as Nicolini (2012), while establishing a historiographic strategy developed from the work of design historians outlined in this section of the thesis.

Some scholars have questioned whether design historians have paid enough attention to the relationship between design history and design practice, with Margolin (1995, p. 20) claiming that ‘Design history [...] has not had much success in engaging with issues of current practice’. Julier and Narotzky (1998, p. 1) have written along similar lines in their text ‘The Redundancy of Design History’, claiming:

We wish to demonstrate how so many members of the older generation of our extended family of design historians, and some of their offspring, our cousins, are dangerously out of touch with the activity they seek to analyze. This nomadic tribe has wandered so far from its roots that we question whether design history has made itself redundant as a contributor to paradigms of practice.

In their attempts to develop the field of design history into a tenable independent field, design historians have propagated clear ruptures between design practitioners and academic historians of designs (Margolin, 1995; Julier & Narotzky, 1998). While it seems inevitable that historians of design have articulated themselves in relation to historians of art, creating such a strong division between design history and design practice seems counter-productive given the potential for dynamic cross-fertilisation between the two. Some historians of design (Lees-Maffei & Huppatz, 2012) have regretted the tradition for design history to be understood as a service subject developed around the needs of training emergent designers. Fallon (2015, p. 18), developing on the idea that design history should not be at the service of either education, or practice, has
continued to argue for design history to be considered as a form of academic scholarship in its own right and ‘a legitimate (sub-)field in the discipline of history’. One concern with this approach is that those design historians who aspire to treat design history as a scholarly subject divorced from the concerns of design as a practice are in some cases the very same individuals who are tasked with training the practising designers of the future. In this scenario there is a danger that emergent practising designers are alienated by the history of design as a scholarly subject and miss out on rich opportunities to understand and question the paradigms of practice. By comparison this thesis moves design history closer to practice in order to make a more meaningful contribution to the way that the paradigms of practice are understood; for understanding the paradigms of practice is an important step in enabling dominant orthodoxies to be challenged more deftly.

Margolin (1995) proposes ‘design studies’ as an alternate approach to design historical enquiry that would more effectively bring history into relation with issues of current practice. Tony Fry (Fry, 2009; Fry, Dilnot & Stewart, 2015) is another scholar to have developed the potential for design history to influence the paradigms of practice, suggesting that the narrowly focused design historical studies that currently predominate, are self-serving and limited in ambition by their preoccupation with disciplinary boundaries. Moreover, Fry (2015, p. 8) refers to what he sees as design history’s ‘clean, sanitized and risk-free engagement with “the world”’, going on to question whether the subject is actually engaged in an attempt to understand history at all:

[…] design history dominantly fails to recognize the historical significance of design […] the project before us is to move design out of what in the critical scheme of things is a trivial modality of history, into a position wherein its actual historical importance, and thus its futural significance, is understood and engaged. (Fry, Dilnot and Stewart, 2015, p. viii)

In claiming that our understanding of the past has an increasingly important role to play in dealing with what he refers to as ‘the deepening complexities of the late modern world’, Fry (2015, p. 3) argues that design historians must sharpen their critical faculties and significantly widen the scope of their enquiries. This must be done in order to help realise the potential of ‘design thought and design action for sustaining the future well-being of humanity and the environments of our dependence’ (Fry, Dilnot & Stewart, 2015, p. ii). Though these claims may appear high-flown, it is widely acknowledged that design (Papanek, 1971; Fry, 2009; Escobar, 2018), and the tools of design – including
'design thinking' (Kelley, 2005; Brown, 2009; Martin, 2009) – have an important role to play in addressing the environmental and societal problems we are faced with today. In order for this potential to be fulfilled, design history has a potentially important part to play in supporting design practice to become more critical and reflective of itself.

One stated pitfall in linking history to the present is to fall into the trap outlined above, wherein history is used to serve and substantiate our current perspective. As Dilnot (1989, p. 237) puts it, this is history ‘anticipating and legitimating the present’. Blauvelt (1994a, p. 231) writes with poise on this subject, countering this position with a call for a greater sense of ‘reciprocity’ between the past and the present:

[...] the representation of the past from a present perspective does not reduce [it] to a pragmatic device for current ideological gains, but produces a reciprocal relationship between the prospective vision of a past reality and the historical representation of that vision by the historian [...] It is within this reciprocity that we can understand the importance of shifting the unilateral viewpoint of subjective histories of graphic design to the reciprocity of discursive analysis.

In spite of the time passed since Blauvelt’s text, the idea of reciprocal exchange between past and present remains progressive for design history and especially historical accounts of graphic design. Unorthodox texts such as De Landa’s (1997) *A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History*, have demonstrated the potential for those willing to question the strict linearity of more conventional historical accounts; but work such as De Landa’s has continued to remain an exception to the rule, with more conventional approaches continuing to persist, particular within mainstream, non-academic domains. The dogged treatment of history as events that are to be revered, but ultimately resigned to the past, contrasts with the more future-facing interest from practice-quarters in speculative design and design fictions, which look to stimulate and question our designed futures (Dunne and Raby, 2013; Hales, 2013). Building bridges between backward-facing historical approaches and forward-facing speculative ones holds significant promise for the reciprocity that Blauvelt advocates.

**Summary**

While Margolin’s (1994) plea for increased sensitivity to inter-disciplinary historical study sits comfortably with Blauvelt’s (1994a) call for more nuanced, subject-specific methodologies, Fry’s (2015) demand for a less risk averse, complex form of design history with less concern for disciplinary boundaries seems, at least on the surface, at odds with this. I would like to suggest that in actuality these ideas are not as
incompatible as they might at first seem. Fry’s argument is fundamentally about the inherent motives and mind-sets that drive design-historical research. His position is a rallying call to design historians to stop squandering their energies seeking to establish and protect their own subject interests and to think about the broader significance of their practices as historians. To do so does not necessarily mean that the subject matter of enquiry must be ‘big’, but rather that the broader ambition and frame of reference of the work ought to be. Fry’s concept of the ‘futural significance’ of history resonates with the outlook of my study in which historical precedent is explored with a view to informing current practice. In engaging with the historical source matter in this study I intend to address the concept of futural significance by engendering a reciprocity between past and present concerns, thus traversing between my nuanced subject matter and a broader outlook in terms of time-zone and impact – practice theorists, such as Nicolini (2012), as I have noted above, refer to this as a process of ‘zooming in’ and ‘zooming out’ that seeks to draw connections between micro and macro observations.

While Fry’s agenda is driven by a macroscopic world-view and aligns with a sustainability agenda, my research material remains narrowly-focused in terms of its subject matter and attention to disciplinary specificity. However, the intent in examining these micro-practices is to question the increasingly powerful role that developing economic forces had upon graphic design, and how the rise of capitalism, together with processes of neoliberalisation, impacted upon the concerns of designers.

According to Lees-Maffei’s (2009) Production-Consumption-Mediation framework, my research would fall firmly within the remit of what now tends to be viewed by design historians as a retrogressive focus on ‘production’ – during the 1990s, in particular, scholars sought to shift momentum away from studies of production and towards studies of consumption that paid a greater attention to the broader social order. However, I contend that my interest in the social order of the design studio as a site of production is a progressive one. Far from being an isolationist view of practice that privileges the intentions of designers, my project seeks to trace connections between the social order of the post-war design studio and the broader social order of the era. Furthermore, I am interested in considering how the post-war design studio acted as a powerful inscription device that has had consequences beyond the concentrated period of study presented here.
Literature Review

Overarching tropes in the treatment of corporate image

Taxonomies of trademarks and the obsession with corporate symbols

Within design scholarship the practice of creating visual identities has tended to be treated as a facet of the broader domain of graphic design. The focus of this interest has typically peaked with the logo or trademark, which has been the focal point of a stream of dedicated texts. In 1952, Egbert Jacobsen edited one such volume, *Seven Designers Look at Trademark Design*, within which a number of prominent North American practitioners set out their take on the process of creating a trademark. What has since followed, appears to have been an inexhaustible stream of inventories, each extensively cataloguing the corporate symbols of their time. Key examples here include works by Kamekura (1965), Ricci and Ferrari (1973), Kuwayama (1973), Wildbur (1979), Klanten (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014), Evamy (2007) and Hyland and Bateman (2011). These inventories share in a tendency to collate and classify a multitude of symbols with the fervour of an enthusiastic collector. In their efforts to capture great breadth and variety, they extract such symbols from their socio-cultural context, removing much of their meaning and reducing them to studies in form. While there are texts on the subject that have adopted formats distinct from the taxonomic catalogues – the logo design text book being a prominent one (e.g. Haskett, 1984) – I highlight this sequence of publications in order to draw attention to the overbearing tendencies affecting the discipline that have limited the manner with which it has been studied and understood.

From the above, it can be argued that corporate communication design has been largely understood as an activity centred around a single symbolic mark. This notion is exemplified further by the popular press coverage of branding, where it is common practice to make direct comparison between the size of a comprehensive branding job fee and the seemingly insubstantial corporate symbol. Hence, we have the *Daily Mail* (Poulter, 2003) publishing headlines such as the following, 'BT pays off the piper with £20m logo'; and *The Daily Telegraph* (Carlin, 2007) introducing articles along the
following lines, ‘Bosses of the 2012 Olympics were plunged into a fresh row last night after spending £400,000 on a controversial new logo for the London Games’. My research project will move beyond this preoccupation with the singular logo, to present corporate image-making as a programmatic concern that encapsulates complex identity systems of multiple design artefacts demarcated by a consistently applied house style. But first it is worth considering why the literature in the brand identity design field has been so dominated by isolated corporate logos. Understanding this tendency will help to reveal the risks involved in an alternative systems-based approach to corporate communication design.36 The following range of factors may help to explain this predilection:

1) As a single entity, the logo or trademark, is relatively straightforward to comprehend as it is generally conceived with utmost clarity in mind – as the North American designer Paul Rand (1993, p. 58) exclaimed, ‘the principal role of a logo is to identify, and simplicity is its means’ – by contrast, design systems are complex and messy in their multifariousness.

2) Although many corporate image schemes consist of a great deal more than a single symbol or word-mark, the logo remains the one accepted given that all corporate design schemes are, almost without exception, expected to have (Shaughnessy, 2014a). So, while Simon Manchipp (2010) of contemporary London design agency SomeOne, raised his company’s profile with the provocation: ‘Logos are dead.’; the ensuing backlash appears to have led to a change in stance, with SomeOne adding a question mark to the end of their statement (‘Logos are dead?’) and re-emphasising the de-prioritisation of the logo, as opposed to its outright extinction (Manchipp, 2011). This highlights the difficulty some practitioners have had in their attempts to question the centrality of the logo as a fundamental asset of a brand identity.

36 Although the subject of branding is extremely broad and has been studied from a wide range of perspectives, the field of visual identity design is rather more self-contained and has tended to focus on logos rather than holistic identity schemes. I will go on to discuss the concept of ‘brand’ in broader terms later in this literature review, but here I am concerned specifically with the visual aspect of designing visual identities (the aesthetic image of the corporation) and how this has been understood and examined by scholars, practitioners, and other commentators.
3) Historically speaking, the ‘logo’ as symbolic mark came first (Mollerup, 1999; Shaughnessy, 2014a). So, while trademarks can be traced back centuries (Mollerup, 1999) the idea of a comprehensive identity scheme with a number of visual assets (typically incorporating a standardised approach to colour, typography and image) only began to find favour early in the twentieth century, becoming increasingly commonplace after WWII, as the venerated North American designer Saul Bass (1990) attests.

4) The logo as symbol tends to be the visual cornerstone or lynchpin upon which other design assets are based, as such it is commonly representative of the larger scheme (Blauvelt, 2012; Shaughnessy, 2014a).

5) The implementation stage at which a visual identity is applied to real world assets tends to follow on from the initial stage in which the client and designer agree upon and specify the bounds within which the identity will operate. So, as the realisation and implementation follow on from the moment of gestation and concretisation at which the identity is normally publicised and released, this means the corporate logo is usually the first concrete, final output (practically all press releases marking the release of new visual identities present virtual mock-ups, rather than realised examples that exist in the marketplace).

6) The broader identity scheme beyond the symbol or word-mark can begin to lose its precision as soon as it is released into the outside world (also often being released from the clutches of the design agency which created it, to a number of other agencies, or an in-house team), due to the misalignment between its speculated and intended usage and the demands of ‘real-world’ contexts. This state of inevitable, but uncontrollable misalignment has not generally been viewed as a moment to celebrate as it confounds the controlled coherence promised by such schemes. Some design firms are now working actively to ease the transition from internal conception to external deployment, using workshops to better equip their clients so they are more capable of implementing a proposed branding scheme (Harries, 2017).

7) When the identity has been fully implemented (moving from a virtual specification to an actualised existence) it can be difficult to trace and document its existence in the
outside world as it becomes so widely distributed across complex national and international networks. During the London 2012 Olympic games the V&A museum took the unprecedented step of engaging the public in an attempt to collectively record and document the implementation of the games’ visual identity (Flood, 2012).

**Case studies, gurus and ‘celebrations of success’**

Aside from the literature focused on symbols, also prevalent are those texts emanating from one specific corporation or design organization. Design historian Jonathan Woodham (1997) has written with great insight about literature in this area within the bibliographic essay of his text, *Twentieth Century Design*. Woodham (1997, p. 268) rightly criticises the way that corporate design has been covered, claiming that most of the literature in the field is of a ‘journalistic, pro-corporate outlook’. Here he cites the example of Lubliner’s (1994) *Global Corporate Identity: The Cross-Border Marking Challenge* as ‘typical of the general literature in the field’, proclaiming it: ‘a slickly presented set of case studies of companies with large multinational clients’ (Woodham, 1997, p. 268). Other examples of this ilk include Nakanishi’s (1979, 1985) *Corporate Design Systems 1: Case Studies in International Applications*, and *Corporate Design Systems 2: Identity through Graphics*.

Where taxonomies of trademarks have located corporate branding firmly within the realm of graphic design, the case study format has tended to place the subject as a more divergent discipline, taking in architecture, product design and event design, for example. Woodham also acknowledges the trope of the self-promotional, showcase publication, or what he calls ‘celebrations of success’, that have been produced by either individual design agencies, such as the Design Research Unit (Blake & Blake, 1969) or Pentagram (Gorb, 1978), or specific corporations, such as Olivetti, IBM or Braun (for extensive references here see Woodham, 1997, pp. 268–9). Woodham (1997, p. 268) marks out John Heskett’s (1989) *Philips: A Study of the Corporate Management of Design* as noteworthy for its unusually penetrative analysis but regrets that even this praise-worthy example is ‘tinged with partiality’. As he notes, these showcase texts have most often been sponsored, and sometimes even self-published, by the subjects of the studies themselves and this goes a long way to explaining their oft one-sided nature.

Equally problematic for similar reasons are the ‘how-to-do-it’, or ‘guru’ texts that have emanated from figureheads in the industry who tend to have a vested
interested in promoting the services of their own companies, whether explicitly or not. Early exemplars of this ilk include Michael Farr’s (1966) Design Management, F.H.K. Henrion and Alan Parkin’s (1967) Design Coordination and Corporate Image, Ole Eksell’s (1967) Corporate design programs, and James Pilditch’s (1970) Communication by Design: A Study in Corporate Identity – the second text here by Henrion and Parkin is of significant interest for this study and will be investigated within the second case study (see ‘Case Study 2’, p. 167).

Woodham draws attention to Wally Olins when covering the issues that arise when practitioners write about the importance of corporate design as an element of business strategy. Olins, who in 1965 co-founded the corporate design agency Wolff Olins with Michael Wolff, has written prolifically on the subject over a number of decades and is widely considered to have taken a leading role in the development of the discipline. Olins’s The Corporate Personality (1978) is considered particularly seminal in the field, with corporate communications scholar John M.T. Balmer (2014, p. 6) claiming that ‘an understanding of this book is critical to an understanding of the roots of corporate identity scholarship and, moreover, to a discernment of corporate identity that goes beyond graphic design and a concern with visual identity schemes and company logos’. Earlier, design academic Steve Baker (1989, p. 275, original emphasis) claimed that, ‘what corporate identity currently is, I would contend, is largely the result of the ways in which Wally Olins defined the field in 1978 in his first book, The Corporate Personality’. Though this may read like praise, it was actually far from it. For while Balmer unquestioningly valorises Olins’s influence, Baker holds Olins to account for issues that have dogged the discipline’s development and restricted the ways in which it has been understood. Baker thus uses his article to dismantle Olins’s arguments and highlight the contradictions, inconsistencies and sweeping generalisations found throughout. Given the perceived deficiencies that Baker underlines, one might wonder why the text proved so successful. Baker suggests it was Olins’s position as the chairman of Britain’s ‘best known’, ‘market leading’ corporate identity consultants that propelled the book on to such great renown; a suggestion that appears to hold credence, as the ever-increasing financial rewards involved for those at the leading edge of the discipline would have lent Olins’s words great sway. He was also, according to Baker (1989), an aggressive self-publicist, which could only have helped in the successful promotion of his text.

After Olins’s death in 2014, Balmer offered a rather hagiographic appraisal of his contribution to the subject, with the credibility of his own text cast into some doubt by the assertion that his was ‘the first assessment of Olins’s influence on corporate identity scholarship’ (2014, p. 4); Balmer’s failure to acknowledge Baker’s precise dismantling of Olins’s work suggests he was perhaps unaware of more design-led scholarship into Olins’s influence (with Baker’s text having been published in the Journal of Design History in 1989). In spite of this oversight, Balmer (2014) was correct in suggesting that Olins played an important role in broadening the conceptualisation of corporate identity from a discipline narrowly rooted in graphic design, to one that plays an important role in the wider marketing mix. Thus, we have Olins (1979, p. 209) emphasising the notion that corporate identity – as opposed to corporate image – is concerned equally with behaviour and appearance:

> Corporate identity – real corporate identity that is – is about behaviour as much as appearance, and certainly about reality, as much as symbolism. Whenever behaviour and appearance are linked real corporate identity emerges.

This move to shift focus away from what Olins sees as the thin veneer of ‘image’ and towards a deeper conceptualisation of business ‘identity’, led the discipline to radically develop in scope and ambition in the decades that followed. As corporate design consultants began to consider their clients’ corporate policies on a much broader level, this led to a rise in the status of the corporate design consultant, with design and branding increasingly viewed as a legitimate concern for the board room.
Corporate Identity and Branding as facets of Corporate Communications and Marketing

From the ‘guru’ texts of practitioners like Pilditch (1970) and Olins (1978) emerged a new domain of literature more scholarly in its approach. This canon of work is best represented by the work of the aforementioned John M.T. Balmer (2001, 2010, 2014), who epitomises the new breed of academically-minded business scholars working from the 1990s onwards. The long list of journals to which Balmer has written gives a sense of the contexts within which such scholarship resides, with the publications he has contributed to including such refereed editions as: *Journal of Product and Brand Management*, *Journal of Brand Management*, *Corporate Communications: An International Journal*, *European Journal of Marketing*, *International Studies of Management and Organization*, and the *Journal of Business Ethics*.

Studying the broader disciplinary literature of the late twentieth century reveals a developing schism between practising brand identity designers and what Balmer (2014, p. 4) calls, ‘the first generation of corporate communications and corporate marketing academics’. When Balmer (2016, ‘Summary’ section) suggests that his work has been directed to ‘scholars and practitioners alike’, the practitioners he has in mind would appear to be broad-based branding professionals as opposed to those brand identity designers tasked with the fabrication of corporate image schemes. It is not that Balmer’s work is without worth for such design practitioners, far from it, but rather that the cultures and priorities of corporate communications scholars and practising brand identity designers have diverged significantly over time. As corporate communications and marketing academics developed on the earlier ‘guru’ texts of brand identity design practitioners, the new breed of literature that emerged around the turn of the millennium came to serve a different kind of professional for whom design was only a small facet of the broader marketing mix. This fractured state of affairs is evident in the kinds of journals and conferences that branding design practitioners have contributed

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37 For a representative example of Balmer’s work, see: ‘Corporate identity, corporate branding and corporate marketing – Seeing through the fog’ (2001).
38 This coming together of design and business, both thought broadly, is evidenced in other work around this time, with the UK-based *Cox Review of Creativity in Business* (Cox, 2005) being a crucial example of this, as well works by Martin (2009) and Neumeier (2009).
to. In contrast to the long list of referred journals Balmer has written for, those branding
design practitioners engaging in a broader disciplinary dialogue over the last few
decades have tended to contribute to design industry-focused magazines and journals
such as *Design Week* (Manchipp, 2013a), *Creative Review* (Baxi, 2016) and *Eye* (Bell,
2002), as well as industry facing conferences, such as *TYPO* (Willer, 2011a; Manchipp
2012a & 2013b) and *Brand New* (Willer, 2011b; Manchipp, 2012b; Bull, 2014). In doing
so they have often tended to publicise the work and approach of their own businesses
first and foremost, establishing themselves as aspirational design personalities.

As corporate communications scholars sought to develop a body of literature
aligned with the interests of broad-based branding and marketing professionals, by
contrast, the more specific discourse around brand identity design has become
increasingly insular and self-serving. There are some exceptions to this tendency
wherein scholarship and practice have sought to find a greater sense of coherence. For
example, design firm Moving Brands (2009) adopted a more formal, scholastic tone
when releasing what they described as their first ‘paper’. This was not really a paper in
the scholarly sense, but rather a self-promotional publication full of imagery showcasing
their portfolio of work and textual snippets of their broad creative philosophy.
Nevertheless, their choice of language is noteworthy, suggesting an attempt to borrow
from the perceived integrity and rigour of academia. Three years later they released
another paper (Moving Brands, 2012), this time a ‘white paper’ summarising a
presentation given at what they describe on their website as ‘an insurance industry
forum for global businesses in Austria’ (Nguyen, 2012). It is interesting that they do
not reference the specific details of the forum at which the paper was presented which is
a long-established convention in academic practice. Though including references for
further reading and being entirely text based, the modular format of this second paper
reads like a set of slightly expanded, bullet-pointed principles.

Examples such as this show the willingness of design practitioners to engage in
disciplinary dialogue, but they also emphasise the significant cultural differences
between practicing professionals and practicing scholars. While agencies like Moving
Brands should be applauded for trying to find a middle ground between the conventions
and expectations of academic practice and those of commercial practice, their efforts

39 The shift in language from ‘paper’ to ‘white paper’ can be seen to imply a desire to align more closely
with governmental or industry-driven expertise rather than academic research.
nevertheless serve to underline the dearth of scholarly material serving the interests of practitioners. This deficit leaves significant knowledge gaps that this thesis will look to address.

Wally Olins seems to have been one of the few early design professionals to have sought to work in such gaps with any conviction, contributing to refereed journals and books later in his career (Olins, 1999, 2000, 2002). This is less surprising when one considers that he read History at Oxford and was once noted by RSA (Royal Society of the Arts) chairman Alan Eden-Green (cited in Olins, 1979, p. 208) as, ‘the only design consultant that I know who’s never had a design training’. In this respect, Olins is reflective of the increasingly strategic and business-led orientation of corporate image-making. Equally he can be seen as representative of a broadening in the scope and remits of graphic design and, more specifically, brand identity design, as the century progressed. As design activity has increasingly become a board-level concern (Martin, 2009; Neumeier, 2009), opportunities emerged for strategic, business-savvy individuals like Olins to enter the fray. Indeed, Olins was by no means the first, or only one to do so, with British consultants like Michael Farr and James Pilditch also gaining great influence earlier in the 1960s. These changes in the ontology of design practice are at the heart of this thesis.

The proliferation of scholarly work in the area of corporate marketing occurred during a period in which the dominant terminology surrounding the discipline began to shift. These changes are reflected in the texts of Olins (1978, 1979, 1989, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2008, 2014), Balmer (2001, 2010, 2014) and others. As ‘corporate identity’ fades from view towards the end of the twentieth century, ‘branding’ becomes the de rigueur term. This significant terminological shift was not the first the discipline has encountered, with the subject previously being referred to as ‘house style’ – in Britain at least (Davis, 1952, 1956), if not America. These discursive shifts are significant in that they suggest a changing of mind-set, a purging of past baggage, and an impetus towards the new. Moreover, they can be understood as reflective of the socio-economic context within which such work has been produced. So, while ‘house style’ evokes a certain purity and innocence of the post-war era of reconstruction wherein corporate image-making remained a relative cottage industry with a focus on craft and aesthetics (Olins,
‘Corporate identity’, by contrast, is synonymous with the corporate mergers that became increasingly commonplace in the 1970s and 80s (Julier, 2000), as well as the growing ‘businessification’ of design. The move to ‘branding’, meanwhile, can be understood as an attempt to downplay associations with the corporate world following an increase in anti-corporate sentiment towards the end of the century. This increased scepticism about corporate marketing is clearly evident in publications of the time, including Naomi Klein’s (1999) widely popular text *No Logo* and the magazine *Adbusters*, first published in 1989.

While these three practices – ‘house style’, ‘corporate identity’ and ‘branding’ – are each demarcated by distinct terminological reference points and are discrete in terms of their broader ambitions, they do nevertheless share similarities in the way that each seeks to control and coordinate the visual appearance of an organisation. Whereas ‘house style’ can be understood fundamentally as an output of the design process (with particular reference to graphic design), in ‘corporate identity’ and ‘branding’, design has been reconstituted as one facet of a more complex and comprehensive marketing methodology. Branding design practitioner John Lloyd (2009, ‘The art of corporate design’ section) argues that the diminishing status of design in this context has had a detrimental impact on the development of the discipline:

A lot has been written about the theory and practice of corporate identity. The territory, once the preserve of designers, has been colonised by management consultants, accountants, lawyers, business school professors and design managers. Today, you can find books about corporate identity or corporate branding, as it is now more widely known, that cover market research, strategy development, marketing, corporate positioning, brand architecture and brand valuation. These things are necessary in building a compelling identity but in the midst of all this sophisticated theory and analysis there is a danger that the contribution of the graphic designer and the significance of corporate design may be under-valued.

Through the three case studies presented in this thesis I explore how the methods and practices of corporate image-makers developed in the post-war period and to what extent these developments impacted upon the materiality of practice and the motives of practitioners. It is interesting to see how the emergence of more strategically minded corporate image-makers, such as Farr, Pilditch and Olins, coincided with the efforts of those with a more conventional design and visual arts background.

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40 Olins (1979, p. 210) claims the term house style is ‘superficial and implies drawing up designs for letterheads’.
The history of corporate image-making as a programmatic endeavour

While it is widely accepted that the brand-mark as a symbol of identification has existed for many centuries (Mollerup, 1999; Moor, 2007), the activity of creating a comprehensive programmatic corporate image is understood as a more recent notion (Blake, 1986; Bass, cited in Meggs, 1983). Given that debate surrounds the question of quite how far back such a tendency can be traced, here I map out four distinct schools of thought, locating the different key moments of development for each. These schools of thought can be summarised as follows: 1) Broad antecedents – pre-twentieth century; 2) Founding fathers – early twentieth century; 3) Codification – the post-war years; and 4) Proliferation – the 1980s. The following sections will draw out the key references and axioms upon which these schools of thought depend.

Broad antecedents – pre-twentieth century

Firstly, there are those who have attempted to trace back the tendency for comprehensive programmatic identity schemes through the centuries. For example, Olins (1978, p. 18) rather loosely argues that a historical precedent was set by various religious groups that had used artists as a means to project and control their appearance. He goes on to claim that the second phase of the Industrial Revolution was even more significant, with large and complex enterprises being formed that couldn’t be controlled by existing techniques. He suggests that the English railways of the 1850s were especially important, as they were in large part responsible for pioneering the activity of corporate image-making – as well as many of the broader facets of modern management – and that their work marked the beginning of ‘the age of corporate identity’ (Olins, 1978, p. 18). Here he cites John Betjeman’s London’s Historic Railway Stations (1972) to support his claims. According to Betjeman (1972, p. 19), such companies expressed a unity of style made apparent by the consistent colouring of vehicle liveries, broad architectural and typographic similarities, as well as distinctive crockery and cutlery within the dining cars of the trains. Though the efforts of such railway companies provide an interesting foregrounding to events that would follow, I side with those commentators (Blake, 1986; Bakker, 2005) who have argued that these activities were more gestural in their efforts
and should not be considered comprehensive or programmatic attempts at visual unification.

**Founding fathers – early twentieth century**

Next in line are those scholars who have suggested that the early twentieth century marked the key period in which comprehensive corporate image programmes emerged (Meggs, 1983; Hollis, 1994; Woodham, 1997). In point of fact, many histories of visual identity have been dominated by Peter Behrens’s work for the electrical firm Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG), with graphic design historians, including Philip Meggs (1983), Richard Hollis (1994) and Jonathan Woodham (1997), lauding this work as the first ever visual identity design system.

Working as AEG’s artistic adviser from 1907 onwards, Behrens was responsible for a broad range of designs, from monumental architectural structures to small printed catalogues and posters. Aside from the scope and multidisciplinary nature of this work, what marked it out from that of its predecessors – such as the English railway companies – was its unrelenting rigour in pursuit of uniformity and order (Schwarz, 1996). This uniformity was achieved in part through the standardisation of two key design components: a logo and a bespoke typeface.

![Figure 4) Peter Behrens’s honeycomb logo for AEG, 1907 [left]; the AEG turbine hall with roof-structure mirroring the shape of the logo [centre]; and a coffee pot, one of many products designed by Behrens for AEG [right], with the form again echoing the angular shape of the honeycomb logo.](image)

AEG’s use of a corporate logo was not an innovation in itself, yet this particular design shaped like a honeycomb, distinguished itself through the visual alignment it maintained with other designs within the programme. As design historian Frederic Schwarz (1996) has explained, Behrens applied the logo not only to products and catalogues, but also to buildings, such as the AEG’s turbine hall. Further to this, Behrens
even allowed the structure of many of his designs to be informed by the honeycomb shape of the logo. This can be seen in the corporate architecture of the turbine hall, where the angles of the roof structure mirror the angles of the trademark. It is also evident in some of the company’s products, such as the coffee pots Behrens designed for the firm (Fig. 4).

Alongside the logo, Behrens developed his own unique alphabet for AEG that would later be released as a mechanised typeface. Behrens Antiqua, as it was called, was unconventional in design (Burke, 1992) and helped to differentiate the company from its competitors. The most critical aspect of Behrens’s designs was the consistent and controlled manner in which the two core design components – the logo and the typeface – were applied. Using grid structures derived from architectural theory (Alofsin, 1994; Anderson, 2000) Behrens was able to construct a broad range of design artefacts that were united by a common structural backbone. Whilst grids such as these had been used extensively in architecture before, Behrens’s dogmatic application of these structures was unprecedented in the domain of corporate image-making and played a significant role in the creation of his highly rational and ordered identity for AEG (Alofsin, 1994; Anderson, 2000).

Another powerful and oft-cited example from the early twentieth century is the design identity of the Nazi party. A number of authors (Olins, 1978; Heller, 2011) have argued that this design work constitutes one of the most ‘successful’ visual identities of the twentieth century. The party’s handbook, Organisationsbuch der NSDAP, has been considered amongst the first visual identity manuals, but as design historian Steven Heller (2011) explains, the identity was not as strictly unitary as we are often led to believe. He explains: ‘The Nazis brand may indeed be uniformly distinctive, but for all the significance they placed on graphic design, there was more variety and greater leeway than one might think’ (Heller, 2011). So, in summary, the Nazi identity is a forceful example – as well as a warning – of the powerful potential of symbolic logos, but as Heller (2011) suggests, when it is considered as an identity programme it lacks the cohesive, broad palette of tightly controlled visual elements exhibited by

41 In terms of the role of the grid in the emergence of corporate design, some scholars argue that typographic practitioners Jan Tschichold (Remington, 2014) and Josef Müller-Brockmann (Shaughnessy, 2014a) had a crucial role in laying the groundwork for a rational and objective approach to graphic design to emerge, with their interest in norms and standards linked to the rise of Swiss Style (also known as the ‘International Typographic Style’ or ‘die neue Grafik’) (Hollis, 2006).
Behrens’s work for AEG (for more analysis of visual identity in the context of politics see: Heller, 2008).

Aside from Behrens’s identity system emanating from Germany, there are a number of other canonical international examples persistently put forward by design historians (Olins, 1978; Hollis, 1994; Woodham, 1997). These have included Frank Pick’s stewardship of London Transport from 1908 onwards, American Walter Dorwin Teague’s designs for Texaco in the 1930s, Adriano Olivetti’s direction of Italian firm Olivetti in the 1930s, and Walter Paepcke’s patronage of Container Corporation of America from the late 1930s. But for each of these canonical examples, there are other, oft-neglected cases that are due further consideration. For instance, in Britain, Alec Davis (1956) wrote of a number of other examples such as the standardised lettering of W. H. Smith, c.1903; Tootal’s bespoke alphabet design, c.1911; the early lettering and colour scheme of Mac Fisheries, c.1920; and the type standardisation of the London & North Eastern Railway (LNER) and its coordinated poster campaigns, c.1930. Some of these early British examples are touched upon within this thesis, but given that they reside in a time period preceding the focus of the study, they are not examined in any great detail. Whilst there may be a case to argue that the thesis could have been reframed, beginning earlier to incorporate these preliminary examples, I have chosen to concentrate my attention on the post-war years during which corporate image-making practices became more fully established. As Kinross (1988) and Stiff (2009) explain, this latter post-war period was absolutely critical in terms of the development and commercialisation of graphic design consultancy in Britain. Moreover, Balmer (1998) further supports the idea that this era was critical, stating that the period from 1950 to 1970 was the first important phase in the evolutionary development of corporate identity.

In continental Europe some work has already been done to establish the roots of corporate image-making in particular countries. Design historian Carlo Vinti (2007) has provided a detailed account of pioneering corporate image work in Italy, while Wibo Bakker (2011a) has produced equivalent work on such developments in the Netherlands. Bakker (2005) argues against the international canon referenced above (AEG, London Transport, Texaco, Olivetti and Container Corporation), claiming that such firms have been wrongly identified as pioneers of the discipline. He suggests that as these firms were not concerned with ‘visual unification’ – which he implies is a prerequisite of visual identity systems – their work is simply not ‘corporate identity’.
Their central concern, he posits, was actually to present themselves through ‘good design’. According to Bakker (2005), designers and historians have placed undue significance on such work due to the quality of individual design pieces and the renown of the individual designers involved. Whilst he may be correct about the true motives of these organisations, Bakker fails to fully support his contention that visual identity, or more precisely ‘corporate identity’, is synonymous with unification. This is a point of interest I will look to question further throughout the thesis.

Codification – the post-war years

Next, there are those who claim that the early examples of AEG and Olivetti, for instance, are isolated and exceptional cases, and that corporate image-making on a broader level only found true relevance in the years following WWII. For example, Avril Blake (1986, p. 42) in her survey of the influential British designer Milner Gray, claims the following:

The idea that design could be used as a business tool, to express a firm’s unique identity through all aspects of its operation, had existed before the war, but its realisation was very much a post-war phenomenon and developed on a large scale only during these ten or fifteen years.

Blake’s observations here reflect the significant socio-economic changes that occurred in Britain after WWII, with the ongoing climate of reconstruction leading to increased investment in industry as the country sought to develop its economic performance (Maguire and Woodham, 1997; Breward and Wood, 2012a). As a consequence, new opportunities arose for ambitious designers to harness the potential of design as a force for renewal, with the drive towards ‘modernization’ (Breward and Wood, 2012a) enabling practitioners to more fully explore programmatic approaches to corporate image-making.

Blake’s comments are important for this thesis as they set out a key foundational premise upon which the study develops from, this being that corporate image-making only developed as a significant and recognisable practice in the post-WWII era. Elsewhere the North American designer Saul Bass (cited in Meggs, 1983, p. 132) recognises a similar pattern to the one that Blake identifies, suggesting that:

Corporate identity as a clear discipline is a post-World War II phenomenon. It’s only thirty or forty years old. During this period, its grown from a cottage industry to an institutionalized form, has become an acknowledged component of business activity.
Given that the US is often understood to have been ahead of the curve in terms of the commercialisation of design (Maguire & Woodham, 1997; Julier, 2000), Bass’s comments are worthy of note, suggesting that the development of corporate image-making in North America was more in line with Britain than might first be assumed.

The range of corporate image-making literature emanating from both countries in the post-war period reveals that, if anything, Britain was actually slightly ahead of the US, at least in terms of the codification and dissemination of knowledge surrounding the discipline (Dutton, 1946; Davis, 1950a, 1952, 1956; Havinden, 1955). In Britain, design practitioner and writer Alec Davis (1950a, 1952, 1956) took on a leading role in establishing the terrain, contributing a series of important articles on the subject (see following section: ‘The developing discourse of British corporate image-making’, p. 96). The pinnacle of these efforts was his special issue of Design magazine published in September 1956. Interestingly, this text was particularly insular in its choice of content, with little reference to developments outside of Britain. In the United States, meanwhile, the US design and marketing agency Lippincott & Margulies (1958a, 1958b) are notable for their efforts to codify corporate image-making in their self-promotional publication called Sense. Over two issues in 1958 they sought to clarify the rhetoric surrounding the discipline, providing examples of effective corporate image schemes, and even offering guidance around the appropriate use of corporate identity manuals. The following year, in its May–June 1959 edition, the US magazine Print came out with its own ‘Corporate Image Issue’ dedicated to the subject (Anon, 1959). This featured contributions from Europeans, including the British graphic designer Willy de Majo.

Prior to the publication of these printed editions, Germany led the way in the summer of 1954 with an international exhibition dedicated to ‘The Face of the Firm’ – ‘Das Firmengesicht’ (Wills, 1954). The organisation of the exhibition was structured around the corporations involved, as opposed to the featured designers. It included British work by designers Lewitt-Him for Schweppes and Hans Schleger for Mac Fisheries, as well as representation from Simpson of Piccadilly and Wolsey of Leicester. This work sat alongside designs from America (Columbia Broadcasting System, Container Corporation of America, Hermann Miller, Knoll), Switzerland (Geigy), France (Cinzano), Italy (Olivetti) and Germany (Volkswagen).

Further to these efforts of the 1950s, during the sixties a number of practitioners sought to consolidate further the body of subject-specific knowledge surrounding the discipline, publishing comprehensive texts dedicated to the subject. This included
F.H.K. Henrion’s text *Design Coordination and Corporate Image* (Henrion & Parkin, 1967) co-written with his colleague Alan Parkin, as well as Swedish designer Ole Eksell’s ‘how-to’ text of the same year, *Corporate Design Programs* (Eksell, 1967). These efforts to codify corporate image-making as a programmatic practice clearly indicate the ever-growing significance of the field. Aside from Eksell’s effort, which walked the reader through a hypothetical case study, these texts liberally (and literally) illustrated the growth and impact of corporate image-making as a practice, providing empirical evidence of this growth with numerable contemporary case studies. James Pilditch was another author whose texts would help to concretise the status of the discipline, with *Communication by Design* (1970) developing on the ideas of Henrion and Parkin, albeit within a more business minded paradigm. Pilditch’s firm, Allied International Designers, founded in 1959, would become a major player in the field, ushering in the next major shift when they became the first design company to be listed on the stock exchange in 1980 (Julier, 2000).

**Proliferation – the 1980s**

Finally, there are those who have argued that the 1980s were the critical juncture at which corporate design reached unprecedented levels of success and influence (Julier, 2000; Moor, 2007). Of special note here is the work of design scholar Liz Moor (2007) and her text *The Rise of Brands*, which provides an overview of the development of branding as a phenomenon, drawing particular attention to the late twentieth century. Moor’s text provides a credible and comparatively extensive overview of the practice; tracing its development from an ancient act that signified ownership, to its proliferation in contemporary society, where she says, it has come to represent an abstract form of communication that transcends the purely visual. Whilst her text is comprehensive and convincing in many respects, it lacks significant detail with regard to the formative development of contemporary practice, in Britain or elsewhere. She provides a brief overview of the work of the British practitioners F.H.K. Henrion and Alan Parkin, giving credence to their text *Design Coordination and Corporate Image* (Henrion & Parkin, 1967) in a chapter of her book titled: ‘Brands and Media: the Idea of “Design Coordination”’ (Moor, 2007, p. 30). However, Moor’s efforts to explain Henrion and Parkin’s concepts appear cursory, with their significance undermined due to their tendency to overlook the social, political or economic concerns of corporate branding.
Moor (2007, p. 30) claims that the writing of Henrion and Parkin, together with that of other early British scholars in the field, such as Pilditch (1970), was simply ahead of its time, suggesting that the corporate identity industry only grew significantly in the 1980s following a ‘sharp rise in corporate mergers’. This statement may well hold truth, but it seems anomolous that Moor’s (2013) research, which proclaims to examine ‘the emergence of the branding industry’, fails to address in any substantial detail the role of practitioners, such as Henrion and Parkin, who played a significant role in defining the territory prior to its later dramatic growth – this oversight might have been more understandable had Moor’s text not tended towards a British bias.

The aforementioned Twentieth Century Design by Woodham (1997, p. 141) features a chapter on ‘Multinational Corporations and Global Products’ that gives credence to Henrion’s role as ‘a pioneer in the field’. Here Woodham (1997, p. 141) suggests that the business of corporate identity creation developed dramatically in accordance with the growth of multinational corporations, adding that this was ‘an aspect of the design profession that became increasingly significant in the post-Second World War period’. This point of emphasis seems in contrast with Moor’s approach in which the 1980s are singled out as the critical point of developmental significance.

Scholars, such as Julier (2000), have also chosen to overlook the role of the British post-war ‘pioneers’, preferring instead to focus on the booming 1980s period in Britain as a period in which neoliberal practices began to develop. Unlike Moor, Julier (2000, 2017) provides detailed empirical evidence to support the notion that the 1980s were the point at which design consultancy, and subsequently visual identity practice, reached critical mass. Although the 1980s represent an unprecedented period during which corporate branding became more proliferous (becoming fully entrenched in mainstream culture), there remains important questions to be asked in reference to the earlier period during which the patterns of corporate image-making practices first emerged. As such, this earlier period after WWII is the one I have chosen to focus on.

Summary

In summary, though there may have been gestural attempts towards ‘house style’ previously, the first significant attempts at programmatic corporate image-making came in the early twentieth century. In the first half of the century these efforts were few and far between and tended to be relatively one-dimensional, with Behrens’s scheme for
AEG being exceptional for its strict methods and unitary characteristics across multiple media. The formative period after the Second World War from 1945–1970, however, was decisive in the setting the practical and ideological development course for the discipline. By comparison, the latter phase, from 1970 onwards, was significant as an era of proliferation in which these ideals were further concretised. The review of literature presented here makes clear that this formative period of development after WWII has to date been overlooked, presenting a knowledge gap that this thesis will address. So, although the work of Moor (2007) and Julier (2000, 2017) are key reference points for my work – particularly given their socio-economic perspective on design and branding – I seek to question their pre-occupation with the 1980s in order to consider more fully the influence of earlier decades.
The developing discourse of British corporate image-making

To demonstrate that corporate image-making emerged as a meaningful practice after WWII, I wish to draw attention to a series of texts published in design trade journals around this time. These texts played an important role in the codification of corporate image-making as a practice, demonstrating how an occupational community began to converge around the activity. Furthermore, they provide important evidence of the significant rhetorical developments that occurred within the British corporate image-making scene. In studying these texts, I follow design historian Alice Twemlow (2013, p. 2), who argues that such vernacular texts ought to be included within design history’s purview, ‘not just as raw primary source material, but also as the central point of study’.

The vernacular texts I will examine here are as follows:


The texts included here map the emergence of the ‘house style’ phase of corporate image-making that can be attributed broadly to the 1950s and 60s in Britain, a period during which ‘house style’ was the dominant terminological reference point. The mid-to-late 1970s ushered in a new phase of practice that was demarcated by the increasing popularity of the term ‘corporate identity’, while ‘branding’ became the de rigueur term around the turn of the century.

I have chosen to include here an earlier text from The Monotype Recorder (Anon, 1932) that predates my study period. The reason for doing this is to lay the groundwork for the developments that followed during the focal period of study. This text became an important reference point for future champions of the discipline, with Alec Davis (1956) having made reference to the work in his special ‘House Style’ issue of Design. In this sense the Monotype Recorder article took on new meaning and significance for those later commentators who sought to promote corporate image-making as an important new discipline. This work can thus be understood in reference to the idea of a pre-adaptation (Cattani, 2006) – more recently understood as exaptation (Andriani & Cattani, 2016) – in as much that the text was later reframed by Davis (1956) to serve a purpose for which it had not originally been intended.
1932: Anon, ‘An Account of the LNER Type Standardization’

Wally Olins’s book *The Corporate Personality* (1978) created quite a stir upon its release in the late 1970s, with scholars recognising its exceptionally widespread influence (Baker, 1989; Balmer, 2014). The central tenet of Olins’s text was the suggestion that each and every firm should have a distinctive personality. The notion of ‘corporate personality’ being delivered by Olins as a revolutionary new concept that would transform the face of corporate business, yet he failed to recognise that *The Monotype Recorder* had explored an extremely similar metaphor – the ‘group personality’ – 45 years earlier in an article about the type standardisation of the London & North Eastern Railway (LNER hereafter). Although the author of the piece is not named, Kinross (1985) suggests that it was likely to have been written by Beatrice Warde, who was in charge of Monotype’s publicity at the time.⁴² The article begins by explaining the basic premise of the LNER programme:

In standardising its typography, the London and North Eastern Railway has not only made possible a number of economies but also has given the public at large a visual image of one ‘group personality’ which is even more valuable than the emerald green livery borne Northward by the iron dragons of King’s Cross. (Anon, 1932, p. 11)

The author makes reference to ‘group personality’ on three separate occasions in the short five-page article, emphasising the potential for a standardised design programme to create a ‘cumulative recognition’ among consumers (Anon, 1932, p. 8). Although the standardisation of the LNER was perhaps not the first comprehensive visual identity programme in Britain (see ‘Broad Antecedents’ section, p. 87), this article of 1932 was one of the first attempts to codify the methods of such an approach to design. In this account the author sets a precedent for those writers exploring visual identity later in the century, introducing a number of concepts that subsequent commentators would touch upon (knowingly or not). For example, the term ‘cumulative impression’ (Anon, 1932, p. 8), mirrors what Ashley Havinden (1955) later referred to as ‘cumulative visual effect’, while the phrase ‘distinctive face’ (Anon, 1932, p. 9), could be viewed as an antecedent to the various manifestations of ‘the face of the firm’, that appeared in both

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⁴² Born in New York in 1900, Warde was a writer, scholar and champion of typographic printing. Upon graduation from Barnard College she became head librarian of the American Type Founders Library. After moving to England in 1924 she found work as a writer, resulting in the production of numerous articles. Later she was employed by the Monotype Corporation, firstly as editor of their journal (*The Monotype Recorder*), then as publicity manager of the organisation itself. Her appointment lasted over three decades from around 1927 to her retirement in 1960 (Gruendler, 2002).
Germany and England. Most notably, the notion of ‘group personality’ can be understood as a precursor to what many have considered the twentieth century’s most significant text on visual identity, Olins’s *The Corporate Personality* (1978).

Like Olins, the author depicts the corporation as a living person, complete with distinctive personality, a recognisable voice and even a face. In using this metaphor that compares the identity of the corporation with a human personality, the author softens the perception of a large-scale business operation. Furthermore, the author emphasises how such a programme of standardisation can deliver significant social benefits, describing the premise of a standardised personality as a means of greater clarity and efficiency benefitting individual end-users. For example, in explaining LNER’s decision to standardise a sans serif typeface, as opposed to a serif type, the author posits:

> What did arise was the mental picture of a passenger being jostled on a crowded platform on a winter evening, and trying with one eye on the station clock to verify the connections of a given train; a picture of another passenger running his eye over fifteen excursion leaflets that are printed perhaps by fifteen different printers; glancing from them to the station announcement, to the destination board of the train, to a 16-sheet poster issued by the company and being given in every case a sense of continuity and consistency, a sense that something had been said to him with as little fuss and distraction as possible. (Anon, 1932, p. 10)

The anonymous author (Anon, 1932, p. 10) argues that the typeface in question, Gill Sans, was ‘the most efficient conveyor of thought’, and as such it would communicate most clearly and effectively with railway passengers. Such was the author’s zeal for the operation that, at times, the account reads as if the standardisation programme were of their own making. The detailed manner in which the rationale behind certain design decisions is recounted implies that the author themselves had some involvement in the programme. This would certainly back up the idea that Beatrice Warde was the writer given that in her role as publicity manager for Monotype (the distributors of Eric Gill’s typeface design, and publishers of *The Monotype Recorder*) it would have been in her best interest to champion Eric Gill’s typeface design and the programme more broadly.

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43 ‘Das Firmengesicht’, which translated to ‘The Face of the Firm’, was an exhibition of design coordination work that took place in Berlin in 1954. It contained design work created for four British firms, including the work of Hans Schleger and Ashley Havinden (Kussin, 1954; Wills, 1954). In 1959 Alec Davis organised an exhibition in London under the same title – this latter exhibition was featured in *Design* magazine (Davis, 1959).

44 The author uses the term ‘face’ in a slippery way, predominantly referring to the typeface Gill Sans as a ‘face’. But when she refers to the ‘distinctive face’ of the LNER it is possible to interpret a duality in her turn of phrase.
Nevertheless, whoever the author, they were clearly greatly impressed, claiming that this was a reform of great modernity and significance:

This article deals with an example of genuine typographic modernity: a reform which is radical (i.e. root-deep in economic fact) and far reaching in its effect. [...] When a vast railway system contrives that 10,000 different booklets, leaflets, and other pieces should be almost automatically designed (or say constructed) well and in a recognisable unity [...] the result is extraordinarily significant. (Anon, 1932, p. 7)

The text goes on to argue that to design one piece of print carefully and tastefully was no longer a modern or noteworthy achievement, suggesting instead, that the truly modern conception was the large organisation so powerful that they were forced to impose standard rules upon their print suppliers. This, the author proposes, was the only occurrence of genuine economic or practical significance taking place within the business of twentieth century printing. It is hard to contest the view that the transition from designing these 10,000 items individually, to designing them systematically and on-mass, was one of utmost significance.

In the given account, the standardisation of design exhibited by the LNER suggests a shift away from artistic approaches to design, and towards more strategic, systematic and pre-planned methods. In the authors mind this technocratic turn would involve the demotion of the creative typographer, as they forewarned within the first sentences of the article: ‘It is not an article for typographic artists, because it describes a new phenomenon in typography which to a great extent leaves the artist out of the picture’ (Anon, 1932, p. 7). Of particular note here is the debate raised between notions of creativity, and what Churchman (1968) later referred to as the ‘systems approach’.

The rhetoric of the piece is notable for the manner in which it reflects (and anticipates) the systems turn that took place later within design circles, predominantly during the 1960s under the guise of the Design Methods movement (Cross, 1993). The themes dealt with reflect closely on the work of Bruce Archer (1965), for example, and in particular his influential text *Systematic Methods for Designers*.

As the author outlines (Anon, 1932), the approach of standardisation offered several tangible benefits to the large organisation, including: 1) the visual unification of disparate design outputs, making the company’s offer more widely recognised and distinctive; 2) the raising of design standards – as print items were often relatively unconsidered in their construction, standardising these could result in a higher quality of design; 3) time savings – as construction becomes a relatively automated process, the
total design time involved is cut; 4) cost savings – time savings in the design stage carry through into financial gain for clients.

These organisational benefits did not necessarily impact positively on designers though, with concern raised for more ‘artistically’ minded designers and typographers who the author understood to be resistant to their work being constrained or channelled into standardised forms. Particular tensions between artistic individuality and standardisation were insinuated by the author (Anon, 1932, p. 11) in reference to the plight of the organisation’s poster artists: ‘even those temperamental brethren, the poster artists, are learning that the neutral Gill Sans is safe to use as lettering with almost any pictorial effect.’ In practice, the LNER’s poster artists interpreted Gill’s typeface with a greater freedom than the author implies, with examples evident in which the artists appear to have entirely overlooked or ignored Gill’s design, creating hand-rendered lettering of no resemblance to Gill’s typeface. Even those artists that followed the Gill template often rendered their attempts with seeming indifference, manipulating the letterforms to fit around the pictorial content of their designs (Fig. 5).

The article in question focuses almost exclusively upon the role of typography as a coordinating force, however it does fleetingly mention the role of colour, when touching upon the standardised green liveries of the LNER’s locomotives that were already in existence. The author explains how the posters brought out during the late 1920s under the previous director William Teasdale had helped to bring the ‘group personality of the line into the public conscience’ (Anon, 1932, p. 8). In 1927 Teasdale (1927, cited in Hewitt, 1995) had put five of the company’s most prolific designers on an exclusive contract, with his intention being to limit the variety of pictorial representation evident in the organisation’s publicity – he was hoping to attain what he referred to, in correspondence with his top five artists, as the ‘LNER Look’.\(^\text{45}\)

\(^{45}\) This phrase translates loosely into the rhetoric of contemporary branding, where agencies commonly refer to the ‘look and feel’ of a brand (Wheeler, 2018).
Figure 5) An LNER leaflet from 1938 with the typeface Gill Sans set in the lower half, but a much looser lettering style along the top that only bears a passing resemblance to Gill's design. Designed by Frank Newbould.

For the author, standardisation was seen as a way to control creative typographers, commercial artists, and what they considered uncultured and ill-disciplined printers, inclined to wander from the cause. Advancements in technology, and in particular the tendency for printers to hold an increasing number of alternate typefaces, led them to believe that practitioners were presented with, 'a thousand temptations to typographic vulgarity' (Anon, 1932, p. 7). Standardising a typeface, rather than a style, they believed, would afford greater specificity and accuracy of results, allowing a sense of discipline and order to come to the fore. There is an interesting collision here between the liberating effects of new technology, and the oppressive tendencies of standardisation. This balancing act between what should be specified, and what should be left free-to-choose, would become a dominant theme surrounding the development of corporate image-making throughout the twentieth century.

Norbert Dutton’s article of 1946, ‘Living Design’, was the first of many to lavish praise upon London Transport for the attainment of a coherent visual identity. This argument would later become a mainstay within histories of visual identity, with the organisation becoming a canonical example of international standing, regularly discussed alongside other seminal identities of the early twentieth century, such as AEG in Germany, Olivetti in Italy and the Container Corporation of America (Olins, 1989; Woodham, 1997; Balmer and Greyser, 2003). The manner in which Dutton described the identity of London Transport was rather deceptive. Unlike the author of the LNER piece (Anon, 1932), he did not describe a formulaic programme of standardisation, but rather, something more nuanced that accommodated a multiplicity of approaches within a wider holistic harmony – he stated clearly that the London Transport approach was, ‘never merely the application of a formula’ (Dutton, 1946, p. 98). If for others, corporate image would come to represent continuity, standardisation and formulaic patterning systems, for Dutton, it represented something looser and more susceptible to change. The visual identity that he described was not simply a style, but rather, in his words, a ‘living idiom’, for as he argued, a single style would be ‘doomed to sterility’ (Dutton, 1946, p. 122). This notion of the living organisational idiom is in contrast with the dominant paradigm of visual identity endorsed by most other authors during the twentieth century. A paradigm that has, to this day, revolved around aesthetic unification founded primarily on consistency – just as the LNER text had earlier explained (Anon, 1932), and as many subsequent authors have restated (Bakker, 2005).

The ideal of fervent consistency would seem at odds with Dutton’s (1946, p. 98) stated appetite for an idiom that was ‘infinitely flexible’, but like the author of the LNER

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66 Dutton established his reputation designing packaging (with an emphasis on graphic design) for clients during the 1930s and was considered a pioneer in the field. In 1938 he joined an unconventional new design group, The Design Unit Limited. Consisting of engineers, industrial designers and commercial artists, those involved in the group would continue their individual practice, coming together to offer their services in unison as and when appropriate projects arose. This was an unusual alliance that was not afforded time to prosper, being dissolved with the onset of war. After WWII Dutton joined the Design Research Unit where he worked on packaging as well as broader industrial design projects. He would later go on to practice independently, working for his own clients, such as Cadbury’s. He was an early member of the Society of Industrial Artists, later becoming a Fellow of the Society (see: Newton, 1949).

67 The term ‘idiom’ was picked up by Christian Barman (1979, p. 115), who later explained how London Transport’s director, Frank Pink, had instructed architect Charles Holden to join him in his search for ‘a new architectural idiom’ for the organisation. It is thus possible, that it was Pick who first introduced the notion of a design ‘idiom’ for the organisation in the 1920s.
piece, he endorsed the ‘unmistakable’, ‘recognizable unity’ that could be achieved through the application of consistent, or recurring design elements (Dutton, 1946, p. 98). These contrasting ideals of repetition and flexibility would seem paradoxical, yet Dutton attempts to demonstrate that they are not in fact mutually exclusive. He presents London Transport’s designs as multi-disciplinary, encompassing the design of vehicles, buildings, street furniture, interiors, fabrics and graphics. Whereas other authors have focused on visual identities that are predominantly graphic or typographic, Dutton embraces all media with equal conviction. In his eyes, London Transport’s policy is all-embracing, and this helps to explain why he believed so adamantly, that great flexibility was required to implement a successful visual identity. It is worth noting that that as an organisation, London Transport had made purposeful efforts ever since their formation to coordinate a range of disparate services that had previously run as separate entities (Barman, 1979; Saler, 1999; Ovenden, 2013). As such it was a major organisational imperative to present themselves as one unified and seamless service.

Dutton understood rigorous design detail to be of great importance to the coordinated impression of an organisation. Citing the humble platform bench as an example, he claims that by incorporating the station nameplate into the bench’s design (in an identical size and appearance to that used upon the walls of the station) that the bench ‘falls into place within the larger pattern’ (Dutton, 1946, p. 119). Here he describes a modular method, in which recurrent modules build up a recognisable pattern. This technique emerges again when Dutton (1946, p. 105) describes ticket machine designs as units: ‘the unit becomes, as it were, a module from which composite patterns are constructed.’ He clearly believed that these modular acts of repetition helped to create visual unity, and for Dutton (1946, p. 105), this was exemplified most clearly in the consistent application of graphic forms: ‘The adoption of a single style of lettering, and the recurring use of the London Transport symbol as a decorative motif, contribute powerfully to a visual unity.’ As such, he makes a strong case for the importance of graphic design as a force for effective design coordination. His claims imply that repetitively applied graphic forms may allow greater freedom for other

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48 Dutton’s use of the word ‘module’ could be viewed as significant here, in that it predates renowned continental designers’ concerns for the concept. Swiss designers Karl Gerstner, Emil Ruder and Josef Müller-Brockmann have been credited with developing the notion of the modular grid (Evans and Sherin, 2008). Gerstner (1963), in particular, explored how modules influenced visual communication in his seminal text, *Programme entwerfen*.  

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design domains, such as architectural, environmental or vehicular design. In many respects the idiom that he recounts is fundamentally a graphic phenomenon. This is reinforced further by the illustrated information graphic he uses to substantiate his central thesis that the idiom of London Transport is essentially geometric (Fig. 6). This illustration is used to persuade the reader that the many manifestations of the organisation are united by an ever-present geometry derived from the organisation symbol:

Familiar to every Londoner, the symbol of London Transport is the synthesis of its design idiom: a circle bisected by a horizontal line – two simple geometric motifs. Herein lies the clue to the fundamental geometric character of London Transport design, the basic principles which subordinates and unifies so many different concepts and materials. […] Once this geometric structure is perceived, examples leap to the eye. Every one of the accompanying diagrams will be found in photographic form in this issue of Art & Industry. The interplay of horizontals and verticals is everywhere apparent […] Although London Transport has employed in many fields designers of outstanding individuality, the totality of its design remains supremely impersonal: controlled, co-ordinated and unified within the framework of a geometric idiom.

(Dutton, 1946, p. 112)

Figure 6) A spread from Dutton’s (1946, pp. 112–113) article with numerous illustrations to make the case for what he argues is the essential geometric structure underlying all London Transport designs.
The most vexing aspect of Dutton’s text is the lack of clarity with which he describes the construction of the idiom. He claims that it was achieved by ‘effort not accident’, adding that the design of the whole transport system had been ‘carefully planned’ (Dutton, 1946, p. 98). Yet he suggests simultaneously that the principle that underlay the idiom were unknown to the designers responsible for implementing it:

Analysis must surely yield some unifying principle behind an achievement so rare in the whole history of design. And indeed it does: but a principle so subtle as to have escaped the conscious perception of even those designers who have been most closely concerned in its application. (Dutton, 1946, p. 102)

This leads to an inevitable question as to how such carefully conceived plans and design intentions could be realised by designers who themselves were unaware of these intentions. The development of corporate image work that followed in the 1950s and 60s was reliant on the inscription of intent which was supported by the emergence of artefacts such as the visual identity manual, for example.

A number of typographic scholars (Banks, 1994; Howes, 2000) have highlighted evidence that undermines the dominant, canonical narrative (Barman, 1979; Saler, 1999) that Frank Pick had led a team of designers towards the production of this sophisticated and pioneering corporate identity. For example, Banks (1994) and Howes (2000) have both provided empirical evidence showing that the corporate typeface – considered an early cornerstone of the identity (Saler, 1999) – was simply not intended as a unifying design device. In fact, far from being conceived as a flexible alphabet that could to be applied across multiple media and contexts, Pick had actually commissioned Edward Johnston simply to design a one-inch tall alphabet specifically tailored for use on the organisation’s printed publicity posters (Howes, 2000). As it turned out, such was the unorthodox nature of the typeface design, printers – who were generally unaccustomed to working with sans-serif movable type – were relatively unsuccessful in their attempts to compose the type onto the organisation’s posters. Fortunately, the design suited signage and wayfinding applications better and, over a number of years, its use spread to an ever-greater range of applications. The evidence provided by Banks (1994) clearly undermines Dutton’s (1946, p. 117) claim that Pick had commissioned ‘a standard alphabet for use on its stations’. It is concerns such as these, around the precision with which corporate image-making as a discipline has been understood, that have led the Dutch design historian Wibo Bakker (2005) to question the established canon of corporate pioneers.
Journalist and designer Alec Davis demonstrated a keen interest in corporate image-making throughout his career, contributing many articles on the subject through which he began to codify the principles of a programmatic approach to visual identity. Davis became the chief proponent of coordinated design principles in 1950s Britain, and through his articles in the pages of Design magazine (Davis, 1950a, 1950b, 1956, 1959) – together with a one-off feature for The Penrose Annual (Davis, 1952) – he began to codify the principles of what he referred to as ‘house style’. Davis articulated the growing significance of this emergent concept, with his ideas being widely disseminated throughout the design community in Britain through the means of the Council of Industrial Design’s popular magazine Design. Indeed, Davis could be considered the first writer, certainly in Britain, to formalise and define design coordination as a distinct approach to industrial design.

Born in Lincolnshire in 1912, Davis was a designer and journalist who spent his working life in London. He studied Journalism at London University (now University of London), before freelancing for numerous publications in a range of editorial roles. In 1949, he became the founding editor of Design magazine, but his editorial role there was relatively short lived, with him relinquishing the position after just three years. Still, he continued to be heavily involved with the magazine after this time, contributing numerous features over the coming decade, many of which were written on the subject of ‘house style’, with at least nine features appearing in Design, including a full special-issue dedicated to the subject (Davis, 1956).

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49 Within Davis’s (1956, p. 14) special edition of Design magazine we are presented with a biography of his early career. As this provides a useful grounding in terms of his background and interests, I have recounted much of it here. Davis’s first design article was written on the evolution of the light aeroplane and published in the Design & Industries Association’s magazine, Design for Today, in 1933. Later in the 1930s, he went on to freelance for more design-centric publications, such as Shelf Appeal and The Architectural Review. His next stepping-stone in the transition to becoming a professional design consultant came when he took on the role of editor for The British Printer. He is known to have redesigned the layout of the magazine after the war, which would seem to be a significant achievement for one not known to have trained in design. It seems highly plausible that this particular publication had an influence on Davis’s career trajectory, given that his later work as a design consultant was founded on a rich knowledge of printing and the mechanics of typography. By the mid-1950s he describes himself as a ‘writer and typographical adviser’ (Davis, 1956, p. 14).

50 Given that Stuart Rose worked alongside Davis as art editor, it appears that Davis’s journalistic expertise was more highly prized than his design skills. In June 1952, Davis and Rose were succeeded by Michael Farr and Peter Hatch, as editor and art editor respectively (Anon, 1991).
In February 1950 Davis’s first article referencing the term ‘house style’ was published under the title ‘Printing Design and the print user’ (Davis, 1950a). Although he uses the term ‘house style’ just once in his text, indicating that he was tentative about his selection of terminology, his intention to champion the pursuit of a more holistic approach to design remains clear, as intimated by his introductory blurb:

Good design in business printing means something more than the occasional commissioning of booklet covers or poster designs by Famous Artists: it implies a consistent design policy – reflected in all forms of printed matter from price lists to packing slips. (Davis, 1950a, p. 2)

Davis claims that every single piece of printed design produced by an organisation is of great importance, no matter how seemingly small and insignificant they may appear. According to Davis (1950a, p. 2) even delivery notes and packing slips need to be carefully considered, as these neglected forms of printed matter all ‘help to give an impression of the firm that uses them’. This argument for a holistic approach impacting upon all manifestations of the organisation, no matter how small, is an interesting and important one, adding weight to his concept of a ‘consistent design policy’. According to Davis (1950a, p. 2), another argument for house style is that it could afford economies of production; leading him to suggest that ‘good design need cost no more than bad [...] it will often reduce costs because it involves a measure of simplification’. By standardising colours, formats or materials, cost savings could be made, with Davis (1950a) referring to a particular case that had resulted in a saving of sixty per cent on the client’s original expenditure (regrettably he does not give details of the company or designer involved). Next, he goes on to suggest that a holistic approach to design need not be limited to the realm of printed matter:

In those firms whose printed matter is consistently of a high standard of design, there is almost always an overall design policy which is equally evident in non-printed matter: ideally the two are planned side by side. The possibility of developing a likeness between letterheads and, say, machine tools or biscuits or razor-blades may not be immediately obvious, but these diverse manufactured goods (and most others) carry some form of wording. (Davis, 1950a, p.3)

Here, Davis formulates his most convincing argument. Fusing the need for house style to be cross-disciplinary with his specialist discipline of typography, he implies that typography can provide the means of achieving consistency across the range of products on which it is used. He provides three examples of companies that successfully standardised the wording that appeared across all of their design channels through the use of one specific corporate typeface: Johnston Sans for London Transport, Cyclone for British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) (Fig. 7), and Albertus for Sainsbury’s.
Figure 7) An example of the use of a standard corporate typeface, in this case, Cyclone for British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC). As featured in Alec Davis’s (1952, p.38) article for the Penrose Annual. The illustrations featured top-left and bottom-right also featured in Davis’s (1950a) earlier article for Design magazine.

Davis (1950a) employed a range of phrases to denote the results of a house style, such as ‘family resemblance’, ‘overall-design policy’ or ‘reminder advertising’, but he also draws upon a broader range of rhetoric to describe the act of coordination itself, e.g.
‘rationalisation’, ‘simplification’ and ‘standardising’. The word ‘uniform’ appears once, but the word ‘coordination’ notably does not feature. Davis (1950a) circles around the topic of house style here, with his writing lacking the command, structure and focus that would follow in his later work (Davis, 1956, 1959). Though he posits several different agendas within the text, no clear argument comes through. The main body of the article is introduced with Davis (1950a) declaring the importance of an audience within printed design work, what he refers to as ‘the print user’. Given the prominence of this term within the title of the text, it is odd that he fails to explore the notion in any significant detail. Instead he is drawn down seemingly diffuse avenues of thought, initially championing the value of consistent design policy, before concluding with a seemingly unrelated call for the printing trade to embrace the professional typographic designer. Though he attempts to connect these two concepts, the convoluted manner in which he does so leaves the article confused and lacking resonance.

The three illustrated examples of work included in the article all make reference to typography and/or lettering, with work for Marconi being the sole example in which another means of visual unity beyond typography is referenced, that being colour. As Davis promotes typography as the primary means through which design can, and perhaps should, be coordinated, he dedicates, roughly, three of his seven text columns to the subject. This bias was most likely related to his professional background and expertise. As a ‘typographical advisor’ it would have been in his interests to champion his own subject area; and so, he uses the final two text columns of the article as a forum to voice his belief that the professional typographer ought to be more warmly embraced by the printing trade.

Some five months after this first text, Davis (1950b) publishes ‘Van lettering as part of a consistent Design Policy’ in Design. Featuring six examples, this is a small feature of just two pages, which focusses on just one element of a holistic programme: van livery. Yet Davis decides to include one small image of another design artefact from each organisation (the organisations being: J. Sainsbury, North Eastern Gas Board, HP Sauce, Ilford, Maconochie’s and Dunn’s of Bromley) alongside larger images of the six vans. The text focusses primarily on the quality of the lettering as opposed to the quality

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51 This concept of the print user would have been a relatively radical idea within the world of print, predating the rise of ‘user centred design’ ideas that developed after the publication of Henry Dreyfuss’s (1955) Designing for People.
of coordination, with just one of the six paragraphs addressing the issue of consistent design policy.

In many ways Davis’s (1952) second major article on corporate image-making for the Penrose Annual, ‘Typography and House Style in Industry’ is similar to his first, with many of the same case studies and illustrations appearing in both texts. This text is more heavily illustrated than the first, with four, rather than three case studies and a greater number of pictures used to illustrate each case. Perhaps the most significant development is the inclusion of the term ‘house style’ to the title of this work, with Davis becoming more reliant on the phrase and employing it four times in his text. From this point forward, the term becomes his descriptor of choice, recurring in the title of nine subsequent texts, all written by him over the following eight-year period:

'Typography and House Style in Industry' (Davis, 1952)
'House Style – A special issue' (Davis, 1956)
'House style for household appliances' (Davis, 1957a)
'House style for confectionery' (Davis, 1957b)
'House styles evolving' (Davis, 1957c)
'House style for a printer' (Davis, 1957d)
'House style programmes and progress' (Davis, 1958a)
'House style by remote control' (Davis, 1958b)
'House style: the face of the firm' (Davis, 1959)
'Public house style' (Davis, 1960)

Much of the rhetoric used in ‘Printing Design and the print user’ (Davis, 1950a), was repeated again in ‘Typography and House Style in Industry’ (Davis, 1952). As Davis (1952) began to develop a more refined range of key-terms, the word ‘style’ became more dominant, appearing nine times. More important still is the manner in which he links notions of consistency with increased consumer recognition. The word ‘consistent’ appears six times, while the word ‘recognisable’ also appears again (Davis, 1952). These two concepts can be seen to connect together in each text, as evidenced by the following two excerpts:

The initials of British Overseas Airways Corporation are made easily recognisable by the Corporation’s consistent use of one type-face. (Davis, 1950a, p. 3; emphasis added)

In recent years much stress has been laid on the desirability of a firm’s having a consistent design policy in all its activities, so that a house style is recognisable in its products, its premises, and its printed matter. (Davis, 1952, p. 36; emphasis added)

Thus, Davis explains that consistent design treatment leads to audience recognition. As such, house style is achieved by applying the same style consistently, in order that it is built up through repetition, to become recognisable and thus associated with the organisation in question.
1955: Ashley Havinden, “The Importance of “Company Handwriting”’

Ashley Havinden, born in Kent in 1903, worked for advertising agency W.S. Crawford in London for practically the entirety of his working life. Starting as a trainee, he quickly rose to become Art Director of what some consider the most creative British advertising agency of the first half of the 20th century (Schwarzkopf, 2008). As a member of numerous professional organisations and a frequent speaker at industry events, Havinden commanded respect amongst the design and advertising communities, being a key protagonist in the development of visual identity programmes in Britain. While the programmes he developed as Art Director of Crawfords helped to push aesthetic boundaries, his writing provided the opportunity for him to share his expertise with a wider community of designers and art directors. In the 1952–3 annual, *Designers in Britain* 4, Havinden (1952–3, p. iii) claims:

Repetition is the basis of modern commerce – a totally different conception to the ephemeral success of a popular dance tune which is 'here today and gone tomorrow'. If the sale of a product is to be consistently repeated then the appearance of the product itself, even the factory in which it is made, as well as all the ancillary activities to do with reminding the public about it (such as the packaging, posters, press advertising, printed matter, exhibitions, window displays) must also be co-ordinated and present a consistently attractive appearance.

From the perspective of today’s saturated brand environment, Havinden’s earnest call for coordinated and consistent visual identity programmes appears unremarkable, but this is precisely what is interesting about his statement – it emphasises that visual coordination was not the norm within post-war British society. Here we have a high profile, avant-garde practitioner calling out for a new approach to design practice centred around repetition. Havinden develops on these ideas further in a later article, published in the *Penrose Annual* in 1955. His article, ‘The Importance of “Company Handwriting”’, serves two distinct functions. First, his advocacy of the coherent, recognisable visual identities that he refers to as ‘company handwriting’. Second, in presenting solely the work of his own agency for the featured case studies, he explicitly promotes himself and Crawfords.

When Havinden refers to a company’s ‘handwriting’, he is not insinuating that lettering or typography should be used to achieve a unifying design style. Rather, he is drawing a comparison between the readily recognised appearance of an acquaintance’s handwriting and the kind of consistent visual identity that would benefit business organisations: ‘Just as a man’s script is recognisable at once by his friends, whatever he is
writing, so a company’s variegated approaches to the public should assume a familiar and readily identifiable form’ (Havinden, 1955, p. 58). Havinden is perhaps unaware that his term, ‘company handwriting’, harked back to what are commonly considered the very first commercially branded products. As Davis (1956) explains, traders centuries earlier had inscribed their own signatures upon their goods in order that these goods would be recognised as originating from them. These signatures were literally the companies’ handwriting, and in many cases, they would act as a certification of the product’s quality (Davis, 1956).

Havinden (1955, p. 58) begins his article with a robust argument for the financial waste inherent in advertising work that was not coordinated, stating that individual advertisements must be clearly recognised as belonging to the service or product that they advertised in order that they may be effective:

Some £230,000,000 were spent in 1953 on advertising in Britain. I wonder how much of this was good value? One just has to look at the poorly designed posters in the streets and the uncoordinated advertisements in the newspapers and magazines to see how little of that advertising money fulfils its function in arresting the attention and capturing the goodwill of the public. A large proportion of all advertising is not as effective as it could be, in the first place because it lacks a focus that will be recognisable at once and associate itself, in the mind of the casual reader or passer-by, with the product or service to be advertised. All advertising for branded-goods, however varied, should be consistent in theme and should have an unmistakable appearance. We might call this appearance the ‘company handwriting’.

As with Davis, he clearly believes ‘recognition’ to be a key concept, employing forms of this term eight times and repeatedly explaining how consistency could be used to breed familiarity, and so increase public recognition. Other key terms in Havinden’s article are: ‘unmistakable’, ‘cumulative effect’, ‘cohesion’ and ‘pattern’. ‘House style’ is a term notable only for its absence here, reflecting that the term had yet to become commonplace.

Like Davis, Havinden (1955, p. 58) highlights the role of the audience when he refers to ‘the casual reader or passer-by’. Both authors identify the perception of the audience as a key criterion in defining whether a corporate image programme may be considered as coordinated or not. Havinden (1955, p. 58) claims that only if a scheme is perceived to be coordinated by its audience can it be considered effective, and thus likely to capture the ‘goodwill of the public’. His reference to ‘goodwill’ can be interpreted in relation to our current notion of ‘brand loyalty’ (Pride and Ferrell, 2012) – a term that
infers a consumer’s continued allegiance to the products and services of a single organisation.\textsuperscript{52}

Whereas the LNER text (Anon, 1932) and Davis’s (1950a, 1952) texts both focus solely on typography as a coordinating device, Havinden touches upon a range of additional means by which coordination can be achieved, including: symbols, logotypes, patterns and the style of illustrative or photographic content. He even considers the cropping of imagery as a means to achieve unity, explaining: ‘As a further unifying device it was decided to show “Daks” trousers always in photographs cut just above the waist’ (Havinden, 1955, p. 60).

For Havinden, corporate image-making involves more than simply imposing a consistent style, thus he highlights that there must also be an association between the ‘handwriting’ and each individual product that it appears upon. As such he draws attention to the flattening out that can occur when a single style is imposed insensitively across multiple artefacts (i.e. what suits one artefact may not suit all). Here, the balance between rigidity and adaptability that Dutton (1946) advocated for emerges again, with Havinden’s (1955, p. 61) reference to an ‘infinity of variations’, reflecting Dutton’s ‘infinite flexibility’:

…a unifying style, consistently applied, helps to co-ordinate, consciously or unconsciously, all the ‘messages’ a firm sends out to the public in every phase of its activities and gives them a cumulative effect that immeasurably enhances their value. No effort should be spared, therefore, to make this style as striking and, at the same time, as simple as possible, to allow for the infinity of variations it may have to assume.

This is noteworthy as a number of practicing design practitioners continue to question the ongoing preoccupation with consistency, reiterating that corporate image-making is about coherence, rather than strict, totalising consistency (Steel, 2016).

\textsuperscript{52} Pride and Ferrell (2012, p. 400) claim that ‘there are three levels of brand loyalty: recognition, preference, and insistence’. They suggest that recognition is the lowest, most basic level of loyalty, where a brand is readily recognised by the consumer, but not necessarily valued. Preference is the median level, were consumers show some favourable opinion of the brand. Insistence meanwhile, infers that the consumer is unyielding in their loyalty to the brand in question. Roberts (2004, p. 66) refers to this insistent form of loyalty as, ‘loyalty beyond reason’, implying that the consumer is so unflinching in their allegiance to an organisation that their support may become irrational, resulting in an unreasonable level of devotion.
Alec Davis’s (1956) most potent contribution to the codification of corporate image-making came in September 1956, when he released a special issue of Design magazine dedicated solely to the subject of house style. The contents page of the text read more like an introductory text-book than a monthly magazine, with sections titled under the following questions: ‘Why is it important?’, ‘Who should have it?’ and ‘Where should it be evident’. Other features focus on contemporary and historical examples, the ‘pitfalls and possibilities’ of house style, and finally, a summary of the contemporary context, titled ‘Where do we stand?’ (Davis, 1956, p. 13). Where Davis’s early writing had been obfuscated by a lack of clarity and a tendency to stray off-course, here his prose is more concise. With the words ‘House Style’ emblazoned on the cover of the magazine (Fig. 8), then repeated nine times upon the contents page alone, there is an indication that what had in 1950 been a relatively unorthodox new concept, was in 1956 a blossoming, readily recognised field of practice.\(^{53}\)

Davis’s (1956, p. 14–15) introduction demonstrates his newfound dexterity with the language of house style, but in spite of the unfamiliar eloquence of his prose, Davis’s message remains similar to his earlier pieces, with a familiar reliance on terms such as: ‘recognisable’, ‘consistency’, ‘style’ and ‘unity’. The opening paragraph of the introduction closely mirrors the sentiment of his first text written in 1950, with the words ‘consistent’ again being allied with consumer ‘recognition’: ‘If the style is good, consistent and at the same time flexible, it can do much to promote sales through a wider public recognition and increased good will’ (Davis, 1956, p. 15; emphasis added).

One word that Davis had not deployed before was ‘flexible’ and this would introduce a new critical dimension to his regular argument. To this point his prose had centred almost exclusively on the notion of consistency, with words like ‘uniformity’ and ‘standardisation’ beckoning for a design that privileged rigour and order. Flexibility, instead, insinuated variety, which appears antithetical to the consistency he had prized so highly in his earlier texts. Yet here within his short introduction of some two hundred words we find two distinct references to the need for variety, with the second

\(^{53}\) Edited by Michael Farr (see testing case in Appendix 2) and with a cover design by F.H.K. Henrion (the subject of Case Study 2), Davis’s (1956) special issue of Design is a powerful reminder of the closely knit social connections within the British design scene. Here in this one artefact several key protagonists are represented, with the subjects of my other two case studies (Case Study 1: Hans Schleger, and Case Study 3: Design Research Unit) also featured within the magazine.
reference suggesting that a lack of flexibility could lead to sterility: ‘A house style can therefore be a sound investment and a useful tool; but its edge must not be blunted by rigid standardisation’ (Davis, 1956, p. 15).

Figure 8) F.H.K. Henrion’s cover design for the ‘House Style’ special issue of *Design* magazine, edited by Alec Davis (1956).

On the next spread, whilst discussing the role of design symbols, Davis (1956, p. 16–17) supports his call for flexibility with reference to F.H.K. Henrion’s work for the organisation Bowater, stating that when ‘properly designed they [house style programmes] can be adaptable’. Yet the illustrated examples provided fail to support the
notion that the corporate symbol could provide flexibility. Instead the three photographs featured show simply the same logo repetitively badged across different design artefacts. Aside from the necessary variations in scale and material, no significant adaptation or flexibility is evident. Nevertheless, Davis’s recognition that house style, properly conceived, must balance consistent and variable elements was an important development that mirrored Dutton (1946) and Havinden’s (1955) arguments.

Some twenty-four references appear in the ‘further reading’ section of the magazine, the earliest of these being the LNER article of 1932. Two are from the 1940s, whilst the remaining twenty-one indicate work published between 1950 and 1956, with many of these only vaguely connected to the subject of house style.\(^\text{54}\) Within this seventy-two-page special issue, Davis sets out a comprehensive and rigorous documentation of house style, establishing in the process a basic taxonomy of the different means through which a house style could be delineated. Here he included five discrete ‘factors’ (Fig. 3): Colour, Pattern, Borders, Trademarks and Symbols, and lastly, Lettering, to which he would dedicate significantly more space than any of the other factors, believing it to be ‘the most important single factor’ (Davis, 1956, p. 22).

**Summary**

Analysing the featured articles presented here (Anon, 1932; Dutton, 1946; Davis, 1950a, 1952, 1956; Havinden, 1955) has helped to establish how the practice of corporate image-making was developed over a number of decades through the publication of various texts widely available within popular trade publications. The rhetorical developments traced demonstrate the ongoing attempts made by practitioners to articulate and codify the phenomenon under question. Evident here is a process through which the knowledge of a new, emergent practice is moving from implicit, or relatively tacit forms, to a more explicit, codified basis. Inherent in this transition is the emergence of a ‘community of practice’ (Lave & Wenger, 1991) that developed gradually around corporate image-making. The writers investigated sought to develop clear terminology to assert their position and it is evident from this analysis that

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\(^{54}\) Examples include Anthony Adams’s, ‘An industry in print’ articles, which analysed the way that firms within certain industries presented themselves; or Christian Barman’s article on ‘London Transport Publicity’, which surprisingly failed to touch upon the concept of house style at all.
'recognition' was a primary motive in the pursuit of a coordinated corporate image programme. The first three examples (Anon, 1932; Davis, 1950a, 1952; Havinden, 1955) all highlighted the important role of the consumer, referred to variously as: ‘the traveller’ (Anon, 1932), ‘the print-user’ (Davis, 1950a) and the ‘casual reader or passer by’ (Havinden, 1955). As such, the perception of the audience is recognised to be a key criterion in discerning whether a corporate image programme may be considered as coordinated or not. Achieving the desired recognition is reliant, we are told, on the deployment of consistent, recurrent design elements carefully controlled. Though all of the texts presented here prioritised aesthetic unification above all else, it is surprising to see how these early commentators shared in the acknowledgement that flexibility was also an important consideration.

The texts studied here have proved useful as a precursor to the case studies that follow as they set out the context within which these detailed empirical cases play out. One of the axioms of my project is that contemporary branding practices have a lineage that is rooted in the design practices of the post-war era. So, while scholars like Julier (2000, 2017) and Moor (2007) have concentrated on the proliferation of corporate design in the 1980s, I contend that design practices were heavily influenced by corporate concerns from the 1950s onwards. The work addressed here supports the argument that corporate image-making practice was emergent in the 1930s and flourishing strongly by the mid-1950s. The codification of these practices evident within the texts substantiates this. Moreover, the evidence gathered here further supports my contention that this formative period is overdue greater scrutiny.

Lastly, we have seen through the examples presented here that corporate communication design was typically associated with notions of uniformity. This helps to substantiate Bakker’s (2005) earlier claims. However, what is perhaps more surprising is how often the authors investigated here recognised variety and dynamism as equally important features of successful corporate image schemes.
Having established the conceptual framework upon which this research is based, as well as the methodological approach of the research, what follows here is the critical interrogation of the three selected case studies identified earlier. First, we look at the example of Hans Schleger & Associates (HS&A) led by the commercial artist Hans Schleger. Next comes an examination of F.H.K. Henrion’s consultancy Henrion Design Associates (HDA). Finally, we conclude with the group of Misha Black and Milner Gray, the Design Research Unit (DRU). Each of these case studies reveals a distinct approach to the practice of corporate image-making.

In the case of HS&A we see how during the 1950s it was common for graphic designers to be governed by advertising agents acting as intermediaries between the client and the designer. HS&A present us with an individualistic approach to corporate image that privileges dynamism and variety as much as consistency, order and control. This provides an example that runs counter to the dominant discourse about the need for consistency in order to attain consumer recognition (e.g. Anon, 1932; Davis, 1950a, 1952).

The case of HDA demonstrates how graphic design consultants sought to learn from the advertising business in order to seek jurisdiction for their own profession, to win their own clients, and to communicate with these clients in a more persuasive fashion. Here we see the designer seek to claim a more powerful role in the relationship with their clients, whereby opportunities to rule or govern the corporate image-making process are afforded.

The case of the DRU, meanwhile, shows us how designers transitioned from soft, tentative and organic forms of governance, to more mechanistic and technocratic forms. We see how the DRU as a consultant group moved away from a distrust of homogenisation (or what they call the ‘stereotyped’ approach), slowly embracing concepts of standardisation, strict consistency and control.
In Table 2, above, we can see how various material apparatuses were used to rule relationships between designers, intermediaries and clients. The circulation of these various ‘texts’ between different parties constitutes material evidence of how governing relationships function over time. So, in the case of HS&A, the intermediary, Mather & Crowther, used a Guard Book to assert their position of power over the design consultants. A chain of command thus existed here, running directly from the client,
through the advertising agent, to the design group; with this ruling relationship clearly inscribed within the advertising agent's files (their Guard Books).

By comparison, in the case of HDA, numerous tools are developed and mobilised by the design group to display their command over the working relationship with their clients (be this The Post Office, Blue Circle Cement or KLM). For the most part these apparatuses are conceived to materialise and evidence the group’s control over a particular situation or issue. So, for example, tools, diagrams and maps of different kinds are produced to make arguments for particular strategic design approaches that HDA favour.

With the DRU case there is a certain mirroring of the HDA case, in that material apparatuses are deployed by the design group to evidence their own control over particular work scenarios. In the case of the DRU, some of the tools they produce come to have an even greater sense of power over a more expansive territory. So, for example, their corporate design standards manuals are used to inscribe programmes of action that are to be achieved by a range of actors outside the confines of their own organisation. The interesting aspect here is how the DRU came to rule relationships over other designers and producers working outside their own organisation. In this sense the designer now acted as a kind of intermediary between the client and other designers tasked with implementation duties. A separation begins to emerge here between those more autonomous designers working at a higher strategic planning level and thus applying designerly ways of knowing to business problems, and those tasked more simply with the role of implementing others’ ideas. In simple terms we see a divergence in power between different design practitioners, with some moving closer to the boardroom, and some fixed ever more firmly to the drawing board. So, while some designers begin to successfully rule relationships over their clients, others continue to be more forcefully ruled.
Case Study 1) Coordinated but not standardised: The practical rationality of Hans Schleger & Associates

The following case study will help us to better comprehend the relationship between early British graphic designers of the 1950s and the advertising businesses that they were dependent upon. Hans Schleger, leader of the group, was a commercial artist who was typical of art-school-trained designers based in Britain, in that he was suspicious of large corporations and their drives towards efficiency and standardisation. So, whereas some designers began to be increasingly interested in systems thinking and operations research, Schleger privileged practical rationality over codified scientific forms of knowledge. His approach was reflective and agile, and he understood that corporate design could be made to appear coordinated without becoming homogenously standardised.

The development of Hans Schleger & Associates

Biographical background

Hans Schleger & Associates (HS&A hereafter) was a consultant design group founded in London in 1953 by the German-born graphic designer Hans Schleger. Born in 1898 in Kempen, Prussia, Schleger (born Schlesinger) went on to establish his reputation in the advertising industries of Germany and America in the 1920s and 30s. Having studied painting and drawing at the Kunstgewerbeschule in Berlin (1918–21), he took on the role of Artistic Director for the film set designer Karl Hagenbeck in Berlin (1921–24). He then moved on to New York in search of new opportunities, partly in response to the economic downturn occurring in Berlin at the time (Schleger, 2001), but perhaps also in response to his experiences on the front in WWI (Schleger, 2017). By 1926 he had established his own studio practice on Madison Avenue, signing his work with the pseudonym ‘Zéro’ (Schleger, 2001). Schleger found commercial success during his short five-year spell in America, but returned to Berlin in 1929 to marry his cousin.
Annemarie Mendelsohn, with the Wall Street crash cited as another factor that contributed to his decision to return. Back in Germany he worked as an Art Director for the German office of British advertising firm W.S. Crawford (Schleger, 2001). A feature in *Gebrauchsgraphik* magazine (Frenzel, 1931) indicates the regard in which he was held at this time, being introduced as ‘the distinguished advertising expert and commercial artist, who has achieved so much success both in Germany and America’.

By 1933 Schleger was on the move again, this time to London, where he would reside for the remainder of his life. He was one of a number of artistic Jewish émigrés from central Europe who came to Britain to escape from repressive and intolerant European regimes (Black, 2012). In London he benefitted from the connections he had made at Crawford’s in Berlin, including links with their influential Art Director Ashley Havinden. The American-born designer Edward McKnight Kauff was particularly supportive of him, sharing his own client contacts and helping him to organise an exhibition of his work at the leading art and design publisher Lund Humphries in 1934 (Schleger, 2001).

Once settled in Britain Schleger relied on a series of commissions from advertising agents (e.g. John Tait and Partners Ltd. and William Grant & Sons) and influential patrons of the arts (e.g. Frank Pick at London Transport, Jack Beddington at Shell and Stephen Tallents at the General Post Office) (Schleger, 2001). The most significant intermediary in his early British career was an American advertising agency with offices in London, Mather and Crowther (M&C hereafter). From 1952 to 1964 he worked as a consultant for M&C on an exclusive retainer basis, this meant he was permitted from producing press advertisements for other agencies. During their period of collaboration, Schleger and M&C embarked together on a number of ambitious identity schemes for a range of corporate clients. The most remarkable of these being a comprehensive corporate image programme for the fish monger Mac Fisheries which would come to impact on practically all visual manifestations of the firm. This programme of work would prove noteworthy in the design world due to its unusual mix

Kauff was an established and prominent figure in the British commercial art scene, due in large part to his modernistic poster designs for London Transport. Schleger later moved into a Penthouse apartment in the same block as Kauff and his partner Marion Dorn, sharing in the artistic and intellectual social scene that they were involved with. Havinden also remained a close professional contact for Schleger, though surprisingly, Schleger does not appear to have worked with Crawford’s head office in London, perhaps due to retainer contracts he had in place with other agencies.
of consistent and recurrent corporate imagery, combined with unorthodox wit and dynamism. Furthermore, the programme was significant for its broad national scope, being representative of a wider post-war trend for retail organisations to move from regional to national representation.

By exploring the triadic working relationship between HS&A, M&C and Mac Fisheries I will reveal the hierarchical tensions that existed between designers, advertising agencies and clients during the early post-war period. In order to understand this collaborative labour, I examine the tools of practice implicated in their collective work. This means looking closely at a pair of Guard Books compiled by M&C to record the development of the advertising campaign for Mac Fisheries. By scrutinizing the socio-technical relationships between human and non-human agents I will explicate the role of each party, thus untangling the complex interrelationships between twentieth century advertising professionals and the first British ‘graphic designers’. This endeavour is important in order to establish the role that advertising played in the development of graphic design, for, as Heller (1995a) explains, ‘in most accounts of graphic design’s origins advertising is virtually denied’. HS&A’s corporate image work for Mac Fisheries presents an alternative model of design coordination where more varied, ‘contrapuntal rhythms’ (Venturi, 1966) are favoured over the homogeneous unification typical in the field. The Mac Fisheries scheme thus provides evidence that design programmes can be dynamic and humorous, while also retaining a coherence that binds various artefacts together in unison.

**Mac Fisheries, the early years**

By the time Schleger came to work for them, Mac Fisheries were already a retailer of significant repute, with William Hesketh Leverhulme, of Lever Brothers (now Unilever), having founded the chain in 1918. The first Mac Fisheries shop opened on Hill Street in Richmond, Surrey in February 1919 (French, 2009). From its early formation the firm developed a habit of commissioning high pedigree art and design, with renowned medallist George Kruger Gray commissioned to create a symbol (Fig. 9) for the firm

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56 As previously mentioned the term ‘graphic design’ was not widely adopted in Britain until the mid-to-late 1950s, with the introduction of this new term ushering out the era of the ‘commercial artist’ (Kinross, 1988).
around 1920 (Davis, 1956). Other notable commercial artists were also commissioned, with an advertisement commissioned from Fred Taylor in 1922 (Fig. 10) and both Gregory Brown and Kennedy North contributing poster designs in 1927 (Figs. 11 & 12). Despite the high pedigree of their early design output, Mac Fisheries did not expand notably until immediately after WWII when demand for wet fish grew significantly. Unlike meat, fish was not rationed, so Mac Fisheries stores became adept at advertising new deliveries, with display notices positioned prominently to publicise incoming deliveries, resulting in long queues of patrons waiting at store opening times (French, 2009).

Figure 9) Kruger Gray’s symbol for Mac Fisheries, designed around 1920.

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57 Gray’s symbol was combined together with a distinctive lettering style that was applied to shop-fronts and vans, and the repeated use of these two standardised design elements created a unity of style that was uncommon for the time. This was an early example of corporate image-making in Britain, with a common colour scheme helping to secure the cumulative impression of a consistent visual appearance. As noted in the previous chapter (p. 96), such an approach was not totally unprecedented, with Davis (1956) having suggested that the first example of a consistent approach to corporate lettering in Britain may have been Eric Gill’s standardised alphabet for retailer W.H. Smith. Gill’s first commission for Smith’s began in 1903 when he was invited to create fascia lettering for their new Paris store in the Rue de Rivoli. Between 1906 and 1913, he set out standard sample brush-drawn alphabets that other lettering artists could follow in order to fully standardise the lettering that appeared on shop-fronts, kiosks, vehicles and signs (see: Banks, 1994).

58 Fred Taylor and Gregory Brown were popular and successful artists, highly regarded for their poster designs for London Transport and the London & North Eastern Railway. Kennedy North, meanwhile, had created designs for Shell Oil and the British Empire Exhibition.
Figure 10) Fred Taylor’s Mac Fisheries advert from 1922.

Figures 11 & 12) Posters by Gregory Brown [left] and Kennedy North [right] for Mac Fisheries, both from 1927.
Rationing continued until nine years after the war in 1954 and it was during the early-1950s that the organisation began to consider further expansion. As the rationing of meat began to ease and the branded goods of pre-war became available again, consumers’ appetite for wet fish began to wane (Anon, 1954a). In an effort to compete with other retail outlets, Mac Fisheries decided to widen their range of produce to include fruit, vegetables and dairy products, but in order to expand, existing retail units had to be sold to facilitate the larger premises required to display an ever-increasing range of produce (French, 2009).

Figure 13) Uncredited advert for Mac Fisheries used to announce new store openings between 1951 and 1954. Mather and Crowther Guard Book, History of Advertising Trust archive.
As new stores started to open, newspaper advertisements were published by Mac Fisheries to promote their arrival. One particular design was used repeatedly to publicise the new openings, with the same template used each time and just the store details updated to reflect the latest location (Fig. 13). The standard template featured an illustration with a self-contained, fully kitted-out store being lowered into place by crane onto the archetypal British high-street; the headline reading rather ominously in all capitals: ‘WE ARE COMING TO…’, with the village or town name inserted in place alongside the opening date. This design template was used consistently over a period of four years, from November 1951 to January 1954 (Mather and Crowther, 1951–58) and appears to have been the last advertisement printed by Mac Fisheries before Schleger arrived on the scene. This advert continued to be used long after Schleger’s own scheme had commenced roll-out, indicating that it was common for corporate image schemes to be more multifarious than they proclaimed to be.

Defining the role of the trademark

Hans Schleger and Associates begin work

Just as Mac Fisheries began to open more stores, re-using the same stock advertisement in the process, Hans Schleger was commissioned by M&C to begin work on a publicity campaign for the firm. As already noted, Mac Fisheries had taken steps to standardise their appearance from their first beginnings in 1919, but HS&A and M&C would go one step further, creating a totalising corporate image programme that would impact each and every manifestation of the firm – this was at least the principle. As I will go on to show, the new scheme would prove significant as an early example of a ‘total’ corporate image programme of broad national scope and its pre-eminence gained considerable attention from the international design press (Maiwald, 1953b; Anon, 1954b; Gowing, 1956), as well as peers within the industry (Havinden, 1953; Barman, 1954). A report prepared by Schleger (1959) about the work, listed his own duties as, ‘consultant and designer, works in cooperation with Advertising Agents Mather & Crowther Ltd’. Regrettably, little evidence remains of correspondence or meetings between the two parties, but a pair of ‘Guard Books’ compiled by M&C offers a unique insight into the
process of implementing such a publicity campaign.59 Held in the archive collection of Mather and Crowther at the History of Advertising Trust (HAT), the Mac Fisheries Guard Books collect together, in chronological order, every press advertisement published by Mac Fisheries between November 1951 and December 1958. These books articulate, in minute detail, the transition from the existing design style to the adoption of Schleger and M&C’s comprehensive new scheme.

As design consultant to M&C, Schleger and his group HS&A, seems to have had significant influence over the direction of the Mac Fisheries campaign. According to his colleague and wife, Pat Schleger (interview, Appendix 1.1), he would be present at M&C’s headquarters during design meetings with the client and would present his design proposals to the client. This was not common procedure, as commercial artists like Schleger would normally be kept at arms-length by the agencies they worked for, partly to protect the agency’s lucrative commercial contracts and partly because commercial artists tended to be viewed as ‘hired-hands’, in other words, as artists not fit to participate directly in serious business discussions (Seitlin, 1970). Although early British graphic designers like Schleger had sought independence and professional integrity through organisations like the Society of Industrial Artists, in practice most graphic designers remained heavily dependent on the advertising profession to provide them with work.60 It was likely Schleger’s well-founded reputation in the advertising industry that secured such an unusually close involvement with the client and an equally strong influence in the direction of the campaign. But regardless of his relative power, the day-to-day communications between client and designer continued to be channelled through the agency, M&C.

Contained in the two extensive Mac Fisheries Guard Books are found two letters from M&C, addressed to Schleger from their executive Ernest Arthur Lough. From the first letter, dated 22nd February 1952, it is clear to see M&C’s role as an intermediary between Schleger and the client Mac Fisheries. As Lough (Mather and Crowther, 1951–58) writes:

59 ‘Guard Book’ is a term commonly used in advertising to describe a book or folder used to collate information about a particular campaign.
60 Like Schleger, F.H.K. Henrion had a similar consultancy contract with another American advertising agency in London, Erwin Wasey. I will return to Henrion and his group Henrion Design Associates in Case Study 2, p. 167.
'OPERATION MAC FISH'

Client has just telephoned to say that a Board ruling from Mac Fisheries is that wherever we show the Mac Fisheries trade mark, it must always have the four fish shown in the appropriate places. We can still show it in symbolic form, but it must never appear without the four fish.

Existing material cannot be altered, but this ruling is to apply on all material produced from today.

E.A. Lough

The tone within the note is decidedly brash and dictatorial, leaving little room for Schleger to respond in any way other than to follow the instructions found therein. The given directions are labelled clearly as a ‘ruling’, suggesting that the client was explicitly trying to govern Schleger’s conduct. By comparison, M&C act as a neutral messenger, inflecting no opinion of their own, though their allegiance to the client appears stronger than any loyalty towards Schleger.

Further through the first of the two Guard Books and almost two years later, on 25 of January 1954, the second letter can be found from Lough (Mather and Crowther, 1951–58), addressed to Schleger:

'MAC FISHERIES – TRADE MARKS'

Further to my note of October 1953, we have now received a final directive from Client concerning the use of his trade mark.

It has now been laid down that wherever the trade mark is used near the word 'Mac Fisheries' it must be the official trade mark with two rings and detailed fish as shown on the letter headings. Wherever the trade mark is used other than near the word 'Mac Fisheries', variations such as we are using at the moment are permitted.

It is finally laid down by Client that we are not allowed to use any form of trade mark that is without an indication of the four fish.

E.A. Lough.

The first sentence of the note alludes to the existence of additional written correspondence between M&C and Schleger beyond the two notes found in the Guard Books at the HAT archive – for example, Lough references a note of October 1953 which is not present in the Guard Books. Perhaps the directive content of the two included notes was felt to be of critical importance in the development of the campaign, whereas other correspondence between them was viewed as less decisive. It is worth highlighting the language used in this second note. According to Lough (Mather and Crowther, 1951–58), new directions have been 'laid down' by Mac Fisheries, implying that this new instruction was a command of law not to be disputed (i.e. they have 'laid down the law').
It is clear from these two notes that tension existed between the wishes of Schleger and those of the client, Mac Fisheries. While Schleger appears to have wanted his new, modernised ‘symbolic’ trademark to replace the original symbol designed by Kruger Gray, the client was less convinced about discarding the heritage of their identity. So, although the Mac Fisheries programme has been credited as an exemplar of coordinated design (Schleger, 2001), in actuality the tightly defined constraints that emerged from the client forced HS&A to playfully explore different approaches to the original trademark created by Kruger Gray (Figs. 14–16). At least five stylistic variations distinct from the original Kruger Gray design can be seen within the advertisements in the Guard Books at HAT (looking beyond the realm of printed advertisements within these Guard Books still further variations are evident). These styles range from those with very rough brush strokes (Fig. 14), to a more reductive geometric approach (Figs. 15 & 16). Each of these trademark styles is different, but each transforms the recognisable clichéd outline of the four fish, into indistinct oval shapes.

Figure 15) Excerpt from press advertisement for Mac Fisheries by HS&A, undated. Mather and Crowther Guard Book, History of Advertising Trust archive.

Figure 16) Excerpt from press advertisement for Mac Fisheries by HS&A, undated. Mather and Crowther Guard Book, History of Advertising Trust archive.
Figure 17) Press advert for Mac Fisheries by HS&A, 1952. Mather and Crowther Guard Book, History of Advertising Trust archive.
A fourth approach (Fig. 17) integrates the geometric trademark design with the words ‘Mac Fish – Fresh Fish’ in a script lettering; while the fifth and final stylistic approach is a hybrid design which combines the reductive geometry of Schleger’s circular holding device, with more detailed and recognisable fish motifs (Fig. 18). Here the four fish are finished with a shadow effect that gives them the impression of being three-dimensional – this echoes the more photorealistic approach of Kruger Gray’s detailed original design.
Untangling the chronological narrative behind each of these trademark variations is complex. Nevertheless, examining this small aspect of the campaign may help us understand more about the interrelations between client, advertising agency and designer, whilst also explicating the issues that surround the implementation of vast standardisation programmes such as this. It appears from the two Guard Books at HAT that Schleger’s initial designs all used the integrated logo (Fig. 17) combining the geometric trademark with the script lettering. This is evidenced by the fact that each of the initial advertisements are labelled with a number, for example, ‘Mac Fisheries (Operation Mac Fish) Advt. No. 1’. Whoever collated these advertisements at M&C added the date of the advertisement in pen, e.g. ‘March 1952’. So, we can surmise that the first four advertisements all used the same logo-type variant.

Just days, or weeks, before these adverts had appeared in the press, Lough sent his first note from the client (dated 22nd February), instructing that future work ‘…must always have the four fish shown in the appropriate places. We can still show it in symbolic form, but it must never appear without the four fish’ (Mather and Crowther, 1951–58). Lough’s note suggests that Mac Fisheries were unhappy with the initial designs, perhaps preferring to retain the recognisable fish shapes, even if they were made more symbolic and less detailed. The reference to the fish appearing in the ‘appropriate places’, is more difficult to interpret, suggesting that Schleger may have created some variations that strayed even further beyond Kruger Gray’s original.

What happens immediately after the first note is unclear, but twenty months later the client (Mather and Crowther, 1951–58) appears to have toughened their stance, putting forward more precise instructions that assert, ‘wherever the trade mark is used near the word “Mac Fisheries” it must be the official trade mark with two rings and detailed fish as shown on the letter headings’. They were seemingly not against the more illustrative and loose use of the symbol, but they insisted that it must appear as a secondary element away from the headline ‘Mac Fisheries’. The effect of this decision, was to banish the looser variations of the symbol to the role of illustration. An advert from 1955 (Fig. 19) demonstrates how reverting to the original trademark design had forced the loose illustrative version of the trademark to become redundant, acting merely as a secondary element that was repetitive and discordant. In this example the two trademarks are essentially in conflict given that they are of similar size, but of different graphic styles. The illustrative version is slightly larger, but the detailed original holds a more critical position in the centre of the composition, attracting the eye
courtesy of its darker mass. The hierarchy between these two elements remains distinctly unclear.

Figure 19) 1955 press advert for Mac Fisheries by HS&A. Note the combination of the detailed Kruger Gray logo at the bottom and the loose illustrative logo variant at the top. Mather and Crowther Guard Book, History of Advertising Trust archive.
The perception of the programme

A wider assessment of the material produced by HS&A for Mac Fisheries reveals that the range of trademark variations in use went far beyond those found purely in the printed advertisements. For example, the icon used by HS&A in their range of packaging for Mac Fisheries (Fig. 20) takes the trademark in an altogether different direction, with fish that closely resemble the Ichthys (or ‘Jesus fish’) used to denote the Christian faith. This lack of continuity raises questions as to whether the Mac Fisheries design programme can be considered coordinated or not. The response from the design press, as well as from Schleger’s peers, suggests that the campaign was undoubtedly regarded as a successful corporate image programme at the time of its release. For example, Ashley Havinden (1953) wrote personally to Schleger to congratulate him on the quality of the coordination across the programme:

Figure 20) HS&A’s packaging scheme for Mac Fisheries, late 1950s.
16th December 1953

Dear Hans

I am being continually struck by the excellent publicity for Mac Fisheries. I do congratulate you on this. Not only is all the designing first class, but I think more important still is the co-ordination of your work which is brilliant. That is to say, the advertisements, posters, delivery vans and the shops, all echo the same theme.

As the theme is a brilliant one, I imagine your work is proving a great success to Mac Fisheries. Congratulations on this great contribution you are making to keep good design going in advertising.

As ever yours

Ashley

It is noteworthy that Havinden (1953) points to the coordination of the work as being ‘more important still’, than the quality of the individual designs themselves. This intimates that it is the successful alignment of the parts that aroused his interest, prompting him to send his compliments. Havinden’s actions imply that Schleger’s achievements were rather extraordinary, for if such coordination were the norm it would be unlikely that he would have taken the time to convey his opinion in such a way. It is worth noting Havinden’s (1953) early use of the word ‘co-ordination’, which was not commonly employed in design circles at this time, but found popularity over the coming decades, as exemplified by Henrion & Parkin’s (1967) text, *Design Coordination and Corporate Image*. As we have already seen, Havinden (1955) took an active interest in the practice of corporate image-making, writing on ‘company handwriting’ for the *Penrose Annual* (this was discussed in more detail in the earlier section: ‘The developing discourse of British corporate image-making’, p. 96).

Whereas Havinden was explicit about the role of co-ordination in Schleger’s work, Christian Barman (1954) sent his own more general praise in a letter of appreciation:

My dear Jack [a personal nickname for Schleger]

The more I see of it the more I enjoy and admire your wonderful MACFICIENCY

Yours

Chris

21.11.54

Although less directly complimenting the coherence of the scheme, Barman’s note could be considered a reaction to the cumulative power of the campaign, as he seems to imply that with each new manifestation seen, a further appreciation is gained. Adding to this, the final pun used by Barman to combine ‘Mac Fisheries’ and ‘efficiency’, could be read
as a compliment on the coordination of the scheme. In other words, there is an efficiency in each and every design element, as each individual part comes together to contribute to the impression of a whole.

Aside from these personal letters, the coverage in the advertising, design and marketing press was predominantly positive, complimenting the coherence and ambition of the scheme. For example, *Printing World* (Anon, 1954b) are explicit in their praise for the coherence of the scheme:

The recent, perfectly conceived and executed campaign of the Mac Fisheries, with posters, showcards, price tags, wrappers and leaflets, planned in a perfectly interrelated fashion, each of them indicative of the style and characteristics of the others.

Whilst editor of *Graphik*, Heinrich Maiwald (1953b, p. 2), writes:

It is from the conviction that the various branches of applied art are not things apart, that Zero derives his capacity to introduce continuity of thought and design into his publicity designs; this impresses itself on the public’s mind as a pictorial translation of what is, in fact, thought association. Colour and form create a unified total picture based on the words ‘Mac Fish – Fresh Fish’. Through repetition this concept, the symbol ‘Fresh…’ plus the trade mark, becomes synonymous with the name and trade mark of Mac Fisheries. Zero has for example, fitted the ‘fish symbol’ shown on these pages – into a large diverse series of advertisements without ever losing his characteristic spontaneity of line and conception.

Moreover, Maiwald (1953b, p. 2) lauds the way that HS&A’s campaign refuses to force ‘a sales-success formula’ upon the consumer, arguing that Schleger, with his ‘imagination, the sophistication of humour of his drawings, typographic wit and, most important, with his firm base of common sense, is authoritative yet disarming and persuasive’.

In the pages of *Art & Industry*, Mary Gowing (1956, p. 206–207), who had collaborated with Schleger on the ATS campaign, writes as follows:

Seen numerically the job is a big one. Some five hundred items, most of them complex in themselves, have already been completed. But this is not a job to look at in terms of quantity, or even in terms of its truly impeccable detail. It is a job to assess for its bold and beautifully related over-all plan, for the way each item is a consistent piece of public relations work for the whole Mac Fisheries enterprise, for the continuous consistent repetition of the unique selling point… and for the way the items are grouped for immediate identification and memorisation.

When interviewed by *Sales Appeal* in 1952, even Schleger (cited in Barmas, 1952) himself claimed that the work was a ‘complete campaign’, but the broad inconsistencies in the application of the trademark seem to counter this idea of complete coherence. The anomalous trademarks I have identified can be traced back to two particular factors. Firstly, the conflict between Schleger and the client’s design intentions, which are clearly outlined in the two notes from M&C executive Ernest Arthur Lough
discussed above. These notes evidence how Schleger favoured the reductive and modern approach, whilst the client preferred to stick with the existing traditional design approach for the trademark. This resulted in a to-and-fro between client, intermediary and designer, with ever more alternate iterations of the trademark deployed during this period of instability. The second factor in the inconsistent usage of the trademark can be traced to Schleger’s own beliefs and philosophies about design. From his very early time in New York he had begun to explore the notion of a flexible visual identity, treating the trademark as a malleable device that could be manipulated and mutated to create visual interest without losing its unique recognisability. A key example of this approach was his early work for clothing and haberdashery chain, Weber and Heilbroner (1925–1929), to which I will now turn.

The trademark as illustrative device

Advertising manager, Silas Spitzer, was responsible for commissioning Schleger to work for Weber and Heilbroner and was, according to Gebrauchsgraphik magazine (cited in Schleger, 2001, p. 118): ‘the first to replace the usual realistic American advertising by more modern methods.’ The reference to ‘modern methods’ refers to the idea that instead of just depicting the product, more creative, distinctive and unexpected visualisations would be employed (Schleger, 2001). At the heart of Weber and Heilbroner’s campaigns lay Schleger’s Fabric Group trademark which comprised of three men in fedoras standing side-by-side (Fig. 21).

Figure 21) Schleger’s logo for Weber and Heilbroner, c.1925.
This trademark shared the reductive simplicity of Schleger’s modernised and geometric Mac Fisheries symbol, but it was unusual for the way that it was used in the organisation’s advertisements. For example, the ‘Looming up’ advert (Fig. 22) shows how the trademark could be repeated as part of a larger illustrative component of a design. In many of the other advertisements, the trademark was used purely as an illustrative element and not as a static trademark at all. This can be seen on the ‘Mills! Mills! Mills!’ and ‘Fabric Group Suits for Spring’ designs (Figs. 23 & 24). Here the trademark is adapted with the addition of new elements, such as canes in the first instance, and a geometric, decorative graphic in the second instance. In other examples the trademark is neglected altogether, with the three figures remaining, but becoming far more naturalistic. In this case, the audience may or may not perceive the connection between the trademark and the illustration of the three figures. The connection is based on decoding the meaning of the content, rather than a perception of pure form.

Figure 22) Schlegel’s ‘Looming Up’ advertisement for Weber and Heilbroner, c.1925.
Further advertisements by Schleger’s for Weber and Heilbroner, c.1925.

Alongside Schleger’s publicity campaign ran another series of advertisements with photographs by Anton Bruehl (Fig. 25). Silas Spitzer was again credited with commissioning the work, acting as copyrighter in this instance and providing captions for the advertisements (Newton, 2011). Each featured scene is constructed with model-making tools, with the three figures comprised simply of a paper cut-out of the trademark added to each scene. It is unclear whether Schleger had an involvement in this campaign beyond the use of his trademark, but it is clear to see the extension of the same strategy within both sets of work. This strategy being the use of the trademark as an illustrative device. Furthermore, we can clearly see in Schleger’s work for Weber and Heilbroner a precedent for the Mac Fisheries campaign that came later. There is a light-handed approach to coordination in evidence. Rigorous consistency is put aside in favour of a coordination that is complex and varied, but nevertheless remains clear to the eye. In this sense, Schleger refused to patronise his audience by placing the trademark in the same place in a formulaic fashion. There was a formula in use, but it was never overly prescriptive or prosaic.
Schlegler’s friend Paul Rand (1952, p. 61), who is one of the most highly regarded protagonists in the development of corporate identity in America (Heller, 1995b; Bruce, 2006), wrote of the potential for trademarks to be used as far more than just monotonous and repetitive clichés:

A trademark is not merely a device to adorn a letterhead, to stamp on a product, or to insert at the base of an advertisement; nor one whose sole prerogative is to imprint itself by dint of constant repetition on the mind of the consumer public. The trademark is a potential illustrative
Rand’s viewpoint conflicted with the dominant mindset of most successful designers during the 1950s and 60s, whose stance tended to favour rigorous and unequivocal coordination, over expression or vigour. As clients were increasingly sold on the concept of visual coherence, it was common for trademarks to be repetitively badged across multiple design outputs in order to make this coherence explicit. But Rand and Schleger advocated a different path, where it would be possible to ‘repeat without being repetitious’ in order to ‘actively stimulate interest in the product or brand’ (Rand, 1952, p. 61). Schleger built on this premise throughout his career, firstly with Weber and Heilbroner in New York, then later in the late 1940s with family firm W. Raven & Company based in Leicester, England. Next came a corporate image programme for Finmar Furniture Limited, around the same time as Mac Fisheries. Before long, a raft of other schemes followed, including those for Edinburgh International Festival, British Sugar Corporation and Manchester Polytechnic (Schleger, 1995, 2008, 2014; Schleger, 2001).

The scheme for Edinburgh International Festival was particularly poetic, where Schleger attained a harmony between consistency and variety akin to that of Spitzer and Bruhl’s campaign for the Fabric Group. A trademark was created featuring two birds positioned inside a depiction of Edinburgh castle (Fig. 26). During the first year’s campaign the trademark was applied with restraint, so that a recognisable visual impression was built up across a range of applications (Fig. 27). Over subsequent years Schleger and his team began to employ the trademark in increasingly diverse ways. The birds that had originally been depicted within the confines of the castle were now used in more open and dynamic illustrative compositions. In the words of Pat Schleger (2001, p. 200), ‘after a number of years we began to let the birds out of the castle, as it were’.

This is a resonant metaphor for HS&A’s approach to corporate image-making, whereby they gradually moved away from the point at which they had started, albeit with a sense of great care. The moment at which the birds began to leave the castle was caught rather aptly in a poster from the 1973 campaign (Fig. 28). In subsequent designs, the castle is removed entirely from the central image, making way for ever looser configurations of the bird motifs (Fig. 29).
Another example of the ability to ‘repeat without being repetitious’ is HS&A’s work for homeware store Finmar (1953–63). This was initiated with flexibility in mind, with three different weights of the trademark being created from the outset to ensure maximum adaptability without compromising consistency (Fig. 30). Even this multi-weight trademark was not sufficient for Schleger, as he continued to manipulate the blueprint, rendering it in increasingly diverse treatments. The most divergent of which was composed of various cutlery, including knives, forks and spoons (Fig. 31).

Figures 27, 28 & 29) Poster designs for the Edinburgh International Festival (from 1970, 1973 and 1975), showing how the trademark was deployed with ever greater fluidity.
Figures 30 & 31) System of multi-weight logo-marks for interiors company Finmar [left], c. 1954; and an extreme example of a Finmar poster where the logo is rendered with cutlery [right], 1957.
Control systems at Hans Schleger and Associates

Hans Schleger as Art Director

Despite his penchant for design flexibility and vigour, organisational consistency and control remained important for Schleger in the implementation of the Mac Fisheries campaign. In making the transition from individual commercial artist (perhaps with the occasional assistant), to design group proper, Schleger attempted to retain ultimate creative control of the studio. Studio numbers never swelled significantly beyond seven or eight members, but this still represented a significant operational shift from Schleger’s earlier days working in relative isolation (interview, Appendix 1.1).

Describing the Mac Fisheries account, wife and colleague Pat Schleger recalls how Hans Schleger would oversee and sign-off all work emanating from the studio. Where other consultancies developed scientific management tools to ensure ‘good-and-proper’ working standards, Schleger preferred to be the all-seeing eye. The hierarchical management structure of HS&A was very shallow, with two core levels of importance: first Schleger, and then the rest of his team of employees working under his guidance. They did have a full-time secretary, but the lack of formal job titles left some ambiguity about remaining levels of staff seniority. As Pat Schleger (interview, Appendix 1.1) recalls, employee Hermann Hecht was ‘the studio manager, I suppose’, explaining that ‘we never gave ourselves titles’ (interview, Appendix 1.1). But despite Hecht’s minimal seniority, it was Hans Schleger who remained the manager and Art Director of all work, directing everyone, including Hecht. As Pat Schleger (interview, Appendix 1.1) explains:

> You had something practical to do – I did all the curls on the AOA [American Overseas Airlines] things – but then also at the same time you were allowed to experiment with something else and then he would come as an Art Director and say: ‘oh yes I like that, continue doing that’, so he was a very good Art Director and you got a bit of freedom.

The reference here to ‘a bit of freedom’, suggests that Schleger did keep on top of his staff, allowing them just a little leeway, but not too much. According to Pat Schleger (interview, Appendix 1.1) ‘he did keep his eye on everything, obviously, he didn’t want anything to go out of here that he didn’t think was as good as it could have been’.

The atelier style set up of HS&A could be likened to the master and apprentice model (Paulus & Nijstad, 2003) in the manner that staff were trained up by Schleger, but one of the problems of this approach was the lack of development opportunities for his
staff, with ambitious employees having been known to leave the studio in order to establish their own practices (interview, Appendix 1.1). The limited capacity of the studio premises also restricted the scale of the operation and as a result they did not expand beyond seven or eight staff members (interview, Appendix 1.1). Given that Schleger treated the studio much like a family and his employees like his children, or 'kinder’ (Schleger, 2001), it seems unlikely that he would have wanted to expand the operation any further. This is not to say that HS&A were a family business in the typical sense, for intergenerational interaction was not a core element of the business (Nordqvist et al., 2015). Rather, their ethos embraced the spirit of the family in that they looked after one another, with Hans Schleger a patriarchal father figure to his employees.61

With regard to Hans Schleger’s responsibilities in the Mac Fisheries campaign, it is clear that the illustrative fish characters were his domain, with many of the early advertisements carrying his own personal signature of 'Zero’. Pat Schleger (interview, Appendix 1.1) confirms that her husband had been the original author of these characters, but he was not able to produce all the creative work emanating from the business, hence the need to hire a supporting staff team. Sooner or later, other staff members were required to fill in for him and complete work that he may have ideally liked to author himself. This is evident in the artwork for the Mac Fish characters (Fig. 32), some of which Pat Schleger herself was asked to render. It is likely that other workers in the studio contributed here too, as the client apparently required new artwork on a weekly basis over a period of many years (interview, Appendix 1.1).

61 Although the notion of the family business is a common one – as well as being a popular subject of study in design management and organisation studies (Fletcher, 2002; Poutziouris, Smyrnios & Klein, 2008; Nordqvist et al., 2015) – its strongest association is often with the idea of ownership, as in the family owned company (Fletcher, 2002). However, Best (2015) speaks of the Spanish footwear brand Camper in terms of both ownership (in that it is a family-run business), but also as a company where the ethos of the extended family is fully embraced, with each and every employee considered a part of the Camper ‘family’.
The difference between Hans Schleger’s Mac Fish characters and his wife Pat’s versions can be seen when comparing two similar menu cards (Fig. 32). The contrast between Hans’s fluent Mac Fish character on the right and Pat’s attempt to emulate his style on the left, is noticeable when called attention to. The brush work in Hans’s design is highly fluent, with a consistent quality of line that gives the impression that the artwork was confidently dashed-off, without too much self-awareness. By comparison, Pat’s artwork suddenly seems laboured and inconsistent. This example highlights one interesting aspect of standardising complex design programmes, that is the unenviable task of trying to standardise expressive illustrative work. The idea of aligning multiple illustrators’ work under one precise style runs counter to the long-entrenched conception of the illustrator or commercial artist as one who cultivates their own unique individual style.62

Illustration can be standardised with relative ease if the same artist can be guaranteed to fulfil the entire programme, with Max Hof’s fashion illustrations for Simpson department store being one such example (Havinden, 1955). In any other

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62 For example, when Commercial Art (Anon, 1927) ran a feature on the group of commercial artists Bassett Gray – a precursor to the design group DRU, studied in Case Study 3 – they emphasised how each member of the group actively worked to cultivate their own individual style and approach.
scenario, the idiosyncrasy of many hands must attempt to give the impression of just one, and in this instance a happy compromise must be reached, as in the case of the Mac Fish characters which were rendered by different members of the same studio (interview, Appendix 1.1). This collaborative, if in some ways imprecise effort, is central to group practice, as it is inevitable that one client project may have to be passed between different hands, just as we have seen in this particular case. These issues are only heightened as the complexity of design programmes and the relative size of design groups increase in scale, as we will see in the following two case studies.

**The individual and the programme**

Concerns around the standardisation of multifarious illustration work highlight the difficulties involved when seeking to homogenise work made by many hands. As discussed in the preceding chapter (see ‘The developing discourse of British corporate image-making’, p. 96), some early corporate image schemes had taken more mechanistic approaches to this problem. For example, in order to eliminate the imprecision of the individual the LNER used typography as a modular component that could be readily specified and repeated. Yet, one way or another the individual hand would normally force its way back into the process. In the case of the LNER, lettering artists were required to render large scale train name-plates that could not be printed via the more mechanistic letterpress process. Meanwhile, poster artists would also deviate from the mechanistic standard, rendering their own lettering as part of holistic poster compositions that included text and image within one visual construct.

As corporate image programmes grew in scope, designers often began to set-down rules and guidelines that could be shared amongst those working on implementing a programme (Shaughnessy, 2014a, 2014b). An early example of this can be seen in the planning of the Festival of Britain, where Charles Hasler and his typographic advisory panel produced a style guide for lettering in order to coordinate the typographic appearance on the Festival (Hasler, 1950; Rennie, 2001). The Festival had been the first time many designers had worked in such large collaborative teams, and as such, it was one of the first occasions that design guidelines had been required to co-ordinate the multifarious work of the many designers involved (Rennie, 2001). The Festival typographic specimen document set out examples of the kinds of lettering that should be used throughout the Festival site. Although neither strict, nor formal in its guidance, the specimen book attempted to outline a stylistic spirit that was to be
followed closely. For some reason, Schleger was not involved in preparations for the Festival. He had proposed a logo for the event as one of eight pre-selected graphic designers asked to do so – along with Robin Day, Tom Eckersley, Abram Games, Milner Gray, F.H.K. Henrion, Theyre Lee-Elliott and Peter Ray – but his design was overlooked in favour of Abram Games’s logo (Massey, 1996). Schleger may not have fully enjoyed the Festival’s spirit of collaboration, coming across as a more introverted character, less keen to compete, or fraternise with his peers (Schleger, 2001). Unlike many fellow designers he was against standardisation manuals, preferring a personal, humanistic design approach to a programmatic one, and believed that manuals were likely to be outdated by the time they were put into practice (interview, Appendix 1.1). A number of the designers who created work for the Festival did not share the same view, and later went on to develop far more prescriptive and detailed design manuals for their own clients. For example, F.H.K. Henrion (2000), H.A. Rothholz (2008b), and Milner Gray (1999) of Design Research Unit, were all later involved in developing meticulous corporate image manuals for their clients.

Figure 33, 34 & 35) Typographic advertisements for Mac Fisheries. From: Kilburn Times, 23 October 1953 [left]; Salisbury Times, 28 May 1954 [centre]; Salisbury Journal, 28 May 1954 [right]. All from Mather and Crowther Guard Book, History of Advertising Trust archive.

**Beyond the official programme**

According to Pat Schleger (interview, Appendix 1.1), all work for Mac Fisheries during Schleger’s time as consultant was completed in-house at HS&A on behalf of Mather and Crowther Ltd. However, the Mac Fisheries Guard Books at HAT suggest otherwise. It is
impossible to attribute every advertisement in the Guard Books accurately, but there are clearly those that reside outside of Schleger’s ‘official’ scheme, despite being published during the same period. These range from the purely typographic (Figs. 33–35), to those that include incongruous photographic imagery (Fig. 36). Of the typographic variety illustrated above, there is clearly no attempt made to emulate the typographic language used in Schleger’s scheme; even the ‘Mac Fisheries’ name is rendered in a nondescript format. These typographic adverts would most likely have been constructed by the same compositors who put together the newspapers they were contained within. By comparison the photographic example illustrated here (Fig. 36), does at least attempt to emulate the script lettering used in Schleger’s advertisements, but the photographic element is dissonant with Schleger’s lively fish illustrations.

Figure 36) Example of photographic advertisement for Mac Fisheries, n.d. Mather and Crowther Guard Book, History of Advertising Trust archive.

Beyond the domain of the M&C Guard Books can be found examples of other graphic ephemera for Mac Fisheries that lie outside of Schleger’s varied but controlled design scheme. One of the practitioners responsible for working on such ephemera was lettering artist Leslie Watson. Watson contributed lettering art and occasionally illustrations to various advertisements for Mac Fisheries, though he is not known to
have worked directly for, or with, Schleger’s studio (Rushin, 2011). Watson was a freelance artist who commonly worked from home on commissions for London-based studios such as Max Rayner Studios and Phoenix Studios. These firms focused more on the jobbing side of advertising work (including the preparation of artwork), as opposed to the creative art direction that Schleger was involved in. Amongst the Mac Fisheries adverts Watson was involved in were those publicising specific produce (Fig. 37 & 38). According to Watson’s daughter Elaine Rushin (2011), her father had contributed lettering and illustration to these advertisements. This included the illustration of a Schleger-esque ‘Mac Chicken’ figure (Fig. 38), but not the photorealistic product packaging images (Fig. 37). The photorealism of the product illustrations here is jarring when compared with Schleger’s scheme and it is difficult to believe that he would have sanctioned the jobbing style of these advertisements given their incongruity with his own scheme.

Figures 37 & 38) Example of photorealistic product packaging in Mac-Fish advertising, n.d. [left] and a Schleger-esque Mac Chicken character created by Leslie Watson, n.d. [right]. Both courtesy of Elaine Rushin.
Figure 39) Double-page spread from *Graphik* magazine (Maiwald, 1953a, pp. 16–17). Archive of Art & Design, V&A Museum.

Figure 40) Double-page spread from *Graphik* magazine (Maiwald, 1953a, pp. 18–19). Archive of Art & Design, V&A Museum.
Figure 41) Double-page spread from *Graphik* magazine (Maiwald, 1953a, pp. 20–21). Archive of Art & Design, V&A Museum.

Figure 42) Double-page spread from *Graphik* magazine (Maiwald, 1953a, pp. 22–23). Archive of Art & Design, V&A Museum.
Figure 43) Double-page spread from *Graphik* magazine (Maiwald, 1953a, pp. 24–25). Archive of Art & Design, V&A Museum.

Figure 44) Double-page spread from *Graphik* magazine (Maiwald 1953a, pp. 26–27). Archive of Art & Design, V&A Museum.
With regard to the lettering used throughout the scheme, Pat Schleger (interview, Appendix 1.1) suggests that it was an intentional decision to avoid standardising the script style. As the lettering was meant to represent a fishmonger’s traditional chalked-up blackboard, no handwriting typeface was constructed or used, giving the impression of lettering that had been created afresh each time. This decision fitted well with the need for artwork to be produced by a range of practitioners, including those operating away from the HS&A studio, such as commercial artists like Leslie Watson.

In the design press of the 1950s (Maiwald, 1953a; Gowing, 1956), Schleger gained extensive publicity for his work with Mac Fisheries. The most significant example being the January edition of German magazine Graphik, which gave over twelve pages to the Mac Fisheries campaign, including thirty illustrations. The editor of Graphik (Maiwald, 1952) wrote to Schleger to confirm acceptance of the feature: ‘Just the stuff to suit Graphik, cast in one, a clear approach and yet colourful and manyfold, just what, in our opinion, advertising should be.’

Within the pages of the magazine, a harmonious vision of design coordination emerges through the presentation of a range of designs that are united in visual style and spirit (Figs. 39–44). Within these designs there is a consistent treatment of illustration, typography and colour, yet there remains a vitality and vigour. This visual coordination may not be dogmatically standardised, but its coherence is clearly evident. Yet this perfect construction of a coordination that repeats without being repetitious is in conflict with the reality presented by the M&C Guard Books and the work of individual artists such as Leslie Watson. This leads to the impression that Schleger constructed the image of coordination, perhaps not with an intent to deceive, but rather to present the most impactful, pure articulation of his corporate image scheme. In many respects he simply shows the work that he had directed, preferring to overlook other jobbing work that may have fallen outside of his command. This seems justifiable given that this publicity was presented under his own name, Zéro.63

63 It is notable that Hans Schleger is valorised by Graphik magazine (Maiwald, 1952) as a heroic design individual, with credit for the scheme going to Schleger, rather than his team HS&A.
**Specification and deviations in quality**

There is one further issue that the Guard Books allude to. That is the difficulty which Schleger had in matching the final printed advertisements with the designs that he had planned. This refers to design discrepancies between advertisements Schleger put forward in the design press, and those published press advertisements recorded in the HAT Guard Books. Comparing particular advertisements (Figs. 45 & 46) reveals what is essentially the same advertisement, but in two distinct forms. The first (Fig. 45) shows Schleger’s blueprint, the prime standard set by him as the campaign’s Art Director, as published in issue number one of *Graphik* magazine in 1953 (I will refer to this as ‘the Schleger version’). The second version (Fig. 46) shows the same advertisement, but a variation that appeared in the M&C Guard Books (I shall refer to this as ‘the Mathers version’). There are a number of deviations between these two designs which warrant further consideration. From the annotated record inscribed in the Guard Book we can ascertain that the Mathers design appeared in at least one newspaper within the Bristol area during March 1952 (Mather and Crowther, 1951–58). Unfortunately, it is less clear to discern the full usage of the other design; or indeed, whether it appeared in the mainstream press at all. It is possible that it could have been an early proof, as there is no evidence of this configuration in the Guard Books. As the Mathers advert is labelled as the first design of the campaign, ‘Advt. No. 1. Prov. Press – Bristol Test Area’ (Fig. 46), this could imply that the Schleger version may have been unused.

The most obvious difference between the two versions is the additional fish character with two lines of text beside it. But aside from this extra content there are other discrepancies between the two. Most significantly, the printed name of the company appears in two very different typefaces. While the Schleger version from *Graphik* (Fig. 45) has a heavier, more robust type that holds its place next to the assertive illustration and graphic script lettering, in the Mathers design (Fig. 46) the typeface used for ‘Mac Fisheries’ is too light-weight to counter-balance with the other elements in the composition. In the instance at the very top of the design it is overpowered by the strength of the illustration, whilst in the second instance lower down, it is too weak to hold its place within the construct of the lettering and trademark lock-up device, fading into hierarchical obscurity. Thus, within the criteria of functionality, Schleger’s version is more effective.
The typeface Schleger chose to adopt for the titling in the *Graphik* variant was in line with the typographic zeitgeist of the 1950s, being of the Clarendon category of typefaces that gained significant popularity following their revivalist usage in the Festival of Britain (Rennie, 2001). The type in the Mathers advert meanwhile, is a far more elegant and refined Roman style, inspired by the inscriptive lettering that appears on the Trajan column in Rome (Baines & Haslam, 2002). Schleger’s version again takes precedence, presenting the more appropriate and up-to-date aesthetic to appeal to the everyday consumer.

There are other discrepancies in the presentation of text within the two advertisements, not least the ‘buy it from’ titling text, which is inconsistently treated in each instance, with the text in all lowercase in one version (Fig. 45), and all capitals in the other (Fig. 46). The inter-linear spacing between the various segments of the design also demonstrates deviation between the two examples. The Schleger version has a balance and rhythm to the use of negative, or white space. In the alternate Mathers
version there is more spacing between the bottom of the main fish illustration and the
top of the text block. Although this may be viewed as a minor detailing issue, it does
contribute to the lack of cohesion presented in this published version of the advert. The
lack of finesse in how negative space is used proves significant, as the design simply does
not ring true as the work of Schleger. As Pat Schleger (interview, Appendix 1.1) argues
in relation to her husband’s work for Fisons: ‘it’s the detailing that Hans was so good at,
the space between the lines, all the subtleties of good typography.’

Yet, even if this spacing issue is regarded as a minor inconvenience, then the
additional content placed between the main body text and the company strap-line is a
more major one, destabilising any sense of compositional harmony. This added content
throws the delicate spacing and hierarchical balance of dark and light into disarray. The
second Mac Fish character is certainly eye-catching, but its prominence is a distraction.
Whereas the rest of the design is positioned around a central axis, this fish, positioned
far left, draws the eye in a conflicting direction.

It is feasible that Schleger, or one of his associates at least, was responsible for the
design of the additional component placed in the Mathers advert. Alternatively, it could
have been a late instruction from the client that was fed directly to the production house
where the artwork was being prepared for print. Either way, this extra component
presents itself as a late addition. Given that the Schleger design from Graphik is
aesthetically resolved (being the one Schleger was keen to disseminate), whilst the
Mathers version is fragmented, it appears that this extra component was added to the
Mathers design, rather than being removed from Schleger’s. With this in mind, it is
surprising that the Mather’s advert is labelled as ‘Advt. No. 1’. One assumes that all
parties would have been keen to ensure that their very first advertisement was of the
highest standard, but as I have shown, there are a spate of discrepancies that exist
between what we know Schleger had approved of, and what then appeared in the
mainstream press. These discrepancies fall within Schleger’s remit as Art Director, as it
would typically be his responsibility to liaise with the printer and specify precisely what
was required. This act of ‘specification’ was of great significance in the graphic
designer’s role, with typographic scholar, Paul Stiff (1996, p. 27) claiming that it was ‘the
means by which typographers sought to achieve “quality”.’ Stiff (1996, p. 29) explains
how a specification would set down a designer’s intention, in order that another actor,
most likely a printer, could realise this intention:
What designers make is a specification: its implementation, and so the realisation of the designer’s intention, has normally been done by other people. When design is practised in an industrial process, specification is the end product of the designer’s work: it is what leads to manufacture.

Stiff goes on to describe the relationship between the printer and designer as a complex nexus of communication, with a designer’s instructional language ranging from the declarative to the commanding. He suggests that designers ‘have always relied on printers to fill the gaps in their knowledge: to secure quality they have needed printers’ consent and co-operation’ (Stiff, 1996, p. 27).

Judging by the discrepancies between the two instances of the Mac Fisheries design, it is hard to believe that Schleger had a close working relationship with the printer of the M&C version. It is possible that he was not in contact with the printer at all, for it seems unlikely he would have approved of the deviant version of the design, which suggests that, perhaps, he was not given the chance to approve of it. This would appear to be the most likely reason for these discrepancies, but there could be a number of other possible explanations. It is possible that Mac Fisheries demanded – against Schleger’s wishes – that their advertisements retained some of the Roman style lettering used on their shop fascias – this fascia lettering was one prominent anomaly in Schleger’s programme, remaining in the Roman style which was in distinct contrast to the rest of the scheme. It is also feasible that the printer simply did not have the typeface that Schleger had specified; as such, a compromise would have had to have been reached, which would explain an alternate typeface being used.

The end of a working relationship

As an outside consultant employed by Mather and Crowther to work on the Mac Fisheries account, Schleger retained a relatively free, creative hand in the direction of the work. He was not simply offering a straightforward production service, but was rather a more forceful influence, steering the direction and planning of the campaign. As Mary Gowing (1956, p. 206) puts it:

Most people who are interested in the planning side of advertising will know that Hans Schleger, in co-operation with Mather and Crowther and with Mac Fisheries themselves, has carried heavy responsibilities in the creative planning and development of that highly successful campaign.

Yet it was Schleger’s unusual level of power and responsibility in the planning of this, and other campaigns for M&C, that eventually led to the demise of their fruitful
working relationship. New executives rising up through the hierarchy of M&C after WWII are said to have become uncomfortable with Schleger’s level of governance as an outside consultant. As Pat Schleger (interview, Appendix 1.1) recalls:

[...] there were people coming up who didn’t like the arrangement, and so Gordon Bogan, who was the chairman of Mathers, said to Hans: ‘You know Hans, I think you should quit, because I think one or two of the new people coming up would rather not keep this arrangement going because it’s too much trouble to have somebody from outside.’ It was a bit awkward, Fisons wanted to keep Hans, they came to an amicable agreement and it was transferred to Service Advertising in Knightsbridge.

Perhaps it was the fallout from the relationship with M&C that prompted Hans to seek greater independence from the advertising business. Not to suggest that he immediately stopped working for advertising agents (clearly, he did not, for the work for Fisons continued though Service Advertising), but rather that a gradual shift began to take place. A shift away from a financial dependency upon the advertising business and towards a more independent professional stance where work would be done predominantly direct-to-client, without the aid of advertising agencies acting as intermediaries.  

It wasn’t until March 1957 that Hans Schleger and Associates were registered as a private company, as announced by *World’s Press News* on the 5th April (Anon, 1957):

World-known graphic arts designer Hans Schleger, design-consultant to advertising agents Mather and Crowther Ltd, has founded his own private company. Registered on March 14 was Hans Schleger and Associates Ltd, with a capital of £100 in £1 shares.

The reference to Schleger’s consultancy work for M&C within this short press announcement is noteworthy, seemingly implying the grave significance of this particular contract to his business. Schleger did have other clients of note during this time, including Finmar and The Design Centre, yet the reference to M&C seems to largely define his company. Aside from Mac Fisheries, Fisons was another prodigious client commissioned through M&C. Regrettably no financial records exist to demonstrate the ratio of Schleger’s income coming from the agency, but it seems reasonable to deduce that without M&C, HS&A may have been a very different design studio in the 1950s and 60s.

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64 This closely mirrors F.H.K. Henrion’s career, where he had acted as a consultant to advertising agents Erwin Wasey from 1954 to 1958, before later concentrating on his own studio practice and facing clients directly. In both cases the advertising agent acts as a bridge between individual studio work and professional group practice.
Concluding remarks

In order to better co-ordinate and control the design process and its contingent labour force, some design practitioners had, by the 1960s, begun to grapple with more systematic and scientistic understandings of design, attempting to translate the design process into a kind of mechanistic universal formula (Alexander, 1964; Archer, 1965; Jones, 1970). By adopting the tools of scientific management and applying the ‘hard’ knowledge of science and scholarship to practical design projects, these practitioners sought to rationalise and manage creativity, and thus sought to legitimise design and commercial art as more respectable, profitable forms of labour (Kinross, 1988; Cross, 1993). Such efforts worked to counter the commonly held belief, as articulated by Glazer (cited in Schön, 1983, p. 23), that minor professions, like design, were ‘hopelessly nonrigorous’ by their very nature. British practitioners Bruce Archer (1965) and John Chris Jones (1970) were two protagonists at the heart of the Design Methods Movement in Britain, an initiative at the forefront of conceptual developments in this domain (Cross, 1993).

As we will see in the subsequent case study, some British graphic designers were heavily influenced and inspired by the Design Methods Movement, however, Hans Schleger & Associates were not driven to this end. Instead, they continued to operate on a largely intuitive basis, with fluid and ambiguous organisational structures in place and relatively low levels of cost efficiency. In this sense they privileged what Bourdieu (1990, p. 66) describes as a ‘feel for the game’, doing the right or best thing under the circumstances. This instinctive ‘feel for the game’ being thought of by HS&A as preferential to any such desire to standardise or codify the practice of graphic design. In turn, they tended to prioritise cultural, rather than economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986), with Hans Schleger preferring to think of himself as more of an artist than a businessman.

In terms of their business operations, HS&A employee Pat Schleger (interview, Appendix 1.1) explains ‘we always worked far longer than we could possibly have charged for’, adding that ‘we were certainly not cost effective’. Despite the use of time cards to keep track of the number of hours spent on each studio project, her husband would apparently come into the studio on Sundays to make a decision about how much time they would actually charge their clients for. As she explains, ‘he [Hans] had to
make a decision about what we would charge, he couldn’t really charge by the hour’ (interview, Appendix 1.1). This apparent disregard for cost effectiveness gives the impression of Schleger as a commercial artist committed to the pursuit of his art above all else. We get the impression that providing he could make ends meet, so to speak, he was contented, with the accrual of profit a less significant motivating factor for him.

Although the suggestion that the hours worked at the studio outweighed the number of hours charged to the client may seem boastful or self-righteous, Julier (2017) lends weight to the idea that design professionals were not especially business-like during the post-war years, claiming that designers in general failed to take issues of cost efficiency and the accountancy of their businesses particularly seriously until the 1980s. Fiona MacCarthy (2001, p. 17) further supports the notion that Schleger conformed to this expectation, writing that:

If Schleger’s early supremacy in corporate identity was to be eclipsed as the profession of design management expanded over the next decades, this was because he regarded himself primarily as an artist, refusing to transform himself into a businessman.

Furthermore, in her review of Schleger for the journal *Art & Industry*, his one-time collaborator Mary Gowing (1956, p. 204) argues that Schleger was able ‘to enter the rough and tumble of commercial life without selling the pass to his own conscience’; thus, reiterating the creative, rather than financial, imperatives that underlay his practice.

Schleger can certainly be seen to value practical rationality over its scientific counterpart. In this sense the practice of HS&A can be understood with reference to Schön’s (1983) conceptualisation of the ‘reflective practitioner’, relying as it did upon more improvisational skills learned in practice, than on prescriptive formulas or techniques. By contrast to those attempting to codify design methods, HS&A relied upon the ‘intuition, artistry and unvarnished’ opinion that Schön (1983, p. vii) termed ‘soft knowledge’. There was a dexterity to HS&A’s creative practice in the way that they would approach each new project afresh, devoid of pre-conceived ideas, styles or methods. Consequently, Hans Schleger believed that each design should speak for itself. So when called upon by clients to explain or justify his reasoning, he is reported to have responded as follows:

‘Your clients in a newspaper won’t have a long report about why we have done it like this, and nor will I give you one. If it doesn’t work when it’s in the paper, then it’s no good. Wait till you get the sales report.’ (interview, Appendix 1.1)
This suspicion of formal design reports was in direct contrast to many of his peers, who utilised such forms of inscription to stake out the merits of their own design proposals. Schleger was conscious of how large organisations could be rather daunting environments for consumers in 1950s Britain and as a result he was wary of standardisation, being sensitive to the homogenising effects of corporate consumerism. Commenting on the complexities of working for large organisations, Schleger (cited in Gowing, 1956, p. 207) suggests that: ‘The difficulty of interpreting a large organisation to the public is its impersonal character. People are understandably afraid of the large organisation. Everybody wants to be treated in a personal way.’

So, where some of his peers had found the idea of mechanistic order appealing, Schleger preferred the personal touch. This is exemplified in his work for Mac Fisheries, where the intentionally non-standardised script lettering not only gave each store the impression of individuality, but also tied-in conceptually with the association of freshness that the fishmonger’s chalkboard lettering provided. As Schleger (cited in Barmas, 1952) explained in a magazine interview:

Mac Fisheries have an enormous number of branches, but I want to give each branch a personal note. So I am putting myself in the place of the fishmonger and I’m designing as if the fishmonger himself had quickly chalked up a notice on his blackboard.

Schleger understood that coordination did not have to mean standardisation. He disliked manuals, believing instead in the value of the individual one-off design, yet he managed to align a range of virtuoso one-off artefacts together into coordinated multifarious systems. To do so he relied upon an unspoken tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966; Tsoukas, 2002), the kind of knowledge that can only be revealed in the way that we carry out tasks and approach problems – in this sense it is performative and can only be shared and distributed through such performances. Schön (1983, p. 49) refers to this as ‘knowing-in-action’, explaining that: ‘Our knowing is ordinarily tacit, implicit in our patterns of action and in our feel for the stuff with which we are dealing. It seems right to say that our knowing is in our action.’ Knowing-in-action is dependent upon our own research, experience and reflections; but Schön (1983) argues that, in order to respond in the midst of action when the scenario is beyond ones current knowledge base, practitioners need to ‘reflect-in-action’. This is a more active cognitive process, in which practitioners reflect within the ‘action-present’ (not after the action, which is described as reflection-on-action). Van Manen (1991) describes this as contemporaneous reflection.
With regard to the Mac Fisheries campaign, the significance of the Bristol test area is relevant, as it demonstrates HS&A’s capacity to test and trial ideas before rolling them out in full. This can be seen as an opportunity for reflection-on-action to happen, with M&C’s and HS&A reviewing the effectiveness of the initial design proposals outside the immediate action present. As Advertiser’s Weekly (Anon, 1954a) explained about the Bristol test:

*A strict eye was kept on all promotion. A weekly shop by shop sales analysis was made so that, at a glance, it could be seen where sales were falling or where they were rising. From these figures could be gauged the effect of specific items of publicity.*

What was learnt in the trials was used to inform future marketing efforts, with Schleger revising some of the display ideas before they were rolled out on a national basis. This step-by-step operation goes some way to explain the imperfect visual synergy found between a number of the items designed for Mac Fisheries. As the client and the commissioning agency changed the goals and criteria of the work, the designs themselves were adapted accordingly. This could be viewed as a quite natural process, though it is in direct conflict with the standardising nature of much corporate image work, which is sold on the premise of consistency and recognition – just as we saw in the literature produced by Alec Davis who often linked consistency with recognition (see ‘The developing discourse of British corporate image-making’ section, p. 96).

HS&A did not operate on these terms, for Hans Schleger never believed in the corporate manual, or the idea of strict standardisation or control. As Pat Schleger (interview, Appendix 1.1) explains: ‘He was always for moving on, he wouldn’t want anything set in stone. He thought why not change it, why not go on developing something you started, instead of saying this is it.’ Schleger understood that consistency and standardisation were ideals that existed only in an imaginary ideal state where time stands still and all around is static.65 So, having recognised that strict uniformity was an unattainable ideal, instead Schleger sought to embrace a more practical balance between consistent and variable elements. Rather than trying to control everything, he decided what should remain stable and what should have a certain agility and dynamism. Schleger’s rejection of standardisation and scientific rationality can be seen to reflect the natural resistance

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65 We saw this in the case of the press advertisements for Mac Fisheries where major differences where identified between the published press adverts and those put out to the design press by HS&A to promote their work. These adverts where meant to be exactly the same, yet we were able to identify significant variations in terms of typographic detailing and the use of space.
of a certain generation of British-based graphic designers who were accustomed to their work being understood in relation to the paradigms of art, rather than science, medicine or law. In this sense the practical ethos of HS&A should be understood as typical rather than exceptional.
**Case Study 2) Reconfiguring practice: The systematic methods of Henrion Design Associates**

This case study will show how some commercial artists of the 1950s sought to embrace the opportunities of corporate design head-on. So, while in the previous case study focused on Hans Schleger & Associates we saw a consultant design group embrace corporate image-making without radically adjusting their approach to practice, in this case we will see how Henrion Design Associates (HDA) transformed their practice in order to make the most of burgeoning opportunities in the corporate communication design sector. By adopting methods from Operations Research (OR) and the Design Methods Movement, HDA were able to: develop more productive working relationships with their clients, seek jurisdiction over the field of work, and claim power over their clients in terms of the governance of the design programmes that they conducted. In order to rule relations over these clients they developed a wide range of tools that would present their practice as technically and scientifically rational.

**The development of Henrion Design Associates**

**Biographical background**

Henrion Design Associates were a consultant design group founded in 1951 by the long-established commercial artist Frederic Henri Kay Henrion – commonly shortened to F.H.K. Henrion (Shaughnessy, 2013). Henrion was born of a French mother and a German father in Nuremberg, Germany, 1914. After training as a textile designer in Paris during 1933, he went on to study under the renowned poster artist Paul Colin. During his time in Paris, Henrion also worked under Jean Carlu and AM Cassandre; with this triad of poster artists – referred to by Henrion as the three C’s – considered the ‘three giants’ of pre-war French graphics (Woudhuysen, 1986). According to Kinross (1990, p. 46), Henrion was set to follow in their footsteps and ‘become a French commercial artist in the mould of Colin or Cassandre’, but, as Woudhuysen (1986)
explains, by 1936 he had left Paris for Tel Aviv, citing the situation of civil war created by the sit-down strikes of Parisian metalworkers. In Tel Aviv he would design posters and exhibition materials for the French pavilion of the Levant Fair. Here his designs were seen by the Crown Agents for the British colonies, and shortly after, Henrion was on his way to London, hired by the Crown Agents to promote the merits of citrus fruit (Woudhuysen, 1986).

In London he shared a flat with a German friend of around the same age, Walter Landauer. Landauer, known later by his anglicised surname, Landor, had arrived in London as a teenager and had been directed towards Goldsmiths College to study packaging design under Milner Gray’s tuition (Gallagher, 2009).66 He would go on to become a key innovator in the inauguration of visual identity practices in the United States. While Landor flourished in North America, Henrion remained in London for the remainder of his career, establishing himself first as a poster artist of the highest repute, and then later, as one of the most prominent and prolific pioneers of corporate identity in Britain (Shaughnessy, 2013).

Kinross (1990) explains that shortly after arriving in London in 1936, Henrion had worked under the direction of Misha Black, preparing designs for a 1938 exhibition for MARS (the Modern Architectural Research Society). Along with Walter Landor and Milner Gray, Black was a partner in the design group the Industrial Design Partnership (IDP). These close-knit interpersonal relations would ease Henrion into his next significant appointment as a graphic and exhibition designer working under Milner Gray at the Ministry of Information (MoI) during WWII (Henrion, 1979; Kinross, 1990). During the war Henrion divided his time between the MoI and the US Office of War Information, where he was involved in putting together magazines for the American armed forces (Woudhuysen, 1986).

Henrion’s close association with Black and Gray would not last long beyond the cessation of war, as by the 1950s his new group, Henrion Design Associates (HDA) had begun to compete directly with the Design Research Unit (DRU), the group of Black

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66 Landor was advised to study with Milner Gray by the advertising creative Ashley Havinden. In 1935 Landor, together with Gray (and others) co-founded the Industrial Design Partnership (IDP) (Gallagher, 2009). IDP were an early industry-leading design group that preceded the Design Research Unit – the consultant group studied in the third and final case study of this thesis, p. 212.
and Gray which had been in operation since 1945. Together with Hans Schleger & Associates (HS&A), the groups of HDA and DRU were especially influential in developing corporate identity as a programmatic concern focused on coordination and visual unification (Kinross, 1990; Schleger, 2001; Bakker, 2011b; Cotton, 2012). Furthermore, through his writing with colleague Alan Parkin (Henrion & Parkin, 1967, 1968), Henrion made a lasting contribution to the codification and proliferation of corporate image-making practices. He would also play an important role in the professional organisation of design, taking on positions of stature within various influential organisations, including: President of the Society of Industrial Artists and Designers (1960–62), President of Alliance Graphique Internationale (1963–66), President of Icograda (1968–70) and Vice President of the RSA (1971–73). He was also heavily involved with design education over a forty-year period, most significantly at the Central School of Arts and Crafts, the Royal College of Art, and the London College of Printing (Henrion, 1979; Shaughnessy, 2013).

**From the ‘intuitive’ individual to the ‘rational’ group**

During his early career as a design practitioner, Henrion would become accustomed to working independently in a state of relative isolation, embellishing each design work with his own personal signature as a mark of authorship. As implied from the photograph taken of him in his studio in 1955 (Fig. 47), he was in effect, a lone commercial artist and his tools were his paints and paintbrushes. He had worked on occasion under the command of other designers, such as Misha Black or Milner Gray, but for the most part his clients were the design patrons of large organisations, such as Stephen Tallents at the General Post Office, for example (Hamilton, 1985; Artmonsky, 2011; Shaughnessy, 2013). Henrion’s first comprehensive experience of collaboration came during preparations for the Festival of Britain of 1951, where he was in charge of two pavilions, those representing ‘The Natural Scene’ and ‘Country’ (Atkinson, 2012). Here he worked alongside other designers, artists and illustrators. In his capacity as the lead designer for the two pavilions he was responsible for directing, as well as collaborating with, other practitioners. So, whilst he had experienced collaboration

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67 HDA was established in 1951, replacing an earlier antecedent started in 1948, Studio H (Hope, 1996).
before – particularly through his work for exhibitions like MARS (1938) and ‘Britain Can Make It’ (1946) – the Festival would require an unprecedented level of coordination and teamwork. In this respect it provided fertile ground for designers to share their first experience of designing in large cross-disciplinary teams (Kinross, 1990).

During the period leading up to the Festival, Henrion moved to establish himself as more than simply a lone freelance artist for hire, operating under the moniker of ‘Studio H’ from 1948 onwards (Shaughnessy, 2013). This change appears to have been primarily a symbolic gesture, for in spite of the new name, his business operation does not seem to have changed in any significant way. As such, Henrion continued to work in much the same manner as before, albeit with the assistance of a small number of associates. Here he followed the master and apprentice model that he had been accustomed to when working for the heroic Parisian poster artists of the 1930s. However, over the coming decade he gradually built up the studio practice, changing the name again, first to Henrion Design Associates in 1951, before later it became HDA International in 1973.
(Shaughnessy, 2013). In order to support his efforts to grow the business in 1954 he took on the post of Director of Visual Planning for the advertising agency Erwin Wasey, a large American agency with a London office on Park Lane (Henrion, 1979; Shaughnessy, 2013). He held this post for four years in total, with his colleagues during the time including the typographer and teacher Edward Wright (Stiff and Oven, 2007) and the renowned children’s illustrator Eric Hill (Eccleshare, 2014).

As Director of Visual Planning for Erwin Wasey, Henrion was given his own private office and would liaise directly with the agency’s high-powered clientele, of which KLM were a significant example (Bakker, 2011b). He would learn a great deal about the practices and methods of the commercial world during this appointment, not least the importance of making a persuasive case to clients. Later he recalled how Erwin Wasey had helped him to gain ‘a unique insight into the US advertising and marketing approach’, explaining that, ‘I learned to understand and, at times, use with circumspection, the advertising, marketing research jargon in discussing design’ (Henrion, 1979, p. 7).

As he developed his own group practice during the 1950s and 60s, Henrion would go on to develop elaborate techniques to support and substantiate his creative design work and to convince clients of the technical rationality of his work. These techniques can be seen to relate directly back to the practices of American advertising, and in particular, the knowledge he had gained during his time at Erwin Wasey – Henrion (1979) notes the importance of Erwin Wasey for his career, referring to his ‘four years’ intensive learning of the “advertising scene”’. Vance Packard (1957) famously describes advertising practitioners in post-war America as the ‘Hidden Persuaders’, and Henrion’s exposure to these very same ideas – such as motivational research, depth psychology and subliminal tactics – evidently influenced the long-term approach of his own company. This is significant for two key reasons. Firstly, it is indicative of the transmission of transatlantic influence spreading from North America to London (Nixon, 2013). Secondly, it signifies the influence of advertising practice more broadly upon the burgeoning profession of graphic design; in other words, the development of graphic design as an independent and tenable British profession was dependent on more established advertising practices (Kinross, 1988; Heller, 1995a; Poynor, 1998; Crowley, 2005).

By 1951 Henrion had changed the name of the business to Henrion Design Associates (Artmonsky, 2011; Shaughnessy, 2013) and soon began to consider the
merits of offering clients a more comprehensive service focused on the unification of their corporate image. Another important revelation came at this time for Henrion when he acknowledged that in order for his company to secure lucrative long-term contracts with their clients they would need to present themselves in a manner akin to the clients for whom they wished to work. In other words, rather than presenting themselves as a loose grouping of commercial artists, as Bassett Gray, or IDP had done previously, for example (Cotton, 2012), they should appear more like a commercial organisation themselves. When later asked why the Dutch national airline KLM had hired a British design firm (HDA) rather than a Dutch alternative, Henrion told the Dutch designer, Wim Crouwel (cited in Roberts, 2005, p. 61), ‘institutions like to talk to institutions’.68

Figure 48) Henrion at the age of 49 pictured with employees from Henrion Design Associates in their design studio. As featured in Design magazine (Bendixson, 1963, p. 34).

68 Implicit in Henrion’s response is the notion that the Dutch design scene was not as well developed commercially as Britain’s, with no graphic design consultancies of the requisite ‘institutional’ appearance yet established. In his monograph about the firm Total Design, Ben Bos (2011) notes how Dutch design groups were a novelty in 1963. Bos (2011, p. 7) recalls how KLM’s appointment of a British-based design group had led Dutch designers to feel ‘short-changed and underappreciated’, but that the decision was understandable given that ‘visual communication in Britain had entered a new phase as far back as the war years’.
In order to appear more institutional Henrion’s group practice began to present themselves as a rational and robust business operation. Henrion & Parkin’s (1968) paper for the annual of the Design & Industries Association can be seen as a direct attempt to establish the company in this way. By the 1960s their working methods had developed to reflect the collaborative and systematic demands of the work they now undertook. Where Henrion had previously worked independently and relatively intuitively (Henrion & Parkin, 1968) in the mould of a traditional commercial artist (Kinross, 1988; Preston, 2014), his design team now adopted a range of technocratic methods to fulfil project demands and control the studio workflow.

Earlier we saw Henrion depicted in his studio in 1955 (Fig. 47) with paint brushes at his side and the commercial art posters for which he was known on the studio walls behind him. Fast-forward to 1963 (Fig. 48) and we are presented with a very different picture. Now he is flanked by five employees all smartly dressed. Although a very similar bow tie remains in place around Henrion’s neck, his dress-sense is altogether sharper, with a suit jacket smartening up his appearance. In his hands he holds a mock-up of the livery design for a KLM aircraft (KLM being HDA’s most important corporate client of the time) and behind him we see further examples of corporate design work for other clients. In the eight-year time period between these two photographs we see a significant transition in the self-image of the graphic designer, as well as major changes to the organisational set-up of the design studio. No longer acting alone with his art materials at the drawing board, Henrion Design Associates is now a fully-fledged business operation ready to tackle major corporate image commissions from powerful corporate clients.

A number of factors led to the significant operational changes represented in these two photographs, but amongst the most important was Henrion’s decision to pursue holistic all-embracing design programmes for large national and multi-national organisations. Reflecting back on his earlier career, Henrion (1990) recalls:

Probably early Fifties, or mid-Fifties, I sat down with my five or six associates of the time and said, ‘we seem to be working for many different clients doing many different things’, you know, doing exhibitions for one, letter paper for another, print for a third, packaging for a fourth etc. ‘Wouldn’t it make sense to have fewer clients and be in charge of all their physical manifestations?’ I think the word corporate identity hadn’t crossed the Atlantic yet, we called it House Style. Well we were very lucky to get KLM first, and then came BEA [British European Airways], Blue Circle Cement, London Electricity Board, one after the other. I mean we never made efforts to get work, one brought job usually brought the next one, very much unlike today.
Henrion’s succinct account of events irons over any details or contradictions, condensing several decades into a few sentences and making the transition under scrutiny appear seamless. What is particularly evident, is that in spite of his apparent humility, he positions himself as an active agent in control of his own career development. This suggests that these events came to pass precisely because he willed them to; not that he was responding to external demands and opportunities presented by his prospective clientele. As such, he presents himself as, at least partly, responsible for the birthing of a new culture of design commissioning in which the systematic design programme replaced the ad-hoc commissioning of individual design artefacts. This is significant for my research as it indicates that graphic design practitioners were not only aware of opportunities around coordinated corporate image-making, but also that they actively sought out such commissions, having identified that they could be beneficial to the prospects of their burgeoning businesses.

To what extent Henrion, and other designers, were in fact responsible for leading the transition towards the commissioning of holistic design programmes remains questionable given the relative lack of evidence and research in this area. Although it is clear that Henrion and many of his peers worked persistently to sell their clients the benefits of a coordinated design approach (Henrion & Parkin, 1967, 1968; Rothholz, 2008a), it is also important to acknowledge the critical role of the commissioning client as an enabling agent. Without either the initiative or buy-in of the commissioning client the realisation of more holistic, comprehensive design programmes would simply not have been possible. The relationship to advertising, and especially the advertising campaign as an on-going concern, is pertinent here too, given that the wealthiest commercial clients were already well accustomed to commissioning long-term serialised advertising campaigns that would run over several months or years and across multiple platforms (Schwarzkopf, 2009). As such, the idea of a coordinated central concept, strategy, or design policy, was not unprecedented, though graphic designers, such as Henrion, brought a very particular spin to the serial quality of mass marketing (Artmonsky, 2011; Shaughnessy, 2013). While the advertising campaign as a

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69 The campaign as a serial concept, that grows and evolves with repeating motifs, rhetoric or characters, can be traced back to the beginning of the early twentieth century (Schwarzkopf, 2009) and shares many similarities with the objectives of the corporate image programme. The most significant difference relates to their relative degrees of permanence.
vehicle of communication tends to have a temporal or even cyclical quality, being commonly linked to sales of a specific product or service (Schwarzkopf, 2009), the corporate image programme is envisaged as a more permanent, holistic and concrete entity, with an emphasis on visual unity and the promise to control perceptions of an organisation over time (Henrion & Parkin, 1967). This move from the serial advertising campaign to the serial corporate image scheme can be understood as a shift from product identity to organisational identity.

It was this new totalising impetus of ‘design coordination’, as Henrion and Parkin (1967) referred to it, which demanded the creation of a reconfigured approach to practice facilitated by new tools and technologies. Henrion and Parkin (1968, p. 33) emphasise this point in the introduction to their text for the DIA Yearbook, ‘Systematic methods in design co-ordination’, stating: ‘Every designer knows the creative and administrative problems of designing a single item. But when a task involves hundreds or even thousands of items then difficulties multiply enormously and a new approach must be defined and achieved.’ I shall now go on to examine this ‘new approach’ to practice outlined by Henrion and Parkin in their paper for the DIA Yearbook.

‘Systematic methods in design co-ordination’

‘Systematic methods’ in context

The late 1960s were a key phase of Henrion’s working life, with his transmutation from lone commercial artist, to leader of a successful graphic design group nearing completion. This period of his career can be viewed as the pinnacle of his corporate identity work, with many projects for major clients either in progress, or already complete. The publication of Design Coordination and Corporate Image (Henrion & Parkin, 1967) only further cemented Henrion’s reputation as a pioneer in the field, being recognised as the first major publication of international scope dedicated to the subject (Bos and Bos, 2007; Bos, 2011). Although others had previously contributed to discourse on the subject, nationally and internationally – none more so than Alec Davis
(1950a, 1952, 1956) in Britain – the scale and ambition of this edition was unprecedented. 

Figure 49) Front cover of Henrion and Parkin’s (1967) text *Design Coordination and Corporate Image*.

Though Design Coordination and Corporate Image has proved its durability as an artefact, attaining a cult-like status, in as much that it remains highly desirable for enthusiasts and collectors to this day (Sadha, 2011), the significance of the DIA-paper authored by Henrion and Parkin (1968) has to date been largely overlooked. As Bakker (2006, p. 5) explains, the DIA text ‘is likely to have attracted less attention than the [Reinhold/Studio Vista] book’. This has meant that its significance has been under-valued and under-examined, and as such, the text is overdue further scrutiny. Before

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70 Worthy of note here is Olle Eksell’s (1967) more modest book, *Corporate Design Programs*, which offered a more hand-book style approach, taking the reader step-by-step through a hypothetical and rather abstract case study, demonstrating how a corporate design programme could be initiated and implemented.
going further, it is worth considering the intended audience of each of these two texts and the motives of the pair in authoring them. This will help to establish the intentions behind their publication, as well as the contexts within which they would likely have been received.

Figure 50) Sample spread from *Design Coordination and Corporate Image* (Henrion & Parkin, 1967, pp. 34–35).

The book *Design Coordination and Corporate Image* (Figs. 49 & 50) showcases the aesthetic qualities of design coordination as a phenomenon, surveying the field and setting out the key terminology as Henrion and Parkin (1967) understood it. The text charts the international scope of the discipline relatively well, albeit in a typically Western-centric manner. Overall, it is fundamentally a visual affair, with words treated as a necessary, but perfunctory accompaniment. The visual force of the publication makes a strong case for the power of a unified company appearance, in as much that it provides many visual examples that showcase the graphic impact of coordinated corporate design programmes. In this sense the book reinforces Alec Davis’s (1950a, 1952) argument that a consistently applied design language can enhance the audience recognition of a particular brand or organisation. Co-published by Reinhold Publishing Corporation in New York and Studio Vista in London, readers of the text likely
constituted practising designers as well as students of art and design. Although this book presents itself as accessible to interested laypersons, as well as business and marketing professionals, it does not ‘speak’ to the reader in the same lucid tone that was later popularised by James Pilditch (1970) and Wally Olins (1978), who captured a broader business-minded readership by writing about design from and for business perspectives.

Figure 51) Opening spread from ‘Systematic Meths in Design Co-ordination’, from DIA Yearbook 1967/68 (Henrion & Parkin, 1968, pp. 32–33). F.H.K. Henrion Archive, University of Brighton Design Archives, GB 1837 DES/FHK.

If the Reinhold/Studio Vista text focused on visual end-product, then by comparison, the text for the DIA Yearbook 1967/68 directed its focus to the processual complexity involved in achieving such an end-product (Figs. 51 & 52). Founded in 1915, the Design & Industries Association (DIA) was an organisation established with the intent of raising standards of industrial production in Britain, bringing together in closer unison manufacturers, designers, distributors, economists and critics (Design and Industries Association, 1915; Plummer, 1985). Directly inspired by the success of the Deutscher Werkbund (Plummer, 1985), the intention of the DIA was to harness the mutual

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71 Studio Vista was a relatively small imprint, publishing exclusively on leisure and design topics, while Reinhold published more broadly on non-fiction, with especially strong representation on art and architecture.
advantages attainable from a close-knit association between design and industry. As such members of the organisation ranged from influential industry figures, such as London Transport’s Frank Pick, Ambrose Heal of Heal’s and Noel Carrington of Puffin Books, to design luminaries such as Misha Black, Gordon Russell and Charles Holden (Plummer, 1985).

Given that the organisation had been founded to unite the interests of design and industry, readership of the yearbook is likely to have comprised a mix of business professionals and designers. It is probable that the highly detailed, serious-minded nature of Henrion and Parkin’s (1968) article made it more attractive to the yearbook’s business-minded readership who were more inclined to the concerns of design management as opposed to visual or formalist concerns around graphic design. In this sense, while the Reinhold/Studio Vista book (Henrion & Parkin, 1967) can be understood primarily as a graphic design text attractive to graphic design practitioners, the paper for the DIA Yearbook (Henrion & Parkin, 1968) situates itself more in-line

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72 By comparison, the Society of Industrial Artists – led by designers themselves – was fundamentally about serving designers interests (Armstrong, 2014).
with the kind of ‘design thinking’ literature prevalent in recent times (e.g. Kelley, 2005; Brown, 2009; Martin, 2009), focussing as it does on the methods and operational aspects of design practice and their value to business.

How the DIA article came about is unclear. One can only speculate that Henrion’s standing as a well-connected and sociable figurehead within the industry led to the commissioning of the piece (interview, Appendix 1.2). In agreeing to write for the yearbook his intention was presumably to further the status of his burgeoning group practice, consolidating their reputation as not just industry-leading graphic design practitioners, but experts in a new field of their own making, that is: design coordination.

From ‘carte blanche’ to the ‘chart before the course’

In beginning their text ‘Every designer knows the creative and administrative problems of designing a single item’, Henrion and Parkin (1968, p. 33) can be seen to reach out an empathetic hand to fellow designers, sharing together in the unexpected complications of the design process; but taken in the context of their business readership, this turn of phrase can be seen as an analytical move to set-up the competitive advantage HDA held over their competitors. As they go on to infer, any designer can design a single artefact, but only we at HDA are equipped to handle complex coordination schemes such as this.

After a short attempt to define some key terms and a roll call of recent client projects underscoring their credentials (Fisons, KLM, the Post Office, Blue Circle Cement and British European Airways), Henrion and Parkin (1968, p. 33) continued their piece by outlining the premise of design coordination:

The scale and complexity of these [design coordination] jobs pose a number of problems which cannot be solved by traditional intuitive methods. Often thousands of items are involved, and often the client himself does not know how far a new design policy can be applied and to how many items. This forced us to develop and apply techniques not normally used in design. These techniques apply less to the actual design stages, than to pre-design assembling of information and formulation of design requirements, than to design planning, progressing, and implementation.

Their comments around the limitations of ‘traditional intuitive methods’ are intriguing as they allude to what they view as the insufficiency of pre-existing methods, suggesting that designers’ work to this point had lacked a sense of rationale and structure – later they refer to the ‘rationally structured’ understanding that emerges from their own systematic methods (Henrion & Parkin, 1968, p. 35).
The word ‘rational’ appears six times within this modest 10-page text and is repeatedly valorised. The centrality of the term is emphasised further in a note about the office’s employees, which states that of the ten staff members, three are ‘mathematically trained “rationalisers”’ (Henrion & Parkin, 1968, p. 41). The reverence with which technical rationality is treated in the text is important, as it supports one of the core axioms of my research, that this period of British design history is significant as a moment in which, not only the language of design shifted markedly, but with it, the dominant paradigms underlying the profession. The growing interest in systems thinking that Henrion and Parkin (1968) develop upon, had especially pronounced implications for graphic design practitioners given that their approach had been perceived to lack the scientific rigour or professionalism (Kinross, 1988; Stiff, 2009; interview, Appendix 1.3) of their architectural or industrial design counterparts.73

Comparing ‘Systematic methods in Design Co-ordination’ (Henrion & Parkin, 1968) with another paper Henrion (1956) had prepared a decade earlier for the International Design Conference at Aspen, reveals just how far the dominant mindset of the discipline had shifted during the period. In his paper for Aspen, ‘Graphic Design in England’, Henrion (1956) sets out the differing approaches to the development of creative work taken by practitioners of different nationalities. According to Henrion (1956, p. 1), in North America creative work was developing from a ‘chart before course’ mentality, meaning that market research and statistics were governing the direction of creative design work. On the Continent, meanwhile, he suggested that they put the cart first. That is, they followed a ‘carte blanche before course’ model, with designers given free reign over creative work (Henrion, 1956, p. 1). Britain in 1956 was, according to Henrion, caught between these two states, with clients and advertising agents preferring to put the ‘chart’ first, and designers preferring the blank canvas. Henrion (1956, p. 1) gives away his own position when referring to the forceful manner in which the statistics based, advertising mindset had ‘invaded most fields of graphic design’ [emphasis added].

More astonishingly, Henrion (1956, p. 2) confides that while British designers were using market research, they were not constrained by it should a superior idea or concept emerge independent of, or contrary to, this data:

73 The increasing interest in systems thinking is evident in Britain through the development of the Design Methods Movement (Cross, 1993).
We pay a certain amount of attention to the background and the market requirements, market analyses and surveys, but we are prepared to throw these overboard if an intuitive idea of such quality turns up, which in spite of safe precedents (tried therefore trite), promises to capture attention in an original way, and draw it pertinently and wittily to the point of sale or information. This approach very often gives the best results equally in terms of sales and aesthetics. However, the more we get involved in mass media, be they magazines or television, the more we get involved in the network of charts dictating the course to take.

Henrion’s depiction of market research thrown overboard is indicative of the thinly veiled distain with which British-based creatives of the 1940s and early-50s had treated more ‘scientific’ or rational approaches to design. Compare this with the following two excerpts from ‘Systematic methods’, where Henrion and Parkin (1968, pp. 39 and 42) state:

**It is important for client and designer to agree on the requirements, and on how proposals are to be rationally evaluated, before design development begins. A large design programme is not simply a matter of having a bright idea and trying it on the client.**

We believe that the most challenging problem in any design job is to find the most appropriate systematic method of coping with it. [...] Important decisions which are only too often made subjectively on personal prejudice (called taste) should be made on the basis of more objective quantifiable evidence.

From the ‘original’, ‘intuitive idea’ of ‘such quality’ (Henrion, 1956), to the assertion that undertaking a large design programme is ‘not simply a matter of having a bright idea and trying it on the client’ (Henrion & Parkin, 1968), the evolving design philosophy of HDA could hardly have been more pronounced. Having previously slighted the invasion of the statistics-based American approach, Henrion now championed the merits of technical rationality and the systematic method. Given the turn-around in his ideology, one is reminded of Peter York’s characterisation of the pre-war sign-painter’s transmutation into fully fledged 1960s management consultant. As York (1984, p. 34) remarks:

**These sixties designers were completely different. They’d ask you what your company really did, what its philosophy was and how people related to it, and ask to see the company archives and talk to the senior management. And they sent memos about it all. You’d think they were management consultants from the way they carried on, not sign-painters.**

**Parkin’s role**

Alan Parkin’s role in the development of HDA’s new mode of practice is worthy of further consideration given that he came from a background outside of the typical art and design education system. According to Parkin (interview, Appendix 1.2), he was himself decidedly influential in the creation of both the *DIA Yearbook* text (Henrion & Parkin, 1968) and the Reinhold/Studio Vista book (Henrion & Parkin, 1967), taking
responsibility for writing the first drafts of both texts (Parkin, 2012; interview, Appendix 1.2). Given that he is recognised as a co-author of both texts, it is clear to see that Henrion was keen to acknowledge Parkin’s important role in the conception of these works. Other leaders of one-man teams may have insisted on just their own name being attached to such works, if only for the marketing value of the leader’s name writ large over the cover of the book. Parkin’s influence was not limited only to the construction of the texts themselves, but was also evident in the systematic methods and practices of the studio as described within the \textit{DIA Yearbook} text. As Parkin explains (interview, Appendix 1.2), his role had differed to Henrion’s other employees in that he was a more public facing member of the group. So, whilst the other designers at HDA were based strictly at the Pond Street studio, he was given his own business card (a luxury the others were not afforded) and accompanied Henrion to client meetings, working the slide carousel and supporting Henrion’s design proposal presentations (interview, Appendix 1.2). Next, I will go on to examine Parkin’s role more closely in order to consider the significance of his contribution.

It is notable that Parkin had come to work within the graphic design industry from an unusual background, graduating with a degree in Moral Sciences from Cambridge University (Shaughnessy, 2013; interview, Appendix 1.2). He had a long-standing interest in art and architecture and had won a Sanderson wallpaper competition soon after his graduation from Cambridge. This resulted in a brief spell of work with designer and photographer, Humphrey Spender, before he later went on to work with commercial artist David Kaplan, the step-father of a Cambridge friend (interview, Appendix 1.2).

Next followed a spell with commercial artist H.A. Rothholz, before his final position pre-Henrion as Production Editor of the \textit{Architects’ Journal} (interview, Appendix 1.2). Speaking about how he had come to be employed by Henrion, he recalls a party held by a mutual contact at the Courtauld Institute:

\begin{quote}
There were all sorts of people there, including Henrion, who I had admired from a distance. I grew up in the Midlands and the only thing I knew about smart London stuff was what I read in magazines or heard on the radio. Henrion had done a series of advertisements for Windsor and
\end{quote}

\footnote{In email correspondence with Parkin (2012), he confirms: ‘Yes I did all the writing for publication or reports, first a draft which Henri would check and quite often change in emphasis or argument. He was very good at speaking, but liked someone else to do the writing.’}

\footnote{In the previous case study we saw how HS&A’s work for Mac Fisheries work was reframed by \textit{Graphik} magazine as the work of Hans Schleger alone.}
Newton, or Reeves, I forget which, where there was a smart picture of him in his bow tie smiling, working with Reeves poster colours or something, saying ‘I find them excellent’. It was in _Art and Industry_, a wonderful magazine. From being a schoolboy, I had this standing admiration for Henrion particularly, but also many of the other designers too. I knew who he was. This strange name F, H, K, Henrion, what kind of name is that? I did meet him at this party and started talking to him about what I had been doing. I’d had a year in Italy, a scholarship post-Cambridge, where I was trying to do something between graphics and logic really. An elaborate thing, it didn’t come to anything. He was very interested, because he was interested in all sorts of things. It so happened he had just landed this job for KLM and was really quite alarmed about how it was all going to be done and he saw the opportunity of getting somebody in to help on that side of things – the organisation and the writing stuff. He said what are you doing? At that time I was production editor at the _Architects Journal_. I’d been there about a year. He said would you like to come and work with me and I said, ‘sure I would’, it was as simple as that. We got going straight away on the KLM things. I was fairly good on the graphics side. I wasn’t a professional standard for lettering or typography or anything like that. I’d always had an interest in that, I knew what was what. It was really this organisation, presentation, that stuff. (interview, Appendix 1.2)

Parkin joined HDA in 1961 when the group was already two years into the KLM consultancy. This could explain why there is relatively little coverage given over to the methods behind the KLM work in the _DIA Yearbook_ text (1968) – in terms of complex systematic thinking, it is the work for Blue Circle Cement and the Post Office that receive greatest coverage. Parkin was interested in developments in computing and cybernetics, having exhibited as an artist at the ICA (Institute of Contemporary Arts) show, _Cybernetic Serendipity: the computer and the arts_, curated by Jasia Reichardt (1968). Furthermore, his writing was likely influenced by Bruce Archer’s (1963a, 1963b, 1963c, 1963d, 1964a, 1964b, 1964c) articles for _Design_ magazine: ‘Systematic method for designers’. The resemblance between the title of Archer’s text and the Henrion and Parkin (1968) _DIA Yearbook_ text is simply too striking to be ignored:

*Systematic Method for Designers* (Archer, 1965)
*Systematic Methods in Design Co-ordination* (Henrion & Parkin, 1968)

The close similarity between the two titles suggests that Henrion and Parkin were jumping on the bandwagon that had developed from the ‘unprecedented’ interest in Archer’s ideas (Anon, 1965, p. 73).

Given that Parkin’s interest in mathematics and cybernetic theory had inspired Henrion to employ him, it is apparent that he acted as a kind of scientific foil for Henrion. Yet Parkin (interview, Appendix 1.2) downplays his influence on the group, and when asked directly about his role, claims simply that:

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76 First released as a series of seven separate articles in _Design_, Archer’s (1963a, 1963b, 1963c, 1963d, 1964a, 1964b, 1964c) texts were later published by the Council of Industrial Design in one single volume (Archer, 1965).
My input would have been that I was an admirer of the British Standards Institution, who for many years had been producing these very bleak, very stark, very cut-down little grey covered standards […] where in extremely precise and careful terminology they defined in numbered paragraphs exactly what you must do. I was aware of that as a very high standard of specification publication and would have tried to get it up to that level.

On the one hand, I am cautious to overstate Parkin’s role in the technocratisation of practice at HDA, as Henrion can be seen deliberating about similar principles several years before Parkin joined the firm. Nevertheless, it is hard to ignore the highly technical nature of the systems deployed by Parkin during his time with Henrion. In an unpublished manuscript about his career, Henrion (1979, p. 9) reflects on his ‘long friendship and collaboration’ with Parkin, noting that: ‘on very large design projects a mathematician can be an enormous help – because what you’re doing is really an ordering process, and so is mathematics, breaking things down into sets and subsets.’

Next, I will go on to analyse the article from the DIA Yearbook more closely in order to better explain the role Parkin played in developing the tools mobilised as part of HDA’s new systematic method.

### The ‘collective enabling enterprise’ of design coordination as mapping

Henrion and Parkin (1968) outline four key stages in conducting a design coordination programme:

1. Making a survey
   1.1 Analyse the present situation
   1.2 Assess the present situation
   1.3 Clarify the corporate aims and their relative priorities

2. Information storage and retrieval

3. Formulating a brief

4. Planning and estimating for design development

[my own numbering system]

77 For example, in ‘Design Consultants: A New Profession’, Henrion (1959, p. 36) outlines how ‘a new kind of design practice has developed in Britain’, with the holistically-minded General Consultant Designer now competing with more conventional Specialist Designers.
They emphasise that such a programme is more concerned with the ‘pre-design assembling of information and formulation of design requirements, and to design planning, progressing, and implementation’ than it is with the ‘actual design stages’ (Henrion & Parkin, 1968, p. 33). This is significant as it suggests that, in their view, the preliminary strategic work of design practice is both separate to ‘actual design’ (and so perhaps not considered by Henrion and Parkin as design at all), yet is deemed worthy of a more rigorous and scientific approach than ‘actual design’. This attempt to apply scientific ‘ways of knowing’ to the design process appears counter to recent trends for ‘design thinking’ and ‘design-driven innovation’ (Verganti, 2009), where ‘designerly ways of knowing’ (Cross, 2001) are championed as harnessing unique problem solving capabilities that are applicable beyond conventional design contexts. Far from celebrating the creative potential of ‘designerly ways of knowing’, Henrion and Parkin work deliberately to mask any perceived element of risk or uncertainty implicit in their practice. According to their account, their innovation is not to be found inherent within conventional design artefacts or outputs, but rather in the technocracy and rationality of their methods.

At the very centre of these methods lay intricate tools for data collection and mapping. As such, the second stage of their model – ‘Information storage and retrieval’ – predominates the ideology of the method, permeating throughout the process and having an overbearing influence on the other stages of the model. Viewed collectively, I would suggest, therefore, that the act of ‘mapping’ is central to the method as a whole. Here I draw on landscape architect and theorist James Corner’s (1999, p. 213) conceptualisation of mapping as a ‘collective enabling enterprise’. According to Corner (1999, p. 213), the process of ‘mapping’ is often confused with ‘tracing’, so though mapping is usually understood as replicating or mirroring the world, in actuality it is concerned with the ‘re-shaping of the worlds in which people live’. Mappings are thus

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78 The parallels with the advertising profession are notable here, where ‘planning’ is an established disciplinary practice commonly understood as a form of research-driven strategising that precedes the creative formulation of the advertising campaign (Lannon & Baskin, 2007).

79 Whereas the design coordination programme seeks to downplay the role of design by introducing the credibility of science, the contemporary design thinking movement (Kelley, 2005; Brown, 2009; Martin, 2009) can be understood to ‘up-sell’ design in an attempt to bring more innovation to business contexts – what Verganti (2009) calls ‘design-driven innovation’. Curiously both these initiatives seek to tackle strategic design and business concerns with a combination of rational (explicit knowing) and intuitive thinking (implicit knowing) – it is notable that the HDA model seeks to mask any intuitive thinking, as if it were a sign of weakness.
not the ‘transparent, neutral or passive devices of spatial measurement and description’, as commonly believed, but rather, they should be understood as ‘extremely opaque, imaginative, operational instruments’ that ‘set the stage for future work’ (Corner, 1999, p. 250).

For Corner (1999, p. 250) maps, then, are far from objective, and must be understood as ‘essentially subjective, interpretive and fictional constructs of facts’. Viewed from this perspective, mapping can be interpreted as a powerful communication technique with latent agency to control or coordinate socio-technical assemblages (Brassett, 1994). Here Corner echoes Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) sentiments about processes of ‘territorialization’ and the notion of the map as territory, with Corner’s process of ‘mapping’ being at least somewhat analogous to Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘territorialisation’. As Corner (1999, p. 213) posits, ‘mapping precipitates its most productive effects through a finding that is also a founding; its agency lies in neither reproduction nor imposition but rather in uncovering realities previously unseen or unimagined’. In other words, the process of mapping is both a performative act of exploration that reveals certain hidden truths, and also a formative, foundational process upon which future decisions can be taken and acted upon.

Of the various tools that Henrion and Parkin (1968) detail in ‘Systematic Methods’, many develop from performative mapping processes akin to Corner’s conceptualisation (indeed ‘design coordination’ can be understood as a collective enabling enterprise). For Henrion and Parkin, mapping enables the representation of complex power relations and spatial hierarchies. Thus, we are presented with eight different examples of how various mapping techniques can communicate or organise ideas. These are as follows: 1) a coordinate indexing system that maps client information to produce a database; 2) a diagrammatical map of the findings derived from such a database; 3) a magnetic workflow board that maps out an intended working process, charting the movement of the labour force; 4) a dynamic display stand that maps the relationships between visual references; 5) an evolutionary mapping of the development process behind a new logotype; 6) a comparative mapping of the structure behind ‘old

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80 Also of note here is Baudrillard’s (1983, p. 2) work on the relationship between the map and the territory which argues that: ‘The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory.’
and new’ logotypes; 7) a comparative mapping of the same ‘old and new’ logotypes under conditions of poor visibility; and 8) a mapping of the ‘new’ logo when exposed to horizontal movement.

According to the framework of collaborative objects set out by Nicolini et al. (2012), the design coordination tools created by Henrion and Parkin can be understood as ‘activity objects’. Interestingly, the conceptualisation of ‘activity objects’ as set out by Nicolini et al. (2012) aligns surprisingly closely with Corner’s (1999) conceptualisation of mapping as a collective enabling enterprise. To consider an entity as an activity object means to emphasise its productive role and take account of its potential to motivate collaboration and direct activities (Nicolini et al., 2012). As such, activity objects are forcefully active entities with potential to bestow power on those that create them or control their future development; this means they can assume positions of power within collaborative social settings. Describing the traits of activity objects, Nicolini et al. (2012) state that such objects are, ‘incomplete, emergent and expansive, which gives them their performative character’. Again, this accords with Corner’s (1999) contention that mapping, properly understood, is a performative process – or in Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004, p. 13) words ‘an experimentation in contact with the real’. In summary, HDA’s practice of design coordination depended on a range of mapping tools that can be productively interpreted as activity objects. Next, I will examine these eight examples, dividing them into two distinct categories, looking firstly at those involved in what Henrion and Parking call the ‘pre-design stages’, before examining those that influence what could be considered the post-design stages of work.

**Pre-Design Stages**

Of the HDA design coordination tools centred around the pre-design stages, the diagram of the Post Office survey (Fig. 49) is aesthetically most clearly aligned with conventional notions of topographic mapping, presenting itself as a kind of complex network map. By the same measure, their magnetic workflow board (Fig. 50) shares many similarities with standard flow charts. By comparison the final two examples of the coordinate indexing system (Figs. 47 & 48) and the dynamic display stand (Fig. 51), differ in as much that they are the most emergent tools, with the potential to point to new potentialities, as opposed to prescribing them. Neither resembles a conventional
map as such, but both are concerned with fundamental mapping principles, such as data collection and comparison, and taxonomic categorisation (Corner, 1999).


1) Coordinate indexing systems

Alan Parkin took a lead in developing the indexing tools mobilised by HDA in their work for the Post Office and Blue Circle Cement (interview, Appendix 1.2). Long before the computer had made its entry into the designers professional working context, Parkin’s intricate indexing systems emerged from a form of elaborate computation. Both indexes (Figs. 53 & 54) used a form of coordinate indexing, with each item stored within the system broken up into elementary units of information. So, for example, within the Post Office library there were two kinds of reference cards within the system: plain white and coloured. White index cards containing keywords, or descriptors, were organised alphabetically so they could be used as reference points from which the relevant entries within the full library could be identified. So, if searching for a cross connection cabinet one would consult the white keyword cards for ‘cross-connection’ and ‘cabinet’ and note down the reference number repeated on both index cards. Consulting a library of numerically arranged blue and pink item cards one could then
identify the relevant number card and isolate the card in question. The blue and pink cards were designed as blank questionnaires which could be completed by Post Office employees and returned to HDA for filing.

According to Henrion and Parkin (1968), this system allowed them to access and assemble all the information they had on any Post Office subject within a matter of minutes. They were clearly proud of their achievements here, dedicating several columns of text to a detailed explanation of the inner workings of the system, illustrating the Post Office index cards alongside a further illustration of a rotary filing system used for sorting specimens within an index for Blue Circle Cement.

HDA’s indexing tools can be understood as vacant frameworks that only later became infiltrated with the relevant organisational data from the client. In this sense they reflect the expansive nature of activity objects (Nicolini et al., 2012). Whereas corporate image-makers of the 1960s typically sought to deny the significance of change, treating the development of a corporate image as if it were conceived in a moment frozen in time, HDA’s indexing systems had the potential to foster more dynamic approaches to design that could counter the norm of concretisation. In their expansive nature these systems provided the affordance for a more dynamic approach, whereby multiple readings could be taken from an ever-changing data-set. This could in-turn inform more agile design approaches and strategies. However, this did not come to pass, and instead the deployment of these index systems appears to have followed the normal pattern, in as much that they were treated as another static, concrete entity to inform a marked strategic juncture at a specific moment in time. This line of development means that the emergent and expansive qualities of the indexing systems were restricted, and instead of being harnessed as working tools of benefit on an ongoing basis, their use was limited to the initial moment of release as the findings were reported to the client. In this scenario when the data-entry process was complete, the information contained within the index could be mobilised to inform future action. The particular course of action being dependent on the specific kinds of data collected by HDA and their interpretation of this data. So, although Henrion and Parkin (1968) describe their tools as if they are objective, impartial third-parties in the relationship between design consultant and client, in actuality HDA’s agency in the creation and mobilisation of these mapping tools must not be ignored. Counter to this, it is equally important to recognise that the new HDA mapping tools do have a type of agency in terms of the establishment of a new working model of the HDA process.
Figure 55) Diagram of Post Office design survey, from 'Systematic Methods in Design Co-ordination', from *DLA Yearbook 1967/68* (Henrion & Parkin, 1968, p. 36). F.H.K. Henrion Archive, University of Brighton Design Archives, GB 1837 DES/FHK.

**2) Diagram of the Post Office design survey**

From the findings of the Post Office library, HDA produced a diagram (or map) summarising their design survey of the organisation (Fig. 55). This visual representation held potential for far-reaching action, being used to argue for the redistribution of some 5,000 design artefacts into new groupings on the basis of design-need, as opposed to administrative convenience. For example, following HDA’s proposal, Post Office items located closely together on a street pavement would now be controlled by the same department within the organisation, having previously been grouped by what had been convenient for the administrative stakeholders involved in their operation, rather than the end-user. In aligning certain artefacts with certain administrative departments HDA sought to control not only design entities, but also the internal structure of the Post Office itself. They argued that the relative success of such a design coordination scheme was dependent on the prior coordination of the staff base, with Henrion and Parkin
claiming, ‘it is essential that co-ordination of people should precede co-ordination of items’. They also advised on how the administration of design work should to be managed across the organisation to ensure successful deployment of their proposals. This ‘proposal for design management’ would involve appointing a permanent ‘design administrator’ and a ‘co-ordinating designer’, alongside a ‘design panel’, who would be required for sign-off on all major projects and policy changes (Henrion and Parkin, 1968, p. 37).

Here we see what could be conceived of as a simple graphic design problem (to coordinate a range of corporate visual assets) being reframed as a larger organisational and design management issue. In this sense we can begin to understand how individual graphic design practitioners like Henrion became implicated in more bureaucratic corporate practices of management and governance. Furthermore, we can also see that designers in 1960s Britain were already beginning to understand that ‘corporate identity’ had far-reaching implications well beyond aesthetic values and the media’s constant preoccupation with logos.

When the Post Office diagram (Fig. 55) is combined with the indexing systems from which its findings are derived (Figs. 53 & 54), together they constitute a clear example of the ability of mapping to ‘reformulate what already exists’ (Corner, 1999, p. 214); indeed, the reformulation of existing entities provides a wholly accurate description of ‘design coordination’ as understood by Henrion and Parkin. Following Corner then, the Post Office library should be understood as the finding, whereas the summative diagram of the survey represents the founding – i.e. the basis on which what already exists is reformulated. Another way of looking at this is that the indexed library of cards is generative and thus should be understood as a mapping (though it pretends to be an objective tracing), whereas the diagram is prescriptive and should be understood therefore as a planning (rather than a mapping).

Corner (1999, p. 228) touches on the relationship between maps and plans, explaining: ‘Whereas the plan leads to an end, the map provides a generative means, a suggestive vehicle that “points” but does not overly determine.’ He describes the act of planning as, ‘imposing a more-or-less idealized project from on high’ (Corner, 1999, p. 228). This accords with Henrion and Parkin’s vision for the Post Office, though their plan derives directly from their mapping. The Post Office diagram purports to be a summative representation of the findings from the indexing project, but it is clear that it does more than merely point towards a solution, with Henrion and Parkin forcefully
taking matters into their own hands and regrouping Post Office artefacts and employees into new configurations. Here in this one document it is difficult to separate processes of mapping from processes of planning, such is the convergence of these two activities.\textsuperscript{81}

\textbf{Figure 56) ‘One of eight magnetic boards used for network planning for the Blue Circle design co-ordination programme’, from ‘Systematic Methods in Design Co-ordination’, from DIA Yearbook 1967/68 (Henrion & Parkin, 1968, p. 40). F.H.K. Henrion Archive, University of Brighton Design Archives, GB 1837 DES/FHK.}

\textbf{3) Magnetic workflow board}

A dramatic offshoot of the shift towards design coordination was the need for a more concerted attempt to coordinate the workforce. As Michael Middleton (1967, p. 82)

\textsuperscript{81} In the case of the Post Office library, the indexing tools developed by HDA would become largely redundant, due to irreparable conflicts that emerged between different parties involved in the project. As Cabianca (2012) explains, Henrion was in conflict with Stuart Rose, who acted as a design advisor for the Post Office. In their capacity as design advisors to the same organisation Rose and Henrion were at odds with one another, with Rose instrumental in blocking Henrion’s proposals. Ultimately their conflicting interests were untenable, and as a result, HDA’s ambitious design coordination work made little meaningful impact on the course of the organisation. Their indexing system for the Blue Circle group appears to have been more successful, given the wide role out of HDA’s design proposals for the firm.
explains in his timely book Group practice in design, the ever-increasing scope of corporate design commissions led individual designers towards group practice:

A ‘corporate identity programme’ will bring, buildings, products, printed matter and all other aspects of an organisation into a common design framework. [...] Clearly such large scale undertakings are beyond the capacity of the individual designer; the team is born. Different skills form new patterns of collaboration – on an ad hoc basis for specific jobs, in continuing association, or permanently in an integrated office.

Group practice became ever more prevalent in design from the 1950s onwards, with a surge of groups focused on graphic design emerging during the sixties.

The practice of HDA was, to some extent, restricted in scope by their premises at Pond Street, Hampstead (also Henrion’s long-term home). According to Shaughnessy (2013, p. 86) Henrion worked initially from the drawing room at the front of the house, with his assistants working from a small back room. By 1962 a substantial studio extension had been built, designed by Team 4, an early partnership between Richard and Su Rogers, and Norman and Sue Foster. This allowed the staff base to grow to around 14 or 15 members by the 1970s (Shaughnessy, 2013, p. 86).

Given that Henrion liked to retain direct control of all operations in the HDA studio it would not have suited him to have grown the studio any larger. Recalling a moment in the mid-1970s when a merger had been mooted between HDA and Negus & Negus (the studio of Dick and Pam Negus), Henrion’s second wife Marion Wesel (cited in Shaughnessy, 2013, p. 90) explains why it had been called off: ‘Both Dick Negus and Henri were not used to having anyone interfere with their decisions, and their staff were more like assistants.’ This evocation of the relatively dictatorial design leader clearly establishes the nature of HDA as a group practice in which Henrion directed affairs. Parkin is somewhat anomalous within this one-man team, in that he seems to have developed a more equal working relationship with Henrion, due largely to his ability to proffer forms of knowledge and expertise beyond Henrion’s own command.

As a consequence of HDA’s growing labour force, the flow of work through the studio needed to be managed more purposefully. The deliberate and rational organisation of group work was a far cry from Henrion’s earlier career where he had operated according to the master-apprentice model (Paulus & Nijstad, 2003; Boland & Collopy, 2004) with the odd assistant in the back room. Initially he got by in much the same manner as the lone commercial artist of his earlier years, using assistants to take the leg-work out of any arduous or repetitive labour, but as his team grew this presented new leadership and management challenges. To organise the team and their work,
together they mobilised visual aids that enabled them to plan out their collective working design process in advance, assigning members of the workforce to specific tasks and designating time allowances to different organisational activities. These workflow diagrams set out a sequence of operations that prescribe a time-based process, as well as the workers involved in fulfilling such a process.

One of eight workflow diagrams used in the Blue Circle Cement job was illustrated within ‘Systematic Methods’ (Henrion & Parkin, 1968) (Fig. 56) and it is extraordinary that such a bureaucratic device was illustrated at large scale by a graphic design business, with this technocratic flow diagram taking up four times the space of the ‘creative’ design work illustrated on the very same spread (Fig. 57).\(^2\)

Referred to by Henrion & Parkin (1968, p. 40) as ‘network planning’, and described as ‘a network method for planning, estimating and progressing each major assignment’, these work tools can be seen to derive from the fields of operations research (OR) and more specifically scientific management.

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\(^2\) Graphic designers have typically been unerring in their desire to keep their operational methods concealed, preferring to garner attention through the visual appeal of the design artefacts they produce.
The notion of managing or optimising workflow can be traced back to early twentieth century industrialists such as Frederick Taylor (1911) and Henry Gantt who are credited as important pioneers of scientific management (Mercier and Nunnally, 1965; Ritzer, 1992; Sivarethinamohan, 2008). Using a stopwatch, Taylor developed the time-based study of work (later called ‘time and motion studies’), wherein rule of thumb methods were replaced by more deliberate, rational ones that derived from a scientific study of the work tasks themselves (Ritzer, 1992). Gantt, who worked closely with Taylor, is remembered most clearly for the workflow planning charts he conceived, the Gantt Milestone Chart, a form of graphic schedule for planning a programme of interrelated work tasks (Sivarethinamohan, 2008). The Gantt chart was later built upon by researchers in the United States who sought to develop network planning and analysis by creating graphical tools that could reflect more fully the inter-relationships between distinct but connected work tasks (Mercier & Nunnally, 1965; Sivarethinamohan, 2008).

As Mercier and Nunnally (1965) explain, these initiatives led to the development of critical path analysis (CPA, or often called the critical path method, or CPM) by researchers at the American company duPont, while during the same period researchers working for the US Navy developed closely related hypotheses that led them to posit the concept of the Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT). These initiatives in the field of network planning clearly influenced the ideas of Parkin and his colleagues at HDA, with them referring to the concept of ‘critical path’ five times in the ‘Systematic Methods’ text. Henrion and Parkin (1968) carefully articulate the significance of the critical path method, explaining how it enables them to optimise the way they use their time in meeting tightly fixed client deadlines. Interestingly HDA’s workflow diagrams do allow for some malleability, in that they set out a minimum and a maximum time allowance for each task. This estimate was then used to derive the probable time in which a client project would be delivered.

These workflow diagrams can be understood as a form of map-based inscription device that enabled collective action to happen. Though individual micro-practices within the overarching design coordination practice of HDA were routine and repeatable, on a macroscopic level each new client project would be unique in terms of its time scale and the issues involved. As activity objects, the magnetic workflow boards focused the minds and energies of HDA’s employees, centralising their labours around one focal point of inscription. As such they can be seen to mobilise various social and technical actors around a single commonly agreed objective.
ANT scholar Michel Callon (1981, 1986) refers to this as a process of ‘translation’, by which various diverse actors form a network or alliance in response to a particular problem. For Callon (1986) translation involves four separate moments: problematisation, intereselement, enrollement and mobilisation. According to this theorisation of translation, the magnetic workflow boards served to make an imposition (interessement) that would lock human and non-human actors into specific roles in response to the problem framed by HDA (problematisation). Through a process of enrollement, the workflow diagrams seek to define and interrelate the various roles allocated to actors in the network, thus leading to their mobilisation around the agreed objective.

Though these magnetic planning boards are described as internally situated work tools, it is evident that they had ramifications for external clients too. So, although it is impossible to say how the knowledge inscribed in these diagrams was represented or communication to clients, it is clear that decisions inscribed within these devices had wider ramifications, setting clear frameworks and expectations around which the project would unfold, thus defining the roles and responsibilities of client-actors as well as locally situated ones. The introduction of such tools within the context of graphic design practice is of utmost significance as it represents the emergence of a new culture of audit and measurement that rather inevitably accompanies carefully managed group practice (Dorland, 2009; Cooper, Junginger & Lockwood, 2011).
Figure 58) ‘A specially constructed display stand with rotating felt screens carrying hundreds of colour photographs of design items belonging to the Blue Circle Group’, from ‘Systematic Methods in Design Co-ordination’, from DIA Yearbook 1967/68 (Henrion & Parkin, 1968, p. 34). F.H.K. Henrion Archive, University of Brighton Design Archives, GB 1837 DES/FHK.

4) Dynamic display stand

Henrion and Parkin (1968) provide one illustrated example of an interactive display stand created for Blue Circle Cement (one of two stands used in total), with this device receiving less attention than the other tools dedicated to their pre-design stages – only being mentioned in the image caption and not in the main body of text (Fig. 58). These display stands grouped together photographic references of the client’s existing design collateral, with examples of their vehicles on one panel, signs on another, and
publications and stationery on further panels. By rotating the individual panels, HDA staff members, or clients, could readily analyse whether there was any sense of unification across the various elements of the existing design collateral.

According to Henrion and Parkin (1968, p. 34), the stands provided ‘a fair representation’ of how the public sees Blue Circle, acting as a ‘model’ of the existing state of the company’s house style. In so doing, they served the purpose of revealing any such lack of unity across the existing designs – as Henrion and Parkin (1968, p. 34) claim, ‘lack of coordination, and the size and complexity of the task are immediately obvious’. In clearly evidencing the existing issues for the client, these tools act as a collective enabling device, bringing together the various actors involved in the process (both internal and external) and enfolding them around the same common problem and objective. Again, this process recalls Callon’s notion of translation, whereby HDA deploy the display stands in an attempt to frame the problem (problematisation) and thus form an alliance between the multiple actors in a project.

At one level, the display stands simply sought to trace objectively the state of Blue Circle’s existing design collateral. In practice though, HDA’s agency in the construction of the stands and selection of the images would have inherently shaped the overall picture presented, giving HDA a degree of agency over how the information presented would be perceived. Assuming that they took the photographs themselves, there are the issues of framing, angle and crop that could all impact the interpretation of the onlooker (Evans, 1997). But even without this consideration, the selection of certain representative entities and the omission of others was a powerful determining factor in the observer’s interpretation.

**Post-Design Stages**

Though they claim that ‘Systematic Methods in Design Co-ordination’ is mostly concerned with ‘pre-design stages’ (Henrion & Parkin, 1968, p. 33), Henrion and Parkin provide three examples of ‘mappings’ that are mobilised to support creative design work. I have referred to these mappings as part of the post-design stages, as they concern the production of analytical props conceived after the ‘creative’ work has been completed. These image references are given relatively short text captions and are not addressed at all in the main body of Henrion and Parkin’s (1968) text. Given that they are rather shoe-horned in at the end of the article, it raises the possibility that they may
have been a late addition to the text, perhaps at the suggestion of Henrion. This may be little more than conjecture, but there remains something anomalous about the inclusion of these images – ultimately, they are neither the tools, nor the products, of a design coordination process, and as such, have little to do with the immediate subject of the article. However, it is notable that they follow a form of technical rationality that is in close alignment with the ideology of the various apparatuses described in the rest of their text. Each of the four graphics were conceived to present the ‘new’ KLM logotype as the robust by-product of a technically rational, systematic process. But particularly notable here is the evolutionary representation of the emblem’s development, which Bakker (2006) argues, had concealed the true development course of the design.

Figure 59) Evolutionary mapping of the logo development process, from ‘Systematic Methods in Design Co-ordination’, from DIA Yearbook 1967/68 (Henrion & Parkin, 1968, p. 41). F.H.K. Henrion Archive, University of Brighton Design Archives, GB 1837 DES/FHK.

5) An evolutionary mapping of the logo development process

The ‘evolutionary’ mapping of the development process behind the new KLM logo (Fig. 59) borrows more from the format of the timeline than the cartographic map, structuring a sequential development from old to new, whereby each increment became gradually more reductive, leaving ornamentation behind in favour of a stricter geometric form. As Bakker (2006) explains, the emblem was conceived relatively early on in the development of the project, but after HDA’s initial design proposals were
rejected for being too modern by their clients at KLM, HDA were forced to reconsider the proposals. Bakker (2006, p. 6) argues that the resistance to the original presentation led Henrion to re-present the same materials again, only this time to present them as the product of ‘an almost natural’ evolutionary development, involving ‘no human intervention’. As such, HDA looked to suggest that the authority of the design derived not from HDA’s expertise as human design decision makers, but rather from the natural laws of form and vision implicit within their design approach. So, in Design Coordination and Corporate Image, Henrion and Parkin (1967) refer to the strong ‘gestalt’ of the proposed emblem, recalling the efforts of mid-century scholars such as György Kepes (1944) who Rudolf Arnheim (1954) who had sought to codify universal rules of perception. Bakker (2006, p. 8) accords this approach with that of the engineer, explaining that: ‘Where beforehand there was the impression that graphic designers would just show an emblem design as if it was the result of an artistic whim, now they showed it as an almost technical exercise, as if they were engineers.’ Inherent in this approach was the notion of a more legitimate, objective method that borrowed weight from more scientific practices.

It is notable that this particular mapping of the emblem’s development featured in both the DIA Yearbook article (Henrion & Parkin, 1968) and also in the more well-known Reinhold/Studio Vista book, Design Coordination and Corporate Image (Henrion & Parkin, 1967). The text accompanying the illustration differed quite significantly in each case though, with Design Coordination suggesting that the emblem emerged directly out of this evolutionary process, whereas ‘Systematic Methods’ revealed more frankly that the process diagram was the by-product of the emblem design, explaining how it had been created as a persuasive prop to convince the client of the legitimacy of the design:

*Design Coordination and Corporate Image*

The crown was progressively reduced through many stages (of which 15 are shown), to an ultimate form with very strong ‘Gestalt’. (Henrion & Parkin, 1967, p. 24)

*Systematic Methods for Design Co-ordination*

One of many possible evolutionary developments from the old crown to the new, to convince KLM management of the necessity to go to an ultimate form in one step. (Henrion & Parkin, 1968, p. 41)

The mention of this being ‘one of many possible evolutionary developments’ reflects the fact that in their attempts to persuade the client HDA had conceived multiple variations of this evolutionary development graphic, with Bakker (2006) evidencing two earlier
examples from 1963 and 1964 that preceded the example featured in ‘Systematic Methods’. Here HDA’s approach to design practice accords with some sociologists’ research methods, wherein bouts of rationalisation are deployed to straighten out otherwise tangled and incoherent complexes of action. As Hutheesing (1990, p. 10) explains, for the practising ethnographic researcher ‘little did happen the way it is put down on paper, in terms of substance and sequence’, thus a zig-zagging sequence of events is commonly reframed and re-construed to produce ‘a well organised logical design with a beginning and a rounded-off ending’. Kaplan (1963) cites this as ‘reconstructed logic’, i.e. a form of sense-making that emerges after the fact; as opposed to ‘logic in use’, which refers to the direct application of logical principles in action. In HDA’s case they seemed to have gone through several bouts of rationalisation, translating their reconstructed logic into ever-more persuasive graphic form.

This development represents an important shift in the driving imperatives of graphic design practitioners, with the individual case of HDA’s corporate image work for KLM clearly showing how inscriptions mobilised to frame a client’s comprehension of a design proposal can become fundamentally more pivotal – and thus more valuable in financial terms – to designers than the creative design proposals that they create. Clearly, there is a mutual relationship between a proposed design and how that proposal is framed, in that they are contingent on one another, yet the case of KLM presents the supposition that, from a capitalist perspective, designers may be better placed channelling their energies into the development of compelling and persuasive presentation materials aimed at their clients, rather than concentrating their efforts on the production of engaging designs targeted at consumers or society more broadly – Lee Stone (2010) refers to this as the persuasive element of project management. The other KLM graphics illustrated within ‘Systematic Methods’ support this notion, providing further evidence of the means by which HDA sought to purposefully prove the efficacy of their designs.
6) *A comparative mapping of the structure behind 'old and new' logotypes*

The comparative mapping of the structure behind ‘old and new’ KLM logotypes (Fig. 60) scarcely resembles conventional notions of maps. However, reconsidered as a kind of cartographic tracing of the underlying structure behind the logotypes, the process can be interpreted as directly analogous to conventional map-making, whereby spatial territory is captured and measured, a process Corner (1999) refers to as tracing. The grid structure overlaid on top of the old and new emblems sought, through comparison, to reinforce the simpler, reductive structure of the new design, showing how it could be constructed from fewer grid-lines that were more intentionally placed and in more harmonious relationship with one another. Here the perceived rationality of the grid (Müller-Brockmann, 1981) is deployed to imbue the proposed design with notions of rigour and precision.
7 & 8) A comparative mapping of ‘old and new’ logotypes under conditions of poor visibility and horizontal movement

These final graphic illustrations from Henrion and Parkin’s article render the effect of various adverse viewing conditions upon the proposed new logo design (Figs. 61 & 62). By simulating the impact of conditions such as horizontal movement and focal range, HDA sought to illustrate how the simple gestalt properties of their new logo made it more robust and recognisable, especially in these unfavourable conditions.\footnote{83} So in Design Coordination and Corporate Image, Henrion and Parkin (1967, p. 24) go so far as to suggest that the emblem excels more fully under such adverse conditions, claiming: ‘the worse the viewing conditions – distance, movement, sharp angle, low attention –
the more “crown like” it becomes.’ In stating that their design performed better within the most important contexts of use (i.e. the aeroplane livery moving across the runway), Henrion and Parkin build an ever more convincing case of its efficacy.

In these various inscription devices for KLM, the development of a new culture of legitimacy can begin to be traced, whereby designers began to consider more fully how the rational properties of their designs could be made evident in a persuasive manner to their clients. Where Henrion had once favoured the virtuous and intuitive originality of the individual design artefact – as per his heroic ideas poster – the notion of originality as a driver of cultural production began to be challenged by more dogmatic notions of legitimacy and efficacy. As such the KLM presentation graphics should rightfully be considered as ‘boundary objects’ (Nicolini et al., 2012) that translate the mindset and values of the graphic design practitioner into more readily recognisable forms.84

Concluding remarks

The organisational history of Henrion Design Associates corresponds closely with the particular framing of this thesis in terms of my chosen study period which runs for a 25-year period from 1945 to 1970. Having set up as Studio H in 1948, F.H.K Henrion soon renamed his practice to become Henrion Design Associates in 1951. By 1973 they had changed again to become HDA International, signifying the significant growth in corporate image-making as a practice, as well as its increasingly globalised outlook. HDA had grown steadily ever since their formation in 1951, and it is reassuring to see them reframe their practice for a more global marketplace early in the 1970s. This business trajectory supports my argument that the period from 1945 to 1970 was one of great importance in terms of the flourishing of corporate image-making. So, while the 1970s and onwards was a period of proliferation and consolidation in terms of corporate image-making, the 50s and 60s were crucial in terms of the patterns of practice becoming established.

84 According to Nicolini et al. (2012) boundary objects are artefacts that support collaboration across diverse specialist groups, serving as a bridge that spans intersecting social and cultural worlds.
In terms of their client list and the scale of their corporate image contracts, HDA flourished most fully during the 1960s and 70s, before slowly ceding their position as a widely influential force within the industry as competition increased. Klaus Schmidt and Chris Ludlow took over the firm in 1981, and at this time Henrion shifted focus to his educational endeavours. He acted as a consultant to the new directors as they set-up office in the West End of London as Henrion Ludlow Schmidt. But despite Henrion’s limited involvement with the firm, they decided to retain his name given its eminent prestige (Shaughnessy, 2013).

The tools and apparatuses HDA developed during the 1950s and 60s constituted a radical departure from the intuitive, rule-of-thumb methods that were associated with commercial art practices of earlier decades. By inscribing certain practice-based routines into material apparatus they brought increasing stability to the rituals of design work, introducing design management tools that would enable them to better understand their clients’ collateral; plan their own design processes accordingly; and manage the internal work force, as well as important interconnected external agents. So, whereas the subject of our first case study, Hans Schleger & Associates, resisted any urge to standardise or codify their practice, HDA were inspired by technological developments and initiatives like the Design Methods Movement, seeking to bring a certain scientific rationality to their practice. By codifying certain routines HDA played an important role in developing and establishing particular patterns of consultant graphic design practice in Britain. Though it is difficult to say with any great certainty that their methods infiltrated the wider professional community, it is clear that they influenced a number of young design practitioners who would go on to contribute to the development of corporate design work in the following decades.

Henrion’s most loyal employees remained with him over a sustained period, but given the flat structure and relatively small scale of the firm there was little room for significant career progression. As a result there remained an inevitable ebb and flow around contributors to the studio. A number of commercially successful design groups benefitted from founder members who had gained experience through an involvement with HDA. Among these were Sampson Tyrell, founded by former employees Martin Sampson and Terry Tyrell in 1976. Speaking to the trade journal Design Week, Tyrrell (cited in Anon, 1998) recalled the ‘incredible grounding in what was to become modern
day corporate identity’ that he had received working at HDA after he left art college. The German, Dieter Heil was another who benefitted from time with Henrion (as well as a spell with DRU), going on to found the influential design group MetaDesign with Erik Spiekermann (another to have freelanced for HDA), Florian Fischer and Gerhard Doerrié in Berlin, 1979 (Anon, 2014).

The shift to a more technocratic and programmatic design approach inevitably impacted the nature of the designs produced by Henrion’s studio. So, whereas his early ‘ideas posters’ had hinged around a witty and conceptual approach to communication, the programmatic corporate design systems emanating from the studio from the 1960s onwards were founded on a strict basis of aesthetic unification. As such the examples of design work put forward by Henrion into the public domain privileged consistency, control and order, over any sense of individual wit. Here each item of collateral worked together in harmony, with an emphasis on the sum of parts, as opposed to the power of the individual design artefact to affect change. This is exemplified by the way the studio’s work for KLM was presented in various publications. For example, in Design Coordination and Corporate Image one particular double-page spread (Henrion & Parkin, 1967, pp. 34–35) shows an extensive selection of KLM artefacts all branded with the same repetitive visual elements, creating a particularly homogenised and monotonous effect (Fig. 50).

Although the way of practising design developed radically at HDA during the 1960s in line with profound transformations occurring across the profession more broadly, it is difficult to gauge to what extent these practices were adopted by young practitioners of the coming generations. In terms of their working methods, the ideas set out by Henrion and Parkin (1968) in their paper for the DIA Yearbook are significant as unique early attempts to apply the systematic rigour of the Design Methods Movement within the context of corporate graphic design practice. In these efforts to scientise graphic design, they sought to codify working methods and occupational formulae specific to corporate image-making practice. This meant introducing project management tools commonly used in other, more well-developed professions, an approach that Spinoza, Flores and Dreyfus (1997) refer to as ‘cross-appropriation’, whereby practices, ideas or tools are adopted from other practices or

85 Having been owned by global communications conglomerate WPP since 1986, Sampson Tyrell now operate under the name Brand Union.
social worlds. So, as we saw in this case study they adopted the ‘critical path method’ from the field of Operations Research. But while the tools and principles HDA developed may not always have been entirely novel, their deployment within a graphic design context was largely unprecedented and deeply significant in terms of the development of the discipline and its increasing technocratisation. Inherent in these gradual changes was a shift away from design that responded to the needs of consumers, or even, for those ambitious post-war designers, the needs of society (many post-war designers believed that their right to be considered professionals was dependent on their ability to serve society). Now the consumers who really mattered were the commissioning clients; for the satisfaction of end-users or the grand objective of bettering society were of scant concern if the design group could not get their proposals beyond the client.

Such issues were not unprecedented, with pre-war commercial artists having had similar trials with those who had commissioned their work; yet these concerns around client satisfaction accelerated as the stakes began to be raised. As the size of the average corporate design job grew from the odd artefact, to the comprehensive system of artefacts, the risks involved grew for both clients and designers. For the client, decisions regarding corporate image programmes began to take on important policy-making significance, in that their choices could have major implications across the entirety of their company. For designers meanwhile, the success or failure of a major corporate image programme running over several years and involving multiple staff members could make or break their firm.

As a result of this rise in the level of financial risk surrounding design activity, creative risk can be seen to have diminished in parallel. So as the client came to be considered the most important consumer, design labour was increasingly directed away from cultural production and the pursuit of cultural capital, towards rationalisations mobilised to support the design product and thus the accrual of economic capital. Here the practices of HDA accord with the ANT notion of interessement (Callon, 1986; Akrich, Callon & Latour, 2002a, 2002b), whereby efforts are made to mobilise all parties behind an idea. Energies were thus channelled into persuading the commissioning client of the legitimacy of the design proposals and the robustness of the processes from which they had derived. Any sign of human intuition or taste were to be masked in favour of a technical rationality that accorded corporate image-makers more closely with engineers.
than artists. Thus, HDA promoted the systematic nature of their new methods to imbue the innovation process with a sense of rigour and integrity.

The tendency for maps to be misunderstood as objective tracings that simply mirror reality (Corner, 1999) played into the hands of Henrion and Parkin in their attempts to present their design process as highly rational and beyond scrutiny. That maps – along with other information graphics that lend from their geo-spatial aesthetic (Kinross, 1985) – often remain unquestioned as neutral, benign conveyors of information is due in part to the manner in which their technical vernacular masks the cultural situatedness and human decision-making that is inherent in their production. As such, Henrion and Parkin conceal the human agency implicit in their process behind a technical aesthetic that promotes the supposed supremacy of technical rationality.

There is a danger that Henrion and Parkin’s hyperbolic distinction between rational, systematic methods and traditional, intuitive ones presents a false separation between explicit and tacit forms of knowing. Far from being binary opposites, Nonaka (1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009) claims that explicit and tacit knowledge are mutually complementary and in dynamic interaction with one another, so rather than being understood in opposition to one another, they should instead be considered as multiple elements on a continuum of knowledge. It is thus claimed that it is at the intersection of explicit and tacit knowledge that enhanced understandings, enhanced capacity to act, and new social practices are generated (Nonaka, 1994).

There is a certain deceitfulness to the manner in which HDA aimed to convince KLM of the integrity of their design proposals for their corporate emblem. In their efforts to post-rationalise or reconstruct a more fully considered argument for their work, they reframed their development processes as rational and explicit, rather than tacit and intuitive. Given that graphic design was not considered an established or even a legitimate professional activity at the time (Blake & Blake, 1969), their developmental process was reconceived as a process founded on objective reasoning, thus denying the intuitive basis of their approach.

While the notion of intuition has often been greeted with scepticism due to its accordance with instinctive human feelings, Easen and Wilcockson (1996) argue that it is a fundamental cornerstone of the practising professional or expert across a diverse range of disciplines. They argue that intuition is an irrational process with a rational basis, explaining that the perceived irrationality of the intuiting process ‘does not make
the basis of any intuitive decision itself irrational’ (Easen & Wilcockson, 1996, p. 669).
Nevertheless, for the designers at HDA practising a largely unrecognised profession, the
notion of an intuitive judgement appears to have been far more difficult to defend to
their sceptical clients. As such they constructed fictional process diagrams to persuade
KLM that their proposals simply followed natural evolutionary progress derived from
universal principles of vision (Kepes, 1944; Arnheim, 1954). Inscribing the framing of
their proposals from this technically rational perspective made it more difficult for KLM
to contest the proposals. Just as Corner (1999, p. 251; original emphases) explains in
relation to mapping:

[…] it is the apparent rigour of objective analysis and logical argument that possesses the greatest
efficacy in a pluralistic, democratic society. Analytical research through mapping enables the
designer to construct an argument, to embed it within the dominant practices of rational culture,
and ultimately to turn those practices towards more productive and collective ends.

Thus, Henrion and Parkin’s systematic methods can be understood to posit the idea of
the designer as mapper, and thus, the mapper as persuader.

Viewed more favourably from Nonaka’s (1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995;
Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009) perspective, the complex socio-technical scenario that
unfolded between KLM and HDA can be interpreted not as a deceitful one, but as a
positive, dynamic interchange between tacit and explicit knowledge. From this
perspective, HDA substantiated their instinctive design hunches with carefully
conceived technically rational documentation and evidence, reflecting on their action
(Schön, 1983) to construct ‘boundary objects’ (Nicolini et al., 2012) that would translate
their own personal tacit knowing into more readily comprehensible forms. In this sense,
their working process can be understood to begin and end with technical rationality.
Here they adopt scientific approaches to first understand the problem, and then to
frame the solution. This follows Bruce Archer’s (1963b, p. 73) analogy of the ‘creative
sandwich’, wherein the analytical bent of the two slices of bread – the pre- and post-
design reasoning – sandwich the design process as a whole, thus acting as a holding
device from which the more impulsive innovation act at the centre can be interpreted. It
is by these very same means that HDA sought to gain support for their creative work.

These emergent practices of ‘reconstructed logic’ (Kaplan, 1963) recall Corner’s
(1999, p. 251) conceptualisation of mapping as:

[…] an extremely shrewd and tactical enterprise, a practice of relational reasoning that
intelligently unfolds new realities out of existing constraints, quantities, facts and conditions. The
artistry lies in the use of technique, in the way in which things are framed and set up.
HDA’s practices of mapping should thus be understood as a strategy for *interessement* (Callon, 1986; Akrich, Callon & Latour, 2002a, 2002b) in as much that their core motivation was to align the interests of important actors around their own proposals for innovation and to strengthen the association between these actors.
Case Study 3) Setting standards: Design Research Unit and the design manual as an instrument of control

In the final case study that follows here we will move away from a focus on the design group as led by one man (as per Hans Schleger at HS&A and F.H.K. Henrion at HDA), turning our attention instead to a group ostensibly led by two men, a diarchy, Misha Black and Milner Gray. Having two men at the helm, as opposed to one, may not sound especially significant, but the Design Research Unit were a very different proposition to either of the groups we have examined up to this point. Perhaps most significant is the fact that they set out to provide a multi-disciplinary offering which combined Misha Black’s architectural expertise with Milner Gray’s prowess in graphic design – so immediately we have a more expansive operation seeking to balance the ideals, interests and concerns of multiple partners. One of the most interesting aspects of this case is to see how the DRU transitioned from a socially-motivated organisation, suspicious of corporate homogenisation, to one who came to embrace the flourishing corporate identity scene of the 1960s, developing corporate manuals that championed strict standardisation. Furthermore, the nature of the ‘texts’ circulated by DRU in the performance of their practice changed radically during this period too, gradually moving away from soft, hesitant forms of advice and guidance, to more authoritarian forms of inscription conceived to govern the behaviours of clients and other designers.

The development of the Design Research Unit

Early antecedents in group practice

Founded in London in 1942, the Design Research Unit (DRU) was initially conceived by art historian and critic Herbert Read and advertising executive Marcus Brumwell in response to what they saw as the necessity for comprehensive design services in the coming era of post-war reconstruction (Brumwell, 2010). Designers Milner Gray and Misha Black were enlisted in the formation of the group and became central to its future
development (Blake & Blake, 1969). Gray had been asked to put forward a proposal for the firm by Cecil Notley, a friend of Brumwell’s from the advertising scene. Gray (cited in Brumwell, 2010, p. 50) set out his objective as follows: ‘The final aim is to present a service so complete that it could undertake any design case which might confront the State, Municipal Authorities, Industry or Commerce.’ Gray’s proposal developed with the financial support of several advertising heavy-weights who were members of the Advertising Service Guild (of which Brumwell was a central figure), these included: Cecil Notley (Notley Advertising), Albert Everett Jones (Everetts Advertising) and Rupert Casson (Casson Advertising). Brumwell later became financial controller of the DRU, buying out all company shares in 1956, with Read continuing to act as director and later president of the group (Blake & Blake, 1969).

The DRU had important antecedents in two earlier design groups, Bassett Gray and the Industrial Design Partnership (IDP). Bassett Gray were among the first practising design groups in Britain, having been founded in 1920 by Milner Gray and brothers Charles and Henry Bassett (Cotton, 2012). Gray met Charles Bassett while studying Commercial Art at Goldsmiths College and together they set up office in Ludgate Circus, describing themselves as a ‘Group of Artists and Writers’ with an aim to ‘steer a middle course between the stultifying influence of the commercial art factory on the one hand and the limited opportunities of complete isolation on the other’ (Anon, 1927, p. 282). The group soon grew to contain a number of other designers and artists, including the renowned painter Graham Sutherland; together they shared the cost of rent, utility bills, stationery and the office boy’s wages (Cotton, 2012). It was an unusual arrangement which claimed to champion the ‘stimulus of team spirit and co-operative effort’ (Cotton, 2012, p. 12), yet each practitioner, rather paradoxically, also worked to channel their own signature style and working methods. As they explained in the pages of Commercial Art ‘each member of the Bassett Gray group is an individual craftsman, drawing inspiration from his own sources, working on his own individual lines and freely developing his individual style’ (Anon, 1927 p. 282). In this sense they can be understood as comparable to a latter-day illustration, or graphic art, agency. 86

Designer Misha Black joined Bassett Gray in 1933, signalling the beginning of a long association with Milner Gray that lasted for the rest of their careers (their time

86 Gray’s style was advertised at this time as ‘romantic period work’ (Anon, 1927 p. 282), which is notable given the contrast with the highly corporate visual language he would later come to embrace.
together amounted to 44-years together in total). By 1935 the Bassett brothers had left, and the group was reorganised to become the Industrial Design Partnership (IDP). Six members of Bassett Gray became legally bound partners of the new group, including Black and Gray, as well as James de Holden Stone, Thomas Gray, Walter Landauer (a German émigré who would go on to become a key figure in the rise of corporate image-making in the US with his firm Landor) and influential educator Jesse Collins (a future principal at the Central School) (Blake & Blake, 1969; Blake, 1984, 1986; Cotton, 2012).

In an announcement to mark their formation they set out their intention to move from being ‘an agency distributing the work of a group of free-lances’ to one who would work more proactively together to solve complex multi-disciplinary design problems, thus claiming themselves to be ‘a group of experts working in collaboration’ (Gray, 1935).

Though only relatively short lived, dissolving soon after the onset of war, the group was notable as it acted as a form of prototype for the DRU. Packaging (both graphic and structural) was a central tenet of their offering and a significant specialism of Gray’s, but they were keen to assert their ability to handle a broad range of problems, with *The Boxmakers’ Journal and Packaging Review* reporting that: ‘The group handle complete schemes of presentation, from the styling of goods to the press advertising’ (cited in Blake, 1984, p. 15). In this sense they can be seen to present themselves as a forerunner of the ‘total design’ ethos that emerged with ‘house style’ in the 1950s, wherein comprehensive systems of artefacts came to be considered under the rubric of a single design project. The report continued:

> The complete approach has been built up: materials, designs, construction and costs are studied. The group is equipped, through its research and the specialised knowledge of one or several of its members, to give intelligent assistance and a guidance to any firm that sees the value of a good pack in the selling scheme. (cited in Blake, 1986, p. 15)

The reference to ‘research’ is especially noteworthy given the centrality of the term within the name of their own more illustrious group that followed: the Design Research Unit. It is unusual to find British commercial artists of the 1930s referencing research in relation to their work, suggesting that Gray and Black had more interest in the methods of design practice than was typical for designers of the period. Gray is noted to have taken an interest in the client-facing duties of designers, such as managing client

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87 Blake and Blake (1969) note that the research element of DRU’s practice never truly materialised in the manner that they had first planned, primarily because they were more adept at other services and unable to extend themselves into so many different fields of work.
expectations and organising the design process more broadly, developing an ever-growing checklist of questions over his career which helped to aid him in his interactions with clients (Blake and Blake, 1969). Equally he acknowledged the relationship between the personal/intuitive and the analytical/objective facets of the design process, concluding that ‘data alone will not provide the answer, but data is still necessary’ (Gray, cited in Blake, 1986, p. 16).

Born in London in 1899, Gray was a central figure in the development of design as a recognised profession in Britain. In 1930 he was heavily involved in the formation of the Society of Industrial Artists (SIA, later the Society of Industrial Artists and Designers, or SIAD, now known as the Chartered Society of Designers, CSD), and worked persistently throughout his career to promote the organisation, serving as Honorary Secretary from 1932 to 1940 and as President twice, from 1943 to 1949, and again from 1966 to 1967.88 Furthermore he was closely involved with design education, especially early in his career, having taught at Goldsmiths College, The Royal College of Art, Central School of Art, as well as serving as Principal of the Sir John Cass School of Arts and Crafts from 1937 to 1940 (Blake, 1986; Negus, 1997). In discussing Gray’s contribution, designer Dick Negus (1997) makes note of the lack of recognition accorded to commercial artists of the early twentieth century:

In a calling commonly thought, in its early days, at best to be a refuge of the less intelligent, Gray was unique. With a clear understanding of the future importance of design to Britain, he had a vision of establishing design as a profession and was largely responsible for forming, in 1930, the Society of Industrial Artists.

Black, meanwhile, was born in Baku, Azerbaijan in 1910, and brought to England by his parents, Lionel and Sophia Tcherny, at the age of just 18 months (Blake, 1984).89 He received little training, taking drawing classes at the Central School in the evenings, but by the age of 17 he had begun to design posters and exhibition stands, mainly for the advertising agent J. Arundell-Clark. At 18 years of age he travelled to Seville to supervise an exhibition stand he had designed for the Rio Tinto Company, travelling home via a long stopover in Paris, during which he sought opportunities to further his studies in art (Blake, 1984). On his return he continued to design various exhibition stands, but soon decided more money could be made working independently, so in 1930 set up ‘Studio Z’

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88 Negus (1997) notes that Gray served on various SIA committees until 1984, when he would have been 85 years old.
89 The Tcherny family changed their name to Black (the English translation of Tcherny) by deed poll.
with Lucy Rossetti. They operated from a small design office in Seven Dials, London, designing bookplates, letter headings, window displays, exhibition stands and a bedside table. Rossetti soon retired from the business due to illness and in 1933 Black joined Gray at Bassett Gray (Blake, 1984).

While Gray made his name in graphic design and packaging, Black was mostly known for industrial design, interior architecture and exhibition work. At IDP he designed radios and a television cabinet, as well as exhibition stands, writing for the trade journal *Shelf Appeal* during the period too. His interest in architecture led him to become secretary of the Modern Architecture Research Group (MARS) which had been formed early in the 1930s. He was also a founder member of the Artists’ International Association, as well as an active member of the SIA and the International Council of Societies of Industrial Design (Blake, 1984; Cotton, 2012). Through these social networks Black and Gray established strong connections that enabled them to flourish throughout their careers. During WWII they worked together at the Ministry of Information (MoI) developing government propaganda exhibitions, and later made significant contributions to the Festival of Britain.

Like Gray, Black was heavily involved in education, serving as Professor of Industrial Design at the Royal College of Art from 1959 until his retirement in 1975.

**Establishing a ‘general consultant’ design group**

In 1953 the notion of the design group conceived to offer a total design service to industry (an idea that had been trialled by the IDP in the 1930s) was further concretised when the SIA established the ‘General Consultant Designer’ as a distinct categorisation of design practitioner. Drawing on the Society’s private archive, Armstrong (2014) explains how members of the General Consultant Designers’ Group were granted elite status within the SIA, taking a leading role in the organisation and administration of the

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90 Blake and Blake (1969) reinforce the notion that the Festival was a formative experience for practitioners of the time, giving them a taste of the kind of organisational challenges they would face in their work over the coming decades. As they explain: ‘As co-ordinator of the upstream section, Black was faced with the kind of organisational problem that was to recur increasingly in the years that followed’ (Blake & Blake, 1969, p. 26). Furthermore, Black had prior experience of collaborating with other designers, having earlier taken on the role of coordinator on the 1938 MARS exhibition.
Society. Furthermore, she explains that Misha Black had been instrumental in the establishment of this influential new collective.\footnote{As previously explained, the SIA had been set up in 1930. By comparison the Royal Society of Arts (RSA) was established much earlier in 1754, with their award, the Royal Designer for Industry (RDI) initiated in 1936 as a measure to boost awareness of design in a time when it was widely undervalued and misunderstood (RSA, 2018). Both Gray and Black were awarded RDI status in 1937 and 1957 respectively.}

According to design historian Penny Sparke, the notion of the consultant designer had developed in Britain in the late 1940s, partly in response to developments in America, where the role of the industrial design consultant was already well established (Sparke, 1983). Sparke explains that the role of the consultant designer was to synthesise elements of numerous existing specialisms, bringing together elements of the fine artist, the architect, the craftsman, the engineer and the technician. The establishment of the General Consultant Design Group was significant as it implied a move away from consultancy services founded on the deep-rooted knowledge of a single design craft. So instead of emphasising their schooling in a single discipline, the general consultant sought to bring to market a more coordinated service that focused on the concerns of a company’s collective design policy. As Bendixson (1963, p. 30) reported in a feature on consultant practice for Design magazine: ‘The general consultants offer a service distinguished by its comprehensiveness. This enables them to offer advice on design policy as well as on designing.’ Linking the development of the general consultant designer to the emergence of corporate image-making, Bendixson claimed that general consultants were needed to coordinate house style programmes that incorporated a diverse range of creative artefacts.

By 1963, when Bendixson published his report, a total of 21 individuals are recorded as members of the General Consultant Designers’ Group. Membership was by application only, with applicants having to present work covering a seven-year period in order to demonstrate their experience along with their dexterity as design polymaths. As Bendixson noted: ‘qualification for the group depends on the ability of the individual, not on the collective ability of the team he leads’ (Bendixson, 1963, p. 31). Thus in vetting applicants based on their individual design skillsets the General Consultant Designers’ Group appears to have penalised those whose talents lay in the leadership,
management or administrative duties surrounding design. Though a central tenet of the membership process was to demonstrate expertise in multiple fields (thus the SIA put forward the following five categories as core competencies: graphic design, constructional design, product design, product design engineering, and miscellaneous skills), Bendixson (1963, p. 31) conceded that most members of the group were in actuality masters of one or two fields at most, explaining that membership was, ‘as much an indication of organisational ability and experience as of design skill’. This is telling, as it raises questions around the tenability of the general consultant designer as a fundamental concept; a concept which did not go unchallenged at the time. Responding to an exhibition mounted at the ICA (Institute of Contemporary Arts) in 1960 to celebrate F.H.K. Henrion’s work, Bruce Archer (1960, p. 65, original emphases) writes:

The inference of the [Henrion] exhibition appears to be that the general consultant designer is a special kind of designer who can turn his hand equally to designing a firm’s letterheads, products, trade marks, exhibitions and packaging. Is this really possible? If one is to go by the evidence of the exhibition, the answer is ‘no’.

Archer highlights the uneven nature of the exhibition and the strong predominance of graphic design work to counter the idea of a designer who could ‘turn his hand equally to all kinds of design’. He argued that the whole concept was a fallacy that few industrialists would accept. Instead, Archer (1960. p. 65) backs the idea of the general consultant designer as a kind of design policy maker with expertise in a specific design field, as well as a competence in broader marketing and brand imagery principles, thus suggesting, ‘while specialising in one field of design, [the general consultant designer] is capable of guiding other designers in the projection of a consistent image of a firm through its products, literature, advertising and show room design’. This seems to have been the practical reality for most members of the SIA’s General Consultant Design Group.

Though Herbert Read and Marcus Brumwell had identified the potential for a general design consultancy as early as 1942, there was little immediate scope for such an enterprise. Read became Design Research Unit’s first active employee, working as

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92 The principle that applicants would have to prove the efficacy of their design skills is notable, as such a dictum potentially excluded those in important leadership roles whose specialist skills were linked instead to the administration and management of design.

93 This follows the well-known ‘T-shaped designer’ model where the horizontal cross bar of the letter ‘T’ represents the designer’s breadth of knowledge and expertise, while the vertical stroke represents the depth of their technical and creative skills – this term was coined by David Guest (1991) and later popularised by the design group IDEO (Hansen, 2010).
director from a base in Kingsway two days a week (Brumwell, 2010; Blake & Blake, 1969). He co-opted a small team of associates that included designers Misha Black, Milner Gray, Kenneth Bayes and Norbert Dutton (all still employed by the MoI), the architects Frederick Gibberd and Sadie Speight, as well as the structural engineer Felix Samuely. It was not until 1946 that the founder partners were released from their wartime jobs and the unit became more fully operational (Blake, 1969; Blake & Blake, 1969).

They initially acquired a temporary home at Bedford Square in the premises of the art printer Lund Humphries (whose Director, E.C. Gregory, became chairman of DRU) and by the summer of 1946, 12 full-time employees are on record (Blake, 1969). By the autumn of the same year they had moved to permanent premises at Park Street, London W1, and the team soon grew to 30 in number. In the early years staff numbers fluctuated in relation to workflow, so once contracts had been signed for work on the Festival of Britain due to take place in 1951 (and with which DRU were heavily involved), the firm briefly moved to new offices and grew to 40 in number, but they soon reduced in size again after the Festival, returning to their previous office base (Blake, 1969; Blake & Blake, 1969). After the Festival, corporate image-making became a core driving force at the heart of business development for the DRU, with Cotton (2012) arguing that the graphics department shaped the development of the business as a whole during the period. Important work was initiated to develop house style programmes for Ilford, Tate & Lyle, Gilbey, Watneys and British Railways. Some of these programmes of work lasted more than a decade, with long-term associations developed with Gilbey (over 15 years) and British Railways (10 years), for example (Black, 1964–76; Gray, 1999). By 1958 the team had moved premises again and grown in number to 50, and by 1960 they also had two external offices in Dublin (founded 1954) and Newcastle (founded 1959). By the late-1960s they are said to have averaged around 60 employees (Blake, 1969), which represented a radical departure from the days of the IDP, yet still relatively small in scale by comparison to the multi-national conglomerates that dominate corporate design today.

Given the collective expertise of the partners of the firm (Cotton, 2012), DRU were well poised to deliver on the comprehensive service promised by the idea of the general consultant designer. For a decade or more after the war they held the unique advantage that they were a truly multi-disciplinary group supported by the broad
expertise and specialist skills of a range practitioners from different fields. By comparison their main competitors for corporate image work had emerged from the practices of successful individuals who had a specialism in graphic design. This included Hans Schleger (case study 1), F.H.K. Henrion (case study 2), Willy de Majo (2009), and to a lesser extent, H.A. Rothholz (2008b). It was common for lone practitioners, such as these, to develop group practices of their own after the war, as we have seen with the preceeding cases on Schleger at HS&A and Henrion at HDA. However, it took these individuals time to build impetus and establish themselves as tenable, independent commercial entities, with many practitioners continuing to be reliant on the printing and advertising trades for work, just as they had been before the war.

By the mid-to-late 1950s when groups such as Henrion and Schleger’s had gradually built-up their roster of clients as well as their base of employees, DRU were already flourishing as a more substantial, fully operational and well-drilled group, offering a breadth of specialist expertise across graphic-, industrial- and product-design. In this sense they fit with Ken Garland’s (1996, p. 75) characterisation of the *medium sized design group* whose work is based on ‘craftsmanlike concerns’ and reliant on ‘close personal relationships’. By comparison, based on what we have seen in the previous two case studies Henrion and Schleger’s groups accord with Garland’s (1996, p. 75) depiction of the *small design studio* which exhibits an individualist mindset, being equally based on craftsmanlike concerns, but with a ‘reluctance to parade its wares in the market place’ and a ‘casual disregard for its own cost-effectiveness and profit margins’.

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94 Gray was known particularly for his work in packaging design, but also had a strong command of typography and graphic design more generally (Blake, 1986). Black, meanwhile, had made his reputation in exhibition design, and from a position of relatively little training successfully imbricated himself within the professional networks of the architectural scene in London (Blake, 1984). By the 1950s Black had a team of newly graduated architects working under his command, with Gray soon following suit with his own team of graphic designers (interview, Appendix 1.3). It is notable that they had the backing of Read and Brumwell (as well as their own personal connections), extending their network of influences and capturing a broader range of business opportunities (Brumwell, 2010).

95 Gaby Schreiber of Gaby Schreiber & Associates is noteworthy here as a significant competitor to the DRU. She offered a broad range of services founded on her expertise in interiors and industrial design and was equally notable in her capacity as an independent female design consultant (Sparke, 1983; Schreiber, 1991, 2009; Lomas, 2001).

96 Interestingly, Dempsey (2017, ‘Then there were two’ section) comments with regard to the design scene of the early 1960s that: ‘The industry was still termed “commercial art” and what good stuff there was went to the established guard of the day: Milner Gray, Henrion, Misha Black, Abram Games et al’.

97 Garland’s (1996) final categorisation of practice is the larger *design consultancy group* which employs many skilled people and situates itself closer to the advertising agency, in as much that it is seen to deploy
commercial attitude, my research suggested that Henrion had been rather more commercially minded and thus constitutes a less typical representation of Garland’s small design studio.

The power-structure that underlay the operation of the DRU thus singled them out from their competitors. While their rivals commonly operated as one-man teams, with a known figure at the head of the firm directing a small group of assistants (as in the case of Henrion and Schleger), DRU, were more egalitarian in the sense that the strategic direction of the firm was distributed across the two senior design partners, with further steering coming from Read and Brumwell who remained heavily involved in the early decades. As such, decision-making within the organisation was more broadly distributed, with the ongoing collaborative exchange between Black and Gray encouraging a wider socialisation of ideals to filter down through the group as a whole. DRU recognised their potential as a progressive, socially minded group and actively sought to promulgate this idea, claiming that they were a non-hierarchical company who advocated transparency and collaboration. Within Design, Bendixson (1963, p. 33) introduced them as, ‘almost certainly the best known design office in the country’, going on to report on their firm adherence to, ‘a belief in horizontal or rakehead organisation’.

In reference to this perceived non-hierarchical structure of the firm, one employee is cited (Bendixson, 1963, p. 33) as having claimed, ‘there is no mandarinism in this office’. Bendixson (1963, p. 33) refers to the DRU’s design discussion meetings – held at regular six-week intervals – as the most characteristic expression of this non-hierarchical horizontal structure, claiming that ‘comparable talks undoubtedly go on in other offices, but nowhere else are they so clearly built into the constitution’. Ostensibly, all staff members, no matter their status, were encouraged to take a view on the matters discussed at the meetings, with a broad range of participants invited along, including: architects, designers, research library staff and ‘even secretaries’ (Bendixson, 1963).

Bendixson (1963, p. 33) explains further:

Each designer or architect who is in charge of a job on the agenda pins his sketches on the wall, justifies them to the assembly, and then waits for all hell to break loose. The object is not to force individuals to break down and confess their errors, but to provide them with food for thought.

pushier, hard sell tactics and is likely to be floated on the stock exchange. Groups of this ilk only began to take form in the 1970s, and as such, they reside outside the study period of this project. Garland (1996) notes that medium sized groups like DRU increasingly had to work for larger sized businesses by the 1980s due to the culture of mergers and takeovers which had led to a diminishing number of the medium sized businesses traditionally considered their natural clients.
Occasionally a problem gets discussed at these meetings before any solution has been proposed. These forums seem likely to be a proving ground for exactly those qualities of experience and judgement that Professor Black thinks are at the root of design consultancy.

It is worth noting that the picture projected by the DRU of their own practice is not beyond critique. Long-term DRU employee, Chris Timings (interview, Appendix 1.3) posits a rather different picture in which architects and designers worked in relative isolation from one another, segregated by distinct workspaces split across separate office floors. According to Timings (interview, Appendix 1.3) it was ultimately the senior partners, Black and Gray, who directed events on a day-to-day basis, which is unsurprising given that the venerated design discussion meetings – where Brumwell and Read were usually present – only happened eight or nine times a year (Black, 1964–76).

Given that they operated with Herbert Read and Marcus Brumwell acting in support of Black and Gray, structurally speaking the group can be understood in relation to design management pioneer Peter Gorb’s (1978, p. 286) model of a partnership – for Gorb, a partnership ‘usually comprises three or more equal people at the top of the structure’. However, as Timings (interview, Appendix 1.3) reminds us, Black and Gray were the dominant forces managing the group on a daily basis, and as such the structure can also be interpreted according to Gorb’s model of a diarchy: As Gorb (1978, p. 286) explains, a diarchy is ‘run by two people with equal, different but complementary skills’ and relies upon ‘the reaction between opposites’. It seems that Black and Gray were indeed complementary opposites, with Gray reflecting on their contrasting personalities in a letter to Henrion after Black’s death (Gray, 1977).

Herbert Read passed away in 1968 (Black, 1964–76), while Marcus Brumwell ceased involvement with the firm by 1974 (Brumwell, 2010), leaving Black and Gray free to shape the development and operation of the business. This led them to become widely recognised as the dominant personalities at the forefront of the business. Indeed, such was their stature as co-joined figureheads of the firm that Black and Gray were affectionately referred to by some of their peers as the ‘halftone boys’ (Calvert, 2011).

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98 The DRU Bulletin further supported this notion of departments separated by floors. Reporting on the addition of a new work cafe, the author noted: ‘it is hoped everyone will come for their coffee and tea break and to meet people from other floors whom they do not normally come into contact’ (Black, 1964–76).

99 Halftone is a reprographic printing technique that simulates continuous tone imagery through the use of dots, varying either in size or in spacing, thus generating a gradient-like effect.
This supports the idea that they were understood by their colleagues, collaborators and peers as more of a *diarchy*, than a strict *partnership*.

By comparison to the projected horizontal 'rakehead' structure DRU claimed to operate under, the one-man teams of Henrion and Schleger were more akin to very shallow pyramids, with one central figure at the summit and various assistants working directly under them. Gorb (1978, p. 286) identifies this as a traditional authoritarian organisational structure, where 'one man is the moving spirit'.

The generation of designers that emerged from art school after WWII provided a different competitive proposition, in that they appear to have been more inclined to go into partnership with one another. Thus, businesses such as Negus & Sharland, 1951; Banks & Miles, 1958; BDMW Associates, 1959; Fletcher/Forbes/Gill, 1962; Main Wolff & Partners, 1963; and Minale Tattersfield, 1964; all emerged between 1951 and 1964. Given the shared status inherent in such partnerships, DRU gradually began to face more equitable competition from groups in which the leadership of the company was more evenly distributed.

**From practising design to practising leadership**

In his 1956 address to the International Design Conference in Aspen, Misha Black acknowledged the significant proportion of time the practising designer dedicated to design management duties, explaining that the designer in industry is, ‘predisposed to compromise and is willing to occupy at least part of his life with problems of persuasion, diplomacy, and administration’ (Black, 1974, p. 67). He clearly found frustration in the client-designer relationship, lamenting what he called the ‘soul-destroying battle of

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100 Henrion featured in Bendixson’s (1963, p. 34) article for Design, with his group HDA described as ‘a pyramid in love with a rake head’ – though Henrion is noted as ‘clearly the leader’. Although they recognised themselves as a team, Henrion’s most loyal employees were keen to emphasise his individual genius, with employee Norman Jones (2011) recalling that: ‘We were a team, but Henri was the creative. He always had 1,000 ideas. 999 were rubbish, but one, other designers would die for.’ There is a paradoxical tension here between the conception of teamwork and the notion of the individual genius which Jones evokes.

persuading the philistine’. The client’s powerful agency in the development of design work was a cause for concern too, leading Black (1974, p. 64) to posit that: ‘the client exercises so important an influence on the job as to make him almost equal to the designer in determining its final form.’ In Black’s view, designers entering the industry needed to be wary of becoming all-consuming by the challenge of managing their clients through ‘talking, writing and administering’ practices that supported their creative design work. His suggested solution was for the designer to advance his career and become a design leader with design protégés working under his command. For Black this trajectory from creative labourer to design leader was a natural progression which could enable the design consultant to take on a role more akin to that of the client. So natural was this transition that he described it as ‘the inevitable lot of all but the most resolute artist’ (Black, 1974, p. 64). This new role of the ‘client/designer’ would involve managing the creative practices of those less experienced designers working under their command. Black (1974, p. 67) described the transition as follows:

The erstwhile designer himself becomes the client; if memories of his own travail on the drawing board have not been completely buried under the avalanche of business lunches, he turns, by slow metamorphosis, into the client who is the more able to draw from younger designers on his staff that enthusiastic, dedicated endeavour essential to the production of outstanding work.

Whereas the figureheads of one-man teams had been largely able to dictate the operations of their assistants, simultaneously keeping their ‘hand-in’ and continuing to practice their own individual design crafts,\(^{102}\) by comparison the relatively rapid growth of DRU led Black and Gray to work in a more open and discursive fashion, gradually ceding control of the creative design act in order to allow their younger colleagues to take on greater responsibility (Black, 1964–76). One such staff member moving through the ranks was Chris Timings, a young graduate of the Graphic Design course at the Royal College of Art (RCA), who had joined DRU in 1954 immediately after finishing his studies. Gray had visited the RCA on the look-out for talent six months earlier, with Timings presenting his folio of work for assessment. Timings was a relatively early recruit to Gray’s team of graphic designers and he stayed with the firm for a number of years, progressing to become manager of the graphics department in 1969 (Black, 1964–76). Recalling his early years at DRU, he says: ‘design groups as we know them now,  

\(^{102}\) Henrion, for example, is known to have produced posters well into the latter part of his career, continuing to work on design proposals right up to the year of his death in 1990 (Hope, 1996).
didn’t exist in those days, DRU was really a very small organisation’ (interview, Appendix 1.3). He continues:

It started off with Misha Black and a group of young architects, recently qualified, and Milner Gray, on his own at first. There was a woman called Dorothy Goslett who was their business manager, who was very important in that her job was specifically to manage the business. The business of design management was put on the map at the same time as the business of design. What was terribly important in those days was being seen to be a reliable, efficient and organised graphic designer, not a sort of ex-art student who wouldn’t know how to invoice you. (interview, Appendix 1.3)

During the war Dorothy Goslett had worked closely alongside Black and Gray at the MoI, joining as an administrator in 1941 (Middleton, 1967). She became a partner of DRU in 1946 and was often referred to as ‘Business Manager’ in company records (Black, 1964–76). Her book on the administrative aspects of running a design business, *Professional Practice for the Designer* (1960), would become a popular reference point for aspiring design professionals who sought to run their own companies, being re-published through a number of editions over many decades, later as *The Professional Practice of Design* – the most recent reissue of the text came as recently as 1999, some forty years after its original release. It is notable that Timings accords business manager Goslett comparable status to Black and Gray, citing her significance in terms of the development of design management. According to Timings (interview, Appendix 1.3), Goslett’s (1960) text presents an extremely accurate account of the how the DRU was run from a financial and business point of view.

**Evolving instruments of control: from recommendations to standards**

In order to evidence the shifting patterns of ruling relations within DRU’s design consultancy I wish to draw particular attention to two important forms of inscription mobilised in their practice. These are, first, the written reports created for numerous clients to summarise DRU’s project work, and second, the design standards manuals conceived to specify and control the design policies they developed for their clients. Though these two forms of documents are in essence quite different in tone and intent, I

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103 The October 1964 edition of the DRU Bulletin even notes the release of a Japanese translation of the text (Black, 1964–76).
will demonstrate how these material articulations of practice are in fact interlinked, with the sophisticated and finely-tuned corporate standards manual being a direct descendant of more suggestive and propositional written reports.

**The design standards manual as an instrument of control**

It is difficult to pinpoint with any great certainty the specific moment that the corporate identity manual was ‘born’, so to speak. As previously mentioned, Heller (2011) claims the Nazi Organisational Handbook of 1936 can be understood as a precursor to the contemporary brand manual. History of design scholar Trond Klevgaard (Barbieri at al., 2014, p. 66) has identified another earlier case from 1934 that, he suggests, shares a closer resemblance with modern design manuals than Heller’s Nazi example. So, whereas the Nazi handbook fails to cover many of the concerns typical within the modern manual, such as how to construct the logo, its measurements, and guidelines on correct and incorrect usage across various applications, according to Klevgaard (Barbieri at al., 2014, p. 66) the Norwegian Labour Party’s (Det Norske Arbeiderparti) Handbook for Agitation and Propaganda (Håndbok i agitasjon og propaganda) does share many of the very same features as the modern manual. However, given the probability that there are further examples of early guideline documents waiting to be identified, I suggest that the emergence of the manual is best understood as the result of a gradual sequence of developments, as opposed to a symbolic birthing. This is certainly the case in terms of the DRU, as I will go on to show in the subsequent section of this case study.

For DRU, the development of the standards manual came about through incremental adjustments wherein the specification of corporate image programmes came to be treated as a matter of ever-greater concern. So, whereas their first design specification documents consisted of bureaucratic A4 files with typewritten recommendations inside, by the mid-to-late 1960s these files had progressed to become lavish and extensive publications with meticulous attention to detail in terms of their design layout, materiality and production values (as well as a greater concern for notions of usability). In the following section I will examine a range of these documents to trace the emergence of the corporate standards manual.

In recent times, there has been unprecedented interest in the corporate identity manual as a design object (Shaughnessy, 2014a and 2014b; Reed and Smyth, 2014, 2015
and 2017; Henning, 2016; Jean, 2017). Publishing house Unit Editions have released two popular tomes cataloguing a total of 40 different manuals conceived between 1960 and 2008 (Shaughnessy, 2014a and 2014b). Furthermore, crowdfunding websites such as Kickstarter have empowered several successful campaigns to republish old manuals, including those for the New York City Transit Authority (Reed and Smyth, 2014), NASA (Reed and Smyth, 2015), US Environmental Protection Agency (Reed and Smyth, 2017), the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (Jean, 2017) and, most significantly for this project, the British Rail Corporate Identity Manual designed by the DRU (Henning, 2016). These essentially bureaucratic objects, which have often been the subject of derision from those designers tasked with either creating them or implementing them (Naylor, 1966; Shaughnessy, 2014a; Dawood, 2018), have become an obsession for certain connoisseurs of design, as evidenced by the unprecedented interest in these newly republished documents (Reed and Smyth, 2014, 2015, 2017; Henning, 2016; Jean, 2017).

The basic premise of the design standards manual is to inscribe a set of specifications that seeks to control and govern how a design programme is to be implemented (Naylor, 1966; Carter, 1977; Whitbread, 2009; Heller, 2014). Central to this pursuit is the corporate logo – or what Whitbread (2009) calls ‘corporate identifiers’ – around which a number of other specifications unfold, such as directions around the use of colour and typography, for example. As Naylor (1966) explains, the corporate image manual has a duty to both instruct and persuade, with the intended audience of the manual including senior stakeholders on the client side (who may see such a document as a form of legislation that supports and reifies their new design scheme), as well as designers, managers and administrators tasked with implementing the scheme (these could be from the client side, or from within the design team who conceived the manual, or as is often the case from external design agencies tasked with the more jobbing operation of implementing the guidelines) (Naylor, 1966).

A key principle underlying the success of the manual is the codifying impetus of inscription (Latour, 1986), whereby certain information is concretised in written or visual form, thereby becoming more durable and transferable between actors and scenarios. The manual can thus be interpreted as a supreme example of what Latour (1986) refers to as an ‘immutable mobile’, in that it is a communication tool that is relatively concrete (i.e. immutable) and readily shareable across different contexts (i.e. mobile). Latour explains that the power of the immutable mobile comes from its ability
to enable coalition building around an idea. Thus, the publication of the manual can be seen as an indication that certain actors (in this case the design group) are winning the struggle to create order within a given network (that is, the broader context in which the programme is to be implemented including all the stakeholders implicated in its deployment).

One could interpret the manual as the foremost actor asserting agency across the broader contextual network. Alternatively, following traces of influence, one might suggest that the designers responsible for the conception of the manual are most central, in that they have inscribed certain affordances into the manual as a technical entity, and as such, they are governing other actors in the network (including the manual itself). Your stance here depends on whether you follow a more humanistic approach to theorising practice which privileges human agency, as per Bourdieu (1990) or Schatzki’s (2002) agential humanism; or the post-humanist perspective that recognises the agency of non-human actors as equal to humans, as per ANT scholars like Latour (1983, 1986, 1992), Callon (1981, 1986) and Akrich (1992).\(^\text{104}\) Laidlaw (2010) clearly sets out the merits of these different approaches, arguing for a pragmatic middle ground which recognises the potential agency of non-humans, but also takes account of humans responsibility for political-ethical values – described by Schatzki (2002) as ‘value humanism’.

The notion that the manual forms an alliance around emergent knowledge suggests it can be productively interpreted as an ‘epistemic object’ (Nicolini et al., 2012), though it could equally be considered a ‘boundary object’ (Nicolini et al., 2012) in that it translates complex information into forms that are transferable across disciplines. Khazraee and Gasson (2015) explain that epistemic objects embed emergent knowledge into material form, citing objects such as categorization schemes and representational models as examples – this idea of the materialisation of emerging knowledge provides a most apt definition of the corporate standards manual. Nicolini et al. (2012, p. 8) add that objects ‘become epistemic when they embody what one does not yet know’. Thus, it is precisely the emergent nature of the standards manual that creates motivation around

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\(^{104}\) Schatzki (2002, p. 193) defends what he calls ‘residual humanism’ in which human agency is considered central. Postill (2010) meanwhile, claims that the first two waves of practice theorists understood the human body as the nexus of people’s practice engagements with the world. By comparison, ANT scholars see humans and non-humans as equal in agential terms.
it, becoming the focal point of a developing new community of practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991) centred around the deployment of the new programme. According to Nicolini et al.’s (2012, p. 21) exposition of collaborative objects: ‘The emergence of an epistemic object introduces a form of a collective obligation towards it – an emotional affiliation that becomes a morally binding force.’ As such, infractions against the epistemic object – that is the edicts of the manual – can be easily be held up as infringements.
‘Report on proposed design policy for Courage’, 1950

The first comprehensive corporate image programme DRU completed was for the photographic company Ilford in 1946, though the scheme was revisited and redeveloped some twenty years later, resulting in an extensive ‘Design Standards Manual’ that
specified how the elements of the Ilford visual identity should be deployed (Blake and Blake, 1969). The Ilford manual released in 1966 was not the first manual created by DRU, with Naylor (1966) suggesting that they had created a corporate manual for the brewer Watney’s as early as 1956. However, I have not identified any clear empirical evidence to support this view. The design report DRU produced for Watney’s in 1956 (Gray, 1956) does not resemble a manual in form, and lacks the cohesion between visual and textual elements to be directly considered as such. The earliest manual in evidence from the archives of Black (1980) and Gray (1999) at the V&A Archive of Art & Design was produced for The Civic Trust around 1958 – incidentally, this document is itself labelled as a manual. However, having studied the archives of Black (1986) and Gray (1999) at the V&A, it is clear that they had deployed various forms of specification document in their practice before the fully-fledged manual emerged, and it is with an investigation of these more primitive specification documents that I will begin.

DRU produced project reports for their clients as early as 1950, setting out their findings and the key points of their proposals. It is possible that reports were mobilised prior to this point, though there is no evidence to support this at the V&A (Black, 1986; Gray, 1999). One notable example of the project report was produced for the brewer Courage on the 1st February 1950 (Gray, 1950) (Fig. 63). Type-written on plain A4 paper, stapled and enclosed within a modest cardboard cover, the title reads as follows: ‘Report on proposed design policy and estimated expenditure on sales promotion equipment and material for 1950’. Set across 16 pages, the report was structured into 14 separate sections:

INTRODUCTORY
REVIEW OF SALES AIDS FOR 1949
HOUSE IDENTIFICATION
COCKEREL SYMBOL
MAIN OBJECTS OF PROPOSED SCHEMES
ESTIMATE OF PRESENT CONSUMER MARKET
WORKING MENS’ CLUBS
SALES PROMOTION MEDIA
METHOD OF ESTABLISHING A HOUSE STYLE
HOUSES IN THE FESTIVAL OF BRITAIN AREA
ANALYSED ESTIMATE OF PROPOSED EXPENDITURE FOR 1951
PRIORITIES
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSION

Beneath the list of contents, a small note to Milner Gray has been made commending the quality of the report: ‘Mr. Milner Gray. Congratulations – a really excellent report’ (Gray, 1950, p. i) (Fig. 63). Though it is unclear who the note was from, it seems likely
that it can be accredited to a contact on the client side. Assuming this was the case, it provides a reminder of the novelty of graphic designers’ work at this time. Although such practices of report writing were well established in the worlds of advertising and market research (which were more well developed as professional disciplines), in terms of the typical output of graphic designers in the 1950s, a ‘rational’ design report founded on consumer research, such as this, was far from commonplace.

Precisely how the Courage report was deployed within DRU’s corporate image practice remains uncertain, though it appears to have been used as a summative document, wherein meetings with the client resulted in type-written proposals being finalised and submitted for approval (Gray, 1950). The introductory section of the report describes the intent of the document as follows:

A brief report indicating the broad lines of a policy which in our view should be pursued in respect of sales promotion equipment and material supplied by Courage & Company to their tied hotels and licensed houses and to working men’s clubs. These recommendations are made as a result of our experience of the Company’s requirements gained over the past year, and especially in the light of the design and sales promotion policies discussed at the meetings of the Design Committee during the latter part of last year. (Gray, 1950, p. 1)

The reference to the significance of the design committee meetings is notable, as it implies that the report had a codifying effect, whereby the issues discussed during the meetings were reflected upon, before specific proposals were agreed and inscribed with the aid of a typewriter, setting out a clear course of action. At the heart of the report the driving impetus was to develop a more distinctive, coherent and recognisable corporate image for Courage. Though they referred to the idea of ‘house style’ in the document, this seemed to be linked more to the appearance of public houses than to the burgeoning field of corporate image-making where the term ‘house style’ was still coming to be established (as discussed in the earlier section, ‘The developing discourse of British corporate image-making’, p. 96). So, when they spoke of ‘house identification’, they referred to the strong aesthetic pattern they sought to develop, emphasising the need for their designs to aid in the ready identification of Courage public houses, thus explaining:

It is essential, in our submission, that – always without submerging the individual character of each house – all this design material should conform to a regulated pattern, and so be designed as to be immediately recognisable as belonging to the House of Courage. (Gray, 1950, p. 7)

Here they were critical of Courage’s earlier efforts, deriding their poor design standard as well as the lack of consistency in planning. In drawing attention to the idea that a consistent design pattern produces consumer recognition, they recall the arguments of
authors such as Alec Davis (1956), who had promoted the idea that corporate image programmes should produce readily recognisable aesthetic elements that promote brand loyalty and fundamentally result in consumer uptake and sales, as we have seen. Still, DRU methodically dismissed what they called the ‘stereotyped’ approach of chains like Woolworth’s and Lyons’, where the external architecture and interior furnishing was, in their opinion, overly homogenous. Instead they proposed that the corporate image programme for Courage needed agility in order to be malleable enough to engage with a wide range of different establishments set in diverse locales. In this respect the report suggests a class-based identity, with one design approach for the working-class establishments and another for the higher class public houses, road houses and hotels (Gray, 1950). A budget of £42,717 was proposed for works to be completed in 1950, of which £2,085 was set aside for design fees (a substantial amount in today’s money). In defending the fees, they emphasised the long-term value of the investment, claiming:

Much of the actual design expenditure should be spread over a considerably longer period, inasmuch as a large part represents the cost of establishing basic principles of design policy of a long-term nature. Even so it will be noted that in round figures the ratio of the cost of planning and preparing designs is only a fraction over five per cent of the production costs. (Gray, 1950, p. 14)

Within the report it is significant that they give direct business advice to their client that transcends the concern for the aesthetics of design alone, advising on how product distribution could be extended into different contexts. For example, they suggest that redesigned Courage beer bottles could be used as a basis from which to develop a healthy new off-license trade, and further, that Courage may want to consider introducing their products into more upper and middle-class sport and social clubs of various kinds. This inherently strategic element of their consultancy service suggests that design groups had applied ‘design thinking’ approaches to business problems very early in their operation, confounding the idea that this tendency only emerged later in century, as might be assumed from the heightened popularity the concept has received in recent times (e.g. Kelley, 2005; Brown, 2009; Martin, 2009).

It is noteworthy that the project report is attributed in two separate places as the work of Gray alone, with the front cover (Gray, 1950, cover) and the final page (Gray, 1950, p. 16) stating: ‘Milner Gray, R.D.I., F.S.I.A., Design Research Unit’, implying that Gray was the pivotal client contact for the project and the author of the report. Given the collaborative ethos projected by DRU, it is surprising to see such a focus on a single individual within the team context (later reports clearly list several employees, as well as
their work role, emphasising the multidisciplinary team ethos of the group). Though it is unclear how much collaboration was involved between DRU employees on the Courage work, it is apparent that the project involved considerable collaboration with agents outside the immediate DRU studio context. Gray (1950, p. 2) noted that printed advertising material would continue to be handled by Cecil D. Notley Advertising (Notley had been an early backer of DRU), emphasising the need to keep up ‘many points of contact’ with them in order to enable a successful collaboration. Likewise, he addresses the need to maintain clear communications with the internal Architectural Department at Courage, recommending that ‘steps be taken and any necessary machinery set up to effect the closest co-operation between these parties’ (Gray, 1950, p. 2). A further agent implicated in the project was Mass Observation, the social research organisation, turned market research company of which Marcus Brumwell had been a key financial backer (Brumwell, 2010). They had been commissioned to carry out qualitative research for Courage that consisted of two comparatively small pilot investigations (Gray, 1950). Surveying 200 customers at 56 public houses they sought to gauge the extent to which customers could identify Courage houses from the existing trade signs and symbols present on their premises, furthermore, they surveyed 100 customers at 50 public houses to monitor consumers reactions to new showcards introduced by Courage (Gray, 1950, p. 2).

DRU discuss the evidence from Mass Observation’s research in their report, using the given research findings to substantiate their own position as and when it suits their own ends, but contesting the relevance of Mass Observation’s findings when it conflicts with their own position. Mass Observation’s first survey indicates that a number of the surveyed customers had failed to identify that they were drinking Courage beer, or in some cases, that they were even in a Courage public house (Gray, 1950). DRU used this observation as a crutch upon which to push for a more concerted attempt towards a holistic corporate image, claiming that, ‘a principal plank in any sales promotion policy for 1950 should be to find means of emphasizing the ready identification of all Courage houses’ (Gray, 1950). When the second research survey by Mass Observation (Gray, 1950) suggested that the recognition value of the corporate symbol – Courage’s cockerel – was diminished by the fact that too many variants of the symbol were in evidence, DRU strongly contested this assertion, arguing that the number of different cockerels in use was of little significance, for what was really
important was that ‘the whole idea of “the cockerel for Courage” be emphasised and stimulated’ (Gray, 1950, p. 3). They explained:

In our view the cockerel motif, whilst having an accepted form for trademark use, should be as widely used as possible in as wide a range of variants as expediency demands, so that in the final result the idea will be instilled in the minds of all that whenever you see a cockerel you think of Courage. (Gray, 1950, p. 3)

They went on to restate the intent behind a series of three cockerels they had created for the company in the previous year. Explaining that:

One of the most important steps taken in 1949 has been, therefore, the establishment of the new form of fighting cockerel as the Company’s symbol. This design has been carried out in three somewhat varying treatments, – a simple one colour treatment, almost silhouette in form, for use in small sizes, such as on your bottle labels; a full colour version of the same bird in a formal rather heraldic manner; and a full colour representational or purely naturalistic treatment. These three versions of the cockerel should establish the form of the bird for all general trade-mark purposes. A complete portfolio of these three versions in a variety of sizes and different treatments has been prepared and submitted for future guidance. (Gray, 1950, p. 3)

Although their proposals were put forward merely as ‘recommendations’, DRU sought to gain authority in the tone of the document, occasionally veering towards the more dogmatic, particularly in their summary, where they advised:

(a) the widest use to be made of the revised cockerel motif, (b) the adoption of a standard house colours and letter forms, chosen to differentiate these from those of competitors, (c) the use in appropriate cases of flags, door and window awnings, umbrellas and other trimmings in standard house colours and treatments, (d) to increase the amenities of Courage houses by paying especial attention to their interior decoration, colour schemes and furnishings, and to provide a decorating service to tenants with this object, (e) to offer to provide similar services to working men’s clubs, (f) the provision, either free or on special terms, of equipment and accessories designed to an established Courage pattern (g) a list is made of such three dimensional sales promotion media. (Gray, 1950, pp. 15–16)

The report concluded with a final note re-emphasising the nature of the collaboration with the client, restating the DRU’s willingness to converse further around the given recommendations: ‘the above proposals are submitted as a basis for further discussion on your whole design policy, in order that an agreed target may be set and the appropriation needed to reach it estimated and approved’ (Gray, 1950, p. 16).
The next major report that has survived in the separate archives of Black and Gray at the V&A was produced for another brewer, that is Watney, Combe, Reid & Company Limited (Watneys hereafter) and distributed in September 1956 (Fig. 64) (Gray, 1956).
Taking in a broad range of applications – including: exterior signing and graphics, interiors, stationery and other printed material, advertising, labels, and the Watneys’ transport fleet – the report sought to initiate the development of a corporate ‘house style’. Although the formal qualities of the report share many similarities with the Courage report – particularly in its A4 scale, modest card cover and type-written content – the tone of voice has progressed to become more dogmatic, setting down clear proposals for the deployment of the proposed design policy. In this sense the report begins to resemble more closely the standards manuals of the 1960s, setting out certain guidelines – albeit still ‘recommended’ – around the deployment of standardised colours and lettering for the corporate image. These policies were set out in relative detail in the document and summarised as a series of recommendations at the conclusion of the report. To provide an example of the documents authoritative tone, I present here a sample of the first ten points (of a total 41) presented in their ‘Summary of conclusions’ (Black, 1956, p. 31–32; original emphases):

The Company’s policy to avoid over-standardisation recognised.

It is recommended that the individual character of house should be maintained, limiting common characteristics to certain proposed features.

Recommended that the name WATNEY and the Red Barrel may be secondary in prominence to the name of the house, but should be more prominent than other advertising.

Recommend that the word WATNEY should normally appear in a standard letter form.

Over emphasis on Coca-Cola signs deprecated.

Standard house colours for fascias and signs proposed; employment of a group of basic colours for exterior painting suggested.

Other means of achieving house identification listed.

Proposals made for the uses, size, siting and for the lettering on the Red Barrel symbol. Illustration accompanies report.

Suggestion made for fitting clock into barrel ends.

The adoption of five selected letterforms recommended for use on fascias and signs to a regulated but flexible scheme. Illustrations accompany report.

Of the 41 summative points presented, seven were apparently accompanied by illustrations or samples to support and materialise the recommendations made (Black, 1956, p. 31–32). It is notable that the images were not contained as a part of the final bound report, and as such, have not survived in the archives of either Black or Gray at the V&A (Black, 1956). It is worth considering why the images were not amalgamated
with the text into the final bound project report. On the one hand, this may have been
linked to the availability of appropriate print technology that could produce such a
document in a timely and cost-effective fashion – as print technology developed
through the 1960s project reports and manuals certainly became more lavish in their
production values (Shaughnessy, 2014a, 2014b). Images could have been glued into
place within the report easily enough (‘tipped-in’ being the technical term), or simply
bound into the one document, with image sheets interleaved with the text sheets. On the
other hand, a consideration of format may have been a concern, with some design
proposals perhaps benefitting from a greater sense of scale and materiality, and thus
presented independent of any smaller scale A4 documentation such as this. Most likely,
the separation of design rationale from design visuals reflected the nature of the
production process, in that the rationale was seen as secondary, or at the very least, a
separate endeavour to the production of the ‘creative’ design proposals.

Apparent from the first page of the report is the more forcefully collaborative
nature of the work for Watneys, with Gray’s name now supplemented by the addition of
Ronald Ingles and Kenneth Lamble of DRU, all of whom signed the first page of the
report. It has also become more extensive, progressing from the 16 pages of the Courage
document of 1950, to 38 pages for Watneys, including the addition of two appendices
referencing their initial primary research around competitor practices. We are presented
with numerous references to the idea of ‘house style’, a notion that was tacit in the
Courage report, but not fully explicated. They also refer to the idea of the ‘all embracing
design policy’, demonstrating a certain level of clarity and sophistication around the
objectives of the project that were lacking in the example of Courage.

Though the word ‘recommendation’ was used repeatedly throughout the report,
in actuality, the points they put forward represented more than just speculative
propositions; for the detail, rigour and nuance of the document suggest a
comprehensive and coherent design policy that was fully conceptualised and ready to be
activated. In essence, the strategy had already been mobilised, for to contest any one of
the 41 detailed points would be to unravel the cascading, interlinked inscriptions
embedded within the work presented. The report should thus be understood as a
concrete proposition from DRU to their client for the work they sought to undertake for
them over the coming years. Bearing in mind that there were few, if any, design
companies who could compete with the heft of DRU’s assets (both human and non-
human) and fulfil the recommendations of such a document, in effect it became a kind of informal contract waiting to be signed-off on and fulfilled.

The working relationship between Watneys and DRU appears to have prospered, with the principles inherent in this report being implemented over the coming decade. By 1966, ten years after the inception of the project, the design policy was fully concretised within a rather more lavish ‘House Identification Manual’ produced by DRU at that time (Gray, 1999).

During the late 1950s DRU were commissioned by The Civic Trust to lead a project that sought to coordinate the appearance of a street in the city centre of Norwich. One of the key outputs of the commission was a relatively modest A4 file, enclosed in an orange card cover and titled: ‘Manual for Magdalen Street, Norwich’ (Figs. 65–72). Produced in 1958, it appears that this modest file was DRU’s first de facto design manual, integrating visual and textual elements into a specification of standards.

One of the most significant aspects of this document was that it was targeted not only at their client, The Civic Trust, but more critically at external agents who were commissioned to implement the design vision as set out by the DRU. The point about external agents is particularly important to account for, as it makes explicit the transition towards a more public application of design specifications. In other words, DRU were no longer codifying design principles solely for the benefit of their clients or their own design team, for now the specifications they set out were inscribed for the benefit of those working outside the traditional client-designer relationship. It is no coincidence that DRU’s first corporate manual emerged in alliance with this more public conception of standards, wherein the agreed policy needed to be both more mobile and less contestable. The sense in which DRU’s specification document needed to assert control over actors beyond their own immediate locale, mirrors the Latourian sense in which the immutable mobile acts at a distance, impacting upon distant events, objects and people (Latour, 1986).

In allowing the control of design implementation to transfer outside the immediate studio context, new pressures would emerge around the specification and communication of design principles. DRU could no longer rely on the tacit knowledge and understanding of its employees to ensure the smooth implementation of their design policies. Instead the architects, designers and manufacturers tasked with realising their vision would be practising in some distant context; they would almost certainly never meet and would not be in regular communication with one another either. In this sense, the guidance given in such reports needed to be more explicit and rule-based, leading to increasing specificity and precision. Yet surprisingly the general policy put forward for Magdalen Street retained a great deal of openness and leeway for interpretation, as I will now show.
The programme of work was led by Misha Black, who took on the role of ‘Co-ordinating Architect’, in collaboration with Milner Gray, who was responsible for the scheme’s approach to lettering. A further three DRU employees were directly involved in the design scheme, with Kenneth Bayes, Ronald Ingles and Anthony Wilkinson all attributed on the first page of the manual. There was also an Associated Architect, Bernard M. Feilden, situated externally and seemingly contracted either by Norwich Council or The Civic Trust.

Black (1958, p. 2) introduced the manual setting out the purpose of the scheme as follows:

This experiment in civic design has the objective of bringing still greater vitality to this street, which already enjoys the advantages of good shops, important historical associations, and many buildings of considerable character. Unfortunately the development of individual properties without relation to any collective plan for the street as a whole has tended to reduce the street’s unity, visual impact, and air of importance. The scheme aims to restore the character of the street, without minimising the individuality of each shop or other property. It is not desired to encourage monotonous conformity and stultifying ‘good taste’, but to retain the advantages of diversity within a wide general framework of colour and lettering which will provide cohesion to the whole street.

Black’s response to the design problem he had set out was to propose that:

By the careful painting of buildings above street level; by the grouping of properties within related decorative schemes; by selecting shop window awnings from agreed alternatives; by the careful consideration of all fascias, signs and posters; by the curtaining of upper story windows;
Covering some twenty pages, the manual then went into further detail outlining the principles of the scheme. A detailed schedule of works was put forward, staggered over a nine-month period, from submission of drawings, to completion of works, leading up to the launch date on the 14th of May 1959. External architects working on the scheme were ‘invited’ to submit their drawings to Misha Black in his capacity as the Co-ordinating Architect. Acting in a consultative capacity, Black would prepare comments on the submitted drawings, returning these to the external architects who would be tasked with developing the proposals in a manner ‘satisfactory to their clients and themselves’ (Black, 1958, p. 20).

Although Black served as a kind of control mechanism within the scheme, there appears to have been no punitive consequence for those who failed to submit their drawings to him, or for those who failed to uphold the standards set out within the manual itself. Therefore, the scheme relied upon the good will of collaborators and the assumption that any wilful infraction of the programme would have been obvious to the public. With this in mind Black (1958, p. 2) was careful to adopt an empathetic and enthusiastic tone, managing the expectations of those involved and calling for ‘patient collaboration’ over the coming months. He commended the willingness and enthusiasm of those collaborators involved to date, reminding all involved that they held the opportunity to produce something of ‘great credit and benefit to all, and an exemplar for other towns in Great Britain’ (Black, 1958, p. 2). Given that the project relied on the goodwill of all participants, this could explain why the DRU avoided an overly prescriptive approach to the manual as a series of commands.

Two areas of guidance that were more prescriptive were the standards set out for colour and lettering styles. In this sense the staid type-written report now developed to include visual elements that supported the given specifications and norms. Thus, the user of the manual was presented with two interleaved pages of colour swatches (Fig. 68) and 13 pages of typographic samples (Fig. 69), edging the document away from its rather staid bureaucratic form to become a more useful visual working tool – also notable was the addition of two pages of coloured paper stock used to act as dividers.

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105 This was the Civic Trust’s first street refurbishing scheme but is said to have influenced over 500 other civic programmes (Blake, 1966, p. 26).
before the lettering section and the final page with contact details and a timetable of work.


Within the manual 18 colour options were set out, divided into two groups. The first group of seven colours being assigned for use on external rendered walls and above shop fronts, and the second group of 11 colours being put forward for fascias, window frames, doors and other woodwork. DRU were not insistent about the deployment of the two colour-groups they set out, literally underlining their assertion that: ‘These colours need not, however, be strictly relegated to their two separate groups’ (Black, 1958, p. 2, original emphases). Thus, they actively encouraged users of the manual to take their categories as suggestions only, rather than norms to be followed. The
language of the manual sought to follow this apparent spirit of openness, so we are presented with polite requests to action, as opposed to direct commands. They explain that certain things are ‘preferable’, ‘hoped’ for, or ‘can be useful’, whereas others ‘should be discouraged’ or ‘would be inappropriate’. Close analysis shows that the language of this instruction is fairly dynamic, taking on various forms, as opposed to adopting one strict and consistent code. The first part of the manual refers to what ‘is’, or is ‘not recommended’, and here the word ‘not’ is consistently given an underline treatment. But elsewhere we have repeated reference to what ‘is’ or ‘isn’t appropriate’ and what ‘should’ or ‘shouldn’t’ be done. Here the tone becomes rather dogmatic in places, thus we are told we ‘should always’, ‘should never’, or ‘should not in any circumstances’. I suggest that the uneven and diverse range of language deployed to instruct the user here was intended to disguise the underlying instructive nature of the text.

Figure 69) One of several fold-out spreads with sample lettering, Magdalen Street manual (Black, 1958, p. 1a–1b). Milner Gray Archive, V&A Archive of Art and Design, AAD/1999/8/103.

When it came to the suggested lettering, 13 different fonts were presented (Fig. 62), divided into three groups of four, with one script typeface provided as an alternative option. Apparently, the idea here was to provide a ‘reasonable variety’ from which
owners and occupiers of the properties concerned could ‘choose under the guidance of
their architect’ (Black, 1958, p. 11). Here the design strategy mirrored the project as a
whole, with the introduction to this section stating: ‘The object is an observance of
standards rather than standardisation. Our proposals, therefore, avoid the easy solution
of laying down one standard letter style, which, however good, would result only in
dreary uniformity of good taste’ (Black, 1958, p. 11). Rather curiously the given samples
were not named as such, but merely described by generic terms such as ‘Serif letter’ or
‘Square or slab serif letter’, this is odd given that the printed samples in the manual
appear to be comprised of recognisable movable type, rather than hand-rendered
lettering, as might be the case for sign-writing.¹⁰⁶

Contrary to the cascading inscription of rules that is the contemporary corporate
image manual (Shaughnessy, 2014a and 2014b), DRU were notable for the perceived
openness of the design strategies that underpinned their early corporate design schemes.
For instance, their work for Courage, Watneys and Magdalen Street all rebelled against
what they saw as the homogenisation of chain stores such as Woolworth’s, Marks and
Spencer, and Lyon’s. Instead they sought to strike a balance between homogeneity and
heterogeneity, promoting coherence rather than strict consistency, and arguing for the
need to retain the charm and values of individual entities (such as a public house’s
unique architectural details) rather than eradicating any anomalies in the spirit of total
unification. As such, this constituted a very different approach to that of international
modernism, or even art nouveau.

One early precedent to the corporate manual is worthy of mention here for its
likely influence on DRU’s approach. That is the aforementioned lettering guide created
for architects and designers working on the Festival of Britain: A Specimen of Display
Letters designed for the Festival of Britain 1951 (Hasler, 1950). Conceived by the
Typographical Panel of the Festival, led by typographer Charles Hasler, this document
sought to control and coordinate the deployment of lettering across the various Festival
sites, of which the Southbank was the most prominent. By specifying a wide range of
lettering styles all belonging to a vernacular variety referred to as ‘Fat Faces’ (Fig. 70),
the policy sought to propagate an eclectic range of typographic content that was lively
and dynamic, while exhibiting an undeniable intrinsic family likeness (Rennie, 2001).

¹⁰⁶ Interestingly, the treatment of colour appears to have been dealt with more precisely, with each swatch
labelled in accordance to the British Standards Institute’s range of 101 Colours.
Figure 70) A couple of sample page spreads taken from *A Specimen of Display Letters designed for the Festival of Britain 1951* (Hasler, 1950). As featured in Nikolaus Pevsner’s (1952, p. 31) article for the *Penrose Annual*.

The style of the Festival typography was considered retrogressive by some, in that it sought to revive Victorian types, partly a reaction to the popularity of new sans serif typefaces that were becoming ever-more ubiquitous (of which Gill Sans was the most omnipresent). Given the tinge of pastiche that surrounded the scheme it proved to be divisive within the design community too (Rennie, 2001), perhaps in part because it represented British tradition, with its Victorian origins being in stark contrast to the developments of international modernism happening abroad. Nevertheless, the team of designers at DRU seem to have been greatly inspired by both the spirit and style of the lettering scheme for the Festival. In their capacity as coordinating designers central to the development of the Festival, the key partners at the DRU would all have engaged...
with the Festival specimen document and it is apparent that their projects for Courage, Watneys and Magdalen Street each took some level of influence from the Festival lettering scheme. The Watneys and Magdalen Street projects seem to have borrowed heavily from the popular lettering style of the Festival, capitalising on the popular zeitgeist of the time. So, just as the Festival had revived a wide range of ‘fat face’ lettering styles, DRU chose to do the same with these two particular clients. In the case of Watneys, they moved them away from what was perceived to be the ‘mechanical’ Gill Sans (Gray, 1956, p. 9), towards a range of type styles thought to be ‘rather richer in form and more traditional in character’ (Gray, 1956, p. 10).

Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly, the inherent strategy behind the Festival specimen document that sought to bring coherence rather than homogeneity mirrored the approach that DRU adopted with all three clients. So just as the Festival had trialled the idea of a loose pool of typeface styles and colours (as opposed to a single corporate logo, typeface and colour), DRU took up the same approach with great fervour, applying the method to work for Courage, Watneys and Magdalen Street. But as I will now go on to show, things were rather different for DRU when it came to the work they had initiated for British Rail in 1963 (Cotton, 2012).
Perhaps the most noteworthy standards document created by DRU was their Corporate Identity Manual for the British Railways Board, which was first published as a three-edition volume in 1965 and subsequently expanded over the years (Gray, 1999). Given its tightly controlled technical manner, it set itself apart from their earlier schemes which had played on eclecticism and cohesion, rather than strict consistency. Such was
the cultural significance of the British Rail work that it was released to much fanfare at an exhibition titled: The New Face of British Railways at the Design Council in London, later touring to Liverpool and Dublin (Stark, 1965).

This latter manual released in 1965 has continued to be a subject of some interest, being republished in 2016 following a crowdfunding campaign (Henning, 2016). As such I will not go into the details of this document, for it has already received considerable attention, with the republished edition (Henning, 2016) expanded to include several new essays, while also garnering interest from the wider design press (Brewer, 2016; Robertson, 2017). Furthermore, there is not the possibility to properly investigate its significance here, given that the scale and scope of the project was so vast and complex. Instead, I wish to draw attention to a precursor to this much celebrated manual located in the archive of Milner Gray (1999) (Figs. 71–74). For here I have identified an early corporate manual for British Rail which constitutes a soft launch of the design policy that was later more fully concretised in the three-edition manual of 1965.107 This document is significant as it helps to bridge the gap between the relatively crude manual DRU created for Magdalen Street and their more sophisticated and much-celebrated work for British Rail. In this sense the interim manual is more important as a historical document than the much celebrated and recently republished version from 1965.

Labelled as a ‘Preliminary Issue’ and released in November 1964, the first DRU manual for British Rail was enclosed in a modest A4 black card cover, much like the very earliest reports they had produced for their clients – on the first page (see Fig. 72) someone added a hand-written note discretely at the top of the page, labelling the document as an ‘Interim Manual’. This example was given added allure by the purposeful cover design (Fig. 71), complete with corporate logo and sans-serif type. The choice of typeface is significant here given that DRU had previously been so reliant on vernacular British type-styles in their work for Watneys and Magdalen Street. This shift from serif to sans-serif typography can be seen to reflect developmental changes in the zeitgeist between the 1950s and 60s, with international modernism and especially ‘Swiss style’, coming to have an increasing influence on the British design scene (Hollis, 2006).

107 Milner Gray acted as chairman of a working party responsible for the development of the design programme.
The reference to ‘corporate identity’ is significant, given that usage of this term was not yet commonplace – when Henrion and Parkin (1967) released their seminal text on the subject they referred to innumerable different terms (design coordination, corporate image, house style and corporate identity, for example) highlighting the multiplicity of discourses that surrounded the discipline.  

108

Figure 72) Opening page of the preliminary Design Manual for the British Railways Board (Gray, 1964, p. 2.01). Milner Gray Archive, V&A Archive of Art and Design, AAD/1999/8/113.

108 The myriad of interrelated terms deployed within the field is a problem that persists to this day, with Balmer (2001) having drawn attention to the fog of confusion surrounding the discipline and its discourse.
Inside the manual displayed many similarities with earlier reports and manuals produced by DRU, so although the typography is now printed, rather than type-written, the layout of the text continues to adopt the rather perfunctory fill-the-page typographic aesthetic of their earlier reports, with designerly notions of ‘white space’ (White, 2002) not having come to bear on the manual as yet. We also find the tendency for underlining the word ‘not’ still persists.

Elsewhere pages continue to be broken down into numbered points, with further delineation between sections now provided by a rule across the page, a treatment not used in their earlier typewritten reports. Here we see a process of simplification occurring in terms of the typographic presentation of the manual – this is a subject that typographic scholar Paul Luna (2011) has covered well with reference to the historical development of the dictionary. While the style of titling was consistent with earlier volumes produced by the DRU, now each page was given a unique reference code rather than a page number, with this code contained in a block of standardised information positioned at the top-right corner of every page. Within this information block was the British Rail logo, the sheet number and a reference to when the document was issued. This system of consistent labelling and attribution was a significant development that carried through into the three-volume manual released the following year. While in the
‘Preliminary’ manual the coded sheets were bound firmly together by two staples that went through all of the sheets, in the subsequent manuals (Fig. 75) sheets would be punched and ring bound, a development that allowed the manual to become a dynamic and expansive entity, which could be amended or added to quickly and inexpensively. A further change afforded by technological advancements was the closer integration of text and image components, so although some pages remained purely text based, most now combined illustrations and specification diagrams with detailed textual content and description.

The tone of voice within the interim British Rail manual is radically more dictatorial than previous documents, emphasising the shift towards a more authoritarian approach to corporate image-making. This provides a stark contrast with their initial position which had led them, fourteen years earlier, to advise Courage away from what they called the ‘stereotyped’ approach of Woolworth’s and Lyons’ (Gray, 1950, p. 11). Elsewhere they had warned Watney’s of ‘over-standardisation’ (Gray, 1956, p. 31), explaining how an all-embracing design policy ‘can be both dignified and unobtrusive’ and ‘need not imply an inflexible standardisation’ (Gray, 1956, p. 6). Similarly, they claimed that the aim of the Magdalen Street project was about ‘an observance of standards rather than standardization’ per se (Black, 1958, p. 11), leading them to admonish the ‘dreary uniformity’ that resulted from taking ‘the easy solution of laying down one standard letter style’ (Black, 1958, p. 11).

Contrary to this initial stance, they now adopted a tone that more mirrored a more totalitarian form of design governance. So, although we see mention of the softer ‘should’ and ‘shouldn’t’ again, we now find reference to what is, or is not ‘permissible’, what ‘must appear’, or ‘must not be altered’. Most powerfully we find several references to ‘the rules’ that are ‘to be followed’. It is remarkable that the group had shifted their stance to the idea of uniformity quite so dramatically. So, whereas earlier they had followed the coordinated but not standardised approach that we saw from HS&A in the first case study, now standardisation and control became their raison d’être.
The typographic language of the DRU’s work for British Rail echoed the overarching change in their approach. So, whereas their earlier corporate image programmes for Magdalen Street and Watney’s had championed an eclectic mix of revivalist typefaces in a nod to British history, their work now came to embrace the sans serif type and grid structures of the Swiss Style (also known as the ‘International Typographic Style’ or ‘die neue Grafik’), with cutting edge design and innovation in Britain increasingly influenced by developments on the continent (Hollis, 2006). According to American design pioneer Paul Rand, the rationality and logic of the Swiss approach was well suited to the instructional impetus of the corporate design manual. As he explains, ‘there is no counterpart to Swiss design, in terms of something that you can describe, that you can follow, that you can systematically understand’ (Rand, cited in Heller, 1995b, p. 58). Evidence of the Swiss approach is clear to see in the design components specified in the interim manual (Figs. 71–74), however this early interim version of the manual remains a relatively un-designed artefact by comparison to the final set of British Rail manuals.
(Fig. 75) which in their specific design vernacular can be viewed as an homage to the International Typographic Style.

One effect of the DRU’s more dictatorial approach to the manual was the need to rationalise why particular rules had to be followed – albeit some more strictly than others. By explaining why a particular rule was in place they appealed to the user’s sense of logic. So, on the first page a paragraph of text set in capital letters is presented to the reader, setting a very different tone to the enthusiastic and welcoming one Black (1958, p. 11) had earlier established in his document for the Magdalen Street project:

LINE BLOCKS OR PRINTING PLATES MUST BE MADE FROM ORIGINALS SUPPLIED BY CHIEF PUBLICITY OFFICER, AND THE BR STANDARD PROPORTIONS MUST NOT BE ALTERED. VERSIONS OF SYMBOL AND LOGOTYPE ILLUSTRATED HERE AS REVERSED OUT OF SOLID PANELS HAVE BEEN SPECIALLY DRAWN AND WEIGHTED. REVERSED BLOCKS SHOULD NOT THEREFORE BE MADE FROM POSITIVE ORIGINALS. (Gray, 1964, p. 2.01, original emphasis)

There is a sense in this introductory paragraph that the user of the manual is not granted any great sense of intelligence or agency. Unlike the Magdalen Street manual which allowed its users the liberty to take decisions from a palette of options, the interim manual for British Rail regards its users with distrust and assumes they are in need of controlling. In the relatively short space of six years, the DRU manual thus progresses from a discursive tool of collaboration in aid of a kind of social progress, to another powerful part of the machine ensemble (Schivelbusch, 2014); a technocratic tool to control others.

Here we see the emergence of what Latour (1990) refers to as an ‘anti-program’, in that individual creative practitioners are now viewed as a potential threat to the programme, in as much that they are considered likely to act out against the scripted program of action inscribed within the manual. As a result, we can see during this period the beginning of an aggressive trend towards ever more complex and detailed design manuals conceived to tightly control those responsible for implementing the corporate image schemes set out within them.

**Concluding remarks**

The technocratic nature of DRU’s manual for British Rail is surprising given the utopian idealism on which the group had first been founded. From their position as a non-
hierarchical group who had prized sensitivity, nuance and horizontality in their design approach, the move towards a more hierarchical, controlling and homogenised form of corporate design culture is pronounced. So, whereas they had earlier admonished what they called the ‘stereotyped’ approach of chain stores which supressed individual virtuosity (Gray, 1950), now they embraced a more autocratic approach to corporate image-making that prized strict consistency, coordination and control above all else.

Here I wish to zoom out in order to contextualise the development of the group and their shifting imperatives. Profitability had been a major concern in their first decade of business, with their first profit on record posted in 1957, twelve years after the formation of the group and a year into the consultancy work for Watneys (Brumwell, 2010). Nevertheless, they continued to grow their workforce steadily over the decades, becoming more profitable with time. In 1957 they returned a net profit of £10,983 (19% of their turnover), but although turnover showed strong growth, records suggest that their profits peaked at 22% in 1961, dropping back down to 17% by 1965 and projected at 18% for 1969 (Cotton, 2012, p. 89). By the late 1960s, operational problems began to arise, with the design discussion meetings lapsing in frequency and internal communications becoming increasingly strained (Black, 1964–76), partly due to the staff base being split across multiple premises. By this point the two senior design partners were progressing into the latter stages of their careers and attempts would soon be made to hand over the reins to a younger generation (Black, 1964–76; interview, Appendix 1.3). This idea of ceding control contrasts with the drive to control I noted at the end of the preceding case about HDA. This links back to my fundamental argument about how coordinated practice was impacting organisational ontology in different ways. So, whereas in a firm of 5–15 employees, as per HS&A or HDA, one person can maintain control – or rule relations – over the day-to-day operations of their business; in an organisation of 60-plus employees, like the DRU, leadership duties inevitably become more stratified in order to delegate the wider range of managerial duties to a broader range of individuals. Yet, as I will go on to show, Milner Gray was more inclined to the hierarchical model of the one-man-team, as per Henrion or Schleger. By comparison Misha Black understood that by relinquishing control of some of the day-to-day operations of the firm they could keep the business competitive in an increasingly competitive marketplace.

Black had aired many concerns around the long-term viability of group work in his concluding chapter to Michael Middleton’s (1967) book, *Group Practice in Design*, a
book which Black had originally conceived of and would go on to champion. Here he contemplated the means by which group practices could sustain over the long term, questioning whether groups should always attempt to adapt to their circumstances, or whether in certain scenarios it was necessary for them to acknowledge that they had entered a new historical period in which they were no longer fit to serve. Ultimately, Black gave the impression that he was resigned to the idea that design groups ought to be dissolved before their innovation processes became routine and the practices of the group institutionalised; his argument being that a design practice without the dynamic vitality of innovation was unfit to be considered a design group at all. As he explains:

In the end the group will outlive its usefulness and should dissolve. There is comfort in long-established practices, and convenience in the sturdy administrative structures which build up around them, but the function of design is to find formal relationships which simultaneously serve the needs of society and symbolise the emotional forces which motivate it. When the design group is no longer expressive and becomes content to reiterate forms which have only archaic interest, then its life is ended. (Black, cited in Middleton, 1967, p. 290)

In spite of this strong ideological position, Black was evidently torn between a will to accept what he saw as the inevitable decline of DRU as a group and a need to adapt in order to sustain. The notion of aging was touched on in some detail within Middleton’s book, with Black (cited in Middleton, 1967, p. 86) noting that ‘no organism can live without growth and group organizations are as susceptible to the laws of ageing and death as are all other biological systems’. He also warned against the complacency of middle age and the regurgitation of long-past victories, suggesting that at some time the reins of leadership would need to be passed on to younger practitioners within the group if it were to persist as a viable business operation:

If the leader insists on retaining creative leadership when he no longer has the capacity to do so, then the group will dissolve or become yet another humdrum design organization with a reputation for experienced practicability as partial compensation for its lack of creativity. (Black cited in Middleton, 1967, p. 289)

Although Black was seemingly keen to organise the succession of leadership within the group, Gray was less assured on the matter. By 1968 an external management consultant from Urwick Orr Partners had been commissioned by the DRU to compile a review of the organisation and management of the firm. Urwick Orr and Partners Ltd had been founded in 1934 by Lyndall Urwick and John Orr, both proponents of scientific management, with Urwick considered an important pioneer of management consultancy (Brech, Thomson & Wilson, 2010). The consultant from Urwick Orr Partners concluded that DRU’s non-hierarchical collective decision-making principles
were no longer fit for purpose, as they made it difficult to ‘arrive at correct decisions rapidly’, they also identified that parts of the organisation were operating independently from one another without ‘formal unified command’ (Schweizer, 1968). It is interesting to note that the consultant recommended a more mechanistic form of governance, going against what organisation scholars Burns and Stalker (1961) had identified as the trend towards more organic organisational structures within the technology industry of the era. It is also notable that a design group had sought the expertise of an independent management consultant as early as 1968 at a time when group practice in design was still in its relative infancy. The value of management consultancy and corporate strategy was clearly coming to the fore during this period, not just in Britain, but also the United States, where in 1963 Bruce Henderson founded the influential Boston Consulting Group, credited with launching the corporate strategy revolution (Kiechel, 2010).

Following the advice of the consultant from Urwick Orr Partners, DRU took on new premises at Aybrook Street and went through a restructuring process, with new departmental divisions introduced that were to be headed by younger managing partners. Problems persisted though, with divisions developing between the two main partners. Although Black had plans to gradually cede control of day-to-day operations, Gray, who was 11 years his senior, had no intention of retiring. By 1973 Black complained to Brumwell that Gray was ‘an increasing problem’, being ‘counter-productive’ and a depressive presence on the graphic design group which he led – the designer Dieter Heil is reported to have handed in his notice as he could ‘no longer tolerate an old man peering over his shoulder’ (Black, 1973). By this time Gray was 74 years of age and still closely involved in the day-to-day operation of the group, by comparison Black was 63 and lamenting Gray’s unwillingness to retire.

By 1977, three of the four founder partners had ceased to be involved with the group, Herbert Read having passed away in 1968, Marcus Brumwell resigning in 1974, and Misha Black passing away in 1977 (Cotton, 2012). After the early to mid-1970s the endeavours of the group are less well recorded, not having been archived or celebrated to the same extent as their earlier work.109 As a result, a particular uncertainty remains around their operation between the mid-1970s up to 2004 when they were acquired by the architectural practice Scott Brownrigg (Cotton, 2012). As Cotton (2012, p. 101)

explains, 'the group’s name dropped out of currency' by the 1980s. During this period, they began to be written about in terms of what they had achieved in the past (Lott, 1982; Sparke; 1983; Woodham, 1983), as opposed to what they were achieving in the present. So, for example, in Jane Lott’s (1982) feature for Design magazine we now find a retrospective profile of Milner Gray’s career.

Gray lived on to the age of 98, passing away in 1997 and is said to have continued to serve on various SIA committees until 1984 (Negus, 1997). After the loss of three of the founder partners DRU appear to have entered a period of gradual decline, being largely superseded by what Garland (1996) refers to as the pushier, more aggressive, and hard-sell tactics of emergent consultant groups like Fitch and Company (160 employees by 1985), Michael Peters (around 90 employees by 1985), Conran Associates and Allied International Designers (the first design group to float on the stock exchange in 1980). Although DRU struggled to sustain the success of their practice into the latter part of the twentieth century, for a number of decades during their heyday they set a precedent that showed how a strong ideological approach to group work could provide an antidote to the perils of overly routinised institutionalism. Black (1967, p. 290) thus recognised that business pressures could easily lead to overly hierarchical and rigid work structures, urging design leaders to ‘be constantly aware of the need to retain the essential elements of the group concept while the pressures of time schedules and expediency concert to turn it into a master-and-servant establishment’.

As designers who had progressed into their design management roles, Black and Gray were highly sensitive to the needs of designers, recognising that creative practitioners needed to be accorded creative agency in order to feel actively engaged within the practice, and thus to self-identify as veritable members of the group.110 As organisation theorists Peter Merholz and Kristin Skinner (2016, p. 129) explain, ‘designers work best when they can bring their whole selves to their work, and not just behave as employees’. Paulus & Nijstad (2003) echo this sentiment, arguing that a culture of autonomy and openness can lead practitioners towards a preferred state of intrinsic motivation. DRU believed, accordingly, that by affording their own designers such conditions it would be in the interests of the group as a whole, as the individual

110 This is a subject business theorist Chris Argyris (1957) covers well in his early work on the conflict between individual human needs and the requirements of organisations as systems.
group members would be just as concerned by the well-being of the collective as they would with any sense of personal glory. In so doing they sought to avoid what Chris Argyris (1957) describes as the all but inevitable conflict between individuals and the organisational systems in which they work.

Aligned to these concerns, Black (cited in Middleton, 1967, p. 290) suggests that individual members of design groups must be placed in a position to ‘accept that their salaries properly reflect their individual contributions to the group and that, when profits are made, these are fairly distributed’. Furthermore, he argues that leadership within the group must be fairly assumed, rather than imposed, and flexible enough to change when necessary. The issues that Black raises align clearly with what design management scholars have understood as the central importance of trust and transparency in fostering a productive group working climate (Paulus & Nijstad, 2003; Best, 2015). Paulus & Nijstad (2003) suggest that harmony is especially important in creative organisations where divergent viewpoints and ‘wild’ ideas can be particularly fundamental to success. Although Black understood the need for a certain organisational agility, later called ‘organizational ambidexterity’ (Duncan, 1976; March, 1991; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), his partner Milner Gray was more closely wedded to his own role as a patriarchal leadership figure within the organisation and reluctant to cede power (Black, 1973).

While Black’s ideal of the highly transparent, socially motivated design organisation could be dismissed as the product of a bygone era, he was not delusional about the need to compromise, recognising that idealism must be balanced with a more rigorous business ethos. In this sense he mirrored many of the traits of the ambidextrous organisation (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996) in that he sought to find an equitable balance between creative and economic success – what scholars of the subject refer to as the dual function of exploration (or conquering uncertainty) and exploitation (maximising performance) (March, 1991). Black identified that those groups for whom creativity was their raison d’être would find difficulties in reconciling this creative leaning with the problems of daily work and efficient organisation, and as such, the DRU thus naturally sided towards an emphasis on creative rather than economic performance.

Much like organisation theorist Mary Parker Follett (1940), Black understood leadership not as an authoritarian bending of will, but rather as a sensitive
interpretation of the needs of the group as a set of individuals. As such he sought to strike a balance between the ideal of serving society and the need to accrue capital:

> Idealism is the essential bone structure of the group, but sentimentality is a disease which will quickly debilitate and finally destroy it. The working pattern of the group must be tough and fair. Wages must be adjusted to the value of work done, bonuses distributed with reasonable relation to the profits earned, slackers dismissed, financial reserves accumulated, business affairs efficiently conducted. No group achieves perfection in its business and administrative organization, but the closer it approaches that goal, the longer will be its productive life. (Black cited in Middleton, 1967, p. 290)

Between the poles of the ‘individual genius’ designer (Wilkins, 1992) and the fully institutionalised neoliberal design agency (Dorland, 2009; Julier, 2017), Black (cited in Middleton, 1967, p. 287) set out his vision for the group of ‘mature authority’, founded on idealism, but operating with a sense of economic pragmatism:

> When the group has jettisoned immaculate ideas of equality, when it has thrown up its leader, when a hierarchy of creative talent has been recognized, then the group will be at the height of its power. It will have lost the capacity for producing the completely integrated statement which was the prerogative of its youth, but it will be able to design with that mature authority which serves well all conditions which do not require the nobility of individual genius.

This ideal state of multi-disciplinary group practice was one that DRU sought to embody for much of the 1950s and 60s, setting a progressive example for many groups that followed. As the founder partners ceased their involvement with the firm the practice gradually lost its way, being overtaken by more commercially minded enterprises that saw their contribution to society in economic rather than socio-cultural terms. In this sense the organisational development of the DRU is an interesting reflection of economic developments in Britain, as well as being indicative of the rapidly shifting imperatives of design practitioners of the era.

Next, I will go on to draw my conclusions from the three case studies investigated here. In so doing I will seek to ‘zoom out’ (Nicolini, 2009) from the detailed accounts of practice detailed in the preceding chapters to draw connections between the three cases and link the changing patterns of practice that are evident with broader developments across the British design scene.

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111 Whereas Taylor’s (1911) managerialist vision posited the organisation as a machine deployed solely to achieve the purposes of the shareholders or owners, Follett (1940) considered the organisation as a composite of the individuals of which it comprised (Junginger & Faust, 2016).
Conclusion

An overview of the enquiry

This thesis has examined how the materiality of practice changed for British graphic design consultants in the post-war era as they moved away from an artefactual approach to their work, to a systems approach, shifting their focus from individual entities, to systems of entities part of a single programme of corporate image work. In order to underscore the severity of these changes I drew attention to F.H.K. Henrion’s (1990) anecdote about ‘the end of the ideas poster’. This incident hinted at the ramifications of a holistic, systems-based approach to design by explaining how the individualistic design approach of pre-war had come under increasing strain in the race to adopt and develop more co-ordinated and coherent approaches to corporate design communication. The Henrion episode thus serves to emphasise conflicts between earlier conceptions of the ‘commercial artist’ as a heroic individual responsible for the production of heroic individual works of art, and the new post-war ‘graphic designer’ concerned with notions of organisation, structure and method. The thesis thus developed from the observation that the emergence of the systems approach had major ramifications on the development of how graphic design came to be practiced. By reference to the existing literature I have argued that the nature of the changes I identified have yet to be fully understood, let alone accounted for (see: ‘Introduction’, p. 13; and ‘Literature Review’, p. 77). As such, my project has set out to map how the way of practising graphic design changed during the period from 1945 to 1970 in accordance with the growth of corporate design communications.

Aim 1) To critically interrogate the relationship between corporate image-making, group practice, and graphic design professionalism within post-war Britain.

As I set out in the introduction to this thesis, the first aim of my project was to critically interrogate the relationship between corporate image-making, group practice, and graphic design professionalism within post-war Britain. I addressed this particular aim by following the list of objectives as laid out in the introduction to the thesis (p. 15). This involved drawing on the established literature to track the development of
programmatic corporate image-making. Particular consideration was given here to the growth of graphic design professionalism and the normalisation of group practice. From this initial work I developed a review of the evolving discourse within British corporate image-making (p. 96). In scoping the project, I conducted a pilot study of twenty-one consultant design groups active between 1945 and 1970, narrowing my selection down to just three groups based on an extensive range of criteria (see: 'Unit of analysis and selection of cases', p. 59). These groups would become the central case studies of the thesis, with their corporate image-making practices constituting the individual units of analysis under scrutiny. Next, I carried out an extensive scoping of the available archival resources relevant to each case study and conducted semi-structured interviews with surviving practitioners who practiced as members of the selected consultant groups. Having established a tentative link between systematic corporate designing and group practice, I put forward the hypothesis that the development of corporate image-making was closely interwoven with the growth of group practice in design, as well as the broader development of graphic design as a tenable work form. Though some scholars casually note the linkage between group work and corporate image-making (Middleton, 1967), or the significance of corporate image-making for the development of graphic design as a recognised activity of work (Bos & Bos, 2007), the triadic relationship between these phenomena had yet to be clearly or fully articulated. The explication of these three closely intertwined threads of historical development should therefore be understood as a key contribution of this research.

**Aim 2) To track how the emergence of corporate image-making impacted the materiality of practice for British graphic design consultants of the post-war era.**

The second aim set down in my introduction was with regard to tracking the emergence of corporate image-making to understand how it affected the materiality of practice for British graphic design consultants active in the post-war era. During the initial scoping of the research I had originally been interested in the aesthetic ramifications of a systems-based approach to branding (i.e. how design artefacts are impacted by the adoption of the systems approach), but my impetus soon moved sharply towards understanding how the routine practices of graphic designers were modified during this period. This analytical move was fundamental for the development of the project, as it led me to direct my attention on everyday practice routines, helping me to develop a better understanding of the changes that occurred within design practice during the
period. Moreover, this shift in orientation and emphasis resulted in a more original, distinctive project set apart from the current canon of literature. In turning the focus of attention to the materiality of everyday work life, I have thus been able to address how work tools (or technical entities) developed and deployed by designers contributed to changes in the dynamics of ruling relations between designers and their clients. Furthermore, the efforts of designers to codify and explicate the logic of their designs have been shown to relate to the perceived efficacy of design work, as well as the broader legitimacy of the discipline.

In taking a ‘materiality of practice’ approach to the research I have aligned myself with the contemporary tradition of practice theory set out by scholars such as Reckwitz (2002), Schatzki et al. (2005) and Nicolini (2012). This has meant prioritising practice as the basic unit of analysis for understanding organisational phenomena. In other words, I have chosen to focus on the micro-practices of graphic design consultants in order to establish how the patterns of practice within small design organisations changed during the study period. Following my set list of objectives (p. 15), I drew on the established literature to identify the typical practice-based routines of graphic designers active in the 1940s. My intent here being to understand the nature and dynamics of graphic design (or more accurately ‘commercial art’) practice at the beginning of my study period.

From the initial scoping of archival resources, I was able to identify technical entities (i.e. inscriptions of practice) mobilised in the performance of corporate image work, with each of the entities in question having had a performative role in the respective practices of the selected case study groups. Using a collective case study model, I triangulated data from my archival research sources and my semi-structured interviews in order to test the viability my findings. Over the duration of the research my attention has been increasingly led towards the material ‘stuff’ of practice, as this was found to be a more fertile source of data in terms of the processual complexity of practice. By comparison the semi-structured interviews provided subjective data around the attitudes and routines of practitioners and the organisational contexts within which they worked. Together these sources of data complemented one another, in as much that the archival inscriptions evidenced the micro-practices of practitioners, while the interviews provided a more supportive layer of data about the site or locale of the work, as well as the broader philosophies of the practitioners involved.
In adopting a collective case study model (Stake, 2005; Blaikie, 2009) I have undertaken a joint study, wherein several cases were researched that together represented the phenomenon of corporate image-making. As such, though each case study had its own intrinsic value (Stake, 2005), it was chosen as part of a collective that would enable generalisations to be made from the microscopic cases to the macroscopic phenomenon. I shall briefly summarise the findings from each of the three cases, before drawing out the recurrent themes and threads in order to build a better understanding of how corporate image-making practices developed more broadly during the period. Through the case studies investigated here I have presented several instances of individual practitioners grouping together to realise the possibilities of corporate image work. In so doing, these newly formed groups sought to gain jurisdiction over their field of work and to improve the perceived status and value of graphic design work. Consequently, the case studies presented here have traced detailed interconnections between these three threads of development, and have thus substantiated and explicated their contingent relationship during the period under study.

The three case studies

Having established the triadic interdependency between corporate image-making, group practice, and graphic design consultancy, I was able to question in more detail how the materiality of design practice developed in response to the outlined changes. By focussing in on the material apparatus of practice I have identified how different consultant groups responded to the opportunities of corporate image work.

Hans Schleger & Associates

The case of Hans Schleger & Associates (HS&A) shows how the actions of Schleger and his employees were closely governed by the advertising agency Mather and Crowther (M&C). Focussing on a pair of Guard Books compiled by the advertising agent as a record of the Mac Fisheries campaign, I have traced ruling relations within this working relationship between designer, client and advertising agency. Acting on behalf of their client, they set out ‘rulings’ to forbid particular design permutations. Thus, we saw how M&C governed HS&A’s corporate image-making practice, introducing regulations to constrain and control their creative work. This resulted in a tussle for power between
the client and the designer, with the advertising agency acting as a neutral intermediary between the pair. As a result of these conflicts the Mac Fisheries campaign was not applied with any great consistency, with the diverging visions of the different partners resulting in a fairly low level of standardisation by comparison to the tightly controlled corporate identities of the 1970s. Despite the hierarchical line of command faced by Schleger and his colleagues, they continued to approach the Mac Fisheries campaign with a certain dynamism and fluidity, playfully exploring different renderings of the firm’s original trademark. Hence, we see many subtle variations of the same logo appearing across a range of Mac Fisheries advertisements.

Through the example of the Mac Fisheries campaign we can begin to understand the difficulties involved in coordinating, controlling and implementing a nationwide corporate image scheme. Aside from the divergence of opinion between the designer, client and intermediary, we also saw issues in terms of the implementation of HS&A’s proposals. By closely examining the differences between Schleger’s posited advertisement designs, and those final prints that appeared in the public press, we find numerous discrepancies. So, whereas Schleger’s proposals demonstrate a sensitive and nuanced approach to typographic layout and space, the printed press reproductions appear ham-fisted by comparison, with much of the detail and order of the original layouts having been lost. Furthermore, the typefaces deployed by Schleger in his proposals are not reproduced according to his specifications.

Drawing on my semi-structured interviews I was able to demonstrate how different members of the Schleger team had been required to produce new versions of the fish characters originally illustrated by Hans Schleger himself. This underscored the particular issues involved when trying to align illustration work produced by different creative practitioners. We also saw how designers and typesetters working outside the Schleger studio had been tasked with producing design and marketing collateral for Mac Fisheries. In this instance it seems that the designer in question, Leslie Watson, was working independent of the Schleger operation, with no direct communication in place to ensure alignment between their design approaches. Elsewhere I identified typeset advertisements created for Mac Fisheries during the same period that bore no resemblance to the Schleger identity scheme. However, in spite of the many discrepancies and inconsistencies I identified, it was clear from the archival research that the scheme was considered a great success by the design community, with a
number of Schleger’s peers having commended the work. It was also featured extensively in the international design press.

Examining Schleger’s attitude to corporate design systems, we see him act as a reflective practitioner (Schön, 1983) shunning techno-scientific rationality to embrace a heterogeneous form of design coordination distinct from the typical homogeneity of standardised corporate systems. So, while Mac Fisheries sought to regulate the consistent reproduction of their trademark, Schleger’s ethos was to avoid strict standardisation and consistency. With this in mind, he intentionally used handwritten lettering for the Mac Fisheries designs. This was astute for two reasons. Firstly, it stopped the campaign from becoming repetitive and homogenous, with each instance of the lettering created anew. Second, the handwritten script directly referenced the traditional fishmonger’s chalk board, thus connecting his design back to the product at hand and insinuating a certain freshness which was especially desirable with regard to the seafood produce being publicised.

Schleger was said to have rejected the overt rationalisation of his creative work and was generally resistant to the standardisation of corporate design. So, while others were quick to embrace corporate standards manuals, HS&A worked persistently to create dynamic corporate image programmes that were coordinated, but never standardised. We saw how this approach could be traced back to his time in New York in the 1920s, with evidence suggesting that this particular method persisted well into the 1970s when he died. The coordinated corporate design of HS&A thus presents an example of a consultant group who embraced corporate design commissions on their own terms. As they gradually became more independent from the advertising business, they sought to redirect their practice away from powerful global corporations and towards organisations and institutions in the public and cultural sectors. In their work for these clients they embodied a designerly form of practical rationality, not so far removed from the ‘traditional intuitive methods’ of commercial artists.

**Henrion Design Associates**

By comparison to Schleger and his group, the evolutionary development of F.H.K. Henrion and Henrion Design Associates (HDA) demonstrates far more radical shifts in the ways and means of practising graphic design consultancy. Thus, we see Henrion and his colleague Alan Parkin developing a ‘new approach’ to practice in order to tackle the
scale and complexity of corporate image work. So, while Henrion the pre-war commercial artist was reported to have used ‘traditional intuitive methods’, Henrion, the post-war graphic designer fully embraced the principles of technical rationality, employing mathematically trained rationalisers and seeking to scientise the design process. The efforts of HDA to codify their practice were not merely an attempt to formalise their own methods, but also to marketise their process and to make their particular way of practising into a selling point. Given that HDA published on their methods in both English (Henrion & Parkin, 1968) and German (Henrion, 1968) it is likely that they influenced subsequent patterns of practice in Britain and beyond. Furthermore, their influence spread through those practitioners who had worked with HDA before going on to establish their own consultancies, with Sampson Tyrell (later Brand Union) being a strong case in point.

HDA deployed various material apparatuses in order to seek greater legitimacy for their work. The tools they developed allowed them to present their practice to clients as technically and scientifically robust, and thus beyond scrutiny. Much of their attention was directed to what they called the ‘pre-design stages’. Within the case study on HDA, the notion of mapping as a ‘collective enabling enterprise’ (Corner, 1999) was deployed in order to explain how complex information systems had been central to their methodology. The various mapping systems devised by HDA gave them control over the flow of project data, thus enabling them to direct the collaborative working relationship with their clients. Examples discussed included indexing systems developed to catalogue data about their client’s operations, as well as graphic diagrams conceived to re-present this raw data back to their clients in a more persuasive fashion. Following Corner (1999), I have used the notions of tracing, mapping and planning to question the different modes of inscription deployed by HDA in their work. HDA’s close control over the collection and shaping of data gave them a certain degree of power over their clients, enabling them to rule relations and act like kingmakers seeking to redistribute power within the organisations for whom they consulted. Yet these initiatives were not without complication, for as we saw in the case of the Post Office, a breakdown in communications led to much of the work being disregarded. Nevertheless, developments in this domain saw Henrion develop the strategic arm of his practice, moving gradually away from the basis of commercial art for which he had originally been known. While most of the new apparatuses centred around servicing the client, HDA also produced network planning tools which enhanced their capacity to manage
their own internal employees, carefully pre-planning project schedules, distributing staff, as well as estimating time and costings to their clients. This can be seen as a significant shift away from the ad-hoc methods of the individual commercial artist.

From the critical examination of their paper for the DIA Yearbook (1968) we can see how Henrion and Parkin developed a hyperbolic distinction between rational and intuitive methods, denigrating traditional ‘rule of thumb’ approaches as unfit for purpose and seeking to purge any sign of intuitive action from their own processes. Scholarship from the profession of nursing (Easen and Wilcockson, 1996) shows that this dichotomy was erroneous, given that intuitive decisions are not irrational by default; rather, the act of intuiting should be understood as an irrational process with a rational basis.

With Henrion and Parkin having successfully imposed techno-rational frameworks onto the pre-design stages of their work, their next move was to rationalise the act of innovation at the heart of their service. Their work on the KLM logo thus shows how creative decision making had tended to be made on a purely intuitive and instinctive basis. What was particularly interesting in this case was to see how these intuitive decisions were reframed to be presented as outcomes of a codified, technically rational process, when in actuality they had emerged from tacit, unplanned acts. This attempt to mask the human element of judgement and experience inherent in intuitive decision making thus reinforced the perceived illegitimacy of intuitive methods, as well as the apparent vulnerability of creative work. As a result, many of the practices developed at HDA can be understood as forms of risk management conceived to optimise their chances of success with their client and reduce any unwanted friction wherever possible.

**Design Research Unit**

By comparison to Schleger and Henrion, Misha Black and Milner Gray were well accustomed to group work before WWII, having engaged in some form of group practice since the 1920s. Whereas HS&A and HDA developed into one-man teams with a known personality at the head, the leadership of the Design Research Unit (the group of Black and Gray) was more evenly distributed from the outset, with the diarchy of Black and Gray leading the operation together with support from the founder partners Herbert Read and Marcus Brumwell. Through much of the 1950s pre-war commercial
artists had tended to be reliant on the advertising industry for work (just as HS&A and HDA had been), however, DRU’s dependency on advertising was different.

Paradoxically, the financial backing of Marcus Brumwell’s contacts at the Advertising Service Guild enabled the DRU to set out on a distinct and divergent path from the norm, with their strong financial underpinnings enabling them to operate independent of the advertising agents who ordinarily acted as intermediaries between clients and designers (just as in the first case study on HS&A). Given the relatively stable economic basis of their operation, the DRU were more forceful than others in setting out their ideological perspective, positioning themselves as a non-hierarchical, transparent and highly principled design consultancy (Cotton, 2012). So, although they had developed early corporate image programmes in the 1940s, much of their initial work during the post-war period centred on cultural and social reconstruction, with major commissions for exhibitions like ‘Britain Can Make It’ and the Festival of Britain. Although their staff numbers fluctuated in the early years, they were the only British design group of any real significant scale operating during the period. By the early 1950s the DRU had developed a positive reputation in Britain and abroad, but they failed to return a profit in their first decade of operation (Brumwell, 2010), a liberty no other British design group of the period could afford.

Although it appears that the DRU operated with a rupture between the graphic and architectural teams, with two departments split across separate floors of the workspace, the cross-disciplinary expertise within the group allowed them to take on distinctive commissions encompassing both two- and three-dimensional design. Such a set-up enabled them to distance themselves from the world of advertising and the idea of the commercial artist as a hired hand. Their early exhibition work set a precedent here, with the commission for The Civic Trust at Magdalen Street typical in this respect. The project reports and manuals prepared for their clients show how the DRU progressed from relatively soft, suggestive forms of governance flagged as ‘recommendations’, to stricter more assertive ‘rulings’ that forbid those implementing their ideas from straying from their specific intentions. The notion of inscription (Latour, 1986; Latour & Woolgar, 1986) was mobilised here to show how corporate image manuals can be interpreted as immutable mobiles (Latour, 1986) conceived to assert control over others from a distance. Here we see a marked shift by comparison to the case of Schleger who had been ruled by the advertising agent in their capacity as
intermediary. By comparison the DRU lay down rules and specifications to control other designers, applied artists and manufacturers.

Recurrent themes and threads: drawing together the cases

The fight for jurisdiction

Through the case studies presented here we can see how early design practitioners schooled in the arts had sought to develop design into a more respected, tenable activity of work independent of the advertising business. So, in the first instance, ambitious individual design practitioners set out to establish their own group practices. But during the initial operation of these groups, in the late 1940s and early-1950s, they continued to be reliant on commissions from the advertising industry. So, for example, between 1951 and 1962 Hans Schleger was contracted to the advertising agency Mather and Crowther, while F.H.K. Henrion took on the post of Visual Planning for Erwin Wasey between 1954 and 1958. In both these cases, these positions of stability within advertising were used as a stable basis from which to pivot-off in order to gain greater independence from the advertising industry and to move more fully towards independent group practice in graphic design. So, as we have seen in the case of Henrion, his corporate image work for KLM developed directly from the client contacts he made working at the advertising agency Erwin Wasey (Henrion, 1979; Bakker, 2011b).

Although Schleger and Henrion both sought to move away from the isolation of freelance commercial art work by establishing group consultancies, they did so in their own particular ways. So, while Schleger rejected the formalisation of design, preferring a more fluid, reflexive approach, Henrion embraced attempts to scientise design, adopting a Taylorist (Taylor, 1911) approach to the design process, wherein rationalisation was taken to extreme levels in a quest for efficiency, calculability, predictability and control – what Ritzer (1992) calls the four dimensions of ‘McDonaldization’. The divergence between those committed to the established idea of design as an artistic practice, and those keen to distance themselves from art (at least in certain business focused contexts) is especially pronounced here.
By comparison, the Design Research Unit developed from the initiative of Herbert Read and Marcus Brumwell, who had used the funding from their advertising contacts to persist with their own unique model of group consultancy. In this respect DRU were anomalous from other design groups of the era who existed on a less stable footing. The role of Read and Brumwell is especially unusual here, given that their involvement in the venture does not appear to have been only economically motivated, being driven, at least in part, by a sense of social duty. Given the relative scale of DRU, they were able to take on sizable commissions beyond the capacity of those smaller groups they competed against. These factors helped to set them apart, with questions of cost-efficiency a less pressing factor in the day-to-day operations of the firm. So, where Schleger and Henrion had needed to tackle financial viability as a primary concern, DRU could be freer spirited, striving to question the commercial orthodoxy as they did.

While early graphic design practitioners like Schleger and Henrion had, by the end of the 1950s, slowly began to gain some independence from the advertising industry, by the 1960s they were increasingly challenged by practitioners from beyond traditional design contexts. Take for example the development of Michael Farr’s design management business, ‘Michael Farr (Design Integration)’ (MFDI hereafter) (see testing case, Appendix 2, p. 330). The growth of MFDI can be considered indicative of the development of an increasingly contested field, with a broader base of practitioners from varied educational backgrounds now seeking to benefit from the opportunities of design’s growing status. In this way Farr is comparable with other entrepreneurial design consultants such as James Pilditch or Wally Olins. Like Farr, Pilditch led his own successful group Allied International Designers, while Olins led the influential consultancy Wolff Olins with his partner Michael Wolff. While Farr’s business only prospered for around a decade (Appendix 2), Pilditch and Olins both played major roles in the later proliferation of corporate image-making as a central tenet of the marketing mix. In the process they reconceptualised what it meant to practice as a design consultant. The examples of Farr, Pilditch and Olins, thus reflect a broadening out in the conceptualisation of corporate image-making, away from the earlier preoccupations of graphic design and the unification of corporate aesthetics, to a more fully rounded conception of the brand as a nexus of different design sensibilities beyond the conventional graphic veneer.
The designer as leader

With greater jurisdiction over their work came greater administrative responsibility for designers, as we have seen in the case of Misha Black who seemed to rue his own transmutation from the role of the designer to that of the design leader. According to Black (1967), the position he described as the ‘client/designer’ was one wherein the designer distanced themselves from the concerns of the drawing board in order to direct their energies to the management of their employees. Though Black and his partner Milner Gray came to accept the growing disjunction between the management of design and the more conventional production side (Case Study 3), many commercial artists of pre-war were not as willing to give over their active role in the production process. Thus, we saw Schleger (Case Study 1) and Henrion (Case Study 2) reluctant to cede the ‘hands-on’, craft-based aspects of design labour.

In each of these cases the practitioners in question adapted their role, as well as the skills and routines of their practice, to accommodate the collaborative group work required when handling unwieldy corporate image-making commissions. This is a key finding for my research, as it supports my initial supposition that the emergence of corporate image-making had significant impacts on the patterns of practice for design consultants. So, as I show through the thesis, individuals grouped together to handle ever more complex corporate image schemes. For Schleger, this meant adopting something akin to an atelier, or master and apprentice model, with the craft and artistry of design taking precedence over the formal codification of work life. Henrion, by comparison, emphasised the depth of specialist knowledge spread across his team, frequently referring to the trained mathematicians within his camp. Here Henrion directed his energies into the formalisation of work processes in a bid to appear more institutionalised to the corporate clients he wished to serve. For Black and Gray, group practice was not entirely unfamiliar, given that they had trialled group working first with Bassett Gray and then later with the Industrial Design Partnership. But whereas their earlier groups had operated as loose collectives of artists and designers, DRU, by comparison, sought to develop a more tightly-knit collaborative team ethos. Though this was largely successful, by the late-1960s the ethos and harmony of the group came under stress as the group took on more institutional tendencies.

Of the three cases studied here it is apparent that the central personalities heading each group came to have an important influence over the identities of the
collective groups they fronted. As a result, each of the businesses in question struggled to sustain themselves once the involvement of the founders became less certain. The DRU were the only group to have made significant attempts to impose a more distributed management structure. With the idea being that this would enable leadership to be reattributed and allow a succession to a younger generation. However, these efforts came late in their development as a group, with founder partners so deeply entrenched in their existing roles that they were unwilling, or perhaps unable, to step out of the limelight.

When HDA International became Henrion Ludlow Schmidt, Henrion stepped aside, taking on an advisory role that enabled Chris Ludlow and Klaus Schmidt to take the firm in new directions. There seems to have been little attempt to smooth this transition, with Ludlow and Schmidt moving the operation away from its long-standing base at Henrion’s home in Hampstead. It was perhaps the disjunction between the two phases of the group that had allowed its new incarnation to prosper, with the group still active until Schmidt’s passing in 2007.

Schleger by comparison appears to have had little desire to sell on his business, rejecting hierarchical systems outright and considering the practice a family to be nurtured, as opposed to a corporate institution to be sold on or sustained.

**Models of group practice**

In terms of practising in groups, we saw a varied range of models in the cases presented, from the informal and organic, to the more mechanical and codified. Thus, we had the case of Schleger, who rejected formal hierarchy, embracing instead the idea of his studio as a family and his employees as his children, or ‘kinder’. By comparison, we saw Henrion reporting on the new technocratic methods he had developed to coordinate both his design work and the collection of employees working under his command. Finally, we observed the case of the DRU, as led by Black and Gray, and their attempts to embrace a non-hierarchical and transparent group structure, where the values of all practitioners were considered equal. So, whereas Schleger and Henrion had operated their businesses as one-man teams, placing themselves as the central figureheads, the DRU relied on the diarchy of Black and Gray, with Read and Brumwell acting in support as business partners with a financial interest in the venture.
In their influential text *The Management of Innovation*, Burns and Stalker (1961) explain how technology firms of the 1960s had moved away from conventional ‘mechanistic’ forms of governance, to more flexible and ‘organic’ organisational structures better equipped to deal with growing instability and more rapid rates of change. Yet, as we saw in the case studies presented here, within the domain of design the inverse trend can be witnessed during the same period, with design organisations seeking to present themselves as *more* bureaucratic and rule governed than they had previously been. This is not to suggest that design practitioners moved from one extreme to another, but rather that they adapted gradually to more closely resemble the formalised structures and operations of their corporate clients.

According to Hage (1965), centralised and formalised organisational structures privilege efficiency gains above all else, whereas decentralised, unformalised structures are more well suited to fostering creativity and invention. Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) posit a similar perspective by reference to the aforementioned concept of ‘organizational ambidexterity’ (Duncan, 1976; March, 1991). They suggest that organisations that are highly flexible and adaptive in their approach can be simultaneously inventive and efficient. According to Hage’s (1965) model, the commercial art practices of pre-war can be understood as high on invention, but low on efficiency; whereas the increasingly technocratic corporate design practices of the post-war era can be understood as an attempt to find a more equitable balance between invention and efficiency – as per Tushman and O’Reilly’s (1996) organisational ambidexterity.

**From socio-cultural to economic capital**

As design slowly began to gain traction as a recognised professional activity it went through a process of increasing commercialisation, from which the highly prized cultural capital of commercial art came to be challenged by more explicit drives towards the imperatives of economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986). During this period the imperatives of some designers were radically modified, as they sought to rationalise design labour and manage the risks inherent in their work. Business principles thus began to take precedence over traditional design values and the principles of social
betterment that had initially followed in the aftermath of WWII. As we saw in the introductory sections on ‘Americanisation’ (p. 30) and ‘Professionalism’ (p. 33), many British design practitioners distrusted the increasingly commercialised nature of design in the 1950s and 60s, questioning whether the burgeoning corporate opportunities of the design world conflicted with their own sense of ethics and purpose.

Within the three case studies investigated we saw how the practitioners involved had engaged with corporate communication design in their own particular ways. So, whereas Schleger (and HS&A) was against standardisation and the all-powerful corporation, Henrion (and HDA) embraced the opportunities of big business, seeking to model his group on the institutions for whom they wished to work. Design Research Unit, meanwhile, gradually transitioned towards more techno-scientific methods as the group grew in scale and became more established. So, although they had once loathed the ‘stereotyped’ design treatment of chain stores, they gradually came to embrace corporate standardisation as a core facet of their approach to corporate image-making.

While those design practitioners rooted in specialist forms of craftsmanship had often struggled to balance commercial imperatives with their more high-minded craft-based principles (Sparke, 1983), this does not seem to have been the case for the emergent new design entrepreneur – as characterised by Pilditch (1970) and Olins (1978) – who appears to have had few qualms about the morality or ethics of design and consumption. The emergence of these increasingly entrepreneurial individuals (like Farr, Pilditch and Olins) forced art-school-trained design practitioners to direct their energies towards more strategic, business-minded endeavours in order to remain competitive and continue to have a say over the governance of their work. So although I have identified the emergence of the design entrepreneur as a significant occurrence due further scrutiny (see ‘Further research’ section, p. 280), I have also shown how individual commercial artists and designers transmuted towards new ways of practice which incorporated more entrepreneurial dimensions.

112 Others (Shaughnessy, 2014a) have also noted how the probity of early post-war designers was slowly eroded as corporate communications came to have an ever-greater influence over the design profession.
113 Sparke (1983, p. 75) reflects on the shifting focus of design consultancy Lloyd Northover – a design group formed in 1975 on a traditional art school basis – and their move away from ‘skilled work on the drawing board’ towards ‘research and analysis’ in an effort to combat the financial challenges of the recession of the period.
In spite of their efforts to be more business-like, many of the burgeoning design groups of the 1950s and 60s struggled with profitability. DRU, the first group to get going in Britain, had by 1951 become a firm of almost world-wide repute (Blake & Blake, 1969; Cotton, 2012). However the socio-cultural success of their work was not matched in economic terms, with records showing a loss over their first decade of operation (Brumwell, 2010, p. 51). Like many groups of the era they favoured a certain utopian idealism, with John Beresford Evans (cited in Brumwell, 2010, p. 56) describing them as ‘less of a business enterprise or a firm than a common way of thinking about design’. Still, in practice, they managed to grow their staff base and increase their turnover through the 1960s and 70s, posting profits between 1957 and 1969 (Brumwell, 2010; Cotton, 2012). But as they developed to become more viable in economic terms, their approach hardened. With more technocratic forms of governance and communication now in place, tensions began to emerge that put strain on the non-hierarchical ethos of the group (Black, 1964–76). So, the social idealism that was evident in their early endeavours and exemplified by the utopian exhibitions of the 1940s and 50s, slowly gave way to a more institutionalised culture of work. Black soon recognised that the rationale supporting design work had come to be at least as significant as the work itself, leading some practitioners to falsify the reasons for their decisions – much like we have seen in the case of Henrion Design Associates and their rationalisations of the KLM logotype. As Black (cited in Blake, 1983, p. 63) explains, ‘the acceptance of his [the designer’s] work will depend not on rational judgement but on his own powers of persuasion, on his capacity for convincing argument, which often must deliberately falsify the real reason for his decisions’.

Hans Schleger, meanwhile, is noted to have had a certain disregard for what Julier (2017) calls the economies of design, with his employees commenting on his disregard for cost efficiency. Thus, we were told how he visited his studio at weekends to calculate how many of the hours actually worked could reasonably passed on to their clients (interview, Appendix 1.1). In this sense Schleger accepted that certain costs could not be passed on to the client, treating his business as a labour of love rather than a strict profit-making enterprise. As the business operated from his home, younger assistants working were known to have acted as babysitters to his children, with family and creative life blurring into one (Schleger, 2001). Though F.H.K. Henrion had begun from a similar base to Schleger as a successful individual commercial artist, he embraced the opportunities of corporate image-making more fully, adapting his working practices to
reflect and benefit from changes in the industry. Having practiced commercial art with a sense of fluidity and individuality earlier in his career, his design methods now became more formalised and systematic. Though he lamented the demise of the poster as a heroic individualistic medium, he had been quick to capitalise on the economic possibilities of systematic corporate image-making. The group he had founded in 1951 were slow to develop at first, but by the late-1950s the vision of group practice became more fully realised with a slew of major corporate image-making commissions. As a consequence, HDA prospered well into the 1970s, before Henrion ceded control of the group in 1981.

Although design had become an increasingly viable career path in the post-war era, by the 1970s, many practitioners were becoming less optimistic about the possibility for design to make a meaningful contribution to the world. Looking ahead to the prospects of the coming decade, Misha Black writes in 1972:

The period of enthusiasm and self-confidence is ended. Few designers now believe that they can change the world by the excellence of their work. Even if they are comforted by the conviction that their activity influences the environment and is thus an aspect of the external forces which affect social development, they know that they are part of political and economic systems which permit execrable social conditions which are tolerated only because they are a fractional improvement on the past. (Black, cited in Blake, 1983, p. 258)

Black’s despondent attitude about the future prospects of the British design scene compare unfavourably with the optimistic principles that had underscored his earlier practice at the DRU. When they had first formed, DRU promoted themselves as having been established for a higher purpose beyond that of just financial gain, asserting their intent to serve the needs of consumers and society at large (Cotton, 2012); yet Black’s later pessimism indicates how radically some designers’ attitudes had changed. Designers now came to reluctantly accept that they were part of more complex systems that were often beyond their control, with Black rueing the increasingly commercialised nature of the design scene and complaining at how the designer’s ideas were hindered by the whims of their uneducated clients.

Writing in the early-1980s, design commentator James Woudhuysen (1981, p. 17) echoes Black’s sentiments about the state of the profession, claiming that: ‘In industry ruthlessness is the order of the day and in government the “wets” lose every Cabinet debate; in design, by contrast, ideology of any kind has long been dead.’ Moreover, contemporary commentators (Blauvelt, 2012; Van De Velden, 2012; Shaughnessy, 2014a) also note how designers’ control and authority over the corporate
design process began to wane from the mid-to-late 1970s onwards, with practitioners focused on strategy and design management coming to the fore and taking a commanding role in the management and direction of corporate design programmes. So, while designers of the 1960s had become accustomed to an unprecedented level of influence and control, this state of relations was relatively short lived. Van de Velden (2012) argues that designers’ diminishing control over corporate design work led many to seek alternate opportunities, ushering in a new era where the notion of the ‘designer as author’ was particularly celebrated and valorised – he scathingly suggests that in current times, so called, ‘important design’ is typically generated by the designer himself and serves as nothing more than a ‘commentary in the margins of visual culture’ (Van de Velden, 2012, p. 17).

Further research

As I have shown through this thesis, a ‘practice theoretical’ approach to research drawing on scholarship from the fields of Management and Organisation Studies (MOS), Actor Network Theory (ANT) and Science and Technology Studies (STS) has eminent potential for addressing design historical enquiry. The tools and methods I have drawn on in this research project thus provide a methodological toolkit for those researchers wishing to examine the practice-based routines of design organisations operating in the past, present or future. While some scholars may view the apparatus of everyday work as boring or unappealing, in their ability to script stable and routine performances, such entities can be considered ‘the bedrock of modern capitalism’, as Thrift (2005, p. 3) explains. As such, those scholars attempting to understand the tendencies of corporate design practitioners would do well to consider the material apparatuses upon which these practices depend.

Through the examples presented in the case studies here we have seen how various material apparatuses were used to exert control within corporate communication design work. In these examples there were several instances where the moral or social basis of British design came under threat from growing commercial pressures. Given these findings, I argue that the practice-based routines of design practitioners operating between 1945 and 1970 can be productively interpreted as
antecedents to the neoliberalised forms of design practice that followed in later decades (Julier, 2013, 2017; Escobar, 2018). My thesis can thus be interpreted as a pre-history of such neoliberal design practices; with this particular interpretation suggesting that a subsequent study should be made to link the ‘pre-history’ of corporate design (1945–1970), to the increasingly neoliberal concerns of design practitioners working from the 1970s onwards.

While group practice in design became more common during my own study period (1945–1970), the number of consultant design groups seems to have increased ever more rapidly in subsequent decades. As the number of groups in operation began to rise, so too did the relative scale of these groups, with staff numbers increasing in accordance with the global expansion of design offices. This thesis has sought to establish the state of ruling relations within early graphic design groups in Britain, but further work is required to better establish how these power structures evolved over time. This work could be highly valuable, for as this thesis has shown, the ways in which design practices are governed is closely interwoven with the imperatives of designers’ work. As such, by examining practices of governance within design consultancies, the motives driving design work can be revealed, making plain for whom such design work has been conceived, whether it be to serve the needs of: society, individual citizens, or corporate clients.

The history of corporate design and its management

There is more work to be done to understand how the management of design developed as corporate design practices reached new levels of economic significance in the 1970s and 80s. Michael Farr provides an important testing case (Appendix 2) of the initial emergence of ‘design management’ as a discipline, but his practice was not sustainable long term, and in many ways his model of practice seems to have been anomalous by comparison to what followed. So, where Farr had established an independent design management consultancy acting as a separate business entity positioned between designer and client (Appendix 2), what followed would, on the whole, appear to have been a closer imbrication between design and management practices within the design organisation as entity (see for example, the case of Pilditch’s group, Allied International Designers, or Olins’s firm, Wolff Olins). Further work is needed here focussing on the intersection of these two practices – designing and managing – in order to establish
their historical interrelationship and the impacts they have had upon the performance and management of design. Although there has been a range of scholarship surrounding the theorisation of design management (Martin, 2009; Neumeier, 2009) and the idea of ‘managing as designing’ (Boland & Collopy, 2004), a more detailed practice theoretical approach to the study of the subject’s history could reveal more about how the patterns of practice developed in this area. Several strands of research could be developed here, drawing on the initial investigative work I have conducted on Michael Farr’s design management business (Appendix 2) as a starting point. These strands could include:

*The design entrepreneur*

The emergence of entrepreneurially minded design practitioners from outside conventional design contexts reflects a broadening out in the way that design has been conceptualised (Findeli & Bousbaci, 2005). This is evident in more recent developments, with Service Design, Strategic Policy and Innovation Management all developing as recognisable, independent disciplines. So, while design had originally been understood narrowly as a practice dependent on craftsmanship, after WWII it became increasingly understood in broader terms, reflecting Herbert Simon’s (1981, p. 129) contention that anyone who ‘devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones’ is a designer. These changes mirror developments in the way that branding practices have been conceptualised too, with Olins (1979) arguing that the ‘new’ corporate identity of the 1970s constituted a more fully-rounded behavioural form of identity, as opposed to the shallow aesthetic preoccupations of earlier corporate image work. Olins thus underscores the need for well-rounded strategic branding design practitioners with skills that transcend a concern for just the visual.

One particular strand of research could look at how the management of design developed in relation to the growth of corporate communication design activity. A direct line of enquiry here would be to trace the emergence of the entrepreneurial design practitioner, looking at how the pioneering work of practitioners such as Farr, Pilditch and Olins impacted subsequent patterns of practice. Such a study would need to be

114 Farr is significant for his relationship with a number of practising designers who went on to become significant ‘players’ in the industry and it would be reasonable to deduce that their interactions with Farr and his experiments in managing their work had an influence on their own approaches to managing design work – most notable here are: Michael Wolff (Wolff Olins); Crosby, Fletcher, Forbes (later to become Pentagram); John McConnell (Pentagram); and Dick Negus (Negus & Negus).
carefully tailored and nuanced in order to identify meaningful insights about the patterns of practice in these organisations and how they developed and changed over time. A historical study of the management of design within practices such as MFDI (Farr), Allied International Designers (Pilditch), and Wolff Olins (Olins), would certainly help to develop a better understanding of how the complex intertwinement of different management and design practices impacted upon the concerns and imperatives of design practitioners.115

**The designer as strategist**

Established research (Sparke, 1983; Brassett & O’Reilly, 2015; Calabretta, Gemser & Karpen, 2016) supports the notion of the designer increasingly removed from the ‘coal face’ of design craftsmanship. For example, Sparke (1983, p. 75) explains how some design practitioners became so far removed from design ‘in the “craft” sense’ that by the 1970s they were ‘business consultants in all but their name’. Following this line of thought, a further strand of research would delve deeper into the transmutation of the craft-based design practitioner away from the concerns of the drawing board and towards those of the board room. This thesis has made a valuable contribution in this respect, with the three case studies presented here examining practitioners who straddled a concern for craftsmanship with a concern for management. Thus, we saw how different design practitioners responded and adapted to the tectonic changes that underlay the development of the profession. Still, more work in this area would help to develop a fuller impression of the period, as well as a better sense of the challenges presented to those commercial artists who preferred to remain working in a more isolated, individualistic way, while still engaging with corporate design commissions. It would certainly be interesting to see how art school-trained designers remained competitive in relation to more entrepreneurially minded business-school graduates.

Aside from matters of leadership and higher-level governance within corporate design practice, there is also the issue of the stratification of leadership to consider. For example, the case of the ‘project manager’ as an internally situated intermediary operating between designer and client is interesting in terms of the balance of

115 In the case of Wolff Olins there is an extensive body of oral history research (Roberts, 2001) to draw upon as a starting point. Another group to add to this list would be Pentagram, with Peter Gorb’s (1978) monograph on their work providing a useful entry point.
management and design expertise that Sparke (1983) alludes to. The education and ways of practice of the design project manager have been seldom considered, with the lack of attention directed towards this role curious given the seemingly powerful position project managers hold in the performance of design work – this is an issue that Dorland (2009) carefully pinpoints, but one that would be worthy of further critical evaluation.

The theorisation of design and management

Finally, a further strand of research could involve tracking how the theorisation of design management developed historically through the work of individuals like Michael Farr, Peter Gorb, and Naomi Gornick. Michael Farr has been credited as a key progenitor of ‘design management’, while Gorb is known to have pioneered the teaching of design management at the London Business School (Gorb, 1990). Elsewhere Gornick’s work at the Royal College of Art, and later Brunel University, is due further scrutiny (Aldersey-Williams, 1997), particularly in terms of her interest in strengthening the management capabilities of designers, as well as championing the idea of the designer as strategist (Gornick, 1998). Part of this wider initiative would carefully untangle the historical relationship between the management of design and design management as two interconnected but distinct concerns, one focusing on the value of design to management, and the other on the value of management to design.

Branding as a bridge between graphic design and advertising

In the thesis set out here I have paid particular attention to the different professional roles at play within corporate design work. Part of my focus has been directed to an explication of the interrelationship between advertising and graphic design practices. While I have argued that the activity of graphic design became a tenable work form as a by-product of advances in corporate image-making (and thus the two activities were contingent on one another), it is unclear how this relationship developed over subsequent decades. The findings of my research show how graphic designers used corporate image-making practices as a means to gain jurisdiction and competitive advantage over the advertising agencies that they had previously relied upon. By adopting a more rigorous, systematic and technical design approach they were able to establish their work as distinct from that of interrelated but competing marketing
professionals. Corporate design strategy was thus developed as a long-term business
endeavour distinct from the more cyclical nature of the advertising campaign.

Further work could be done here to trace how the relationship between
advertising and graphic design has developed since the 1970s, with particular attention
paid to the role of both parties in the development of corporate branding practice. As
was evident from the case studies presented here, graphic designers in post-war Britain
stole a march on advertising practitioners by claiming corporate image-making as their
own unique domain. They did so by emphasising the enhanced recognition and loyalty
they could develop for their clients by coordinating their corporate image (as we saw in
the historical literature that preceded the case studies). During the period studied here
graphic designers thus came to dominate corporate image-making, but their relative
monopoly over the domain did not last long, with the practice soon becoming more
fiercely contested.

In recent times, the distinction between advertising agencies and corporate
design firms has blurred, with businesses from both camps competing for work in a
terrain now referred to as ‘branding’ (Anon, 2011). In spite of the increased competition
between corporate design firms and advertising agencies, each continues to exhibit their
own distinct occupational formulae and routines (Crowley, 2005). For example, it is
notable that advertising firms have strongly entrenched patterns of practice that revolve
around occupational roles such as the ‘planner’, ‘copywriter’ and ‘creative’. But again,
more could be done here to understand how these specific job roles have influenced the
treatment of the ‘brand’. So, for example, it would be constructive to identify precisely
what is distinctive about the way that advertising agencies handle brands, by
comparison to the way that branding agencies have handled them.

Work is also needed here to connect the early history of corporate image work
that I have examined in this thesis with the history of advertising and particularly the act
of planning as developed by practitioners like Stanley Pollitt (Feldwick, 2000) and
Stephen King (Lannon & Baskin, 2007). Furthermore, it would be interesting to see how
Farr’s conception of ‘design management’ (more properly understood as the
management of design) compared with management practices within advertising
agencies. A further thread of research might take a more global perspective, examining
how ruling relations within design and marketing differ from country to country. For
example, Olins (Anon, 2011) suggests that while Britain moved away from the model of
the advertising agency as the dominant supplier and conduit for communication
commissions, that this model continues to persist in other countries such as India and Poland.

Summary

Through a combination of archival research and semi-structured interviews, this thesis has articulated how the development of corporate image-making impacted the patterns of practice for consultant graphic designers in Britain during the 1950s and 60s. Given the broader practical, historical and theoretical implications of the work, I argue that the contribution to knowledge should be considered threefold.

This chapter has concluded the thesis by providing an overview of the enquiry, its contributions and limitations, along with possible directions for future research. The chapter was comprised of four sections. The first reviewed the overriding aims and objectives of the project. I briefly reviewed the findings from the three selected case studies, examining how each group had responded to the burgeoning opportunities of corporate image-making, with some radically modifying their approach to practice, and others embracing the discipline without necessarily compromising their ideals.

Next, I sought to synthesise the findings from the case studies in order to ‘zoom out’ and draw connections between the themes and threads that emerged during the course of the enquiry. Four key strands of connection emerged here. The first regarded designers’ struggle for jurisdiction within a competitive marketplace, examining how graphic design consultants developed consultant group practices while competing against more well-established advertising firms. The second strand reviewed how commercial artists had transmuted to become design leaders, establishing power and control over their employees, clients, and collaborators, and thus ruling relations within the workplace. The third strand compared the models of group practice enacted by the design consultancies, focussing on their organisational structure and operational methods. Meanwhile the fourth and final strand concerned how the imperatives of graphic design consultants shifted during the study period, with the evidence suggesting that economic capital came to be more highly prized than cultural capital, reversing earlier trends.
In the final section of this chapter I set out possible directions for further research. Firstly, I argued that this thesis should be considered a pre-history of neoliberal design practice. As such, a natural development would be to follow-up this ‘pre-history’ with a future study focused on the neoliberal design practices that emerged during the 1970s, 80s and 90s. I went on to examine a range of opportunities within this particular frame, looking at: the emergence of the entrepreneurial design practitioner, the transmutation of the designer-craftsman to the design leader, the management of design within design consultancies, the stratification of design leadership, and the historical development of design management and its theorisation. Lastly, I argued for more research focused on the liminal spaces between design and other interrelated marketing practices. So, for example, I set out the possibility of further branding-based research which would examine how advertising and graphic design professionals competed for work in the fields of corporate identity and branding from the 1970s onwards. It is exciting to see where the different opportunities opened up by this thesis could be taken on next.
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Appendices

Appendix 1. Semi-structured interviews

Appendix 1.1) Interview with Pat Schleger

Edited transcription of interview with Pat Schleger, 14 December 2011, at the Schleger home and studio, London. Questions by the interviewer, David Preston, set in bold italic text.

[Speaking on ‘Pro Industria’ catalogue] I don’t know whether you saw this in the AAD. This was the cover, and it was a spirally bound brochure … square. That’s a Gropius car, then there was an interior done by Mies van der Rohe. So, this was promoting modern design in Germany.

**Were Pro Industria a company?**

I don’t know. They may have been a group of people who were all in the Bauhaus tradition, that doesn’t mean to say they were there, because Hans was never there… he was in the ordinary art school in Berlin. Some people write and say he was at the Bauhaus just because he was in that modern design area, but he was never there, he was at an ordinary art school.

**Do you think that was indicative of the influence of the Bauhaus, or was the same thing happening in other places?**

Well it was certainly happening all over Germany, well not over Germany, because the first Bauhaus was in Weimar.

**Would you tell me more about Migros, the Swiss supermarket you mentioned on the telephone?**

He must have been the first person in Switzerland to do a chain that was all the same – lovely stuff too. It has sort of gone in reverse now, now that he’s dead and there is no one to keep it as he envisaged it. When I first when to Switzerland – Walter Herdeg the editor of Graphis, was a great friend of ours so we did go once or twice – it was at its height then, lovely packaging, everything again all cohesively designed. It was a joy to go in Migros. Now that’s got prettified, which is a shame. Sainsbury’s took a leaf out of our BSC packaging and was very simple in those days, but now it has gone to pieces really. That era has disappeared.

**Did he manage all the things going in on the studio and direct activities?**

Yes, he did, he was a marvellous art director I think. We’d be pasting up these things and he would say: ‘Mr Hecht, I think if you just moved that another 10 points’, you know, this kind of thing. So yes, he did keep his eye on everything, obviously, he didn’t want anything to go out of here that he didn’t think was as good as it could have been.

**Was there anyone who worked here that was not a designer that would have helped managing or with secretarial duties?**

Oh yes, we always had a secretary, a full-time secretary then, who did do all the letters and filing, and work cards. She had some idea of how long we had spent on a job, but it was hours… I mean really hours… we were certainly not cost effective as Mrs Thatcher called it, no way.

**Would the secretary keep on top of scheduling and time management?**

Well to some extent, yes, because everything we did for Mathers had a deadline, it was all newspapers then, they were only just going into television when we parted company. We did something at the beginning of television for Mac Fisheries, practically one of the last things we did.

**Would some record of that still exist?**

Well, I once asked about Mather and Crowther archives. They said they chucked everything away before 1960.

**Well I am going to the History of Advertising Trust (HAT), near Norwich tomorrow to look at Mather and Crowther’s guard books from the mid 1950s.**

Also, there is someone who works at HAT who apparently did lettering for Mac Fisheries, but didn’t work for Hans. I will have to report back to you.
We were talking about the secretary weren’t we… Hermann, who was as it were the studio manager I suppose – we never gave ourselves titles – he would probably keep track of what sort of adaptations and ads had to get to Mathers at what times, I expect he did that.

So, he had some minimal seniority?
Yes, he did definitely I think, while he was here.

Did someone replace him in that respect?
There was another chap who replaced him.

Was it ever considered that you might do that, as you were such a long serving employee?
Well I much preferred doing the work. Nor, I didn’t really do it. As far as billing, which poor Hans couldn’t bear, but he had to come in on a Sunday with a chap from our accounts firm to help him do all the billing. But he hated it. He took that on rather than someone else. Well he had to decide, because we always worked much longer than we could possibly charge for. It helped having these time cards which we kept, we’d put down Mac Fisheries, three hours, maybe, Raven, two hours, that sort of thing, so he an idea, he could tot it up, or I expect the secretary did that, so that he knew how many hours we had spent, so he had to make a decision about then what he would charge. He couldn’t really charge by the hour.

You mentioned you parted ways with Mather and Crowther, was there something that happened that triggered this?
Yes, there were people coming up who didn’t like the arrangement. So Gordon Bogan, who I think was the chairman of Mathers, he and Hans got on very well, you know we used to go out for dinner and that. He said: ‘You know Hans, I think you should quit because I think one or two of the new people coming up would rather not keep that arrangement. So Gordon Bogan, who I think you should quit because I think one or two of the new people coming up would rather not keep this arrangement going because it’s too much trouble to have somebody from outside.’

So, they wanted to take control of it all in-house?
I think so, yes. So actually, it was a bit awkward, Fisons Pest Control [another Mathers client] wanted to keep Hans, but I think they came to an amicable agreement and it was transferred to Service Advertising in Knightsbridge.

Was Finmar in the 1950s?
Yes, we were doing it at the same time as Mac Fisheries.

But not through Mathers?
No, through Finmar itself.

It’s interesting that you had these two channels of work. Was it difficult for Hans?
No, he liked the challenge. We may have got them [Finmar] through the Design Council, because clients used to go there and say: ‘We want somebody to do our designs and who would you recommend?’. I have a feeling Finmar came through that source.

How would Hans have have presented these designs? Would he have taken the lead in presenting the designs to the client?
Yes.

Would there be any record of that today, in terms of the presentations to clients, would it all have been in his head, or would he have typed up a manuscript?
No, we would have done all these as exact roughs as it were, then they would have been silkscreened if it was a short run. There was a time when we were doing a special offer poster for Mac Fisheries once a week. They’d phone up the copy, ‘Fresh Haddock’ or ‘Oysters’ or whatever it was, then we’d do it in a couple of days and they’d have it silkscreened for the next week.

How about at the beginning of the process when Hans would have to sell the idea, as it were?
Well that was always done at Mathers when we were working for them, but if it was Finmar, it was here.

Would that have been done with slides?
Oh no, actual roughs, which were pretty well the finished thing.

He wouldn’t have planned out what he was going to say?
I don’t think so I think he had it in his head.

The brief wouldn’t exist anymore I suppose?
No, I suppose he used to right a report as to why we had done things. I’m not sure about Mac Fisheries, but later on we wrote reports for BSC… I don’t think we did for Finmar. It was person-to-person, much more individual in those days. When we started working for Manchester, a place like a polytechnic existed on reports and I had this duty of writing these boringly lengthy reports and we had meetings up there with the Faculty Head and who knows what, and I had to come back and write these reports for them.

Would these reports have been discarded?
Yes, I wouldn’t have kept anything like that.

Having spent time in a number of archives it is clear that it tends to be the designs that are preserved, but the documents substantiating the work are barely evident at all.
Well mostly it was Hans having the original ideas and mostly putting it down on paper with drawings. I think when we had this much more personal contact, even with Mathers really, the whole scene was a bit different, it wasn’t so cut and dry. It was a bit more free and easy.

Also, I think the thing that’s lacking now in advertising is humour, people wanted to make it fun and light hearted, now it’s hard sell and you have to have all these reports and raison d’êtres. I mean, I remember once Hans came – he had meetings where he’d show all this Fisons stuff – and they’d say: ‘Now tell us about it Mr Schleger’; and he’d say: ‘Your clients in a newspaper won’t have a long report about why we have done it like this and nor will I give you one, if it doesn’t work when it’s in the paper, then it’s no good. Wait till you get the sales result’.

With Fisons there was often a black line or something… it was all pasted up with cow gum so you could take it off very easily. I remember once he came back and said: ‘They asked me why I’d put this black line down the middle of the ad’. So I took it off the rough and said: ‘That’s why I put it there’. He very much thought if you don’t understand it and like it as it is, I can’t really convince you to like it. It’s either going to work for you when it’s in a newspaper, and whether your sales going up and down, or it’s not. There isn’t really any point in me giving you long explanations of why I did it.

I’ve been looking at Henrion. He seems to take the opposite approach. He’s trying very hard to sell the idea and convince the client that this is what is right. Well it wasn’t really Hans’ approach at all.

Did you ever do a [corporate identity] manual or anything like that?
No. Hans always said they’d be outdated by the time they were used. He was always for moving on. He wouldn’t want anything set in stone. He thought why not change it, why not go on developing something you started, instead of thinking this is it.

Presumably he still thought order and unity were important in some way?
Yes, well these have a quality of something in them, like taking a photograph and using it in all sorts of different
ways. Then you go on to something else. But it’s what you see that matters, in the newspaper. You don’t get an explanation next to it. Why this was done like that. He was very conscious of the public, the receiving end.

It seems to me that the work you were producing as a studio has a delicate balance between consistency and variety… everything looks unified, but each individual item is interesting, and it works in and of itself.

Yes, it is part of a whole as well, but it isn’t all the same.

And there was no written or codified structure to maintain this holistic appearance. Do you think you ever strayed too far from base with this?

That I don’t think I can answer. Hans was the mind behind what we all did. It’s a fine balance.

Fisons seems less coordinated to me, but maybe it wasn’t intended to be that way?

Well I think it was so diverse. Incredibly diverse. Weed killers for hundreds of different things, pineapple tea, all these other things we used to protect crops. It was worldwide and pretty diverse.

Was there an attempt to coordinate it?

It had a more subtle cohesion. It wasn’t all fish, it wasn’t all one thing. Pest Control still had a little logo that was always there, modest in its way.

How about with your client Ravens, if you had copy, would that all be generated by you?

Oh no, we wouldn’t write copy. They didn’t have advertising, they just had these show cards.

You mentioned before how you weren’t allowed to do advertising for anyone else other than Mothers. How would that have worked with Finmar for example?

Well they didn’t do newspaper advertising.

Was it specifically newspaper advertising?

Yes, I think so. Television was only just coming in.

In terms of the expansion into television… this makes me think of ‘total design’ crossing many media. How did you handle the multi-disciplinary aspect of total design?

Well we didn’t really do television, but it was pretty total. We did everything, stationery, vans etc.

Would you have had to draw in other expertise into the studio to help on such tasks?

We did make up a model of the shop in plasticine showing how to use all the things they thought they needed: indoor posters, showcards.

Were you improvising, in a sense, as you went along?

We used to have working drawings of the transport fleet. A van would come around here and we’d rush out and paste on these white waves we’d made out of cartridge paper. Then we’d measure up what spaces between the waves and all the rest of it… where handles were. For the bigger ones we just did working drawings.

This is a nice piece of typography [points to Mac Fisheries work on table], it’s the detailing that Hans was so good at, and the space between the lines, all the subtleties of good typography.

When it came to the later work with Manchester and Edinburgh, did Hans still sign the work?

Sometimes he did, sometimes he didn’t. With ads it might have been that we didn’t have time, or he might have been out.

Some of the Manchester stuff, it seems to become more photographic. You wouldn’t expect to see Hans’s signature on this.

No. Well we worked with an excellent photographer called Alan Murgatroyd.

Did you ever have the scenario where you created a design system and someone else took on your designs?

I don’t know what happens. We never worked on Raven after the owner Bernhard died. His sons took over and they had their own ideas.

Would these things [referring to ephemera on table] have been conceived at the same time?

Well no, as they wanted them. Bernhard would ring up and say I want a wrapper for a pair of socks.

So would the system have been established at the beginning?

Hans would have chosen the colours from the start, there were two show cards at the beginning.

Did Hans have particular views on corporate identity as it developed?

Very much. Well it snowballed didn’t it. He very much got on with his own work. He did write articles about it when he was asked to, because he had very strong feelings about it.

Corporate Identity seems to have been a thread in your work, do you feel your approach to it was different to other studios?

Well we were at the beginning of it, and then it took off. Lots of people did it, because then people realised it had a value to make a coherent image of a campaign.

It seems after the war design groups became more common…

Hans did have an assistant at the beginning. But it was an affluent time once we pulled out of the war. The whole country was back on its feet and quite affluent. So then people advertised more. Because there was an upbeat feel, and there was money around then for the first time for a long time, they spent. So they wanted to advertise because it was what you did. The affluence that began to come made people a bit more daring to experiment. When times are tight they think well it has all got to succeed straightaway. Whereas then they thought, if it doesn’t, alright we’ve wasted a bit of money, but then we can do something else. So you get more freedom when there’s a bit more money sloshing around. When there isn’t they get a bit frightened and they think well I have my scheme like the one I’ve seen over there.

Do you think corporate identity came out of advertising?

Well it is all advertising in some sense. Spreading your name, but there are all sorts of things you can do.

It seems Hans got his freedom through the advertising industry, or lots of his work was coming that way?

Well the newspaper advertising was coming that way. Mac Fisheries was complex, because they risked having the whole show, for them it was a risk, very much so, to spend all this money on having a cohesive image. But it worked for them. It is a bit of a risk, if you go for it the rewards are probably better. But to convince somebody of that is not easy. I’m not in touch with advertising now.

I have been reading a range of contemporary design criticism on the relationship between design and advertising. They are thought of as very different professions by the people in the professions today, but design critics tend to suggest they are one and the same thing.

Well they should be, but probably it’s not how it has gone now. I can’t really comment on that.
Was there usually a mix of men and women working in the studio?
I think there were probably more women than men.

Would that have been unusual for the time?
Hans wasn’t that kind of male, if you know what I mean. He probably didn’t care at all what sex anybody was.
Appendix 1.2) Interview with Alan Parkin


Can you talk a bit about how you came to work with Henrion?
I met him at a party, it was some girl at the Courtauld who was having a party and invited me. There were all sorts of people there, including Henrion, who I had admired from a distance. I grew up in the midlands and the only thing I knew about smart London stuff was what I read in magazines or heard on the radio. Henrion had done a series of advertisements for Windsor and Newton, or Reeves, I forget which, where there was a smart picture of him in his bow tie smiling, working with Reeves poster colours or something... saying: `I find them excellent'. It was in *Art and Industry*, a wonderful magazine. From being a school boy I had this building admiration for Henrion particularly, but also many of the other designers too. I knew who he was. This strange name F H K Henrion, what kind of name is that? I did meet him at this party and started talking to him about what I had been doing... I'd had a year in Italy, a scholarship post Cambridge where I was trying to do something between graphics and logic really. Elaborate thing it didn't come to anything. He was very interested, because he was interested in all sorts of things.

It so happened he had just landed this job for KLM, and was really quite alarmed about how it was all going to be done and he saw the opportunity of getting somebody in to help on that side of things, the organisation and the writing stuff. He said: `what are you doing?'. At that time I was production editor at the Architects Journal. I'd been there about a year. He said: `would you like to come and work with me?'; and I said: `sure I would'. It was as simple as that. We got going straight away on the KLM things.

I was fairly good on the graphics side... I was a bit too careless I wasn't a professional standard for lettering or typography or anything like that. I'd always had an interest in that, I knew what was what. It was really this organisation, presentation, that stuff.

That's how I met him. He bought that lovely house and studio in the war when there were all sorts of funny things happening and the place at Capel. Julian Huxley [biologist] lived next door but one and Fred Uhlman, the painter, was up the street, it was a nice Hampstead thing. The studio was the backroom at that time. Later, Richard and Sue Rogers were living in the basement with their first baby I think, and Norman Foster lived somewhere close by. And that was Team 4. They'd done a house for Richard's Aunt or something like that, but hadn't done very much. So Henrion got them to do the studio at the back, which was the same principles that they've stuck too all along. You order everything out of a catalogue and make sure that the things all fit like that, and you leave it all bare and painted. Of course, the classic thing is it always leaked from the roof and they had to keep coming and seeing why the window seals weren't working. But that was the nice studio that you don't see from the front.

There were two or three people there, there was David Varley, I think Christine Hall was there when I started. He had his smart studio in the front always full of cigar smoke and these bookcases that went around. There was Daphne who was a sculptor who spent all her time in her studio in the back in the garden. She did nice terracotta sculptures. I think it is still there in the front garden, a girls figure, full size in ciment fondue. She was keen to use ciment fondu which was a new thing at the time. The household was run by Mrs Goodall, a Yorkshire woman, married to Bob Goodall who was an ambulance driver opposite. Mrs Goodall was the down to earth no-nonsense Yorkshire woman who looked after the children and the dog and made the breakfast and lunch. She was the housekeeper and she always used to bring up the coffee and biscuits for the boys and girls upstairs. It was a very cosy, small thing. There were a lot of people who came and went through the staff. Henrion was very thoughtful, kind and generous on his secretarial side, there were various women who were unfortunate in one way or another, he did really good things. There was Norma Kitson, whose husband had been a famous case of opposition to apartheid in South Africa. He'd been locked up for fifty years or something horrible. She didn't stay all that long. She started her own typesetting business. There was poor Margo, another unfortunate divorcee, her husband had been a diplomat or something. There was Tempe Davis. There were a number of different people.

The designers were either students who came along and would work for wages, or there were one or two steady, older ones. Brian Grimley who'd been the art editor of design magazine. He got in the way of drinking too much. Excellent magazine designer with his own system of grids. He got fired, or withdrew. Henrion gave him a job for quite a while to get back on his feet. There was Maurice Godding who was ferociously convinced of the rightness of communism. He'd been at the new Bauhaus, Ulm. He'd done the proper Hochschule course and was a dab hand at the smartest modern typography. Henrion steadily gave him work. Ernest Hoch was another one who was not all that successful in his commercial things and was always on with this typographic rationalisation that nobody else took very seriously. Henrion was very loyal and supportive of his things in the SIAD and he did quite a bit of work for McAlpine and things like that.

There was a certain amount of interchange. Angela Reeve had been at DRU, she left and came to us. Brian Grimley had been at *Design* magazine and came to us. The students were straight from studentship, some of them were ambitious and some weren't. A chap called John Harris who avidly learnt everything he could from Henrion – particularly on the commercial side – he was always doing freelance in the evening and then in the end he started his own business, with fair success.

There was a South African chap called John Cleal. He was a good salesman and a good commercial head and all that. He did quite well with Henrion on the sales and presentation side. Almost too good he was, because he was always angling to go off on his own, taking one or two of the clients with him, which he did in the end... went to Wales and did quite well.

We knew what other people were doing, it was always a sort of news gossip thing, have you seen the new thing that DRU, or so-and-so have done. We all read the magazines, *Graphis*, and other expensive international magazines. There was a great buzz with the Japanese Olympic games, the chap who did that [Kamekura]. The different pictograms for each sport, that impressed us all. What they were doing in Switzerland, Germany and Austria was always much admired. Muller-Brockmann was a sort of superman figure.
How nice it must be to have clients who will let him do all those things. That was always in the print area. And in those days print was completely different. There were the old printers. There were printers who went in for the smart world of design, and would do bleed on all pages and who would make no bones about getting the right monotype types and so on. Westerham Press made a thing of doing good printing for the modern designers. It was still a thing of consciously, deliberately bringing modernism to the people. It wasn’t really to the people, nobody cared about the people. It was an elitist sort of thing. But to bring it is what they had been doing from the Bauhaus onwards in some parts of the continent. And with Henrion having had those years in Paris and coming as a foreigner – well all of those people, they were pretty well all foreigners apart from Games and James Gardner. DRU was a bit different, they were always very upmarket, very well connected. They weren’t foreign.

Were there other agencies you remember at that time?

Down in Belsize Park there was James Gardner who was doing much the same as Henrion, but not so successfully. He had a small studio where he did exhibition design, graphic design and occasionally posters. I had a bit to do with him, one of Henrion’s jobs was Philips. Philips sponsored and paid for a great big museum in Eindhoven called the Evoluon. The bit that Henrion got was about evolution. Gardner had got a big chunk of that and we had to cooperate with him.

Willy de Majo, everybody took one at him, poor man. He was very straight-laced, and very over dignified and pompous and humourless and thought a great deal of himself and all his work. I think he worked with his wife. He really rather struggled against Henrion and the more dashing ones. There were all these stories about how he had a special thing with a raised dais for himself to be on, with big windows and a little hatchway, so he could keep an eye on the boys and girls below so he could see they were not achieving.

Abram games, who worked virtually alone, he had one or two assistants. For years Games thought he had invented the first universal copier. He was a very nice man and very successful on the poster side. He did the Radio Times.

Going further back there were these big names like Ashley Havinden. He was a smart country gent, he always wore tweeds and went off to country parties at the weekends. He ran Crawfords of course. Very recognisable style. That was the advertising agency world, which Henrion of course was well in, he was art chief at Erwin Wasey, wasn’t he.

There were these Vienesse geezers. There was a man called Foges [Wolfgang Foges]. There was a lot of mileage between him and Henrion. Foges was a publisher, I think it was he who was behind Future magazine – a deliberately forward looking thing, of which Henrion had been the chief graphic man.

And there was George Rainbird, who had a very good publishing business doing well-illustrated publishing books. Some of the best stuff immediately post-war. Henrion was on the edge of that, he knew these people, but he was never really fully in the publishing world.

Henrion enjoyed meeting new people and carrying on with the ones where there was something to be worked on together. He kept very well in with the people in the AGI and those in America. When he’d first been in London he shared a flat with Walter Landauer, who was about his age and a chum of his, who then went on to America and did very well. When he came to England he would come and visit Henrion. When we were doing KLM… KLM had gone to Ogilvy Benson and Mathers. David Ogilvy was a bit advertising man, he was Scottish, but he had gone to America and become a top man there, very, very successful. KLM had gone to him and he’d said: you’ve got to get a smart look. Look at Pan American, look at TWA, now look at your silly thing. Get yourself a good designer. I don’t know whether he had recommended Henrion, but somehow or other it had worked out like that.

So I went with him to NY to get clear with OBM [Ogilvy Benson Mathers] what they were going to do on the advertising side and what we were going to do on the house style, the design coordination side.

He got all his chums: Leo Lionni, Paul Rand, Will Burtin, Ken Adam, Saul Bass, Charles Eames. When they were in London for one reason or another they would come and see him, and when he was in America he would see them – he didn’t go to America very much – they would sort of keep in touch. They were all nice, friendly people. Mainly, or particularly, the Americans because there was no competition for business because they were different worlds then. And I suppose the same goes for the European ones. They were each working their patch and they didn’t really go across.

There was some quite sharp competition in London for some of the plumb jobs. The Post Office for example. Before my time, the late 50s. Henrion had done the posters for the elections of Tony Benn, Anthony Wedgewood Benn. His father was a socialist publisher who had been ennobled as Lord Stansgate. Young Anthony inherited that title which he did not want to do. He said: ’I’ll stand for parliament as an ordinary member’, which he did and won. Henrion had done the poster stuff for his campaign. Wedgewood Benn’s wife was a nice American woman who was very keen on design and I think it was through her, connections like that.

He got Henrion in to advise on various matters. They’d got a big problem about the telephone boxes… the Gilbert Scott telephone boxes… they thought that they needed a new telephone kiosk and the new pillar box. Henrion was hired as design consultant for those things and I think they had already started the thing of special stamps really as a commercial thing. They had got a department of stamp design that Angela Reeve went to later on.

In connection with those things Henrion got David Mellor – the Sheffield iron and steel man – to have a think about the new pillar box. They did all sorts of trials and things, but I still see them around. The telephone kiosk was also a big problem. They got various people to do ones and I think the new ones have stuck. There was a whole business about the colour. Nobody knew what Post Office red was. Everybody knew what Post Office red was, but nobody knew what it was… it had never been standardised – that red there.

Quite a bit later on, after Wedgewood Benn moved on, he was succeeded by a chap called Edward Short – this must have been Harold Wilson’s government – Edward Short was a former school teacher who didn’t get on at all well with Henrion. He thought Henrion was a fancy foreign chap and we don’t want that sort of thing in the Post Office. So we didn’t go on with the Post Office very much after Wedgewood Benn left.

That was one of Henrion’s great features of course. He knew a lot of people, mixed it all in. There was this sort of toffs and snobs thing in Hampstead. And there was the international people and all manner of people like his neighbours… he was always on the scene. Unfriendly people would say he’s the man who knows everybody, and yet has no friends. There were these professional friends usually from way back, and there were the dinner party Hampstead ones which was more business than anything else.
Curiously he didn’t like to be by himself. I never understood this, but he would never go to the cinema by himself, he would always ask somebody to go with him so that he wasn’t by himself. When he was with other people he was always very jovial, and lively and interested in other people and so on.

He would never speak German. He used to deny sometimes that he even understood German. I really don’t know why. He brought his mother with him to England, his father was a lawyer apparently from a family that had been traditional craftsmen – silversmiths – in Nuremberg. I don’t know what happened to his father.

**Do you remember when you started with Henri?**

I think it was the end of 1960 I started with Henri. Three of us when I started.

**Who else was working there when you started?**

David Varley was there, very quiet, very bland, nice chap. He had gone straight from the Royal College. Henri used to do a bit of teaching at the college and I think he’d picked him up there.

David Gillespie was another one who had been a pupil of Henri. He did work for us. He was a very busy chap, Henrion liked him and got him to do various things for exhibitions. I remember a big set of Olivetti diamond shaped things which were illustrated in various places.

**Did he work in-house with Henri?**

He came and got the job, talked about, went off and did the things and then brought them in in his van.

**So when you arrived there was David Varley? Sue something or other you mentioned before?**

What’s her name, it’ll come back to me. She was just an assistant, a good competent typographic person, did the paste-ups and all that.

**Was there anyone who was not a designer there, a secretary or…?**

There was always a secretary for doing the letters, and for doing the day to day office admin, petty cash and so on. There was always an accountant, usually a part time book keeper who had retired, there was a Scotsman who would come in once a week just to do the books. He [Henrion] had a registered company, Studio H Limited, which got trade discounts and was run as a separate company. He and his wife were the sole shareholders, something like that. That was run at a modest profit. Then there was the design business that had separate books and there’d be fees negotiated that would be paid before, during and after. That paid the… I suppose… I don’t even know that you see… how careless and ignorant I was… I don’t know whether we were actually paid by Studio H or what became Henrion Design Associates. It used to be Studio H. It was the Americans who brought in this thing about the so-and-so ‘Associates’ … Donald Deskey Associates. That seemed very smart and modern in those days.

Henrion Design Associates. I was an associate. There was a chap who was there before me who was an Associate, though he never did any work in the office, or elsewhere else as far as I could tell. Ronald Cuddon. He was an architect. He was always a bit of a joke between Norman [Jones] and me. . . . took there’s Ronald Cuddon with his bow tie and that’s about all. I don’t think he ever did any work with us, though he could have done the original Pond Street studio.

**Did Norman Jones join around the same time?**

I am not sure, I think he was already there. He had been at the London College of Printing, and from childhood he was a nut for type. He was a wizard at hand lettering, he could turn it out any size you wanted.

**So there were about 6 of you or so?**

No, 3 or 4. Christine Hall was the female assistant.

**So did she have less responsibility then?**

Yes, she had less responsibility.

Everybody called him Uncle behind his back, sort of thing. ‘Is Uncle away?’, ‘Is he in today, or gone out for a meeting’.

When he went off for a week to one of these international conferences, then somebody would bring in a little gramophone and we’d have our music playing and things, which was never done when he was there.

**You mentioned Cuddon, I wondered if there were other Associates?**

I don’t think that was ever very clear, I suppose everybody was an Associate. I got a business card, but the others who were always in the studio didn’t.

**Why do you think you had a card and the others didn’t?**

Because I went with him to a lot of meetings you see, the things for the presentations. I worked the carousel thing. We developed some quite elaborate things, he spent a lot of time over that… it was just Kodak carousel and we had two, so you could do things with super imposition on the screen and things like that. I would work these things and he would give a nod or a wink at a certain moment. They were quite carefully prepared presentations, he was very particular about that. Sort of scripted really. He would work out what the sequence was by mucking about the slides. Get the sequence right. Then he would talk very glibly about the things.

**I wondered if he wrote them down?**

They were done in a cover thing. They were certainly, in cases like KLM, done as a sort of script in fact. So there was a record of it. I suppose that was the written presentation that the board members had seen on the thing. I suppose that is what it was. That was carefully done. It was one of the main activities of the secretarial person. They had to do very good and fault-free typing.

**And that would make up the script?**

Yep, that would be the script, that probably, he and I would have written together. He would come up with the concept and say I want it to be like this and like that, and then I would write out a thing in good style. And then he would edit it, he took a great deal of care over those things. His English was very good, but he was not good at writing a visual presentation. That he was glad for me to do.

**Was it clear when you started there that this would be part of your role?**

I don’t think it was explicitly done. You see from the studio point of view I was an outsider brought in for something not very clear, and I suppose it wasn’t very clear to me either. It just seemed like a good thing at the time. I suppose people like David Varley and Norman Jones wondered what’s this bloke going to do, because I hadn’t been to an art school. I had been to Cambridge and done a bit here and there. I had always felt I was quite competent in that area. My first job in London was with a designer called David Caplan who was an old time communist and had worked with all sorts of people including Shell. He had worked with McKnight Kauffer and Tom Gentleman and he had done this little office all by himself, or with one assistant, just about making ends meet down in the East-end somewhere. He was a London-Jewish designer who had come up through Shell and had this small office after the war. He was intensely jealous of Henrion and these smarty-boots who were up in the West-end getting all this money.
Appendix 1.3) Interview with Chris Timings

Edited transcription of telephone interview with Chris Timings, 23 November 2012.

Questions by the interviewer, David Preston, set in bold italic text.

**Could you talk a little about your education and how you came to work at DRU?**

I was in the army in 1945 when the war ended, and I wasn’t absolutely certain what I was going to do at that point. I was offered a course in what was called Commercial Art in those days. I had an Uncle who was in the advertising business, but design as we know it now didn’t exist in those days, so what I was going to do was all rather vague. The only thing I learned from this course that the army provided was that the place to go was St Martins. So that was one key piece of information I got. I had no idea where Saint Martins was, what it was like, what its reputation was, or really anything about it at all. I was told by somebody that I needed a folio of work, so I knocked one up on my desk at home, making up my own projects and providing the answers. Put it under my arm, went up to London, made an appointment to see the head of St Martins. Had an interview, and got in. And started work that September, completely cold if you like… a steep learning curve from then onwards.

So I did the graphics course at St Martins. On the staff there were two young guys who had come from the Royal College and they said: ‘you’ve got to go to the Royal College’. So I applied and got in. I did the standard graphics course at St Martins, I think it was three years, and then I did a postgraduate course at the Royal College, which was another two years I think.

While I was at the Royal College the head of department came into the studio one afternoon and said: ‘there’s a guy called Milner Grey from Design Research Unit coming in tomorrow afternoon looking for staff, would anybody who is interested have their folios ready’. So I had a folio and Milner Gray came in and the head of department made an appointment for me to see him with two or three other people. And he said: ‘yes, I like your work, we’ll have another interview and I will introduce you to one or two other people who work at DRU’. There were two of us in competition with one another, to cut a long story short, I got the job and the other guy didn’t.

This was six months before I finished at the Royal College. So I was in an extremely fortunate position of having a job before I left and knowing exactly what I was going to do and where I was going to go. So I duly ended up sitting behind my desk at DRU.

**What year was that when you joined?**

‘52

**So you would have started at St Martins about 1948?**

St Martins was ’48, ’49, ’50 and the Royal College was ’51, ’52. And I went straight into work at DRU without a break, late in ’52.

**Do you remember the names of the tutors at St Martins who came from the RCA?**

The tutors at St Martins who recommended the RCA were a guy called Roger Nicholson, who was primarily a three-dimensional designer, an exhibition designer and a furniture designer. He was very well known at the time but seems to have faded away completely. He was a very well known all-round design guy in ’52. He went through our folios and sort of tutored us for the Royal College entrance, including telling us about the interviews and the kind of questions they would ask. So I owe a lot to this guy really and I followed his advice. There was another tutor at St Martins from the Royal College, a man called Walter Hoyle, he was more a painter than anything else.

**What did your position involve at DRU and how did this change or develop?**

DRU was really a very small organisation in those days. Milner got together with Misha Black, another guy from the Ministry of Information. Misha Black was an entrepreneur more than anything else, I don’t think he had very much formal design training, but he understood that design was going to be something which was going to be important in the future.

Milner Gray on the other hand was a practising designer in his own right. They got together and decided that what they needed to offer was a multidisciplinary practice. In other words there were going to be graphic designers, interior designers, architects and people who specialised in exhibition design – which is something which has faded away completely, because it’s done by exhibition contractors now, but it was a big thing in those days, you can imagine, immediately after the Festival of Britain particularly.

The thing about DRU was it never had any formal structures, it just kind of grew. It started off with Misha Black and a group of young architects, recently qualified, and Milner Gray, on his own at first. There was a woman called Dorothy Goslett who was their business manager, who was very important in that her job was specifically to manage the business. The business of design management was put on the map at the same time as the business of design. What was terribly important in those days was being seen to be a reliable, efficient and organised graphic designer, not a sort of ex-art student who wouldn’t know how to invoice you.

**And Goslett was critical in that respect?**

It was very important that Dorothy Goslett was introduced into the group with the other two key designers.

**Do you know anything about her book?**

Oh yes, her book is almost childlike. Her book is exactly how DRU was organised financially. Dorothy’s book is a description of how the Unit was run from a financial and business point of view. It is a very simple book, but a very good book.

**Do you know what her background was?**

I’m not sure whether Dorothy was in one of the ministries with them during the war. You know Milner and Misha came from the Ministry of Information. She goes right back to those days. Dorothy had been with them right from the word go as the person who was going to look after the books while they got on with the design.

She was a brilliant person really. When I say she was simplistic, she was simplistic because she understood that designers wanted to get on with design, and not worry about money. And so she used to handle the money for us and she did it in a way that everybody could understand. It was very open to comment and criticism and discussion. She was a very good person to be involved with a design group that had only just started and had young people in it like me.
Did she help to manage people's time and to allocate staff to various tasks?
No she didn’t do that at all. She had no say in the running of the design side of it. The key to DRU’s success was the fact that every person in the office had an hourly rate. Therefore, everybody’s time was charged out on that basis, except the secretaries…the administrative staff consisted of a couple of secretaries and Dorothy, they weren’t charged out to clients at all, they were our overheads, so to speak, but they helped us to run the business. Every designer, from the very moment you entered the company, was made very conscious of the fact he had an hourly rate which was charged to the client, and it was much, much higher than just a multiple of his salary, because it had to cover our overheads. When we first went there we were on a very, very small wage. I can’t remember what my salary was when I went there, a really tiny amount, you know, the minimum salary for the time. Because so many people wanted to work at DRU that they did really take advantage of us, because we’d go there whatever they paid us.

We did time sheets. Every hour we put on the time sheet was theoretically charged to the client at our hourly rate. The younger designer could therefore see if he had sat all morning at his desk, with no ideas coming at all, doodling…and that in doing that he had spent 5 hours at a certain rate. Therefore after a few days or weeks, he could see that the cost to the client would already be 500 quid or whatever it was and he hadn’t done anything. We were in contact with that hourly rate as a sort of philosophy, which did help the whole company to understand what was going on and how we had to make money to survive. It also did away with the idea that there were some people who were making huge amounts of money out of the company, while us poor young designers were being paid a pittance, because it was all really transparent. That was one of the philosophies of the place, that there were no hierarchies. We knew the partners earned much more than we did, but there was no hard and fast hierarchy which made you feel that there was senior people, middle people, and junior people, we all mucked in together. I know it sound terribly idealistic, but in fact DRU was an incredibly idealistic sort of place in those days.

These different hourly rates didn’t imply a certain hierarchy?
Well, I suppose it did. What it really boils down to was, Milner the principal, was charged at a high hourly rate, and we accepted that, and then there was a big drop down to us guys in the studio who did all the work. We were really all more or less equal, so there wasn’t a great difference between our hourly rates. The people who had been there longest earned much more than the people who had just come in. But there wasn’t a secrecy about wages and salaries as there would be now. So it made for a democratic kind of existence. DRU was a very transparent place, that was why it was so nice to work there.

From what I have read I get the impression that everyone was chipping in, working together, but I wonder, when there were lots of voices who took control, who made the decisions?
Milner and another senior partner, a man called Kenneth Lamble. He wasn’t a designer, he was a technician or technical advisor, he was there because Milner, in those days, was doing a lot of work for a glass company, Milner was very conscious of the fact that when you were doing packaging, there were certain technical things that it would be advisable for a designer to know about, packing techniques like injection moulding for example. So he got this chap Kenneth Lamble in on a senior position who was a technical advisor on glass and packaging.

So you worked under Milner in a team?
Milner was the leader of the graphics team, Kenneth Lamble was the team technical advisor, and we all worked under Milner. Milner dreamed off the jobs he wanted to do himself, and he would do them, and use one of the four of us as an assistant, to help him with that job. But he would take major creative initiative, it would be his work. When DRU started to get so much work that Milner couldn’t do it all himself, quite simply he started to delegate the work to those designers who he thought were most suitable to do it...the guys who would be most likely to come up with the right solution. The remarkable thing about DRU was, when that system of delegation started, when there started to be too much work for Milner to do, the designers, although they may have only been working in his office for a week, would be taken and introduced to the client. Now that’s the most important thing I think in the whole ethos of DRU. Right from the word go, Milner would take you along to his clients and introduce you to them, you would sit around the boardroom table and keep your mouth shut, unless asked any questions, but the thing was that the client then knew about you and therefore you could build up your own relationship with the client. And when you had built up your own relation with Milner’s client, he would say: ‘Right Chris, you can take this job over now, and carry on without me, can’t you’. And I’d say: ‘Yes I can’.

It was that sort of delegation, giving the youngest people the highest responsibility really early on in their careers at DRU which was so amazing and was the thing that made everybody want to work there; because, as you can imagine, it wasn’t a bit like that at some other design groups or advertising agencies. So if we wanted it, we could take over responsibility for direct contact with the client and seeing the job through, right from the word go almost.

They didn’t worry that people might leave and poach the client?
No, they didn’t actually. I have a caveat to that. Milner would sort of be there, observing this situation, and would make a judgement on how much involvement he was going to have. This really depended on his assessment of whether, in my case, Chris Timings was able to handle this client satisfactorily. Because Milner may have been on a retainer – Milner always like to try to negotiate a retainer with a client which meant that he was paid a sum of money for an exclusive service – therefore, he would be honour-bound by the conditions of the retainer to appear at meetings every so often. But otherwise he left the running of the job to an assistant designer, however young, if he thought that person could cope with it. And only did himself the things that he wanted to do himself, which was agreed at a weekly meeting, when the work that was coming in was farmed out to the various people sitting around the table.

At the beginning, myself, and Ken Lamble, and another guy called Alan Ball, from the Central School, were the key designers under Milner, and then later on, June Fraser. In June’s case, more often than not she worked with this other guy Ken Lamble. June doing all the creative work, and Ken keeping an eye on the technical side of things. So, it was a suck-it-and-see situation for most of the early days really, without any very formal arrangement.

What was the appeal of the retainer contract for Milner?
Theoretically the idea of a retainer is that the client retains Milner to design, lets say wine bottle labels, which he did a lot of in those days, then he is excluded from doing that for any other client. That’s the advantage of a retainer from the clients point of view. From the financial point of view a retainer meant that whatever work you were doing, you were paid a sum of money per month, or quarter, or year, which was to retain the exclusive services of the DRU. Then you would charge hourly rates on top of that. So retainers were rather lucrative.

At DRU in those days, retainers were probably not treated as strictly formally as they would be these days. In those days it
was a bit like an extra cherry on the cake. Now-a-days you would find you would be bound by legal contractual agreements: what exactly you would do, and not do under your retainer, and would exactly could be charged in addition at hourly rates. In those days most of the ways that design management developed was a bit suck-it-and-see. The design business barely existed in those days. If somebody said to me: ‘What do you do?’, and I said I’m a designer’, they would look at you blankly and say: ‘Well what’s that?’: A design consultancy would be unknown to most people in industry in those days, and the way of buying design was very unknown to industry, we were breaking new ground all the time.

Did the concept of house style tie in with the idea of the retainer?
Absolutely, yes, we hunted for house styles hard all the time, they were the back-bone of the business really and they came in through various directions. Some of the work came in through the fact that Misha was an architect with an interior design practice who was probably doing the head offices of a big company and said to the right person that they could do with their graphic design brushing up a bit and we were the people to do it. That’s one of the ways our work came in.

Were there certain projects where Milner, Misha and the whole team began to work together?
The strange thing about DRU was that Misha’s industrial designers and architects and interior designers worked very sparsely from the graphic designers. Although we sold ourselves as a multi-disciplinary practice with all the advantages of every sort of designing you could ever possibly need under one roof, in fact the architectural side, who were really interior designers, and the graphics side operated very separately. One of the reasons why they did that was the way that architects are paid is very different to the way that designers are paid and the RIBA people were always keeping a close eye on how architectural work was being charged out at, as opposed to design work. So there was a little bit of, not exactly professional friction, but professional caution needed when operating under the ‘rules’ of the graphic design side, and the ‘rules’ of the architectural side, which were much more strictly governed by the RIBA.

I found a scheme that was done for Norwich, Magdalen Street and the report seems very much like a design manual! Would this have been an example when everyone worked together collectively, as it seems very architectural?
The Norwich scheme was a graphics job, but if the client had have said: ‘What we would really like is to refurbish this completely’, we would then introduce them to Misha and the he would negotiate entirely separately from any graphics contract on the work of designing and building that part. But when it came to the identity manual of that part, the architects and the graphic designers would work together on that. Funnily enough it always seemed possible to keep that kind of architectural work and the graphic work we did fairly separate. The architectural work was done by the guys upstairs, our architects, and the graphic work was done by the guys downstairs, the graphic designers. Usually Misha would be only responsible for the big work, and if Misha decided – at a high level – that graphic designers were required to develop the graphic work in the direction it really should go, then he would call Milner in as well, and he and Milner would go to see the client together, but then as soon as they got back to the office it would be split into two distinctive jobs, mainly because we wouldn’t charge out in the same way that architects do. So the first person to interest themselves in how we were going to charge out fees would be Dorothy. And she would come along and say: ‘How are you charging for graphics work on this architectural job’ to Misha, or: ‘How are you charging for architectural work on this graphics job’ if she were talking to Milner, to make sure there was this distinct difference between the way that it was charged. Dorothy was the person who kept the two systems running in parallel.

The RIBA were very strict on the way architects worked and charged, they were waging their own battle for professional respectability for the architectural profession. Milner was waging a battle for professionalism and respectability for the graphic design profession. For that reason, there was a demarcation line between the two.

How did advertising fit in with this, because Marcus Brumwell was involved wasn’t he?
Advertising didn’t come into the picture anywhere, we did no advertising at all. Marcus Brumwell was a remarkable sort of guy, although we shared an office building with him at first, so he was down in the boardroom suite, he was the principal of this advertising agency, and although he’d got his money in the DRU he never interfered with us at all. We operated absolutely independenty. Obviously if anybody started talking about needing an advertising agency we would be the first people to recommend Marcus Brumwell who was the advertising partner. But there was no formal connection between us at all.

That seems to be quite unusual for the time that you weren’t dependent on the advertising business?
I don’t know of any advertising business who had any worthwhile established design group working within their walls.

From my research RHK Henrion and Hans Schleger seemed very dependent on the advertising profession. Well that was just it. As far as Schleger and Henrion were concerned, I think, just out of a matter of company policy they would be close to advertising to cream off design work that the advertising agents couldn’t do. We kept advertising agents at a distance, because we always found any relationship with a client’s agency to be thoroughly negative. It sounds a bit snotty nosed, but we just didn’t want the bloody advertising agencies anywhere near our jobs if we could possibly avoid it. And as far as I was concerned, we did avoid it, always.

Was it Milner’s extensive contacts that allowed you to do this?
Milner’s, or DRU’s, independent decision was understood and appreciated by the advertising agencies, and therefore let be. If they were honest then they knew we could provide design services that they couldn’t. When I say we didn’t want to know about advertising, that was unfair in a way, because the advertising agencies who knew about us and were happy with the work that we did, would say to their clients: ‘Well we really can’t handle this sort of stuff, you need an independent design group to do this, this is not advertising’. About two thirds of our work was packaging, the business was built up like that, in other words, advertising agents didn’t like packing, they didn’t want to be involved in packaging. Advertising agents don’t make money out of doing design, they make money out of selling space to clients. The only way we made money was out of design, we just charged for design. The advertising agencies used to throw design in as a part of a package (and still do).

We didn’t take any commissions from anybody, golden rule number one. We took no commissions from printers, because we really believed that if there was trouble between the printer and the client, we didn’t want to get involved in that.

In terms of the time sheets, who took responsibility for making sure the time sheets were filled out?
There is an overall answer to that. If you have an organisation which is entirely based on charging out their time at an hourly rate, everybody in the organisation is very conscious of the fact that time costs money and therefore, even when you were planning a meeting we would look around the table and say: ‘We can’t have all you people at your hourly rate being so unproductive sat talking to the client all afternoon, we need you and you and you back on your desks working’. So you have this culture of people being very aware of their time costing money.

**So there would have been an ongoing dialogue?**

Yes, absolutely. When Milner brought a new client into the organisation... lets just say, for sake of argument, he said he wanted me to be in charge of that job... so the first thing I would do is, from the four or five people in the studio, I’d get a brief and then I’d select another designer, or two, besides myself to work on it. So there were three of us. Milner had told me what the fee was. There were three of us and we all knew what out hourly rates were and therefore, if I was the senior guy in charge of the job I would work out that I could only work on that job for a day and I had to crack the design problem by then. It was my responsibility by the end of the day to get it to the stage where the two other guys at lesser hourly rates could develop it for me. I was not encouraged to fuss about details, I was encouraged to get an idea as quickly as possible, and to talk to the guys in the studio who I knew I wanted to work with, because I knew they were the sort of people worked well on that kind of project. This was all very personal – there weren’t many of us – usually perhaps there would be one other middle ranking competent designer, besides me, working on it. We would discuss what it would be and we would work out what we were going to do together. In my latter days with DRU, they would then go off and do it themselves.

It transpired at the end of the day they had put so much creative energy and effort into this project that it was unfair to them to associate my name with it at all, we would acknowledge that immediately. That job is entirely yours X or Y – when it comes to credit, designers are always very conscious of credit. When it came to credits at the end of the job that person would take the credit and Chris Timings wouldn’t be mentioned.

Now it was a very big client and Chris Timings had a coordination job, with perhaps three or four other designers working on the job, then I would get a mention as a coordinator and the other people would get mentioned as designers. We were always very conscious of this, and to be done very agreeably... the degree of responsibility that the senior members of the team took for initiating the project, or making a major creative contribution to the project. But that never caused any problem because that was understood from the word go.

At the beginning when I first joined DRU Milner used to say to me: ‘Chris I am going to take credit for this project because I am retained by the company and they expect my name to be associated with the end product’. I would say okay Milner, that’s fine, I go along with that, because I knew that as time went on, I would be doing the same thing. I would be the one taking the credit for the work, when in fact most of the work was done by lesser individuals. But we didn’t bother about that in any way at all, I think that was because, when I became a senior individual, and when I became a partner and I went to see the client, got a brief, then took it back to the office and discussed it with the other guys and decided who was going to work on it. Then at the very next meeting I went to the person who was going to work on it would come with me – I can remember an occasion where they had only been employed for three weeks and they came with me to see a client. I made it clear at that meeting that the bulk of the creative work would be being done by this person, although I would retain the overall responsibility for the job, and therefore it would be to everybody’s advantage if they saw me as little as possible and this other person as much as possible, as it would be cheaper for them to do it that way. But I accepted entire responsibility for the outcome. If the whole job went up the spout for some reason or another I would be responsible, not the young designer who had just joined the company.

**That was the role of coordinating the operations, is that right... when you said you were a ‘coordinator’?**

Yes, yes.

Milner did his own creative work and had his artwork for the printer done by a couple of office artworkers who weren’t creative. When I first went there I was the only other person besides Milner who was a creative [graphic] designer, the others were office artworkers. Therefore, very soon I was realising ideas and the office artworkers were doing the artwork for me. Because I was the guy who was being paid the most money, and therefore I was expected to come up with solutions to the clients problems. The other guys did artwork like monkeys, they were brilliant at it, absolutely brilliant, but they were none-the-less non-creative people. Everybody understood that there was never any friction about this at all. If there was anybody on the borderline between creativity and artworking, well that could be sorted out in discussion. How much creative responsibility a person would be prepared to take. We might say ‘okay well we’ll give it a whirl, but if you cock it up you are out’. Always this informal kind of management system which ducked and weaved round all the problems of personal relationships and so forth, it was very good, it worked very well. Much better than strict hierarchies.

**I’ve been looking at Norbert Dutton recently, was he there at DRU at one point?**

Yes, yes he was... we are talking about ‘50s and ‘60s now. Norbert was one of the guys that helped Misha on the Festival... there were hundreds of designers who came into prominence just on the back of the Festival. The Festival of Britain was an absolute daydream for designers, the first time designers were employed in large quantities ever in this country. Norbert Dutton was one of the sort of redundant designers who worked with Misha for a short time after the Festival on projects which involved exhibition design mainly, which we were into in a big way in those days.

I don’t know if you are aware of the difference between exhibition design then, and exhibition design now. Serious exhibition design was undertaken by designers and the contractors who provided the exhibitions, that’s all they did... they built the exhibitions. But then between 1960 and the present day exhibition contractors have gradually offered a design service and designers are no longer required. They will design it and make it for you. But in the early days after the Festival it was split quite cleanly, so we did a lot of exhibition work, but the point is that exhibition contractors could always do it much more cheaply than we could, you know, because they weren’t paying top design rates, they were just paying monkeys to do what they were told.

**You have already said that you met with clients personally, I am interested in what DRU’s approach was to presenting work to clients, did you make attempts to convince the clients that your designs were right and if so how?**

Yes, is the short answer to that.

From the archives at the V&A I found that Marcus Brumwell was involved with Mass Observation and that they had done some market research for Courage in 1949 on behalf of DRU – this was slightly before your time perhaps. I was interested that that seemed like one way
that they were trying to rationalise and justify the designs that they had done.

Marcus Brumwell had done work for the brewers. Brumwell may have introduced Milner to Courage's as an ideal designer for cleaning up their labelling, taking stock of the visual presentation of their beer. Marcus Brumwell was probably doing the advertising for Courage's, the press advertising, the day-to-day advertising stuff, and Mass Observation would be used to produce the information that Milner required (the background material that Milner required) to do the corporate identity, or house style as it was called then. In the early days there was tentative collaboration between Stuarts Advertising – which was Marcus Brumwell's outfit – and DRU – which was Milner Gray's outfit – always being quite clear of the difference of their financial base.

It would be fair to say that Marcus Brumwell and Milner Gray would be talking constantly about their joint interest in Courage's and taking work in their appropriate spheres of influence.

Have I answered your question?

It seemed to me that that [market research] was a strategy to substantiate design, in a way, and I wondered in your experience of presenting designs to clients, what strategies did you use to convince them that your designs were right?

Okay, so I haven’t answered your question. There were times when you needed to let the clients know that we had an association with Mass Observation and Stuarts Advertising in order to encourage them, to put their trust in this new outfit, which was our design group, which didn’t offer the sort of services that Marcus Brumwell was offering but offered just a clean design service. I other words all these people would have had input at the briefing stage and then would drop into the background when they were no longer required, they were working very tentatively. In my day there would be meetings with clients who had various public relations people and other people associated with promotion at the meetings where I was representing design, so everybody knew what the functions of the various people sitting around the table was. So we could discuss it together without treading on one another’s toes.

You are making me realise how much kind of experience of moving in the space between the client and the designer I had. My life was spent in that space, if you like, as a liaison between the client and the designer.

Almost a design manager?

Yes, I had to understand design management, I had to understand the working of the advertising agencies, I had to understand how the client’s business worked, roughly speaking. That sort of discussion – which you may think is a long way from design – was the very basis on which DRU built its reputation. If you invited DRU to do a job, and you wanted an advertising agency to sit around the table (or anybody else involved in business to sit around the table who wasn’t a recognised designer) you would need to be at home in that situation, we weren’t ‘well, we’re designers, we don’t understand business’, in fact we were always rather pretending to understand rather more than we did most of the time.

That was the entire thing about DRU, our mission was to convince industry that design was a reliable, professional occupation and that designer could come up with solutions which would sell their product and yet at the same time maintain a high degree of design integrity. What the advertising agencies couldn’t do was to maintain a design integrity, they could talk their clients into doing anything, but they hadn’t got the nous or the where-with-all, or the people in the business who understood design, so they couldn’t really do design in the way that we did it. It sounds pompous, I know, but that is the truth, they just didn’t understand design, but they understood advertising, perhaps we didn’t understand advertising some times. And yet when we were working with advertising agencies it was always clear where the demarcation lines lay. I think by the latter '60s and '70s design offices had become well established, and people knew what designers were representing.

I wonder whether there was a sense that Milner, or the studio in particular, where influenced by other designers working in Europe or America or Britain, or wherever?

Milner was very influenced by Swiss design. Not American or German, or any other design, he was influenced by Swiss design – in the ‘50s. I can’t remember the name of the Swiss designer who was his idol. This is very interesting actually, you have hit on an interesting point. Are you familiar with Swiss Alpine Labelling?

No.

There is a tradition of Swiss Alpine Labelling and we had a lot of reference material in the office on Swiss labelling, alcoholic beverages. We had a lot of really rather nice, tight, and yet rich and elegant designs for alcoholic drinks which originated in Switzerland.

I noticed that in the bulletins there was a record of Tomas Maldonado visiting. Was he someone who was particularly revered?

Remind me about Tomas Maldonado. I know the name, but I can’t remember what he did.

He taught at Ulm school and was very famous for introducing systematic approaches to design.

Yes, I know. In the 1950s if you wanted to follow the Ulm tradition in a precise way you went to the Central School.

Was that Froshaug?

Yes. But if you wanted to pursue the kind of design Milner usually did you might go to St Martins. In our studio there was a representative from each of these educational institutions, I came from St Martins which was one point of view, and this chap Alan Ball had been to the Central School and got the Froshaug point of view. Milner tended to be, what we would have said at the time, rather on the decorative side. A battle raged for years between the Bauhaus [approach] and [the approach of] the Royal College of Art, 1960. Who won depended really on who the staff were that were employed by DRU, whether they came from St Martins or the Royal College, or whether they came from the Central School. So we had this constant battle going on with Alan Ball, trying to push DRU design towards the Bauhaus [approach], and Chris Timmings being happy to be incorporated into the Royal College tradition of the time. On the other hand, because I had been to St Martins, which was the opposite to the Central School, I found the Central School teaching of design very attractive.

Did you ever hear anything of Walter Landor, because I know that Milner knew him earlier in his life?

No. I know the name, but I never knew about Walter Landor. There was an organisation called ICOGRADA, Misha black, with his universal design hat on, was the chairman of ICOGRADA some time during my early time at DRU and Milner was heavily involved with them. Therefore, we were very aware of what was going on around the world in the best design offices (I can say that without blushing). Really we always felt ourselves to be in competition with them and the best designers around the world. We always felt ourselves to be inferior to them in fact, we always envied American designers for some of the successes they had had. We always felt that we were being held by back traditional British attitudes which didn’t prevail in other parts of the world. We didn’t work in a
vacuum, we were always trying to push DRU design towards the Bauhaus, or in this direction, or the other direction.

Were there particular people in America that you admired?

I had an assistant in DRU who went to the States when I left DRU and worked there for Geismar and Chermayeff in New York, she is now dead.

When would that have been?

Um, her name was Angela Reeves.

Ah yes, she worked with Henrion too.

How do you know Angela Reeves?

I identified an archive of her work at the University of Northampton. My interest was piqued as she had worked with both DRU and Henrion. Another name I came across was Dieter Heil who had done the same.

Yes, that’s right Dieter Heil. But Angela Reeves first of all… she was a student at the Regency Polytechnic. I taught there. Throughout my career as a designer I did some odd patches of teaching, DRU allowed that, they gave leave of absence to do that if they thought it was a good thing that we spread the word around and looked for staff and so forth. In one of my periods in the Regency Poly I met a girl called Angela Reeves and she was 19. She came to work for DRU ultimately, having before that worked for British Airways as their in-house designer when British Airways had a design office, it was BEA in those days. And then when I came to Nottingham, Angela went to Geismar and Chermayeff in New York and worked there for about 2, 3, 4 years, I can’t remember exactly how long. She worked at DRU between the time she left the Regency Poly and when she went to New York. She worked at DRU as one of our senior assistants and she is now dead. She was the sort of person you would have been interested to talk to if she was still alive.

Dieter was a German guy who knocked on DRU’s door one day, and said: ‘have you got any jobs?’ He produced an immaculate portfolio from one of the German colleges, I can’t remember which, and we said: ‘yes, we’ll have you’. So we took him on. He was also a very senior and responsible designer for a long time, but these very senior and responsible designers below partner level (that’s below my level) tended to gravitate into a certain pattern of working, they either worked with Milner, or they worked with myself, or they worked with June Fraser.

June Fraser worked with Dieter a lot, they got on very well together, it was really a rather personal thing. June worked with Dieter and I worked with other designers in the studio. Dieter was a middle-period DRU guy and a very good designer too.

Did you ever have any dealings with Michael Farr?

No, I know Michael Farr by name, but I never had any dealings with him.

Let me just say one thing before we stop talking. I can’t emphasise too much, we had this informal approach to setting up really very seriously design jobs, in that we could call a meeting of all the graphic design staff and everybody could have some input, everybody could have opinions on the job we were about to do, even whether we should do it or not. There was always this discussion going on and it didn’t matter how senior or junior you were, what you had to say was likely to be treated with respect.

But Milner would make the final call would he?

Yes, Milner would make the final call. If any really serious disagreements arose, let’s say most of the designers in the office had been involved in a meeting with the client and the design team had serious doubts over whether we should do the job, or the direction we should take, we could always meet in small groups in the office and say exactly what we thought about what Milner’s contribution had been, or what my contribution had been and that helped to resolve the problem. Problems in DRU were very seldom resolved by people taking decisions without reference to anybody else, we worked very collaboratively, and most problems were solvable for that reason. Designers need to be happy to work properly, I think that’s probably the reason we adopted that whole philosophy. Generally speaking there wasn’t any sort of bitchiness or back-biting or unhappiness. Well anyway that’s that.
Appendix 1.4) Interview with John McConnell


Since your letter it [my work with Crookes] is starting to return to my memory, it is a long time ago when you are so old… although the name Michael Farr, I can’t place it, what they did, or what the connection was.

I'm sure I’ve come across him [Farr], and I understand the principle, but I can’t understand how he fits into my life.

I joined Pentagram in ‘74, so it would be in the period between '60 when I dodged military service, I'd done 7 years in an art school would you believe. I went at 14. I came out of Secondary Education and went at 14 into art school and stayed until I was 21. That was as long as you could prevent the army taking you in to be a soldier. To my surprise they decided to cancel national conscription. It would finish in '60. So, I had 6 months left of national conscription between finishing art school and starting work. Like I was going to spend 6 months doing my national service for 2 years, but actually the whole thing would finish in six months, so I decided I would risk it. I went to Southern Ireland because there was then no extradition treaty between Southern Ireland for dodging national service. I came back on the button of '60 to see whether I would be arrested, but they've not arrested me yet!

So that period went from '60 to '74 when I went on to join Pentagram. That was the period I completed this work for Crookes. I am interested in the influence of America on British practice, so I have looked at Hans Schleger and FH K Henrion who were tinkering with corporate identity in Britain in the '50s and had taken some influence from America.

I think all those names you read off there and listed in your email to me… Hans Schleger, F.H.K. Henrion, Design Research Unit … they were doing jobbing graphic design up until the start of the '70s. Then smart kids coming out of business school woke up to the fact that there was a whole field called corporate identity where you could manage the process, which I think is was Farr comes from.

There was a guy called Peter Gorb at The London Business School at Regents Park, helping organisations to manage the design process. That’s when suddenly other people outside the industry woke up to the fact that it was a sexy business to be in. If you got it right you had enormous amount of power or wield in the organisation, and lets face it, the girls were better looking.

It was the champagne and g-string period of design.

The 70s?

Yes. Where young men got into the idea that it was sexy to be doing a thing called design, heaven forbid. Up until that point the bank manager nearly threw you out of the bank if you said you were in the design business – terrible old rubbish.

That was probably learned from America. You think of Wally Olins, he probably was the big one here. Of course, design companies were not driven by designers, but by businessmen, smart young men who wanted to make lots of money. You have a lot of evidence of that from the States… Landor and so on. Large organisations driven by making vast sums of money, whereas I think, and other people in the '60s were just getting over the jobbing graphics. So, it was where we woke up to the idea that there was jobbing
graphics, and then there was this whole sexy area of trying to tell corporations how to manage their identity. We knew about champagne and g-strings by that time.

For me that was the big change, and now of course you have got lots of design companies run by large corporations like WPP, hundreds of bloody things. But suddenly the creative industry tried to take some of it back. That was why Pentagram was unique, because actually Pentagram was owned by designers, run by designers, and wouldn’t allow businessmen anywhere near the site.

**Aside from Pentagram, who do you see otherwise trying to take something back, fighting against that trend?**

I’ll give you a copy of the Pentagram book *Profile*, I’ve got a section in that which is me ranting on about these phoney design companies who presented themselves as management companies. They came along and said: ‘we’ll manage it for you’. And of course, they didn’t have any clue, or they had very little clue, about what the creative process was. It was only then when I came here – the first project I was given was for a company called Clarks shoes – where actually for the first time, I understood the scale and complexity of running a large organisation, with all those goes in it.

**In Living by Design, some of Colin Forbes thoughts were quite interesting about the systemic nature of design...**

Colin was a remarkable person in that he was very creative and inventive, but actually he had a business background. It was Bob Gill’s idea to do Pentagram as an idea. Bringing together lots of creative people and huddling together for warmth. It was to get over the kitchen table phenomenon, it looked like a dickie business. Bob Gill had the idea, but Colin made it work. No question.

**Were Forbes and Alan Fletcher school friends?**

They met while being in college. I don’t think Colin went to the Royal College, but Alan did. But they met up as students.

**So Colin had had more of an education in business?**

I don’t think he had an education in it, it was more of an inclination. He probably picked it up actually from the Military Service. He was in Egypt doing compulsory Military Service. He probably understood how to manage people and groups of people.

It was originally Fletcher, Forbes and Gill, then they were joined by Theo Crosby and Ken Grange. Theo being an architect, and Ken Grange being an industrial designer. And then they decided that got too complicated, so they unified it under the name Pentagram – Mervyn Kurlansky joined and they thought this is getting too ridiculous, all these names. So that’s why they went under the umbrella name Pentagram. And a year later they asked me to join, so I was number 6.

Colin was very bright, he was actually very sharp indeed.

**It is tricky to find much about him, by comparison Alan Fletcher’s life and work is well documented?**

Yes, because Alan did all his books of course, he really worked at his name; whereas Colin was clearly the back office guy. But actually you should see some of his work, you know... it’s not bad. What he taught me is amazing.

**So when you started at Pentagram you were saying that that was when you started taking on bigger scale jobs?**

Yes, they were approached by a company called Clarks Shoes and Alan Fletcher said: ‘I hate the idea of middle class children shoes’, so he said: ‘it’s over to you mate’. And that was really started to learn the game.

One of the things that I remember happened in the ’60s was that corporations took on an in-house design department... it was very smart to have an in-house creative department. Usually organisations would have no idea how to manage it and would probably put a manager who probably was on production on it.

But actually, if you came in as an outsider, you had a gang of people internally who hated you. Because you turned up as the outsider, and you were a smart bastard and they were gonna trip you up at the first opportunity. And so I then started working out how to deal with this political issue. What the art schools never taught you is the politics that are involved in order to achieve what you want. And that was never taught, I doubt it’s taught now.

What I learnt through Colin was the politics – and you shouldn’t be embarrassed, you just deal with it. And of course I became a director of Clarks Shoes. I then went on to be a Director at Faber & Faber and then did Boots. I went on and on and on, dealing with large corporations, all of whom had a large in-house design department, of which the management had no idea how to deal with it.

**So you had to tackle that?**

Yes.

**And how did you go about it?**

That’s another lecture, how you deal with the politics.

In a way a lot of the questions I had planned to ask you were about how Farr had taken on the same role... he spotted an opportunity to be that person who dealt with the politics of managing a project.

Yes that’s what I gather. By the fact that suddenly a number of corporations had woken up to the business benefit if you got this process right. And he is cashing in on that.

I can see that, but I can’t place him. I usually have a vision of people.

**He clearly didn’t make a lasting impact in the way that he worked or operated?**

No. Well your heart starts to sink when you see documents like this [referring to Farr’s correspondence with Crookes in reference to the McConnell design commission].

It would be a learning period, where jobbing graphic designers turned into someone who could manage and were respected, not for jobbing graphics, but actually for what you could do for industry.

**So you don’t recognise Farr from the images of him here [referring to Design Management book]?**

No. I don’t recognise him at all.

**But you remember John Meyer?**

Yes, he was the guy who worked for Crooks Laboratories. Meyer I got on very well with and he supported a lot of what I did. But it was jobbing graphics – apart from this magazine that was slightly more sophisticated.

**What would Meyer’s role at Crookes have been?**

Sales, he would be in charge of sales. He would be Sales Director.

**From your memory, would he have been briefing you?**

Yes, absolutely. I remember one time he had this idea that he wanted to produce an animated movie to show doctors, about how medicine and drugs worked. I remember getting very excited by the idea and getting people involved in doing a series of movies for doctors, all to sell his drugs.

This was a pharmaceutical company for the farming industry [refers to slide] it is doing the same thing. It is simply doing brochures directed at poor unsuspecting farmers.
And the work developed through a close relationship with this chap Meyer?
Yes, absolutely.

You didn’t have to present to the board or anything?
No, it was all through him.

Having looked at all this material stored in Farr’s archive, reading between the lines, I had a very different impression about your working relationship with him which appeared to be much closer from the correspondence. Farr is operating on this organisational level…
Yes, while I was just doing jobbing graphics. I was simply doing lovely brochures. Whereas Farr is a businessman selling the idea of managing the creative process through an organisation which had never assumed the creative process meant a damn thing.

Here [referring to correspondence] he’s starting to face up to the structural issues which you have to face up to when you deal with a large organisation – which I now do every day.

MFDI seem to have created a lot of work in a ten year period, moving premises regularly in response to fluctuations in the market, but by the ’70s, it seems to have just petered out.
It’s just very early in the business. Thats where it started… it’s the growing up of the design world which was driven by art schools who talked about jobbing graphics, without explaining that, actually ‘hold on fellas, if you really want to pump iron you better learn about things like money, and politics, and structure, and how its run’.

How was the growth of corporate identity connected to that change as you see it? Or the growth of branding as we talk about now?
Brand is everything at the moment. But of course it is also pump iron you better learn about things like money, and art schools

How was the growth of corporate identity connected to that change as you see it? Or the growth of branding as we talk about now?

That was presumably a very gradual transition for you?
Yes, absolutely.

When would that have been that you became a Director of Clarks?
I don’t remember, but it would have been well on. Clarks was the first big project. That was the first time I came across a large structure like that.

I’m interested in this idea that Pentagram were a design group without any business people, but also that you had to become more business-like designers. How did you develop that skill of business-like designing?
That’s just straight arrogance on my part. I was so determined to win, but I worked out that you could only win by actually dealing with those issues. So it was a need to be a good designer, and actually carry on doing what I believed was actually helping society generally. But to do that properly and to make the companies appreciate and listen to you, you had to find a way to manage the group. It wasn’t a mechanism to become business-like, it was a mechanism to actually be a more effective designer. To make what you did mean more and solve the problem and to get the people in.

That was the big advantage of Pentagram, that Gill knew, you could share stories, you could come back and talk to Kenneth and Colin or Theo and say ‘screw em’, or ‘string em up’, and they would say, ‘hold on, let’s think of another way around it’.

You talked about the betterment of society as an aspect of Pentagram’s practice…
Oh yeah, absolutely. I 100% believe in the creative process and the benefits it brings. You think, hold on, 20 years later, it is quite obvious that the benefits have been brought.

Presumably you have been in situations where the business imperatives of practising and the more ethical/designerly perspectives came into conflict?
I tell you what’s happened, I think the industry generally has woken up to not buying the management side of design. The creative process is now slightly better understood. The clients who commission it are better. And if you think of Apple, what they’ve done, just simply through the product – Kenneth always argued that corporate identity always came through the product. He was a product designer of course, so he would argue that corner. But it’s how the company behaves and what it does. How it behaves to its customers… I think actually, industry has got better.

Think of Landor in London.

I think they are WPP aren’t they?
Maybe WPP is wiping them out for me.

What’s sad of course is a number of very close friends of mine who fell for the WPP offer.

And what happened in that case?
I have to get careful because I could get biased. Some of my friends who fell for the WPP offer hated what they did and got out… and never stayed around long enough to get the full reward. Of course the full reward was…

‘Look here David, do you want to be a millionaire? In two years time I can make you a millionaire and I’ll give you some of my shares you can put in your back pocket and it will be great.’

If you’re not actually in the creative business and yet you’re running a creative business your inclination is to always show the client more than one. There was an early story that Landor, when he did a scheme for United Airlines, he shot 300 versions. What does that tell the client? It tells the client you don’t have a clue.

We still have the same battle, because with Pentagram we do one solution, and people couldn’t believe that.

To this day?
Yes. I am sorry there is one solution, I have thought about it very carefully, and I will support that solution as a dying man as it were. If you can find a flaw in my argument, then I will modify the solution to fit the flaw.

The real problem was actually that we were having design companies driven by businessmen who actually didn’t have any way to judge whether the solution you had come up with was right or wrong.

In one of my case studies looking at Henrion when he is working for KLM it is very much the same story where he is learning very quickly how to make an argument. He is learning the hard way that he has to do that.

We all learn the hard way. Absolutely.

We were all at the time trying to learn how to explain this… managing the visual manifestation of an organisation is
worthwhile. It is now what clients and accountants call good will, it is measured in good will.

So that more away from the jobbing work, part of that was to provide a clear reasoning to support the work? Correct. Yes, you never talk about aesthetics, you talk about the gain in business.

So when you move onto that trajectory, do you think there is a transition away from the making element of design? Yes [hesitates]. I'm trying to stop you thinking that just because you have decided to go down that route that you've abandoned the craft aspect. I've not abandoned the craft aspect, I believe 100% in that. But it is using this skill [point] to make sure this skill [points again] is understood.

Misha Black spoke about how it was inevitable for the designer to progress into a kind of client himself who would manage the designers under his command. That seemed to be his answer to the frustration of working with clients... you become one. I can understand that the frustration in that period was that you were failing to achieve what you wanted to achieve. That's what the frustration was. I don't know about his staff, but in Pentagram you had assistants who did the donkeywork, but all the thinking was done by the Partner. There was originally a rule where staff should not be employed for more than 3 years. If you had them too long, you got people who were disinterested, or had been castrated. They knew where the filing cabinet was, but actually weren't contributing anything at all to the system.

So generally you have tended to have new partners coming in from outside Pentagram? Correct. I ran my own business for ten years and they invited me to join on that basis.

So in that time you have never had someone exceptional who was promoted to partner? Oddly enough I promoted a number of partners up through Pentagram. So John Rushworth who is currently a major partner here was my assistant. Justus Oehler, the German, he was my assistant. So yes, it has happened.

When you were talking about WPP and other conglomerates, one group who came to mind was Sampson Tyrell, who had originally worked with Henzio, but went on their own and were bought out early on by WPP. They've disappeared!

I believe they are now Brand Union. That's a perfect case. They changed their name to 'brand' and they have abandoned their creative process and gone for the big name.

So there is a sense of retaining the identity of your group? Well... Mr Sorrell came and interviewed me in this room. I told him very clearly that we weren't going to sell to him, however much he offered. We were eight or nine partners at the time and he said: 'Look here John, no need to worry too much, because it's a '60s hippy idea you are selling. No young people will join you. But we are now 23.

Another group from those early days who had a connection to Maidstone Art School was Banks & Miles. Did you have any relation to them? I know the name from the past, but I have no idea... but people grow old.

...I can talk about the next project, actually I then took on Faber & Faber, and again became a main Board Director at Faber. They had an in-house design department and there was originally a designer who ran the design department. Faber were classic in their very early covers, they were very inventive in the early publishing business... specifying how you did a book. By comparison other early publishers would simply get a book and hand the manuscript to the printer, the printer would print the book and then get some artist to do the cover. Berthold Wolpe is the man I am talking about, but he left and then the management didn't know what to do. They then got Richard Holmes and Herbert Spencer.

I am thinking about what they failed to do? Well Herbert decided he would lay the law down about what the perfect book was. That was the old system that you did in the '60s, you laid down rules. He had the idea that he would design the most perfect book and tell the in-house design department this is what a perfect book is. Of course it went straight up the nose of the in-house design department and they spent their life making sure it didn't work. And then Richard Holmes went and he locked himself in a back room to produce the best book in the world and it was the same problem.

The real problem was that the then in-house design department was actually driven by a production manager who dealt with all the paper and all the printing. The ladies who were ex-secretaries who did a one evening course at the London College of Printing on Typography. But actually, you went into the house and all the editors would come out in hives if you mentioned the design department. You found out that the design department had got an amazing technique... if you went and asked them a creative question they gave you a technical answer, and if you asked them a technical question they gave you a creative answer. A perfect way to baffle all the editors, who were not dumb, but baffled. This became a no-go area. So my problem was actually how to rebuild that. I went back to one of the Directors, Mr Robert Wallis in Clarks, and said: 'I've got this problem, what shall we do?' We did a number of things... never try and hit them head-on, but also see if you can find a fifth column, because if you were an external advisor, which I was, the in-house design department would lay man-traps for you on the days when you weren't there. And if you didn't know where the man traps were you were probably going to walk straight into one. So what I found is you identify an individual who the manager of the design department would never promote because they were seen as difficult. I always said you found one person who you thought the management didn't like and you promote them slightly above their station and give them a salary increase and suddenly you have a fifth column. That is not a bad technique, as then you know where the pitfalls... the mantraps are.

With in-house designers you have to find a way to win them over. I did the same with Boots, the same with John Lewis, and so on.

Does that assume you have already won over the trust of the people employing you? Yes, you have to have had a serious introduction from the owner of the business.

Do you think those same long-standing commissions are still coming into Pentagram, like Clarks, Faber? No question. No partner at Pentagram will go in at a lower level, because once you go in at dormant level it is a long route to achieve what you want.

I am interested in the relationship between the advertising business and the design scene, can you tell me more about Pentagram's relationship with the ad business? Certainly, when you introduce the agency, because there is a little bit of friction, because they will want to do the same job as you, they are promoting the corporation, therefore
building its identity, so there is a sense of frustration. The big downfall in the advertising business—except for the very good ones—most of the agencies are handled by middle management, and middle management are very happy talking to middle management; they get warm and cosy and they drink a lot of gin and tonic. But crummy agencies never let the creative people anywhere near the client, there are bag-carriers who will take the portfolio in and sell it and it is done by middle management.

That’s the early vision of the big agencies who wanted to move into it as a business. They quickly got rid of the creative people because they were difficult and weren’t very sensible. They had these very sharp people at the front who were career presenters. That was the big difference.

It is only when you get a very bright agency who have very good creative staff, but on the whole you win that very quickly because you know you are batting on the same plane. So CDP, who is a terrific business I worked with on Clarks, we got on very well indeed. We know exactly what we were doing...you could say, well I’m worried about this. And they would say, we would deal with this.

How did that relationship begin? Did you introduce them or vice-verse?
At Clarks it was the Sales Director who said: ‘I want to go to CDP’, and I said: ‘great’. And of course the advertising agency would on the whole, in the early days, have had more power than the design consultancy because it would be were the MD made a choice of which agency to go to. They always had better status than we did in the early ’70s.

Of course the advertising agencies were very articulate, because if you wanted to be in the advertising business you wanted to be articulate. They were better at that...what’s called bullshit. The design industry was waking up to what they needed to do, and Ian Logan saying: ‘Ah, I hate all this upfront bollocks’. What he meant was all the bullshit you had to do to get your case understood intelligently.

There was a quote from an American business consultancy, McKinsey, very famous, who said: ‘what you have to do John is tell them the truth...on time’. If you get those two things right, you’ll be okay, because they are the two things people all can work out. Whether you are telling the truth, because the animal in them will spot through the bullshit. And on time, because they can look at their watch. It is two bits they can measure very clearly. That always stuck in my mind.

If you accept those two things, is there not a danger that all you do is tell the truth and on time, and you do very little else. It becomes very formulaic and you rely on the patterns of work you have done before?
Then you question what is truth. A lot of young designers are so determined to break in and to do something that will be admired by their peer-group pressure, so they start selling things they shouldn’t be selling because actually they are doing it for the wrong reasons. So as long as it is the truth as you see it. It is not truthful if you don’t believe in it 100%. And design of course does have to be different, just be regurgitating would put you in a weak position.

How have you gone about managing the group personality of Pentagram over time?
We’ve always talked about the idea of having a business partner at Pentagram, but no way.
Appendix 2. Michael Farr (Design Integration), testing case

Here follows the second draft of a testing case focused on Michael Farr’s design management consultancy. Though Farr sold his clients a corporate image service under the guise of ‘house style’, it was decided that this case study did not fully align with the aims and objectives of my thesis. As such, it should be considered as a scoping document which sets in place the foundations from which a further body of research could later develop. This research project would focus on the entrepreneurial design practitioner, with James Pilditch and Wally Olins, considered other potential cases for further research.
The intermediary as integrator: Michael Farr (Design Integration) and the management of design as an independent practice

Planning ‘Europe’s first independent design management consultancy’

Biographical background
Michael Bryant Farr was born in 1924 and graduated from Cambridge University in 1949, having studied the English Tripos under literary critic Dr F.R. Leavis. Farr had no formal training in art or design and his interest in the field only developed towards the end of his time at Cambridge. During his last year of study, he met Nikolaus Pevsner, Slade Professor of Fine Art at the University, who had been asked to work on a revised edition of his text An Enquiry into Industrial Art in England (Pevsner, 1939). Pevsner was said to be too busy to complete the project alone, so Farr took on the project with a view to co-authorship, but as it transpired, when the book was published some six years later it appeared under his own name alone (Farr, 1991). Written in 1952, but published in 1955, Design in British Industry: A Mid-Century Survey, was, in its time, a significant text, mapping the territory with a sense of comprehensiveness that was uncommon for the time. The dominant tone of Farr’s text was a moralising one typical of the era, with him setting out the need to ‘fight against the shoddy design of goods’ that were: ‘thoughtless’, ‘insensitive’, ‘dishonest’, ‘vulgar’, or ‘boastful’ (1955, p. xxxvi). Here he aligned himself with a dominant trope of the British scene, this being the socially driven idealism at the heart of design professionalism that demonised ‘bad’ design, and valorised ‘good’.

Whereas in 1950s Britain there was widely understood to be a need for designers to serve society in an era of post-war reconstruction, in America, by contrast, Farr (1955, p. 151) described how ‘personal responsibility for a design standard tended to be obscured by the need for making money’.¹¹⁶ Though Hayward (1998) argues that the British axiom of ‘good design’ was really about an elitist form of ‘good taste’, brainwashing the masses to oppose mass culture; I would contend that beyond the perceived aesthetic or functional value of this elitist form of ‘good’ design, many British designers of the post-war era were especially motivated by social ends, or good causes. By comparison to design consultants practising in a corporate context today, British designers of the ‘50s were strong-willed about their professional duty to serve society, though this idealistic spirit would come under increasing strain as the century progressed (for more on the tensions between professionalism and commercialism, see: Armstrong, 2015). In Farr’s case, he aligned himself in relation to a human-centred

¹¹⁶ Farr claimed that there was no direct correlation between a raising of design standards and increased sales, contrary to what a number of American consultants had earlier claimed (Farr, 1955, p. 151).
form of industrial design as opposed to the more commercial bent of advertising, with his later interest in ergonomics reinforcing the notion that he was actively interested in, and motivated by, human wellbeing.

After finishing the bulk of work for *Design in British Industry*, Farr took on the role of News Editor at *The Architect's Journal*. This in turn led on to him being offered the post of Editor at the Design Council’s magazine, *Design*. He continued in the role for seven years, and when he left in 1959 remained with the Design Council for a further two years as Chief Information Officer (Farr, 1991). Soon after he took on the position of general secretary at the Design and Industries Association, serving from 1962 to 1966 (Farr, 1991).

**The emergence of ‘design management’**

The second phase of Farr’s career, which I shall focus on here, began in 1961, when he founded the independent design management consultancy Michael Farr (Design Integration) Ltd. (MFDI hereafter) – claimed to be the first independent design management consultancy in Europe. By the early 1960s Farr had identified an opportunity for a new kind of design consultant who could bridge the gap in comprehension between designers and management within British industry by offering ‘business-like designing’ (Farr, 1961). According to Farr (1966, p. 3), the role of such a consultant was in: ‘defining a design problem, finding the most suitable designer, and making it possible for him to solve it on time and within budget’. But this would not prove straightforward, as in practice the design manager of the 1960s stood in a perilous position between the creative and commercial industries – what Farr (Farr, 1966, p. 158) referred to as ‘a knife-edge alternately (or simultaneously) sharpened by the managing director and by the designer’.

When interviewed some year later he recalled how during this time he had identified a need for someone to bridge the knowledge gap between design and industry:

> It is necessary to stress what *Design* magazine meant to me because it was there that I conceived the idea that not all was going to go well with design in industry unless there was a greater understanding on the part of management of what designers could do. Although the term was not used in those days I was struggling to formulate the philosophy which I later called design management, and how it should be practised (Farr, 1991).

Explaining how he had come to work in the field, he continued:

> I had a rather peculiar upbringing in the design business. I am not a designer as most people in the business are, but I had been closely concerned with it and had also been a journalist. I had been able to look, partly from the outside, at what the problems were likely to be in industry. In writing up stories I had talked to many manufacturers and designers about the difficulties they faced. I am not talking about just one type of design but a broad area – all types of product design and some light engineering goods, graphics of all kinds, and interior design. I wanted to make some contribution to all of these. One designer could not possibly be knowledgeable in all

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of them, but a design management consultant could have a working knowledge with the main problems which beset this big variety of industries. (Farr, 1991)

During his time as a writer and journalist Farr had a comprehensive induction into the culture of the British design scene, mingling with the most influential figures in the industry. These experiences placed him in an advantageous position for what would follow. Between 1959 and 1961 he set about planning his new consultancy, launching in November of 1961. The concept of ‘house style’ (later called corporate identity) would be a central tent of this business offering, with MFDI promising to coordinate their clients’ design and marketing collateral in order to produce a coherent and compelling corporate image for them.

Personal records remain at the V&A Archive of Art & Design (Farr, 1956–86), that provide valuable insights into the concerns and working methods Farr adopted during the establishment of this pioneering design management business. These records depict him as a hesitant, uncertain character on the verge of a dramatic life change, and when interviewed some thirty years later he explained how leaving the security of his job at the Design Council had been a high-risk strategy:

Although I had a good, safe job and a wife and four children, I was prepared to take this risk because I believed that then, in the early ’sixties, industry needed design management services and that I could provide them (Farr, 1991).

Although high risk, Farr’s unprecedented exploits with MFDI placed him in a unique position from which he could further market these experiences. This led on in 1966 to the publication of Design Management (1966), a 164-page treatise summarising what Farr’s formative experiences in design management had taught him. Within Design Management, Farr used comprehensive ‘real-world’ case studies – of work conducted by MFDI – to set out his vision for the role of the design management consultant. The high visibility and broad distribution of Design Management elevated Farr’s reputation within the field, and he is still acknowledged as the first to provide a meaningful conceptualisation of ‘design management’ (Cooper & Press, 1995; Cooper, Junginger and Lockwood, 2011; Best, 2015). Furthermore, design historian Jonathan Woodham (1997) has grouped the publication of Design Management (1966) together with the inauguration of the RSA’s Presidential Awards for Design Management (initiated in 1964 and first awarded in ’65) as key signifiers of the emergence of design management, linking these developments to the flourishing Design Methods movement of the same era.

The codification of the new professional ideal set out by Farr represented a significant milestone in the developing bureaucratisation of design as a professional activity, and given the significance of design management to both contemporary design practice, as well as the global economy, it is surprising that Farr’s work has not received greater scrutiny before now. This lack of interest may be attributable, at least in part, to his focus on the everyday administrative management of design, as opposed to design management in the more recent sense, wherein designerly ways of knowing are
mobilised within corporate management contexts. While the concept of design management in the contemporary sense (i.e. what design can do for business) has blossomed in recent decades, scholarship on the organisational culture of design labour is less well defined or developed.\footnote{This may be linked to the lack of status and professional accreditation accorded to those managing design labour on a day-to-day basis, for example, the project manager is often treated as a rather incidental figure.} Ultimately those who have acknowledged Michael Farr’s contribution to the field have done so in an attempt to map the lineage, as well as the conceptual growth, of the discipline of design management; but in so doing they have failed to offer any meaningful contextualisation of the work or ideas of Farr himself.

Farr is somewhat anomalous in this research in the sense that he was not a practising designer himself and had received no specific training in the field. Nevertheless, his influence on the development of design consultancy (in both Britain and beyond) is so far-reaching that his work and ideas are undoubtedly due greater exposure and attention. As he sought to align the needs of industrial partners with the services of design consultants, his work can be considered both an extension and an embodiment of design coordination principles. He is not known to have been a key contributor to the Design Methods movement of the 1960s, but he surrounded himself with those who were at the forefront of this initiative to systematise the design process. For example, design methods pioneer John Christopher Jones is credited with sifting through Farr’s early manuscripts for his text Design Management (1966), and later acted as an ‘ergonomics advisor’ to MFDI (Farr, n.d.). Bruce Archer, meanwhile, another seminal figure in the movement, was instrumental in helping Farr to set up and run his design management consultancy ‘Michael Farr (Design Integration)’ as I will demonstrate using archival material from the V&A archive of Art and Design.\footnote{In recent times Archer has received renewed attention from scholars (Boyd Davis and Gristwood, 2016; Murphy and Evans, 2016) and it is my contention that a revival of interest in Farr is equally overdue.}

Further to this, Farr nurtured the talents of a number of young designers who would go on to be instrumental in establishing design as a lynchpin of modern business practice. Amongst the most influential individuals he employed were: Ken Garland (design practitioner and author of the First Things First manifesto); Michael Wolff (co-founder of global branding firm Wolff Olins); Theo Crosby, Alan Fletcher and Colin Forbes (partners at Crosby/Fletcher/Forbes – a precursor to Pentagram); John McConnell (later partner at Pentagram); Bill Moggridge (co-founder of Ideo); and Dick Negus (founder of Negus and Sharland/Negus & Negus). It is hard to say precisely to what extent Farr educated these designers in terms of the administrative and organisational culture of design work, but their close connection is certainly noteworthy and due further consideration.
Archer, Farr and the ‘knife-edge’ between design and management

As he developed the working model of his practice Farr sought the advice of a range of industrial design luminaries, including Misha Black (partner in the industry leading consultancy Design Research Unit), Gordon Russell (furniture designer and Director of the Design Council), Willy de Majo (director of W.M. de Majo Associates), and F.H.K. Henrion (director of Henrion Design Associates). While Russell had advised him on the financial aspects of the project, advising Farr against the option of ‘taking a partner fund for extra capital’, the others offered more operational advice about the value and function such a service could provide. From Henrion, he took note of a society of designers in Germany called ‘Novum’. While Black, for example, suggested that: ‘coordination of the job may well be worth more than the design fees’ (Farr, n.d.). In highlighting the inestimable value to the client of design coordination services, Black further reinforced the opportunity that Farr had sought to address. But here Farr was not alone, as other, arguably more entrepreneurial (or commercially driven) figures than he, such as Wally Olins and James Pilditch, also recognised this latent potential. As practitioners like Olins, Pilditch and Farr began to gain jurisdiction over the field, a growing schism began to develop in the world of design between those involved in planning and management and those responsible for design in terms of those decisions made at the ‘coal face’. As this burgeoning discipline developed, the significance of the design manager would grow exponentially, to the point where they would come to challenge the credence of the design practitioner.

The documents in evidence from the archive of Farr’s works at the V&A suggest that the most forceful influence on Farr’s thinking came from his close associate Bruce Archer. Born in 1922, Archer had trained as a mechanical engineer at what is now City University. He set up an engineering consultancy in 1953 and was teaching evening classes at the Central School of Art and Design, going full-time by 1957 (Boyd-Davis, Gristwood, 2016). Where Archer and Farr met remains unclear, but in his role as editor of Design magazine (and later Chief Information Officer at the Design Council), Farr was well placed to meet the most influential members of the design community. Archer had contributed his first articles to Design (Archer, 1954) during Farr’s tenure as editor, and it seems that his radical ideas about rational design methods made a lasting impression on Farr. Garland (cited in Twemlow, 2013, p. 77) explains that ‘Farr’s own inclinations were towards human-factors design – and he was most comfortable working with writers like Christopher Jones, Brian Shackel, and Bruce Archer, who held similar views’.

While others had influenced his thinking from a distance, Archer was to become an employee of Farr’s company, operating as a ‘design co-ordinator’ on projects that included a house style programme for the laundrette Brook Green Laundry. His input

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119 Twemlow (2013, p. 162) notes that during the International Design Conference at Aspen in 1955, Farr had led ‘A discussion and demonstration of international kites’ alongside Charles Eames!
into the ideology of the firm – not to mention its general running – is particularly significant, for he was a key figure in the modernisation and development of design methods in Britain. As a progenitor of the Design Methods movement, he championed a dogmatically systematic approach to design and its management. His text, *Systematic methods for designers*, originally printed as a series of articles in *Design* from 1963–64, was highly influential, being reprinted by the Design Council as an offprint, due to what was described as ‘unprecedented demand’ (Anon, 1965, p. 73) – it would go on to be translated into several other languages, according to Boyd Davis and Gristwood (2016a).

Bruce Archer’s highly technocratic mind-set would come to have an unrivalled influence on the operation and philosophy of Michael Farr’s business, with the level of sway he held indicated by Farr’s personal notes from the period. One such example from a meeting between the pair on 30 October 1961 indicates that Archer had helped Farr to work up the fundamental idea and structure of his business (Farr, 1961).

Labelled ‘Meeting with Bruce Archer, Monday 30/10/61’, the front of the note sheet is dominated by a rather rough sketch of a network diagram with a central hub and spokes leading out to connected modules (Fig. 1). It is notable that throughout their careers both Archer and Farr had a strong penchant for complex diagrammatical models, with each of them having leaned heavily on such complex information graphics in their own publishing and journalistic work. Though this rough graphic has little of the nuance evident in their later diagrams, it is important as it hints at the rudimentary nature of their shared understanding at this stage of their working relationship.

![Figures 1 and 2) Michael Farr meeting notes with Bruce Archer (1961). Michael Farr Archive, V&A Archive of Art and Design, AAD/1989/7/1.](image)

The reverse of the same sheet (Fig. 2) shows a list of company names that suggests Archer worked directly with Farr to scope out potential titles for the business, with these names revealing the various ideological emphases the pair were toying with. From notions of organisational planning (‘Design Co-ordination Ltd’, ‘Design Plan’) and
systematic rigour (‘Systematic Design’), to ideas about social networks (‘Design Contacts’, ‘Designers Consortium’, ‘Human Engineering’) and the link between design and business (‘Design Liaison’), the range of names suggested here sketches out the intent, as well as the limits of their thinking. The latter entries on their list read more like a series of keywords than a range of legitimate business names. These words, nevertheless, continue to underline their intentions. One notable, if playful, example being ‘argus’, a term derived from Greek mythology, meaning a monster or watchman with a hundred eyes. Rather an ominous sign for the prospects of design managers and especially those working under their command.

On another sheet further company names are developed and refined upon, with suggestions such as ‘Design Counsellors’, ‘Design Network’ and ‘Design Planners’. This list includes the name that was eventually selected: ‘Michael Farr (Design Integration) Ltd.’. Given the broad range of options considered, it is noteworthy that Farr chose to prioritise his own name in positioning it first. This was relatively commonplace for well-established specialist design consultancies led by a single individual, with prime examples being: Hans Schleger & Associates, Henrion Design Associates and W.M. de Majo Associates (partnerships seem to have become more prevalent with the following generation, but surnames continued to predominate: Banks & Miles; Crosby, Fletcher, Forbes; Main Wolff; and Negus & Sharland). Given how eminently connected Farr was one can only assume that he was advised to make the most of his own name. Positioning ‘Design Integration’ as a secondary descriptor set within brackets had the effect of making it appear like an adjunct, or afterthought, but the decision to include the term ‘integration’ is interesting given the potential for interpretation. While it could suggest a cohesive and holistic service where administration was streamlined, it could equally be seen to refer to the consistent design outputs promised by house style – one of the services offered by Farr. Another interpretation would be in regard to the seamless integration with the operation of the client’s business, while the integration of multiple design specialisms would be a further reading.

The final note at the bottom of the same paper sheet is indicative of the significance of Archer’s influence, reading: ‘Bruce Archer in association with Michael Farr (Design Integration) Ltd.’. It seems likely that Farr was simply trying out his proposed business name in the context of a hypothetical press release rather than proposing this as his company name. But still, it is plain to see that Archer and his ideas were at the forefront of Farr’s mind during the formation of his business plan. If his level of influence remained in doubt, a further sheet of Farr’s (n.d.) notes is labelled ‘IMAGE Basic premise worked out by BA’, and lists a range of facets and ideas for the firm, not all of which are entirely comprehensible. Amongst this list Farr notes his intent to be an ‘all co-ordinating’ force at the ‘centre of a communications network’ – a ‘seller of services, not of things’. He describes the firm’s function as being akin to that of a ‘counsellor’, albeit, one with the stated aim to: ‘govern all I surround myself with’.

Given the rapidly increasing importance of television within advertising and design during the period, his analogy that he will seek to offer the ‘Versatility of [a] TV producer’ is particularly fascinating.
It should be noted that Farr and Archer’s initial planning meetings in 1961 took place during the relatively short period that Archer taught as a visiting lecturer at the Hochschule at Ulm (1960–1961), arguably the most pivotal design school of the post-war era (Spitz, 2002; Jacob, 1988). Archer had been invited to lecture there by Tomás Maldonado, and was tasked with acting as a mediator between the two rival factions that had emerged at the school, the mathematicians, and the scientists and designers. Ulm’s raison d’être was to develop a ‘scientific’ and objective approach to design, characterised by design historian Jonathan Woodham as: ‘a move away from intuition to method, from component to system, from product to process, and from the individual to an interdisciplinary design team as an appropriate means of solving problems’ (1997, p. 180). This philosophy aligned clearly with Archer’s interests, and he was inevitably influenced by the work and ideas of his esteemed colleagues at Ulm (as they were likely influenced by his). Among the design luminaries to have graced HfG Ulm it would be easy to imagine that Archer’s short tenure there would have had only limited significance, but former student Klaus Krippendorff (2008, p. 62) cites Archer as ‘the most influential product design teacher for me’. Krippendorff (ibid.) recalls how Archer had not only given lectures, but also ‘brought a design method to the department; was intensely involved with his students and open to explore alternative approaches’. According to Krippendorff (ibid., p. 64), Archer and Horst Rittel had ‘worked well together and later became major pillars of the Design Methods movement’.

It is telling that Archer should have been involved with Farr at this formative moment in his quest towards rational design methods, but the flow of influence was not only in one direction, with their working relationship being mutually beneficial for both parties. While Farr benefitted from Archer’s intense interest in operational research and scientific management, Archer’s association with Farr enabled him to ‘engage deeply with the commercial world’ and put his ideas into practice (Boyd Davis and Gristwood, 2016b, p. 2). In his doctoral thesis from 1968, Archer acknowledges Farr as having given him ‘many opportunities to put his theories to the test within the framework of Michael Farr design management organisation’ (Archer, 1968).

Marketing a design management consultancy

Given that independent design management was a new conception, Farr took great care to consider how his company would position themselves in the market and attract potential clientele. One sheet of his notes (Farr, n.d.) succinctly cumulates the key

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120 Archer taught at Ulm for one academic year, thus it is likely that his planning meetings with Farr took place shortly after his appointment would have ended in the summer of 1961.

121 According to Boyd-Davis and Gristwood (2016), Archer inclined to the mathematicians’ camp.

122 Key staff at HfG included: Otl Aicher (founder, German), Max Bill (Director, Swiss), Tomas Maldonado (Rector/Prorector, Argentine), Horst Rittel (Professor of Design Methodology, German), and Gui Bonsiepe (student and lecturer, German).
projected facets of MFDI that were understood to be pivotal in attracting potential clients:

**Announcement aimed at clients**

One bill for everything

Know all in design world – multiple personality

Evaluation – pre brief – co-ordinate – see it thro

Communicator – network controller – conductor

International – pan European

Ex COID – *DESIGN* during its formative years
author of standard work
COID as the authority today – Head of Inf DW
MF is now AVAILABLE!
as entrepreneur

Marketing – research briefing – designing new products to meet human needs – no gimmick styling for fashion

Low overheads and comprehensive service

Save clients money by planning and expert placing
Business-like designing – to time
Field covered

In this positioning statement Farr can be seen setting out his own personal expertise and the basis of his business offering in terms of its merits to clients. He seeks to claim jurisdiction across a broad range of design specialisms by suggesting that he has the ‘field covered’ and ‘knows all’ in the business. Here he is setting out his competitive advantage over other design consultancies that do not have his focus on management.

Farr (1965, p. 38) later went on to argue that even those designers who held a talent for management ought not to be managing the design process, claiming that given designers’ training and experience lay specifically in design, that this is how they are best engaged and most fully fulfilled. Farr asserted that designers who ‘are good at designing ... should not have the time to spare to manage the ramifications of their design projects’ (p. 38). This view contrasted with the practices of those designers fronting up one-man teams, like Henrion and Schleger, who led the managerial as well as the creative direction of their work. Indeed, Henrion championed the notion of the ‘general consultant designer’, presenting an exhibition of his work at the ICA (Archer, 1960) under this very same title that promoted the idea of the designer as a polymath able to
traverse across many disciplines. Just as designers had sought professional respectability in order to gain jurisdiction over their work, design managers now sought to do the same, positioning design management as a specialised profession with specific methods and skills. Business Management guru Roger Falk (1964) explained this position clearly in an early introductory feature on design management for *Design*:

> Unlike the artist, the industrial designer cannot work in isolation. What he does is largely dictated by his client, and if his client is amateurish in his handling of design matters he is likely to end up with amateurish designs. The proper management of design policy is as much a professional skill as that of the designer himself. Yet many firms which take infinite pains to develop, say, efficiency in management of personnel will happily confess bewilderment when it comes to design. (Falk, 1964, p. 23).

It is within this highly competitive business context that Farr launched his firm, pondering whether to register as a sole trader, or as a limited company, ultimately deciding on the latter. Archer advised him that he would have greater freedoms if he set up alone without any designers in tow, claiming that to form together with designers would be just like a ‘glorified agency – an exchange and mart’ (Farr, n.d.). Together they worked through the logistics of how to enlist designers into prospective projects, with Archer advising: ‘Just tell des[igner] “I like your work – and I think I can sell it” – but make no agreement to do so – hold out hope of putting designer on a retainer later’ (Farr, n.d.). This is interesting as it suggests there was no intent to retain the designers on firm contracts, but that they might be given false hope of a more permanent agreement. Farr, notes later in his papers that: ‘Designers will tend to come after me if the business goes well. And I’m still free to call on the best men for the job’ (Farr, n.d.). The networked working arrangement they agreed with their designers was one of the most unusual facets of MFDI. Rather than hosting design practitioners on site, they took the unprecedented step of managing designers who worked remotely from their own studio spaces. In his notes Farr rationalised this as follows:

- Decentralised designers at low overheads
- Central small co-ordinating office for fast communications

(Farr, n.d.)

Given that they were not sharing the same working environment on a day-to-day basis, they would need to work carefully to ensure strong and consistent channels of communication. As such Farr had planned to enforce strict protocols, though it is impossible to say whether these were imposed. He noted that:

> All des[igners] working for MF to supply MF with carbon [copy] of everything written or ordered on behalf of the job. Or, all orders thro’ MF office & all correspondence.

123 This led Archer (1960) to respond directly to the exhibition by questioning just how ‘general’ a design consultant could possible be.
The idea that all phone calls between the designer and client would be logged on a postcard and then sent on to Farr in the post seems rather controlling, but Farr was clearly concerned about ‘commanding’ the free spirited freelance designers under his watch. He later mulled over the pros and cons of employing independent design practitioners:

The prevalence of small design practices makes life both better and more difficult for the design manager. Among the advantages he will see that the designer, once he has found the right man, is an expert in his particular field, otherwise he would not have survived as freelance. The design manager will be able to command the designer’s personal attention throughout the project, and not have to deal with second and third string assistants. He will find that the designer’s overheads are lower than those carried by larger practices, and hence his fees more modest. Among the disadvantages he may encounter are (oddly annoying this) the difficulty of getting a message through to the designer if he is away from his office; delays because the designer is unwilling to delegate; and a noticeable lack of interest in the routine of paperwork that is to some degree, always required during any design assignment (Farr, 1966, p. 78).

Here again Farr slights the ability of the design practitioner to handle the administrative dimension of their work, further developing his argument for specialised design managers who are focused on such endeavours. Within the pages of Design Management he gave relatively short shrift to the contractual side of employing such designers, deferring instead to the book, Professional Practice for Designers (1961), the seminal work of Dorothy Goslett, business manager at the DRU. In practice Farr tended to appoint designers of the younger generation who were on the way up, as opposed to those well established individuals who had strong roots already developed from the first half of the century. As such he gave work to developing practitioners who would later go on to play a major role in the proliferation of design as a corporate activity; key figures here included Bill Moggridge (later IDEO), Michael Wolff (later Wolff Olins); and Alan Fletcher (later Pentagram).

Identifying employees for his own team of staff in Piccadilly had its own challenges too, as his project managers had to be trained-up, given that this was not a recognised discipline. He recalls: ‘you couldn’t get a design manager off the shelf. In those days there was no training such as you now find in business and design schools; it was not possible 25 years ago to second or even poach from somewhere else’ (Farr, 1991). In spite of their lack of specialised training the staff of MFDI were a highly educated bunch, with two Oxbridge trained project managers (David Wainwright, a Journalism graduate from Oxford; and Donald Pattenden, a Mechanical Sciences

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124 According to Chris Timings, designer at the DRU, Goslett’s book sets out exactly how DRU was organised financially, being a precise depiction of ‘how the Unit was run from a financial and business point of view’ (2012).
graduate from Cambridge). Farr himself had studied English Literature at Cambridge, with his other employees graduates of Kings College (Research Assistant, Caroline Pearce-Higgins) and London School of Economics (Assistant Project Manager, Anthony Taylor). Bruce Archer was listed as a ‘Design Co-ordinator’ in early promotional materials for MFDI (n.d.) and continued to be listed as a staff member later on, though his role was not ascribed. Albert Everett Jones, was attributed as a Director, as well as acting as chairman of Everetts Advertising Ltd and Mass Observation (the link to advertising is intriguing here, with strong parallels evident between Everett Jones’s role for MFDI and the advertising entrepreneur Marcus Brumwell’s supportive role as Director at DRU – like Everett, Brumwell was also a Director of Mass Observation). Other employees are noted in various company paperwork that survives (Farr, n.d.), included here is the interior ship designer John West, a Durham graduate; Senior Project Manager, Michael Milliken, an Oxford Graduate, and former account executive at Notley Advertising (another interesting link to the profession of advertising); and famous racing driver Sterling Moss, listed variously as a Special Projects Advisor and later a Director of the firm.

Design management as processual practice

A model of ‘design integration’ as a management process

On a two-sided note-sheet labelled ‘Aims / Methods’, Farr (n.d.) can be seen setting out what he understood as the key stages in the sequence of managing a design coordination project. This early note, inscribed during the gestation period of his new business, reveals his initial conceptions of the routine tasks involved in the design management process:

Sequence
1. set job with pre des market/technique research decided
2. set brief in general terms
3. fix client/des meeting
4. tie up brief, schedule, fee
5. contract with client/contract with des
   leave des to work direct – because design and admin at this stage are often both involved in single decisions. (this is system at DRU)
6. tie up job
7. presentation
8. publicity and promotion
9. marketing follow up

Within this sequence it is surprising that greater attention is not given to the management of designing as a process in and of itself, with Farr jumping directly from
settling contractual agreements to tying up the job, leaving the contracted designers to deal with the design labour. No detail is given to processes of feedback, refinement and development, thus suggesting a straightforward process from the client setting the brief, to the designer answering it. This emission suggests that Farr had little day-to-day knowledge of the practice of designers. Although he had worked alongside editorial designer Ken Garland at Design, his observations had otherwise been made from a distance. At this stage in the gestation period of his business he conceived of design management fundamentally as an administrative process in which the design act was but a minor inconvenience.

This process outline inscribed in shorthand has a perfunctory, concise quality that derives in part from its personal, private nature. Its clinical quality is at odds with the more public inscriptions of process that Farr later came to develop and publicise. For instance, when his book *Design Management* was released in 1966 he had elaborated on this sequence to develop a much more detailed inscription in diagrammatical form that represented his projected process (Fig. 3). The diagram appeared in the fifth chapter of *Design Management*: 'Planning a Design Programme', at the beginning of which he made plain his debt to Archer, referencing *Systematic Methods for Designers* (1963–4), and explaining: 'The author is indebted to his colleague, L. Bruce Archer, for some of the ideas in this chapter' (Farr, 1966, p. 60). Farr now included a much fuller mapping of the design act, with several stages of review and modification built in, and far greater detail given over to the networks of influence and consideration to be factored into such a process. The diagram focused on industrial design, as opposed to corporate graphics, with reference to the design of 'products' via 'working drawings', 'prototypes' and the 'works department'.

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**Stage 1**
- Preparation of design ideas
- Coordination of design ideas
- Modification to design data
- Presentation of designs
- Revision to related data
- Work to design office
- Initial construction

**Stage 2**
- Satisfaction of electors
- Final testing
- Revision to related data
- Final construction
- Correspondence with clients
- Detailed drawing

**Stage 3**
- Satisfaction of electors
- Final testing
- Revision to related data
- Final construction
- Correspondence with clients
- Detailed drawing
- Information to system contractors/agents
- Maintenance
- Final production
- Production
- Production

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Design manager's area of involvement
According to Nicolini et al.’s (2012) framework for understanding collaborative objects, Farr’s process list (above) and process diagram (Fig. 3) can be understood as ‘infrastructure objects’, in as much that they operate as tools to structure, anchor and enable collaborative work (Star, 1999). There are some caveats to Farr’s published diagram (Fig. 3) in as much that he stresses that it is a representation that should not be taken literally given that each design management project differs from case to case. As such it is impossible to say with any certainty the extent to which this infrastructure was mobilised in the day-to-day practice of his design management company. Whereas Henrion and Parkin had drawn attention to similar work-flow diagrams, framing them as fundamental collaborative tools implicated directly in their practice; Farr posits his process map as neither a universal model applicable in all scenarios, nor a specific example born of a single case study from his practice. Instead his diagram is framed as having educational value, presenting a hypothetical scenario that ‘pre-supposes that two or more products are being designed by two designers simultaneously, and that they are in turn aided by specialists, such as ergonomists’ (Farr, 1966, p. 59). As such, his diagram cannot be taken as a working plan inscribed for future enactment by his employees, but should be understood instead as having been conceived through a process of reflection-on action (Schön, 1983), whereby Farr retroactively transcribed a working process that had already been enacted by him and his peers (I have used inscription here to infer setting out in advance of, and transcription to infer setting out in response to, one being projective, the other more reflective). Whereas Henrion and Parkin’s work-flow tools are directly implicated in the HDA studio as a site-specific or local community of practice, the community of practice circling around Farr’s diagram is broader by comparison, being comprised first and foremost of readers of Design Management. In this sense the diagram plays a powerful role in codifying the emergent new field of design management to a community of practice developing around these concerns.

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125 Hanseth and Lundberg (2001) suggest that such objects should be classified as ‘work oriented situated infrastructure’, rather than universal service infrastructure, which would include basic provisions such as electricity or the internet, for example.
There are immediate similarities between the process-based diagrams that Farr and Archer deployed in their respective texts. In *Systematic Methods*, Archer (1963) spoke of the shift away from the ‘habitual rules of thumb’ of a sculptural, or artefactual approach to design, towards a more logical and analytical ‘systems’ approach. In the seventh and final instalment of his series of articles (‘The Final Steps’, 1964) his carefully constructed arguments culminated in a 14-page check list for designers, followed by a 229-step arrow diagram outlining the entirety of his process (Fig. 4). It is astounding that *Design* gave over such great quantities of the magazine to Archer’s ideas over a two-year period, yet in commercial terms their decision was vindicated by the unprecedented interest with which the articles were received (Anon, 1965).

Archer’s approach to information design derived directly from his interest in operations research and critical path analysis and his 229-step process makes Farr’s four-page diagram seem concise by comparison. Still, in terms of their efficacy as communication tools, Farr and Archer’s models share similarities in that they privilege detail over explanation, with much microscopic nuance, but little macroscopic value. In other words, to deduce meanings from the diagrams as stand-alone objects they must be studied intently for a sustained period. In Farr’s case the only macro-level signposting providing any entry-point, or welcome into his complex diagram were the five headings: ‘Project Investigation’, ‘Selection of Design Team’, ‘Stage 1’, ‘Stage 2’, and ‘Stage 3’. Given that the final three titles provided little descriptive value, these headings were of minimal benefit to readers needing enticement to de-script the model.

Spread across two separate spreads of his book, Farr’s disjointed inscription gave the impression of an author with a mastery over the subject, but not a mastery over its
visual explanation. Still, perhaps this was the point. Inherent in both complex technocratic diagrams by Farr and Archer is an implied mastery of design management processes that leads one to question to what extent such diagrams are intended to communicate to readers, and whether the fundamental message is more about the authors command over the discipline. Reflecting on this tendency to invoke notions of mastery without providing workable models, associate of Farr and Archer, John Christopher Jones (1966, p. 32), an early champion of the Design Methods movement, complained of the ‘substantial but not always very practical publications’ emerging from the field. Jones explained that: ‘The literature on methods of designing is growing quickly, but it is not easy to read or to put to practical use. Much of it is both vague and dogmatic, and there is little reference to the work of practising designers’ (Jones, 1966, p. 32).126 There is a case to suggest that there was more benefit to Farr or Archer in projecting an impressive looking but incomprehensible model, as opposed to a concise presentation of their ideas that might suggest a field of little real substance or complexity.127 Regrettably Farr’s diagrams did not improve as communication devices over time, with the visuals he mobilised in his later book, Control Systems for Industrial Design (Farr, 1973), becoming increasingly intricate and more heavily scripted, following the Program Evaluation and Review Technique, or PERT method, developed by the US Navy (Mercier & Nunnally, 1965).

Jones (1966) was not alone in beginning to question the development path of the Design Methods movement, with Christopher Alexander, another key early progenitor of the movement, now disassociating himself from it entirely. Sharing his disdain for the course of development, Alexander rued what he saw as ‘continued attempts to fix all of life into logical frameworks’, explaining that: ‘I feel that a terrific part of it has become an intellectual game, and its largely for that reason I’ve disassociated from the field’ (1971, p. 3). Bayzit (1994) meanwhile, reflects that what had begun with ‘everyone ... systematizing his or her own approach to design, and externalizing it as design method’ (p. 18), soon transformed into ‘a sort of academic subculture’ (p. 21). Though Archer could be accused of being implicated in the culture of intellectual gamesmanship that Alexander describes, Farr’s text Design Management, is by comparison, much more pragmatic, providing numerous case studies to illustrate his arguments and to ground his ideas in commercial practice. Yet in the case of their visual models of the design process both were guilty of many of the traits that Jones and Alexander identified, presenting process maps that were substantial, but not very practical; difficult to read, dogmatic but vague, and overly fixed down with little in-built malleability.

Though Alexander (1971) and others, had disassociated themselves from the intent of inscribing the design process in intricate detail, Farr and Archer continued to be interested in such pursuits, at least in the short term, with Farr’s diagrams in Control

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126 Given that it was published in the same magazine the following year, Jones’ text, Design Methods Compared (1966), should be understood as a direct response to Archer’s Systematic Methods, clearly stating in its introduction the desire to set out alternative methods to those put forward by Archer.

127 In Archer’s defence, he did provide more straightforward, summative diagrams in Systematic Methods (1963–4) that communicated his broader over-arching ideas.
Systems for Industrial Design (Farr, 1973) continuing along similar lines to Archer’s earlier work. Perhaps it was the sprawling nature of design management processes that led them to seek the comfort of such precise, orderly diagrams, but it seems that many British designers of the era greeted Archer’s ideas with a sense of befuddlement, with writer (and one-time MFDI employee) David Wainwright reporting in the Guardian that:

Some traditional designers and engineers see Bruce Archer as the lineal descendent of the medieval schoolsmen who debated the number of angels assembled on the head of a pin. Designers, in particular, tend to be sceptical of Archer’s meticulous check-lists of action to be taken before a design can be produced (Wainwright, 1964).

According to Wainwright, Archer was treated with more deference outside of Britain; still, it is surprising to see that even his close associate Farr (1966) acknowledges the bemusement with which industry had greeted the trend for elaborate design methods. In justifying the introduction of his own design method, he explained:

Why have a ‘set sequence of events’ to guide the designing process? Are there not enough rigorous, systematic methods already bemusing industry to make us pause before yoking the unique, creative act of designing to yet another of them? If industrial designing were a simple craft process whereby somebody made a single object for a customer whom he knew, then there would be no need to categorise his actions. The sequence would be there alright, but it would never need to be discussed and probably never altered. Industrial design today for quantity production which is distributed wholesale to mass market is, regrettably, not like that. Many still think it is, and many are the messes they get themselves and theirs firms into (Farr, 1966, p. 60).

Following his process diagram, Farr set aside eight pages to depict in detail a hypothetical timeline for a design programme. This included a precise schedule of events organised on a day-to-day basis, arranged under the following headings:

Day 3: Agree an outline for inception costs for the new product.
Day 10: Describe and redefine all aspects of the project in sufficient detail to disclose any missing information.
Day 15: Select product designer.
Day 16: Appoint and brief designer.
Day 30: At approximately the mid-part of Stage 1 the designer and the DM would get together informally for what is, without doubt, a vital discussion. The designer will outline his scheme with sketches and in language which the DM should be able to follow sympathetically...
Day 45: The designer’s work in the form of drawings and/or models is now presented for approval.

(Farr, 1966, pp. 62–67)

Farr used similar scheduling devices in his daily practice, mobilising both projective inscriptions (plans) and reflective transcriptions (reports) in his communications with clients and designers. Taking his work for The Crookes Laboratories as an example, we can see a projected work schedule diagram (Fig. 5 & 6) which sets out the envisaged 22-day work plan necessary for the design of a range of ampoule packs (medicinal
capsules). This diagram inscribes a projected work plan from the preparation of copy, through to the product launch.


Further to this, we have ‘Progress Report No 1’, dated 30 January 1965 (Figs. 7 & 8), which gives a holistic overview of the entire programme of work initiated for Crookes. A summary of the projected work-plan as outlined by MFDI on the 23 December 1964 is
set out first. This provides brief schedules of work for three separate design tasks: ‘House style’, ‘Labelling’, and ‘Repackaging’. To take House style as an example, the given schedule is as follows:

mid-January designer briefed
26 February sketch designs presented to you.
26 March “rough designs” (in typeset form) presented to the Board.

The document then continues by providing a one-month progress report. Thus, we are presented with a comprehensive breakdown of activities involved in the design of the House Style:

2.1.1. On 15 January Mr John McConnell was presented with a detailed brief for the design of a house style for The Crookes Laboratories Limited, on which Mr McConnell subsequently began work.

2.1.2. At the same time Mr McConnell was given agreed texts for the principal stationery used by The Crookes Laboratories Limited, including letterheads, envelopes, accounting stationery etc, an indication of the van liveries required, and also the texts for the plaques required for the new Basingstoke factory.

2.1.3. Mr McConnell was also given a selection of labels, outers etc used for the “major” products in public, ethical and veterinary lines, to indicate to him the general labelling requirements of the company.

2.1.4. It was agreed with Mr McConnell that his house style would be presented to you in sketch form on 26 February, and that it would be prepared in “rough” form (that is, with typeset texts and samples of newly labelled products “in the round”) for presentation to the Board on, or after, 26 March.

2.1.5. It was further agreed with Mr McConnell that his house style scheme would be a general framework, and that its implementation in the labelling and packaging of public, ethical or veterinary lines would be the subject of further contracts between Crookes, MF(DI) and Mr McConnell – thus giving the company and the designer liberty to employ other designers to interpret and apply the design to particular lines. It is therefore open to the company to employ another designer for the public, ethical or veterinary lines (any or all) if desired.

2.1.6. Further guidance on labelling in the context of the house style is being given to Mr McConnell at the end of this month.

MFDI’s transcript of events marries up closely with their projected work-plan, giving the impression of a company concerned to present themselves with utmost professionalism. The written tone of voice remains strictly formal throughout, with designer John McConnell always referred to as ‘Mr McConnell’. Furthermore, the bureaucratic nature of this relatively regular correspondence is striking, taking on the formality of a contractual agreement. As such the correspondence seeks to diffuse responsibility away from MFDI as a central hub of communications, and thus distribute accountability more evenly between client, designer and design manager. On the one hand this could be considered necessarily clear and transparent communication, but a
more sceptical viewpoint would suggest a culture of accountability management, wherein Farr’s devotion to documentation and paperwork represents a desire to minimise his own responsibility. As such, these documents indicate the central position of responsibility within which MDFI operated. As an independent design management consultancy, they were likely considered accountable for the quality of the design work that they managed but given that they did not directly employ the designers who worked with them they did not have the ultimate control over their practices and the resultant work that they produced.

In ‘Report No 11’ for Crookes, dated 13 June 1966, MFDI can be seen to suggest a change to the working relationship between them and their client in response to an organisational restructuring of Crookes. The concluding summary within the report notes the following:

Temporarily the services afforded by MFDI are not being utilised to the fullest advantage, partly because lines of communication are obscure, and partly because of indecision arising from the company’s own re-organisation. Too much of the [MFDI’s] Project Manager’s time is devoted to progress chasing of a largely unproductive and abortive nature too little to the over-all planning and integration of the company’s graphic style, particularly as regards involvement with the company’s packaging policy at the source. [...] Given authority within its particular area, and given a clearly-defined network of internal relationships and systems, MFDI will be able to apply the house style at a far greater rate than hitherto, and will be able to make the maximum contribution to the programme of modern marketing and rationalisation on which CROOKES have now embarked and on which, to a significant extent, their profitability depends (MFDI, 1966, p. 9).

It seems that in spite of the apparent systematic efficiency inherent in the practices of MFDI that their clients simply weren’t operating in the same highly specified, technocratic manner. In a section of the report titled ‘Areas of responsibility’, MFDI sought to clarify precisely what they were accountable for, claiming that: ‘MF(DI)’s role should again be clearly defined and publicly promulgated’ (MFDI, 1966, p. 5). They were struggling to work productively within the operational structure of their client, with some misunderstandings emerging around the services that they provided and how they could be accessed by the employees of Crookes. Given the fall-out from the restructuring of Crookes, MFDI were clear to reiterate that they should continue to be ‘directly answerable to the Managing Director’, who they suggested, should give a ‘ruling’ to decide how their services are to be used. The report suggests the introduction of a ‘work ticket system’ which would: ‘enable any department to initiate design work in a consistent and methodical way’ (1966, p. 6).
Central to the report is the proposal to more carefully control the management of design work from within Crookes, embedding MFDI’s services more intentionally and directing work demands through more productive channels. In a section titled ‘Direct and indirect working relationships’, they refer to a graphic diagram as a tool to communicate their structural suggestions (Fig. 9). The diagram positions MFDI as a centralised design management service at the heart of Crookes, reporting directly to the managing director. As such, MFDI position themselves as an intermediate step between managing director and middle-management. In this diagram we see further evidence of the manner in which MFDI deployed inscription as a means to control complex socio-technical assemblages.

**Concluding remarks**

In *Design in British Industry* (1955) Farr reflected on how the design consultants he had engaged with were concerned primarily with the artistic standard of their work, harbouring little concern for business issues. By comparison, his own central concern was the systematic operation of design as a commercial process. He understood that designers preoccupied with the inherent quality of their designing could benefit from an
association with more business-minded practitioners who were able to align creative design work with more objective commercial needs.

Developing on Misha Black’s assertion that the coordination of design labour held more latent value to clients than design work in and of itself, Farr set out to establish his own independent management consultancy. Michael Farr (Design Integration) were in operation for some 13 years from 1961 to 1974 and although they were successful through the 1960s, by the end of the decade demand for their services was on the wane. Towards the end of the ’60s Farr began to diversify his interests, becoming a Director of two further firms operating from the same premises as MFDI: Organised Office Designs Ltd. founded in 1967, and Farr Ergonomics Ltd. founded in 1968. Collectively these three firms were responsible for over 100 design projects completed predominantly in Britain, but also in Europe (Farr, 1991).

Farr’s business operations regularly moved premises, operating from six different locations during their 13-year tenure, expanding and contracting in order to facilitate fluctuations in demand for their services from clients. Noting how the 1960s and ’70s were not a golden era for design, Farr later recalled how they had needed to be constantly mindful of their overheads and costs, and had to respond to fluctuations in the market:

> During the period we moved from small to larger premises and back to smaller ones in lower rental areas. Big project opportunities would come along and we would find ourselves with too little space and too few staff. So we had to be flexible and capable of reorganising ourselves to cope with any new challenge (Farr, 1991).

By the early ’70s client commissions became less frequent, with Farr moving the operation away from the operation primarily from a base in the Birmingham area (Farr, 1956–86). During central London to Hampstead, where he had his home, then later running this period Farr (1973) published Control Systems for Industrial Design, building on the earlier success of Design Management. By the middle of the ’70s work diminished to the extent that he gave consideration to alternative career opportunities, with the final phase of his career taking him to Hong Kong, where in 1976 he became head of the Swire School of Design. A post he held for some 11 years, up to his retirement, upon which he returned to England.

Though one-time colleague of Farr, graphic designer Ken Garland, claims that MFDI ran into trouble because ‘they were ahead of their time’ (Garland, n.d.), it is my contention that there were particular vulnerabilities inherent in Farr’s practice that help to explain why they were not more successful long-term. Chief amongst these is that MFDI were too easily circumvented by their clients. John McConnell’s (2017) recollections of his working relationship with MFDI suggest that clients and designers working in collaboration with Farr readily circumvented the services of MFDI. So although the archival documentation of MFDI’s work for Crookes Laboratories (Farr, 1965) suggests close cooperation between MFDI and McConnell, in practice McConnell (2017) developed stronger ties with the client contact than with the design management consultancy, going on to deliver various projects beyond the initial job prospected by
Farr and his team. Furthermore, correspondence between Farr and his client makes clear that the designer will be free to agree further contracts with the client in isolation from the initial agreement made (Farr, 1965). In essence this meant that once MFDI had established effective working practices between the designer and client their services became somewhat expendable. As a result, MFDI took on the high risk labour of initiating the projects and ensuring that operations developed from a clear and stable footing, but lost out on the more lucrative opportunities to maintain these good practices that they had worked so hard to set in place. Although Farr was proud of the number of clients and designers the firm had worked with, in practice the business may have been more sustainable had they been able to maintain longer term relations with fewer clients, focussing their energies in maintaining a smaller pool of clientele.

Speaking in 1991 of things he would do differently second time around, Farr claimed: ‘One is that I might have narrowed our range a little because it probably became too stretched over too wide a market’ (Farr, 1991). There would have been inherent advantages in them developing more consistent working relationships with their designers too, with the long list of designers credited as having worked with MFDI (Farr, 1956–86) suggesting that they rarely used the same designer twice.

Another issue for MFDI was that they appear to have had little input on the creative strategy put forward to their clients, and as a result, this made their services more easily dispensed with. One discreet note made by Farr during the development of the business sees him label the work of MFDI as ‘admin’, explaining how they will: ‘leave des[igners] to work direct – because design and admin at this stage are often both involved in single decisions’ (Farr, 1961). With their focus on the management of the design process, MFDI essentially acted as project managers – albeit relatively sophisticated ones – who would organise and pool the relevant talent needed to fulfil a client contract and guide them through the early development period of the project. Although they played an important role in scoping out client projects and establishing briefs, it appears that in practice the innovation delivered within each project was born of the independent designers who were usually contracted by their clients rather than by MFDI themselves.

With the designers – who ostensibly worked under their governance – employed directly by their clients, MFDI were an organisation that depended on fractious and unstable relationships where agency was widely distributed across fluid networks of practice. Although Farr and Archer had great interest in the strict codification of design as a process, the working relationships they depended on were far more dynamic and unstable. The distributed nature of this collaborative practice meant that they often relied on new designers working in remote contexts to understand their approach and get up to speed quickly.

128 Farr credits this as being the system at the DRU, but what he fails to acknowledge is that DRU were primarily a design-led company with administrators acting in support of designers. By comparison MFDI sought to raise administration to a primary level, with designers acting in support.
In the gestation of the business Farr mooted a strict paper-trail for his designers, suggesting that they would log any client phone calls on pre-paid postcards which would then be forwarded on to MFDI. In practice the terms of the working relationships with his designers appears to have been far looser, with designers left much to their own devices in terms of the production of the work.

The methods of MFDI are interesting in the way they relate to contemporary notions of work. Farr’s core proposition centred around dynamic and adaptive project-based organisation, as opposed to a permanently fixed workforce. This notion accords closely with modern tendencies in the creative industries where freelance talent is often pooled around the demands of particular projects, a model referred to as project-based organisation, or PBO (DeFillippi, 2015). In some respects, the model of practice promulgated by MFDI was better suited to this modern context where advances in telecommunications have normalised remote working and enabled clearer channels of communication between distributed working groups.

Farr worked closely with Bruce Archer as he conceived of his business, formulating working methods that were closely intertwined with those of the burgeoning Design Methods movement and the ongoing attempts to scientise design. I have given serious consideration to Archer’s work here as he played a pivotal role in transferring theoretical ideas from the Design Methods movement (that might otherwise be considered impractical or idealistic) directly to the commercial design management practices of MFDI. So, while the Design Methods movement has been looked back upon with regret – especially by many of the ‘first generation’ practitioners involved – as a misguided and naive academic endeavour with little lasting impact, I have sought to show that in actuality, practitioners like Farr and Archer were active in deploying these ideas directly within the context of industry. Furthermore, I contend that Farr’s deployment of these principles within the context of design management has likely had a lasting impact upon practising designers’ conceptualisation of design management, as well as the broader patterns of practice.

Given that Archer had a formative influence on the working methods of MFDI (as well as other group practices studied within cases from this thesis, especially HDA) I have sought to understand how his ideas were received by the design industry, making comparison between his theories and those of Farr. Archer’s Systematic Methods (1963–64) has commonly been portrayed as a kind of all-encompassing technocratic behemoth, but this view has overlooked the sensitivities and nuance with which Archer treated the systematisation of design. Archer (1963–4, p. 11) clearly stated that he had no intention of trying to mechanise the creative act of design, stating it would be ‘a contradiction in terms to codify creativity’ and explaining that his methods depended on human creativity, experience, intuition and judgement. As such he is up-front about the limitations of a systematic method, claiming that his ideas seek to ‘reduce the dull, imagination supressing chores which the designer now has to undertake’, helping them to systematically define which elements in a design problem should be dealt with intuitively and which can be tackled systematically (ibid., p. 12).

In all likelihood, the extreme technical rationality of Archer’s 14-page checklist and 229-step process model overshadowed the detail of his broader principles. Whereas
graphic diagrams are commonly used to summarise complex ideas using spatial arrangement and visual communication principles to aid comprehension, in Archer’s case his central diagram became an overwhelming extension and concretisation of his already elaborate ideas. In spite of this, I argue that the work of design methods pioneers like Archer remains relevant and timely given our ongoing concerns around ideas such as artificial intelligence and the role of so-called ‘big data’ within design. As advancing computer technology (and computational thinking more broadly) continues to impact on culture and society, designers continue to consider the relationship between technocratic systems and human endeavour. Archer’s work should be understood in this context as an effort to reflect on the organisation of complex socio-technical assemblages.

Farr, by contrast, while not as influential as Archer in terms of his scholarship, was more successful in terms of situating his ideas within industrial practice over a sustained period, locating his work firmly in a commercial context. His influence permeated though those young designers who worked with him, with many going on to found commercially successful group practices. Those ambitious design professionals who worked under Farr’s management later played a critical role in the emergence of design as an increasingly important factor within the economy, both in Britain and on global level, as British firms expanded through international offices. There is further work needed here to establish how companies like IDEO, Wolff Olins and Pentagram (whose founder members had all worked with Farr) accounted for design management early in their operation. Ultimately as MFDI ran its course, with Farr suggesting that it had become too broadly stretched over too wide a market, it appears that the burgeoning field of design management was enveloped into the practices of designers, rather than continuing to operate as an independent practice, as per the model of MFDI.

As design management became imbricated into the daily practices of corporate designers, the activities of design practitioners were profoundly impacted by the concerns of management, with design practice being increasingly dominated by commercial imperatives.

Although Farr’s most precise diagram from Design Management (Fig. 3) was not a situated work tool enacted by MFDI’s designers, processual inscriptions born directly of the day-to-day practices of MFDI were nevertheless fundamental to its operation. The type-writer was a critical form of technology in the office (an infrastructure object), being mobilised to inscribe extensive written process proposals and plans (Fig. 6 & 7) and to send back retrospective process reports transcribing activities to clients (Fig. 8 & 9). These intricate, cascading inscriptions symbolise the bureaucratic nature of design management as conceived by Farr. As such, they recall Latour and Woolgar’s depiction of lab scientists as ‘compulsive and manic writers ... who spend the greatest part of their day coding, marking, altering, correcting, reading and writing’ (Latour & Woolgar, 1979, p. 49). The comparison to the scientist is apt here, given that in borrowing heavily from Archer, Farr too can be seen to have pursued the intent of scientising design practice. Indeed, the highly technocratic working processes of MFDI mirror closely the audit culture of the contemporary design scene that Anne-Marie Dorland depicts (2009), in which ostensibly free-spirited creative design practices are in actuality
overwhelmingly full of metrics and management structures. Here I have suggested a connection between early attempts to routinise the practice of design and later technocratic forms of governance that can limit the potentiality of design, as well as hindering designers’ pursuit of self-actualisation. This connection is made with the caveat that more work is needed to trace how the management of design developed in the latter part of the twentieth century.
Appendix 3. Conference papers and published articles

Appendix 3.1) Co-ordinated design policy and the shift from one-off designs to comprehensive design systems

3,000-word paper for ICDHS 2012 Conference, Sao Paulo.

Co-ordinated design policy and the shift from one-off designs to comprehensive design systems

Preston, David / Royal College of Art / United Kingdom

Design co-ordination / Visual identity / Design methods / Design management / Graphic design history

During the late 1940s and early 1950s a small group of designers embraced the concept of ‘design coordination’ in an attempt to unify the visual output of their clients. This shift in emphasis – favouring order over expression – represented a tipping point in the professionalisation of graphic design in Britain, helping to transform designers from individual commercial artists into business practitioners working predominantly in groups.

1. From one to many

Immediately after the Second World War, designers in Britain began to seize upon a concept that had explored only fleetingly up to this point. This was the idea that by co-ordinating multiple designs to ‘sing from the same hymn sheet’, clients could gain a competitive advantage over rival businesses and organisations. Central to this approach was the concept of recognisability, i.e. if all of the products and activities of one organisation can be easily recognised as belonging to them, then the ‘cumulative impression’ of these varied products and activities will far outweigh their individual value.¹

Up to this time there had been an over-reliance on the role of the trademark as a co-ordinating device. But designers now began to consider a far wider gamut of visual tools to demarcate this cumulative relationship. Alongside the trademark, the colour scheme and typographic palette chosen to represent the organisation became critical new components. A third, more ambiguous component, that eluded codification, was what might be described as a palette of visual language; this could typically include patterns, borders and other graphic mark-making to be associated with the organisation.² These components together comprised what was described in Britain at the time as a ‘house style’. This term came from the printing and publishing industries, where the ‘rules’, or ‘style of the house’ referred to the particular way in which a publisher or printer produced its work [Unwin 1926: 8].

In this paper I will explore the techniques and methods used to plan, implement and control house styles. I adopt the term ‘design co-ordination’ to describe the technique used to align numerous designs into one coherent, unified whole. The term derives from FHK Henrion and Alan Parkin’s seminal text, ‘Design Coordination and Corporate Image’ [1967],³ which is thought to be the first book dedicated to the subject of visual identity.⁴

The technique of design co-ordination spans the fledgling development of visual identity as a professional activity. Right from the early British notion of ‘house style’; through the rhetoric of ‘corporate identity’ that emanated from North America in the 1960s; up to today’s dominant terminology of ‘branding’. Throughout these phraseological developments the concept of ‘co-ordinating’ a number of designs remained, and continues to remain, a methodological constant. I argue that the phenomenon of design co-ordination was far more significant to the development of design as a profession than the canonical examples of early twentieth century corporate identity valorised by design historians.

These so-called pioneers (AEG, Olivetti, London Transport, CCA) often appear in design history surveys like a roll-call of who is who.¹ But whilst there may be some unity of design in these canonical examples, it wasn’t until the 1950s that the technique of design co-ordination really found ground.

In looking at the approaches used to co-ordinate multiple designs, I am distancing myself from the existing debates around representation and perceptions of organisational identity. For this reason I have purposefully shied away from the term ‘corporate image’ – as found in the title of the aforementioned book – as it has been used to refer to the audience perception of an organisation.⁵ Whilst there is an abundance of literature in the field that focusses on the notion of identity, the subject of design co-ordination has been largely neglected as a serious area of study. In this paper I will demonstrate how a more thorough understanding of the methodological developments within design co-ordination can provide insight into shifts away from making and towards planning within the graphic design profession.

¹ ‘Cumulative impression’ was a phrase used by Beatrice Warde to describe the effect gained by standardising the typography of the London and North Eastern Railway [Warde 1933: 9].
² Journalist and designer Alec Davis played a critical role in championing design co-ordination within the pages of various magazines and journals; in particular the Council of Industrial Design’s monthly title Design. In November 1956 a special issue of the magazine was produced dedicated to the subject of ‘House Style’. In it, Davis proposed five ‘Factors in house style’: colour, pattern, borders, trademarks and symbols, and lettering [1956].
³ Henrion and Parkin explain that the title of their book was ‘chosen to describe the activity which creates a house style’ [1967: dustjacket].
⁴ Henrion claims as much in The Image of a Company [Bos 1990].
⁵ For example, see Bainer & Gregory (2003: 40).
⁶ Henrion and Parkin define corporate image as ‘the totality of pictures or ideas or reputations of a corporation in the minds of the people who come into contact with it’ [1967: 7].
2. Non-methodical methods in design co-ordination

The way in which design work was commonly conceived in Britain changed significantly in the aftermath of the Second World War. Whilst in pre-war, designers and commercial artists tended to survive on a series of one-off commissions; in the subsequent period, there began a slow, but definite transition towards ‘design programmes’. These programmes, or house styles, comprised of multiple design items conceived simultaneously as part of a comprehensive visual identity system. But these new design systems would require a careful planning and rationalisation process that would draw designers away from the making tasks that they were truly comfortable with.

Towards the beginning of the century attempts were made by so-called ‘patrons of the arts’ to raise the standards of art and design in British business. Among these individuals were Jack Beddington at Shell, Colin Anderson at the Orient Steam Navigation Company, and most famously Frank Pick at London Transport. Nikolaus Pevsner described Pick as ‘the greatest patron of the arts whom this century has so far produced in England and indeed the ideal patron of our age’ (1968: 209). Whilst these individuals had a significant effect on the over-riding standard of design in their respective organisations, the role of design co-ordination within their work remains questionable. London Transport has arguably become the most heavily cited example of early visual identity work in Britain, being widely considered the first visual identity scheme of its kind. Design historians have praised Pick’s ability to bring unity to a disparate organisation, laying particular focus on the role of Edward Johnston’s block-letter alphabet as a co-ordinating visual force. In order to establish the historical ‘seeds’ of design co-ordination methodology it is worth considering the methods in which Pick and Johnston operated.

Whilst it is undoubtable that Johnston’s lettering takes a central co-ordinating role in the organisation’s visual identity today, this was not his intention when the alphabet was designed. There is various evidence that suggests Johnston’s lettering was never conceived as a co-ordinating force; but instead, that it was created for one particular usage, namely to appear printed on posters at one inch tall (Howes 2000: 41; Banks 1994: 16). Whether Pick had intended Johnston to create a co-ordinating typeface remains unclear. He did seemingly want to unify the complex transport system he had taken command of – it had its origins in a number of smaller rivals and this led it to appear like a disparate collection of separate operations, rather than one coherent network. The evidence presented here suggests that if Pick did commission a co-ordinating typeface from Johnston, perhaps he simply chose the wrong man. Johnston himself was strongly opposed to mechanical reproduction and as a calligrapher he saw each letter as an individual creation. This was in strong contrast to the demands of typeface design, where letters are treated akin to modular components, appropriate for repeated usage within the context of any permutation of surrounding letterforms (Banks 1994: 38). As such, Johnston was not the best placed candidate to create a systematic and flexible alphabet that could be reproduced at various sizes, in numerous materials and in different contexts.

Colin Banks suggests that the alphabet that Johnston created may have become universally used purely as a matter of default (Banks 1994: 26). For once it was designed, the alphabet seems to have been immediately regarded as having been designed for ‘all purposes’. Not just for use in print at one inch tall, as originally intended; but also for example on signage made of glass or enamelled iron (Howes 2000: 42). The fact that the lettering actually worked on anything other than posters was extremely fortuitous, as whatever the intentions of the original design, this allowed the organisation to apply the resulting alphabet to a diverse range of forms and materials. And so it was that the typeface resulting from Johnston’s alphabet design became a key component of a co-ordinated design policy, but most significantly, it did not come about through a planned act of design co-ordination on his part, but instead by a rather circumstantial series of events.

Let’s consider the wider context of London Transport’s visual identity for a moment. Describing the design style of London Transport in 1946, Norbert Dutton explained that: ‘It is effort, not accident, which has developed the idiom.’ But just two sentences later, he goes on to suggest that the ‘unifying principle’ behind the idiom was: ‘so subtle as to have escaped the conscious perception even of those designers who have been most closely concerned in its application’ (1946: 98). This seems a remarkable contradiction; if the designers concerned with applying the idiom were unaware of it, this suggests it was in fact altogether unintended. Kempers has suggested that Pick’s was a personal policy, distinct from the institutionalised design policies that followed later (Bakker, 2009: 25). Perhaps there is an assumption here that Pick was silently orchestrating his band of designers around his own carefully planned personal intentions. But this seems like no way to implement a comprehensive design policy.

3. Systematic methods in design co-ordination

In stark contrast to London Transport, the methodological approach of Henrion Design Associates (HDA) presents a very different narrative about the way in which designers could engage with the process of co-ordinating design. In their 1967/8 handbook of the Design and Industries Association, Henrion and his employee Alan Parkin, formalised many of their design methods in a text titled ‘Systematic Methods in Design Co-ordination’ (1968). Their interest in design methodology reflects the thriving development of the design methods movement in 1960s Britain.

7 For example, Sailer claims Pick commissioned Johnston to design a special typeface that would be used to imbue the system with a coherent visual identity. [1999: 43]
8 Forty, referring to Pick, claims that ‘it was from him rather than anyone else that the vision of the unified and perfect transport system seems to have come’ [1979: 114]

9 The first design methods conference at Imperial College, London helped to launch the movement in 1962. In 1965 the Council of Industrial Design published Bruce Archer’s text ‘Systematic Methods for Designers’ (1965) – note the similarity to the title of Henrion and Parkin’s text.
Henrion and Parkin’s text begins: ‘Every designer knows the creative and administrative problems of designing even a single item. But when a task involves hundreds or even thousands of items then the difficulties multiply enormously and a new approach must be defined and achieved’ [1968: 33]. They go on to claim that the complexity of the vast design co-ordination programmes under their charge couldn’t possibly be dealt with by traditional intuitive methods, suggesting that new techniques had to be developed and applied from outside the field of design. Interestingly, Parkin came from a background outside of design, graduating with a degree in Moral Sciences from Cambridge University. Henrion’s background was more artistic, having developed stature as one of the top poster artists of the 1940s. In this respect Parkin was seemingly a scientific foil for Henrion, his interest in mathematics and cybernetic theory were in part what inspired Henrion to employ him, for he was not a conventionally trained designer.10

In the interwar period Henrion had plied his trade as a lone commercial artist bringing a fluid and intuitive approach to his ideas-based posters and other jobbing design work. This was a dramatic contrast to his work after the war, where he became the leader of an international graphic design business, developing a far more systematic and scientific design methodology through his company’s work for clients such as KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Blue Circle Cement and British European Airways. Although the transformation in his career was pronounced, the playful and intuitive designer of the early years didn’t completely disappear and can still be seen in the lecture posters he designed later in his life. Nevertheless, Henrion’s career path does highlight a paradigmatic shift within the design profession, away from the ‘authentic voice’ of the maker,11 and towards the rational and objective voice of the planner.

The ‘new techniques’ that he and Parkin described in their article would ‘apply less to the actual design stages, than to pre-design assembling of information and formulation of design requirements, and to design planning, progressing, and implementation’ [1968: 34]. The four key methods that Henrion and Parkin explored were: making a survey, information storage and retrieval, formulating a brief, and planning and estimating for design developments. Many of the techniques they developed were effectively analytical tools designed to leverage a more thorough understanding of the vast range of items under their command (they mention in passing 5,000 Post Office items under one scheme). These included bespoke indexing systems that would allow HDA to cross reference any one design item with another. This enabled them to understand patterns in the information they were dealing with, allowing them to organise individual items together in groups. Another such tool was a ‘specially constructed’ display stand that would allow them to collate together hundreds of images that represented the various design items of an organisation. This would allow them to compare all the vehicles used by one organisation. Alternatively they could rotate a single panel of the display to compare and contrast a range of vehicles with a range of stationery, for example. Alongside these physical design co-ordination tools they developed a range of complimentary project management solutions, which although rudimentary, give a clear insight into the complexity of the design processes they were attempting to control.

Many of the techniques that Henrion and Parkin explored in Systematic Methods for Design Co-ordination find strong parallels with another burgeoning field; that of design management. In the pages of the monthly title Design, Michael Farr took a leading role in championing the importance of this area, stating that ‘Design is a unique factor in competition. Skilful management of designers and designing, therefore, becomes imperative’ [Farr, 1965: 39]. But Farr saw design management as a function to be fulfilled by a non-designer, claiming that ‘if designers are good at designing they should not have the time to spare to manage the ramifications of their design projects, regardless of whether or not they are also good managers’ [Farr, 1965: 38]. But in the case of HDA, it was Henrion who remained at the helm of the firm, overseeing day-to-day operations and presenting himself as the figurehead through which all decisions were channelled.12

4. Conclusion

Milner Gray, of the influential British design group Design Research Unit claimed that: Designers and manufacturers have been unable or unwilling to come to terms with the implications of machine production. The difference between designing for production by hand and by machine is that one is a process of making while the other is a process of planning [1949: 10].

Henrion typifies this shift in emphasis from making to planning within the graphic design field. Although in effect he was never simply a maker or a planner, the trajectory of his career indicates a pivotal turn away from distinctly intuitive and artistic means, towards more technocratic methods in which the visual identity became the ultimate instrument of control. Whereas Frank Pick’s personal design policy for London Transport produced design that became more-or-less co-ordinated through good fortune or even a matter of default; the policies that Henrion advocated used design co-ordination as a rigorously planned marketing tool that could provide a competitive advantage for clients along with economic stability for designers. Commissions for design co-ordination programmes went far beyond the piece-meal provision of a one-off design commission, often providing retainer agreements that could last over a number of decades. This enabled commercial artists like Henrion to establish graphic design as a tenable profession of its own, independent of the inter-related disciplines that commercial artists were previously dependent upon, such as advertising and printing.

References


10 Interview with Alan Parkin, 13 December 2011.
11 Tony Howard writes of the ‘authentic voice’ of modernism as opposed to the ‘adopted voice’ of post-modernism in which only the imitation or the recycling of ideas is possible [1993].
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Co-ordinated design policy and the shift from one-off designs to comprehensive design systems


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<david.preston@network.rca.ac.uk>
Appendix 3.2) The corporate trailblazers

8-page article for *Ultrabold, The Journal of St Bride Library*.

During the late 1940s and early 1950s a small group of designers embraced the concept of ‘design co-ordination’ in an attempt to unify the visual output of their clients. This shift in emphasis – favouring order over expression – represented a tipping point in the professionalisation of graphic design in Britain, helping to transform designers from individual commercial artists into business practitioners working predominantly in groups.

**Design bodies**
Attempts had been made to establish graphic design as a recognised profession from the beginning of the twentieth century. Of particular note were the various design bodies formed throughout the first half of the century, including the Design and Industries Association (1915), the Society of Industrial Artists (1929) and the Council of Industrial Design (1944). Although these organisations had some limited success in their attempts to professionalise design, it wasn’t until after the Second World War that significant progress was made. The burgeoning possibilities of post-war Britain provided the opportunity for graphic designers to establish themselves as the professionals they had long wanted to be. The appeal of such professional standing was the promise of a better status in society, not to mention the possibility of an improvement in designers’ fees and salaries.

**The first design groups**
After the First World War, recognised individual designers and commercial artists had lost much of their work to firms of advertising agents. This was due in part to the market research that advertising agencies had begun to offer. These additional services helped them to bolster their business propositions and win them new clients.

At this time a few select designers realised that by working together in groups they could offer a more holistic design service that would enable them to compete directly with advertising agencies for business. This service would pool together the knowledge and skills of the individuals within the group, allowing them to take on larger jobs beyond the realm of the individual artist-designer. One such designer to identify the opportunities of group practice was Milner Gray – one of the founding partners of the multi-disciplinary design group Bassett-Gray.

Bassett-Gray was among the first practising design groups in Britain, having been founded in 1921 by Gray and brothers Charles and Henry Bassett. They described themselves as a ‘Group of Artists and Writers’ and their aim was to ‘steer a middle course between the stultifying influence of the commercial art factory on the one hand and the limited opportunities of complete isolation on the other’. The group contained a number of designers and artists, including painter Graham Sutherland. Designer Misha Black joined the group in 1933, signalling the beginning of a long association with Gray that lasted the rest of their careers.

In 1935 the group reorganised to become the Industrial Design Partnership. This formed the prototype for the Design Research Unit, formed in 1942 by Gray, Black

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1. ‘Design co-ordination’ is a term used by FHK Henrion and Alan Parkin in *Design Coordination and Corporate Image* (1967) and encompasses the notions of ‘house style’, ‘corporate identity’ and ‘branding’. Although each of these terms has a particular emphasis (both historically and conceptually), they each describe a desire to create a co-ordinated company image, or visual identity.

2. The term ‘graphic design’ is widely thought to originate from an article by the American W.A. Dwiggins, written in 1922. It was not widely adopted in Britain until well after 1948, when Richard Gayatt introduced the term within an educational context at the Royal College of Art.


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DAVID PRESTON

The corporate trailblazers

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Figure 1: BOAC Speedbird poster, FHK Henrion, BOAC, 1947.
and advertising entrepreneur Marcus Brumwell. DRU (as they were commonly known) set the precedent for other design groups to follow. In 1946 they completed what could be considered the first comprehensive design co-ordination programme in Britain for the photographic company Ilford (Figure 2). Their relationship with Ilford lasted until 1966 and spanned two separate design schemes. They went on to work with various high-profile clients including Austin Reed, Dunlop, London Transport and the Watney Mann Group. But their design programme for British Rail (1956–66) was perhaps their most seminal work, described at the time as ‘the largest and most complex of any attempted in this country’.4 It included the design of locomotives, hovercraft, freight-liner containers, car ferries, station names, signing and uniforms (Figure 3).

The influence of émigrés
Whilst DRU had been formed by a group of various individuals who might best be described as ‘Industrial Designers’, the two key design groups that followed shortly after – Henrion Design Associates (1951) and Hans

and advertising entrepreneur Marcus Brumwell. DRU (as they were commonly known) set the precedent for other design groups to follow. In 1946 they completed what could be considered the first comprehensive design co-ordination programme in Britain for the photographic company Ilford (Figure 2). Their relationship with Ilford lasted until 1966 and spanned two separate design schemes. They went on to work with various high-profile clients including Austin Reed, Dunlop, London Transport and the Watney Mann Group. But their design programme for British Rail (1956–66) was perhaps their most seminal work, described at the time as ‘the largest and most complex of any attempted in this country’. It included the design of locomotives, hovercraft, freight-liner containers, car ferries, station names, signing and uniforms (Figure 3).

The influence of émigrés

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Figure 6: ‘Grow Your Own Food’ poster, Hans Schleger, the Ministry of Food, 1942.

Figure 5. ‘Eat Greens for Health’, Hans Schleger (Zéro), the Ministry of Agriculture, 1942.

Figure 4. ‘Four Hands’, FHK Henrion, the Ministry of Information, 1943.
Schleger & Associates (1954) – were formed by individuals known predominantly for their work as poster artists. Designer Ken Garland lists Henrion and Schleger – along with Abram Games – as the ‘top trio’ of British poster design. Both Henrion and Schleger were German émigrés settling in Britain in the 1930s, and they each built a strong reputation with their posters for clients such as London Transport, the General Post Office and the Ministry of Information (Figures 1, 4–6).

Henrion and Schleger had each gained experience with design co-ordination prior to the formation of their design groups. Schleger worked with knitwear business W. Raven & Company on a design programme from 1946 through to 1950, whilst Henrion completed the first of his many design programmes for the paper company Bowater in 1949. The adoption of these design co-ordination programmes signalled the beginning of a dramatic change in the way that design objects were conceived. It was a move away from the individual object created in isolation, and towards the comprehensive alignment of a company’s entire visual output.

It is interesting to note the career path of Abram Games, the third designer who completed Garland’s ‘top trio’ of poster design. Around the middle of the century, Games created designs for two of the most prestigious identity jobs in Britain: the first BBC ident (often referred to as ‘Bat’s wings’) and the Festival of Britain logo. But in subsequent years Games seems to have veered away from the business opportunities presented by design co-ordination, focusing primarily on one-off designs in the mode of an individual craftsman.

Meanwhile Henrion and Schleger continued in their efforts to inaugurate design co-ordination in Britain, with high-profile programmes for both domestic and international clients. Henrion’s client list included Blue Circle Cement, British European Airways, C&A, KLM, the London Electricity Board and the Post Office, while Schleger worked with the British Sugar Corporation, Edinburgh International Festival, Finmar, Jaeger and Mac Fisheries.

Over time, an increasingly large proportion of their work became focused on design co-ordination programmes. But this unification of their clients’ design output came at the expense of the one-off designs that had forged their early reputations.

Design as a science

Whilst advertising agencies had used market research and consumer psychology to substantiate their ideas, designers’ work must have seemed somewhat frivolous in contrast. As a consequence, designers began to adopt a more ‘scientific’ approach to their work to support the presentation of their ideas to clients. FHK Henrion's design programme for KLM was an early exemplar of this scientific analysis within graphic design (Figures 7 and 8). Henrion conducted various tests in order to prove the effectiveness of the redesigned KLM logotype (Figures 9 and 10). One such study simulated the logo moving at high speed (Figure 10). This was intended to show the clarity of the new logo in comparison to the original design. Although not highly scientific, Henrion's tests were effective in persuading KLM to go ahead with the new proposals. Henrion explained that under poor viewing conditions the logo became ‘more crown like’ as a result of ‘the perceptual processes discovered by gestalt psychologists.’ The KLM crown logotype remains in use today, unchanged 50 years after its original creation.

Design Research Unit were another early exponent of this more analytical and systematic approach to design,

Schleger & Associates (1954) – were formed by individuals known predominantly for their work as poster artists. Designer Ken Garland lists Henrion and Schleger – along with Abram Games – as the ‘top trio’ of British poster design.

Both Henrion and Schleger were German émigrés settling in Britain in the 1930s, and they each built a strong reputation with their posters for clients such as London Transport, the General Post Office and the Ministry of Information (Figures 1, 4–6).

Henrion and Schleger had each gained experience with design co-ordination prior to the formation of their design groups. Schleger worked with knitwear business W. Raven & Company on a design programme from 1946 through to 1950, whilst Henrion completed the first of his many design programmes for the paper company Bowater in 1949. The adoption of these design co-ordination programmes signalled the beginning of a dramatic change in the way that design objects were conceived. It was a move away from the individual object created in isolation, and towards the comprehensive alignment of a company’s entire visual output.

It is interesting to note the career path of Abram Games, the third designer who completed Garland’s ‘top trio’ of poster design. Around the middle of the century, Games created designs for two of the most prestigious identity jobs in Britain: the first BBC ident (often referred to as ‘Bat’s wings’) and the Festival of Britain logo. But in subsequent years Games seems to have veered away from the business opportunities presented by design co-ordination, focusing primarily on one-off designs in the mode of an individual craftsman.

Meanwhile Henrion and Schleger continued in their efforts to inaugurate design co-ordination in Britain, with high-profile programmes for both domestic and international clients. Henrion’s client list included Blue Circle Cement, British European Airways, C&A, KLM, the London Electricity Board and the Post Office, while Schleger worked with the British Sugar Corporation, Edinburgh International Festival, Finmar, Jaeger and Mac Fisheries.

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Figure 9 (right): Analytical comparison between original logo (left) and redesign (right), Henrion Design Associates, 1961.
as the component parts of their company name suggest. Milner Gray had proposed a three-part structure for the company that embraced the functions of design, research and administration. According to Avril Blake, ‘Bassett Gray taught Milner that there were two stages in solving design problems, the second was the personal, intuitive creation of the drawing or artefact, the first, equally important, was analytical and objective.’ This emerging ‘analytical and objective’ emphasis on design was partly responsible for the considerable growth of design management after the war.

As business manager, Dorothy Goslett was a key member of DRU from the outset. In her 1961 book Professional Practice for Designers, she asserts the importance for designers to be practical businessmen if they are to turn their ideals into reality. The dual role of designer-businessman seems to have been one that FHK Henrion relished throughout his lengthy career. In contrast, Hans Schleger seems to have been a somewhat reluctant businessman, preferring to keep his studio small and his identity programmes more low-key. Fiona MacCarthy suggests that: ‘If Schleger’s early supremacy in corporate identity was to be eclipsed as the profession of design management expanded over the next decades, this was because he regarded himself primarily as an artist, refusing to transform himself into a businessman.’

So while Henrion’s work focused on systematic manuals for the application of rigid consistency across various applications, Schleger seems to have been more relaxed, establishing firm foundations for his design co-ordination programmes, before allowing them to evolve in response to the demands of each specific application. Schleger’s work for Edinburgh International Festival is a case in point. A logo was created that featured two birds positioned within a depiction of Edinburgh castle (Figure 11). This logo was initially applied with great restraint, building up a recognisable visual impression across a range of applications. But over subsequent years, it was employed in increasingly diverse ways. The birds that had originally been depicted within the confines of the castle were now free to create more open and dynamic illustrative compositions (Figures 12 and 13). In the words of Schleger’s wife and colleague Pat: ‘we began to let the birds out of the castle’.

Schleger’s work for Edinburgh International Festival demonstrates the fluidity of his approach to design co-ordination. This mindset enabled him and his associates to combine the best of both worlds: fusing the consistency and coherence found in Henrion’s work, with the virtuosity of one-off designs.

The end of the ideas poster

Whilst these emerging design groups had been campaigning for the importance of design co-ordination, designers like Games continued to work as independent artists creating predominantly one-off designs. This was in strong contrast to Henrion’s work for KLM which exhibited such rigorous, slavish consistency across a variety of design applications.

In 1959, Henrion created a poster for a Proctor and Gamble toothpaste called Gleem (Figure 14). The work

Figure 14. Gleem poster artwork, FHK Henrion, 1959.

was commissioned by advertising agency Erwin Wasey. When Henrion presented it to them, their response was rather unexpected. In his words:

When I showed it to them, they said it is much too good for us, we don’t want it. I said, I beg your pardon, what do you mean? Well, what we need is a poster which is part of a total campaign in the press and on television. So in the press and on television we have certain actors using Gleem toothpaste and on the posters we want the same thing ... I realised it was the end of what I called the ideas poster.”

There was a distinct irony in the situation. Henrion had been one of the key protagonists in the promotion of design co-ordination, yet he seems to have been somewhat dismayed by the effect it had had on his beloved ideas poster.

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