Comic strips and the making of meaning:

emotion, intersubjectivity and narrative drawing.

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CONTAINS PULLOUTS

Abstract

List of Illustrations

Contents

Abstract

This study argues that the experience of reading comics is comprehensible as a series of intersubjective relationships represented in physical form. Considering concepts of self-conciousness, perception, embodiment and social experience, it develops a narrative model that brings the physical forms of self-expression into a series of relationships generated and made meaningful to embodied subjects.

I seek to develop the theoretical work of a minority of comics narratologists. In particular, theorists who focussed on the relationship between content, form and enunciative context, rather than focussing on the study of enunciation alone.

Following cultural theorist Martin Barker, I adopt a cross-disciplinary theoretical approach, which considers the relationship between the ideas, forms and methods of one discipline and another. However, I adopt an interdisciplinary method in two practical Drawing Demonstrations, that makes instrumental use of studio methods in solving two theoretical problems. I argue for practice-based research as problem solving.

My argument has a main axis: readings of philosophical descriptions of self-consciousness and perception on one hand, and readings of the work of narratologists who focus on the relationship between *histoire* and *discours*, on the other. My argument establishes a set of theoretical predecessors in works that I bring together for the first time. This constitutes a new set of ideas from which my argument derives. This set has not been compiled before in English language comics narratology.

The model of narrative that I describe is also original, although correlates to the work of other narratologists. Also original are my analysis of

the theory of 'mediagenius' and conditions of intersubjectivity and my analysis of comic strip artist Matt Madden's work in terms of concepts of self-observation. My two Drawing Demonstrations provide an original model of practice-based research following a problem-solving approach.

In approaching comics narratology as a relationship between *histoire* and *discours*, this study develops Barker's approach. It provides opportunities for comics narratologists to reconsider the application of both the approach and the ideas that it represents.

Introduction

When we read a comic strip, the particular characters and situations in the plot engage us. Through our reading, we get to know the possibilities and impossibilities of the world in which the plot takes place. We follow a fictional course of events, of which we make our own sense. Outside this course of fictional events, we also know that the strip has been drawn, produced and made available to us by a number of people. We know that we are holding it and reading it. We understand that the situation we are in comprises a series of relationships that we have with other people, some of whom are fictional, none of whom we have necessarily met, but all of whom have taken part in directing our reading.

Although comic strips are polymodal, engagement with them is termed reading. This reflects a longstanding semantic issue. We read the text, but view the drawings that comprise comic strips. However, the overall designation 'read' in relation to comics is not lexical. It does not indicate a syntax and grammar of comics. Rather, use of the term is derived from the activity of engaging with the characteristic media in which they have appeared, such as books and newspapers. Even as those media change, the term reading remains.

Research questions and approaches in English language comics scholarship

In this study I will consider and discuss the experience of reading comics in terms of sets of relationships between people. To do this, I aim to answer two questions. Can intersubjective relationships be described as

narrative? Are intersubjective relationships evidenced in the making and reading of drawn narratives in comic strips in particular?

These questions arise from a review of the English-language work of a small number of theorists whose interest in comic strips is narratological, as distinct from the majority of comics scholars, whose interests are historical or sociological.

Narratology falls into two distinct areas of study that might be broadly called the 'study of telling' and the 'study of what is told'. Although these areas impact upon one another, they reflect two distinct approaches to defining narrative itself. Because the word 'narrative' means both the activity of telling and the content of what is told it is important to bear this distinction in mind (Schütz 1970, Benveniste 1971, Chatman 1978).

Theories of narrative that are exclusive to comic strips are few, as are applications of general theories of narrative to the medium. They have emerged only recently in comparison, say, to the emergence of a large body of film theory in the same period (Hatfield 2005). They reflect the distinction between the 'study of what is told' and the 'study of telling to' in the wider discipline of narratology by approaching comic strips as either a relationship between form and content (or 'what is told') or as the analysis of the relationships between content, form and enunciative context (or 'telling to'), the study of which defines the comic strip medium through these relationships themselves.

Amongst comics narratologists the tendency has been towards the study of 'what is told'. As a result, they have taken approaches that locate and describe structural or systemic consistency in the comic strip as

enunciation only, particularly identifying knowledge with structural archetypes (reflecting Propp, Greimas and Levi-Strauss), experience with systems of signification (reflecting Peirce and de Saussure) or frequently theorising a combination of the two (Eisner 1985, McCloud 1993, Groensteen 2007, Wolk 2007).

The comics narratologists who study 'telling to', or the relationship between 'telling to' and 'what is told', are even smaller in number. They consider enunciator, enunciatee, context and medium to be topics affecting both the form and content of what is expressed. This approach brings alterity to bear on the semic analysis of structure (Barker 1989, Baetens 2001, Madden 2007). I use the word alterity here to mean the principal of taking the point of view of another, following the work of Emmanuel Lévinas (Lévinas 1970).

The distinction between these approaches is not absolute in the theoretical field. For example, McCloud describes reader response in relation to a broadly structural analysis (McCloud 1993:205) and Barker undertakes a 'deep' structural analysis of a particular comic strip according to Propp (Barker 1989: 117). Overall, however, the study of 'what is told' is the approach that currently dominates the field of English language comics narratology.

This state of affairs suggests that there is further work to be undertaken, addressing the possible narrative relationships that describe 'what is told' in terms of 'telling to'. In this study, I refer to, analyse and seek to develop the theoretical work of comics theorists who have approached the relationships between content, form and enunciative context as a definition of the comic strip medium.

Martin Barker's "Comics: ideology, power and the critics" (1989) applies the narrative and sociological theories of Valentin Vološinov to the experience of making and reading comic strips. Barker extrapolates a list of principles through which the form of comics can be analysed relative to the experience of the people who make and read them. Barker's introduction of Vološinov's ideas to the study of comics is unique, and has not been pursued.

The ideas themselves beg questions that both locate the comic strip medium as unique in its narrative functions and bring into focus a network of other ideas rooted in theories of self-consciousness, perception and subjectivity across a number of disciplines.

Jan Baetens' discussion of a definition of the comics medium as a physical trace of its producers, the meaning of which is relative to a reader, implies more comprehensive theories of embodiment, depiction and intersubjectivity (Varnum and Gibbons 2001).

Although not interrogative, Matt Madden's 'Exercises in Style' represents a practical demonstration of the relationships between 'what is told' and telling to', referring to the physical representation of functions of mutual misunderstanding that are theorised in the work of Schütz, and which comprise a function of intersubjectivity (Madden 2007).

These comics theorists take a dialogical approach to the medium, compelled by their narratological focus on 'telling to' relative to 'what is told'. In this study, I analyse Baetens' discussion and Madden's drawings in detail and refer to Barker (and to Vološinov) repeatedly in relation to descriptions of relative subjectivity.

My conscious point of view in the promotion of these theorists' work is expressed in my research questions. In this study, the absence of a wider explication of canonical works of comics narratology by theorists who broadly approach narrative as 'what is told' is due to my interest, not in 'telling to' as distinct from 'what is told', but in approaches to the relationship between them.

My questions arise out of a wider extrapolation of readings of these three comics theorists, developed through readings of the work of theorists in a number of disciplines who share a dialogical approach, and whose work I bring to bear directly on the study of comics.

In this sense, my questions cannot address those issues in comics narratology that are exclusively concerned with 'what is told'. Rather, they belong to another paradigm in the field. My two questions seek to pursue an alternative course of study that develops the dialogic approach to comics adopted in English by Barker, Baetens and Madden and locate it in a wider context of theory that shares this approach.

My study is confined to English language narratological theories of comics. In many other fields of study, a distinction made upon the basis of language would be unnecessary, due to the habitual translation of texts from one language to another, and keen ongoing debates about the quality and meaning of translations in international fields. However, the field of comics scholarship, and particularly the field of the narratological study of comics, does not yet have this habit.

Translation is not simply a responsibility for the scholarly reader who may or may not be fortunate enough to be polylingual. The history of

comics production and the cultures of comics reception are categorically split along language lines. A small minority of comic strips produced in one language ever appear in another. This not only establishes a set of distinct texts as objects for study, but also establishes distinct audiences and communities of knowledge, relative to those texts. The audiences for French language comic strips and Japanese llanguage comic strips are quite different. Distinctions between scholarly communities drawn along language lines are a corollary of this. There is much to be translated that might change the current state of scholarship simply by appearing in another language.

Cross-disciplinarity

My study refers to theoretical and practical work in a number of disciplines. The field constituting the narratological study of comics already derives from literary, film and art theory and philosophy, as well as general narratology.

Compared with other fields of study, studio practitioners constitute a significant minority of scholars in the field, and the forms of studio outputs form a significant minority of its current canonical texts in the form of scholarly comic strips about comics narratology (Eisner 1985, McCloud 1993, Madden 2007, Sikoryak 2009, Cohn 2010).

I refer to work in the fields of philosophy, narratology, comics narratology, sociology, cognitive science and studio practice in my study. These references occur in a number of ways, which require enumeration and justification.

I make a general distinction between cross-disciplinarity and inter-disciplinarity, as different ways of approaching and making use of material in my study. The issue of relative expertise is central to this distinction. Cross-disciplinarity allows the discursive use of information, forms and methods from more than one established discipline in the development and presentation of an argument. The relationship between materials derived from more than one discipline is the topic of discussion.

Cross-disciplinary development of relative expertise across a range of disciplines does not result in specialism in those disciplines, because the activity actively seeks to destabilise and reform definitions rather than adjudicate them. The existence of disciplinary specialism is a problem for any cross-disciplinary argument, in that cross-disciplinary approaches depend upon a contingency of expertise, whereas specialism seeks to negate this contingency (Candlin 2000).

My general approach in this study has been to make expertise contingent upon the development of my argument. In this sense, cross-disciplinarity presents problems as a research activity, because research aims to collate, review and select, based upon specialism. Insight has status exclusively in the context of specialist knowledge. According to this definition, to conduct research is to gain disciplinary expertise and utilise it to become a specialist. Thus, research is an activity defined by incremental development within an agreed frame (the discipline itself) and insight is adjudicated against it as specialism.

However, because the value of cross-disciplinarity lies in contingency, it is the relationship between ideas, forms and methods that

grounds the cross-disciplinary argument. Describing and demonstrating these relationships constitutes a different type of research activity, in which the field of study is formed by these relationships themselves and in which collation, review, selection and insight are adjudicated by the terms of the relationship themselves. For example, Martin Barker's utilisation of the ideas of Vološinov constitutes cross-discipinarity. Vološinov is a literary theorist. His ideas are expressed as a specialism in this field of expertise. Vološinov was not expressing ideas about comics. In describing how comic strips can be read in terms of Vološinov's ideas, Barker does not instrumentalise them, because of the possibility of category errors arising from the elision of comics and literature. Rather, Barker makes the topic of discussion the relationship between the experience of comics and Vološinov's literary specialism (Barker 1989).

On the other hand, inter-disciplinarity is the instrumental use of ideas, forms and methods from one discipline in another, in order to bring one body of specialist knowledge to bear on another. In this activity, there is absolutely no possibility of contingency, because the terms of the inter-disciplinary relationship remain the fixed terms of the disciplines themselves. This has to be the case in order for instrumental effects to occur.

This is not my general approach, although I take it on two occasions in my study: in the practical studio demonstrations that I make in answer to two different narratological questions in Chapters Two and Three. In these cases, I have been careful to develop and frame my narratological questions as problems that can be solved by making new drawings. I utilise

the forms and methods of studio practice instrumentally, to solve problems that have arisen and been focused in narratology.

The general problem facing inter-disciplinary working is apparent in both cases. I had to manipulate both expert frames of reference, the disciplines of studio practice and narratology, in order to accommodate the other, so that one could instrumentally affect the other. The value of solving a problem set in one discipline by means of the forms and methods of another, lay in solving this general problem.

The practical work that I have undertaken in order to answer narratological questions in this study is inter-disciplinary, although my general approach is cross-disciplinary, making the relationship between the ideas, forms and methods of different disciplines my topic. My inter-disciplinary use of drawing also constitutes a considered approach to the relationship between theory and practice encompassed by the term practice-based research.

Practice-based research

My study utilises both studio practice and theory appearing as text. This polysemic approach requires that I identify the ways in which I have used writing and drawing as research methods and the ways in which I have used text and image as outputs.

To justify the roles of text, practice outputs and methods in my study, I will give an overview of the debates about the definition of practice-based research and the issues that face the researcher. I will position my method in relation to them.

Practice-based research has been the subject of pedagogic debate for almost twenty-five years, in the context of both the study methods and the adjudication of higher research degrees.

Since the1992 reform of the higher education system in Britain, represented by the first Research Assessment Exercise (RAE1), new higher degrees in fields of cultural study involving practical or technical traditions, such as Art, Design, Architecture and the Performing Arts, have been created and rationalised according to templates derived from the study of history and theory. These qualifications are intended to create parity between degrees pursued by practical and cross-disciplinary methods and those that already existed to establish theoretical competence.

Therefore, practice-based higher qualifications in Britain are the result of historical changes in the structure of higher education, bringing traditions of practice into the established context of theoretical research (Bird 2000:03).

Debates about the role of practice in research have been underpinned by the subsequent proliferation of these qualifications. Relative to the structure of wholly theoretical degrees, in which they are undertaken, problems arise in the use of practical methods and the production of research outputs in forms other than text.

These problems are not unique to higher education, but early attempts to address them developed largely in response to the instrumental issues of adjudicating research and awarding qualifications (Cornock 1988, Allison 1988, Frayling 1993, Gray 1993).

There is still no agreed pedagogic definition of practice-based research in the visual and performing arts in Britain (Candy 2006:03). A report of the country's Arts and Humanities Research Council, revised in 2008, could not identify "...any established or accepted prior definition..." (Rust, Mottram and Till 2008:10).

This lack of definition both reflects and accounts for problems articulating agreed methodologies for practice-based research and adjudicating its outputs. Almost ten years after the emergence of the first practice-based qualifications, educationalist Fiona Candlin wrote that students, supervisors and examiners are "...still expected to proceed without a clear map of what is expected and without established criteria for competence." (Candlin 2000:04).

There is not a dearth of definitions, however, but rather a wide variety, predicated upon the developing programmes of individual places of study. Candlin identifies an extreme diversity of required research outputs, from the visual-only outputs required by Leeds Metropolitan University's PhD by Visual Practice on one hand, to the requirement at the University of Hertfordshire for a written thesis of eighty thousand words to accompany visual material, on the other (Candlin 2000).

This diversity also arises from the incorporation of traditions belonging to particular media into the requirements for assessment of particular degrees. "In the case of PhDs by Composition at the University of Edinburgh, the outcome... is a portfolio of compositions... No written component is required." (Coyne and Triggs 2007:03).

As well as a lack of agreement about outputs, and hence a lack of agreement about the adjudication of these outputs, there is also lack of agreement over the terminology used to describe the methodological role of practice.

The term 'practice-based' is widely used to describe the use of practice as a method of research, and its products as research outputs in themselves, not requiring the mediation of a text (Candy 2006:01). The term 'practice-led', on the other hand, refers to the processes and products of practice as topics for theoretical analysis utilising text, so that "...the results of practice-led research may be fully described in text form without the inclusion of a creative work." (Candy 2006:01).

However, consensus over these terms is not complete. As recently as 2008, the revised Arts and Humanities Research Council report into practice as research used the term 'practice-led' to mean the use of practice as research method rather than as the topic of research (Rust, Mottram and Till 2008:10).

I have followed Candy's definition of practice-based research in this study. She writes: "...whilst the significance and context of the (research) claims are described in words, a full understanding can only be obtained with direct reference to the outcomes." (Candy 2006:01). There are specific methodological problems with this definition, which I shall address, but the identification of two distinct approaches to practice as research, in which one definition focuses on method and the other definition focuses on topic, creates a framework for further discussion. It is the definition of practice as method

that I shall discuss in relation to my study. This study is practice-based, not practice-led.

The diversity of definitions of both methods and outputs is derived as much from a continuing debate of theoretical questions, arising out of debates about the practical issues of teaching and assessing research degrees.

Three theoretical questions underpin the debates. First, are non-text outputs, and the methods of their production, able to communicate knowledge rather than simply constituting knowledge? Second, by what criteria can this knowledge be adjudicated within an academic environment? Third, what is the status of these outputs and methods relative to the production of text?

Discussion about the ways in which artefacts communicate knowledge as research outputs is underpinned by different conceptions of intentionality and interpretation. Explicit in Leeds Metropolitan University's requirement for visual-only outputs is the idea that material produced in practice is completely intentioned and can be clearly interpreted and adjudicated for competence without reference to an accompanying text.

This view is supported by arguments against the intentionality of text rather than arguments that make explicit how non-text artefacts communicate. The intentionality of both text and artefacts is considered mutable, but no evaluation of the ways in which mutability is a basis for adjudicating academic competence is forthcoming (Candlin 2000).

This position is predicated upon the idea that artefacts presented as outputs require an interpretative framework, but that this framework is

centred upon the artefact itself. The issue is about the artefact relative to interpretation rather than the artefact relative to intentionality.

Many participants in the debate argue that interpretation cannot be adjudicated in this sense and hence artefacts cannot independently communicate knowledge as research outputs (Higher Education Quality Council 1997:05, Burling, Freidman and Gutherson 2002:10).

As a result, for some of these educationalists, the interpretative framework for artefacts is provided by text, refocusing the terms of adjudication upon the intentionality of the researcher relative to their own production (Newbury 1996, Candlin 2000:02, Rust, Mottram and Till 2007:12).

This creates a situation unique in humanities research, although not in the instrumental research undertaken in science or technology. In this situation, the researcher is both producer and commentator, effectively undertaking a dual practice where process and products are methods of research to be studied as they occur, rather than the outputs of study alone (Quinn 2007).

However, others retain a focus on interpretation, arguing that establishing professional consensus will provide an interpretative framework for artefacts as outputs, independent of text. Following Anne Douglas, Karen Scopa and Carole Gray, Michael Biggs argues that developing an agreed interpretative framework for practical outputs is the role of the institution or rather, of educators precisely identifying their community of expertise (Douglas, Scopa, Gray 2000:03, Biggs 2002:04). Candlin writes: "To become an expert, you have to have a specialised field, which can only be mastered if

it is enclosed, or defended if its borders are clearly defined and policed." (Candlin 2000: 02)

Approaches to interpretation have attempted to identify a unique role for practice that cannot be achieved by a return to the intentionality of text alone or through the process of managing a dual practice. Stephen Scrivener has identified this unique role in what he describes as 'creative-production' (ie. a tradition of studio practice), requiring the representation of the researcher's personal journey in practice as a template for future studio practitioners to follow (Scrivener 2000:02).

The detailed recording and reporting of the practical processes of production and reflection are necessary for practice to fulfil this role. Text is then descriptive rather than analytical, outlining methods of production as an adjunct to the research outcomes, which remain the artefacts themselves (Scrivener 2000:09).

Scrivener arrives at the 'creative-production' model, requiring recording and reporting, because he makes a distinction between traditional studio processes and instrumental or problem solving models of learning, utilised in science and design, such as those developed by educationalist Donald Schön (Schön 1983).

Schön describes the process of problem solving as cyclical. A problem cannot be solved until it is suitably set, he argues. Each new form of a problem is a critique that outlines the problem in a new way. Experiments test the newly outlined problem and finally, unintended experimental outcomes change the problem, leading back to the start of the cycle. Further,

judgements about the value of choices made throughout the cycle are made in terms of past experience (Schön 1983:139).

Scrivener argues that although the process of problem solving offers repeatable templates for adjudicating artefacts, as well as devising practice methods, these templates cannot encompass the experience of studio practice (Scrivener 2000:05). In his opinion, the 'creative-production' researcher is motivated by the desire for practical activity per se, rather than by the desire to frame and solve problems to an adjudicated template in order to communicate results. This desire will not submit to analysis, but can only be described and adjudicated as a template for further action (Scrivener 2000:02).

Biggs, Burling, Freidman and Gutterson are critical of this interpretative framework on the grounds that, although the model can be generalised, there is no way in which to adjudicate the relative competence of individual practices or researchers. It can only describe practice on the assumption that the description will be significant to other practitioners, rather than creating a repeatable framework for analysis in each case. Biggs writes: "We need to differentiate between... personal development... and activities that are significant for others." (Biggs 2002:02, Burling, Freidman and Gutterson 2002:14).

However, although Scrivener proposes the 'creative-production' template, aspects of Schön's problem solving model convince him. He sees the possibility of considering the outputs of problem solving as demonstrations of process, rather than as entirely instrumental outcomes that finally leave process behind (Scrivener 2000:07).

In this sense, some practical outputs are able to provide a view on their own production. They might appear alongside both descriptive and analytical text, but neither type of text is necessary for them to communicate as well as constitute knowledge. The production of these artefacts is directed as problem solving, but the outputs are not entirely instrumental. Rather they are demonstrative.

As demonstration, these outputs create an interpretative framework that derives from the setting of a problem itself. They represent a type of problem solving that aims to make its processes explicit in its outputs rather than aiming to effect change with the output as the solution to a problem. Douglas, Scopa and Gray write "...the outcomes of the research process are... evidenced... within the final product." (Douglas, Scopa and Gray 2000:03).

In this sense, Douglas, Scopa and Gray write "... the role of practice is part of the methodology of the research and is therefore relative and heuristic..." (Douglas, Scopa and Gray 2000:05). They identify two possible roles for practice in research, according to a problem solving model generating outputs that communicate the process of their own production: either as evidence in support of a theoretical argument presented as text, or as a means of communicating knowledge that text cannot, through demonstration (Douglas, Scopa and Gray 2000:05).

The studio drawings that form part of this study follow one or other of these models. The drawings representing types of co-present emotional expression in Chapter One act as evidence in support of my argument (Illustrations 02. 03. 05 and 06, Pages 109, 110, 112 and 113). The drawings

that I call 'demonstrations' in Chapter Two (illustrations 08 to 23, Pages 179 – 194) and Chapter Three (Illustrations 41 to 46, Pages 259 – 264) constitute solutions to two specific problems framed so that the drawings themselves demonstrate the process by which the problems are solved.

The drawings in Chapters Two and Three do this by making overt visual comparisons between themselves and existing drawings made by other studio practitioners, alongside which they are presented. Conceiving these comparisons in theory was as important to the framing of the two problems as it is to an understanding of the drawings as outputs or solutions. They were not conceived through practice. That is, the drawings respond to two questions that were, in themselves, framed in order to allow their solutions to communicate knowledge as practical outputs.

This process did not preclude the use of descriptive, theoretical or analytical text. However, theory predicated and framed each problem and theorising was not undertaken post hoc: the drawings themselves take a theoretical position. Neither do any descriptions I include constitute a dual approach in themselves. Nor were the drawings approached as a predetermined topic to be researched and analysed in text alone.

The pedagogical debates about practice-based research reveal wider issues about the relationship between theory and practice as types of activity, where theory is circumscribed by the medium of text and practice is defined broadly as not-text.

However, I propose that interrogation of these definitions will advance little in discussions that focus on media. Text or not-text is beside the point. Rather, the relationship between theory and practice can be explored

as a relationship between intentionality and alterity, based in an essentially social conception of communities of expertise, including academic communities of expertise. As Douglas, Scopa and Gray write: "Embodied knowledge within the artwork relies on the ability of the research community to understand the particular artwork and the research within it." (Douglas, Scopa and Gray 2000:03).

Is it possible to describe any types of drawings as theoretical drawings? The term is unfamiliar to any number of communities of expertise who know theoretical text or theoretical diagrams, which are types of drawing. Are there theoretical comic strips?

An example of a theoretical comic strip is provided by Scott McCloud's theory of comics drawn as a comic. The theory is part of the comic's script and the medium of comics is used to extrapolate that script (McCloud 1993:180). The comic strip medium acts as an intentioned text, for all that it includes drawings as well as words.

Alternatively, both the comic strips of Robert Sikoryak and Matt Madden communicate theoretical positions utilising methods akin to the model I have used in this study. There is no explanatory text in either artists' work, because the drawings themselves communicate a point of view in relation to a predetermined theoretical problem. They are meta-comics, employing a comparative positioning that requires a specific community of expertise in order to be understood (Sikoryak 2009, Madden 2007).

McCloud insists on the distinction between message and medium. For him, both theory and practice are defined by different approaches to the roles of message and medium. Theory is a type of communication in which

medium and message are never confused, and in which the role of medium is consensually ignored by theoreticians and readers. The agreed focus is upon theory's object, which is what is communicated in the text. The medium is transparent. Meaning is approached as an object in the text.

Consequently, a characteristic of theory is its pretence to absolute intentionality. In theory, what is meant is communicated only in the content of the text. It is not communicated in the material of the text, nor in the relationships represented by the text's production, nor through the interaction of productive intentionality and receptive alterity on the part of subjective writers and readers.

Even if a theoretical text is difficult, those belonging to the community of knowledge to which it is directed will not look outside its content in order to understand it. They agree that everything they need in order to understand it must be found in the content of the text, because they agree on the text's absolute intentionality.

However, we do not approach drawings in the same way as we approach theoretical text. Why not? First, we agree with each other that we approach the two forms of communication differently. Drawing belongs to a different register of communication to writing. This difference in register is created by the consensual adoption of a different set of rules of engagement. As a result, we cannot find the whole meaning of the drawing in the content of its text because there is no objectified 'text' in the drawing in this sense. There is no agreed absolute intentionality for us to focus upon.

Instead, we agree to find meaning in a more complex relationship between intentionality and alterity, represented in the physical medium of the

drawing. Unlike objectified theoretical text, we agree upon the inclusion of the subjectivity of producers and receivers in finding meaning in the medium and in the social situation of drawings.

Making theories is not making drawings. Not only is this because theoretical text and drawing are physically different, but also because in making and consuming theory, we agree to the absolute intentionality of the text. This is not at all the agreement that makers of drawings have with viewers of drawings. With drawings, the medium itself is agreed to be communicative, so that the relationship between intentionality and alterity is meaningful in itself.

Some of the confusion about practice-based research derives from confusion about the different roles of message and medium that are defined by our consensually agreed approaches to theory on one hand and practice on the other hand.

Pedagogically, it might only be by considering the role of theory from the position of the role of practice, whilst maintaining the active possibility of both, that learning takes place. Practice-based research can manipulate these different points of view with the aim of mutual enlightenment. The search for agreed models for this process is the wider subject of debate in the field (Coyn and Triggs 2007:04).

In this study, I have brought the agreed conventions of theory to bear upon practice in order to make and look at drawings as demonstrations of problem solving. In framing the theoretical problems to be solved, I have self-consciously oscillated between the agreed conventions of the two pursuits of theory and practice as both a producer and a reader.

In particular, I have considered drawing in terms of theory's conventions and therefore approached drawings as though they could represent complete intentionality, established in part by the particular way in which I have framed the problems which the drawings aim to resolve. I approached this theoretical stance itself in terms of our consensual approach to drawing. I brought physical form and social situation into a now wholly theoretical framing of the drawings, bringing subjectivity into view. In this way, I produced these drawings theoretically whilst being enabled to consider the medium of drawing as theory, not solely as theoretically objectified content.

Method and chapter summary

Prior to beginning this study, my research questions arose out of knowledge of the discipline of contemporary English language comics scholarship, and the sub-discipline of comics narratology in particular.

Because the sub-discipline is characterised by a tendency towards the narratological study of 'what is told', I aimed to frame questions that could not be fully addressed within this constraint. Rather, from the beginning, these questions would focus the study on the relationship between 'what is told' and 'telling to' in discussing the meaningful experience of comic strips. This was not a position of disagreement with a dominant tendency in comics narratology, but rather the sense of an opportunity to build upon work in the field that has taken a less popular approach and is consequently overlooked in relative terms.

In choosing this approach, the number of comics narratologists on whose work I could build was radically reduced and the potential field of study

became exponentially large. The paucity of existing theorisation in this sub-set of a sub-discipline (or the work of comics narratologists interested in 'what is told' relative to 'telling to') mitigated against the existence of a wider theoretical canon on which to draw.

Because of this, I faced a cross-disciplinary study. This would include, but look further than, the key works in English language comics narratology by Will Eisner, Scott McCloud, Thierry Groensteen and Martin Barker, for example. It would also have to include, but look further than, the wider theoretical canon on which their descriptions of the experience of comics are based.

Barker's 'Comics: ideology, power and the critics' was significant to my choice of approach. It informed my theoretical method in that it outlines cross-disciplinarity as a study of the relationship between ideas from different disciplines. More significantly was the introduction, through Barker, of the ideas of Vološinov to my field of study.

Methodologically, Vološinov's theories anchored my identification of theorisations from a number of disciplines that focus in some way upon reciprocity as a defining function of experience. These reflected the relationship in narratology between 'what is told' and telling to'. For Vološinov, this reciprocity is discussed in the context of literature as dialogue, or mutual orientation towards others. In the field of philosophy, for George Mead reciprocity creates self-consciousness in the form of a conscious 'I' and a self-conscious 'Me', for example.

Therefore, my choice of approach resulted in both the framing of my questions and in the spontaneous appearance of a wide field of study that implied cross-disciplinarity as a method.

Introduced to the field by the work of Barker and anchored by the work of Vološinov, I found that I could make more detailed distinctions about narratological theories relating 'what is told' and telling to'. In making these distinctions, I came to consider enunciation relative to enunciator and enunciatee and time in relation to embodiment, for example.

I also disestablished the identification of the 'fictional world' with 'what is told' and the identification of the 'real world' with 'telling to'. These identifications derive from the narratological study of 'what is told'. They cannot be assumed in the study of the relationship between 'what is told' and 'telling to'. I found substantiation for this approach in the work of Paul Ricoeur, who describes fiction as a method of interpreting action in both real and fictive worlds (Ricoeur 1984-6).

I found that I could not fully consider subject enunciators relative to other subjects, in relation to objects of consciousness, without engaging with philosophy. Neither could I ignore sociology or aspects of cognitive science if I were to explore the role of embodiment or the functioning of depiction.

My field became large, but it was not random. Although ranging across disciplines, my study would keep the narratological distinction between 'what is told' and 'telling to' always in view. Working through the theoretical implications of the relationships between the two would form the content of the study.

Hence, dialogic theorisations of emotion, gesture, physical trace, perception, embodiment, narrative drawing, self-consciousness and intersubjectivity were the topics that informed my research questions and around which my discussion would develop, adopting a cross-disciplinary approach.

From the start, I intended to utilise narrative drawing to answer theoretical questions. This intention arose in part from a desire to continue the tradition of practical theorists in comics scholarship, being a comic strip artist myself.

However, my main motivation arose from my unsubstantiated conviction that I would be able to provide solutions to theoretical problems with narrative drawings. These solutions would not be limited in form to 'what is told' (as the plot of a new comic strip, for example), but through demonstrations of the relationship between 'what is told' and 'telling to' (through creating the meaningful context as well as the content of a new strip). By definition, this would be the only inter-disciplinary part of my study.

My overall aim in the study was to promote the theorisation of the relationships between 'what is told' and 'telling to' in the field of comics narratology. This aim was not developed in disagreement with approaches in the field that mainly theorise the mediating structures and systems of 'what is told'.

Rather, I aimed to accumulate approaches to the narratological study of comics, by building on the work of the small number of English language predecessors whose work shares a common interest with mine.

My study does not commence with a discussion of either comics or drawing. In Chapter One, I begin in a very different discipline: philosophy. I describe how the concept of intersubjectivity arises out of descriptions of self-consciousness and perception in the work of Georg Hegel, Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred Schütz, and Nick Crossley. I outline a structure of story telling that reflects the particular conditions of intersubjective relationships.

I develop a definition of 'subjectivity' as the condition of being self-conscious relative to experiences of the world, and a definition of 'intersubjectivity' as subjectivity arising relative to other subjects.

This task itself requires that I consider some of the ways in which acts of communication bring about physical transformations in the world, with reference to the work of Jack Katz, Raymond Gibbs, Nick Crossley and George Mead in particular. I do this in order to outline a model of narrative as a comprehensive series of embodied relationships involving time, movement and self-perception.

I discuss how differentiations between 'I' and 'me' inform our sense of ourselves and others and I describe how this knowledge is rooted in the shared physiological processes of proprioception.

This approach allows me to advance a conception of the physical transformations that we make to the world when we communicate with other people in narrative terms. I consider the physical forms of expression to be the traces of actions made by specific embodied intersubjects.

I focus on emotion because in doing so I am compelled to consider the body. The forms of emotional expression are always body forms.

My aim is to consider the motive, material and temporal aspects of social embodiment as narrative situations.

This underpins my focus in the study on the generation of embodied subjectivity on one hand, and its perception in the physical traces of communication on the other, both in co-presence and mediated through technology.

Through this process, I am able to describe a narrative model that reflects these conditions of communication. This structure is derived from the social, motive and temporal terms of emotional expression that I discuss.

To apply these terms, I draw on the work of narratologists Émile Benveniste and Seymour Chatman and utilise Benveniste's distinction between 'what is told' and 'telling to' to position my approach to narrative. The narrative model I describe and name is central to the ways in which I theorise subjectivity in the rest of the study, specifically in relation to comics narratology.

In Chapter Two, I refer to the work of Kendall Walton and Phillip Rawson to correlate the narrative model with self-consciousness as a function of depictive drawing. The terms of depictive drawing introduce an evaluation of a theory of graphic enunciation unique to comic strips, discussed by Jan Baetens.

This theory re-connects physical trace with the structure of narrative, crossing the boundary between 'what is told' and 'telling to'. In doing so, it suggests that the drawn narrative in comic strips is perceived as an embodied relationship between enunciator and enunciatee.

I evaluate this theory against a number of conditions of intersubjectivity in the work of Crossley, Barker, Vološinov and others, returning to functions of self-consciousness that connect the theory to Gerorge Mead's theorisation of alterity. Consequently, I am able to describe the physical forms of expression as experiences of time.

I am now in a position to interrogate the connections that I make between physical trace, embodiment, intersubjects and social relationships by framing a problem that provides the possibility of practical solution in the form of narrative drawing.

The problem takes the form of a question: 'Is it possible to adopt another's forms of expression in order to communicate something new?'

On one hand, this question is framed by establishing the possibility of a theoretically neutral subject (the 'other' whose form of expression I attempt to adopt), following Daniel Dennett. On the other hand, it is framed by Patricia Hampl's identification of the context of enunciation in the form of enunciation itself.

I describe the methodology of my Drawing Demonstration One in detail. The practical activity entails making a series of three new comic strips in the manner of three existing comic strip artists (Mike Mignola, Chris Ware and Jim Medway). I utilise scripts extrapolated from the existing work of another artist as a control in each case.

I undertake a comparative analysis of the comic strips produced in Drawing Demonstration One, relative to the question. Drawing Demonstration One formed part of three papers I presented at the College Art Association Annual Conference, Chicago: 'Comics and Art History', at the 'Graphic Novels

and Comics' Conference at Manchester Metropolitan University in 2010 and at the International Association for Media and Communication Research Annual Conference 'Comics Working Group' in Braga (Grennan 2010b). (Grennan 2009a, Grennan 2009b, Grennan 2010a)).

In Chapter Three I develop my discussion of the relationship between embodiment and time, describing both co-present expression and technological trace as a temporal index creating history.

I describe and evaluate a fictional project in the work of Jorge Luis Borges in these terms. I extrapolate the idea that identical forms of expression take on different meanings in relation to different embodied subjects and propose that these demonstrate the relationship between embodiment and time.

I consider the work of comic strip artists Seth and Chester Brown in this light, re-stating the connection between intersubjectivity and physical trace as a definition of drawing style. On this basis, I describe Drawing Demonstration One and the works of Borges and Seth under review as three different projects revealing intersubjectivity as well as functioning intersubjectively.

This description prompts discussion of two further projects, each made in different contexts, but sharing the aim of revealing intersubjective relationships by consciously manipulating the relationships between 'what is told' and 'telling to'.

I consider the work of artists and theorists of 'appropriation' in the fine arts in the 1970s and 1980s. Referring to Guy Debord and Daniel Buchloh, I describe ways in which the appropriation project constitutes an

attempt to substitute one embodied subjective trace for another, with the aim of making visible, and hence destabilising, the social milieu in which artworks are consumed.

I describe the ways in which this project correlates to the previous projects in intersubjectivity that I have outlined. The appropriation project maps the ways in which self-observation at the level of self-consciousness constrains the development of self. This constraint is embodied as social consensus. The appropriation project recognised that this constraint is habitually invisible because it embodies social equilibrium.

From this idea, I undertake an analysis of work by comic strip artist Matt Madden. Madden's project also aims to reveal the relationship between self-observation and social constraint, in the form of the conscious manipulation of comic strip genres. It does this by adapting the method of Raymond Queneau's experiments with literary style to comic strips.

This analysis allows me to frame a second problem against the possibility of a practical solution, in the form of narrative drawing. Again, the problem takes the form of a question: 'Is it possible to make a new expression completely under the constraints of a recognised horizon of expectation?'

This question is a verbalisation of the problem that Madden seeks to solve in his drawings. I describe the methodology of my Drawing Demonstration Two in detail. The practical activity entails making a series of three new comic strips from a single script. The recognised 'horizon of expectation' utilised to constrain each drawing is identified by historical period as well as genre. I attempt to draw a new comic strip each in the manner of commercial comics of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. I undertake a

comparative analysis of the comic strips produced in Drawing Demonstration Two, relative to the question. Drawing Experiment Two formed part of a paper I presented at the Comics Forum Conference, Leeds (Grennan 2010b).

In conclusion, I encapsulate my argument, identify aspects that I consider to be original in the field and their possible significance for comics narratology. I assess the study's potential for impact on the field and identify areas for further study.

Chapter One:

Intersubjectivity – emotion, embodiment and a model of narrative.

Intersubjectivity

Ways of approaching and discussing the concept of self-consciousness and the concept of perception make repeated appearances throughout my study. I use them in a number of ways to define and describe intersubjectivity.

Historically, the definition and interrogation of both of these concepts has resulted in a number of detailed descriptions of human experience, in which theories of the human subject, society and environment are presented and debated. These descriptions constitute a body of theory that crosses boundaries between the disciplines of philosophy, cultural theory, sociology and science, and share a focus on these concepts rather than any methodology, tradition or point of view.

The relationship between concepts of self-consciousness and perception is itself historically determined. Some philosophical descriptions of self-consciousness have required descriptions of perception (Merleau-Ponty 1968, Schütz 1970), whilst some sociological and scientific descriptions of perception have required descriptions of self-consciousness (Goffman 1959, Mead 1967, Katz 1999).

As a result, the body of theory, comprising the interrogation of self-consciousness and perception as descriptions of human experience, has generated a broader field of related topics and approaches, which are not reducible to the disciplines in which they appear.

Rather, the field of topics and approaches displays a tendency for theorists working in one discipline to utilise aspects of another. Interrogating self-consciousness has led theorists of knowledge to become social theorists, for example (Schütz 1970), and led cognitive scientists to become theorists of embodiment (Gibbs 2005).

The definition of this broader field is also the shared pursuit of concepts of self-consciousness and perception across disciplines. The work of theorists sharing this pursuit is a self-selecting set. Consequently, a set of existing theories of self-consciousness and perception inform my understanding of intersubjectivity. On this basis I feel justified in considering these theorists of self-consciousness and perception to be also theorists of intersubjectivity (Crossley 1996). In this, study, as constituents of this set, I consider the work of Georg Hegel, Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred Schütz, George Mead, Erving Goffman, Valentin Vološinov, Martin Barker and Nick Crossley.

The work of theorists belonging to this set broadly considers human consciousness as mutually relative to self, other human consciousness, the body and the physical environment. Taking this approach, it connects psyche to society, self to institution and material to meaning. Describing self-consciousness, the work of these theorists tends towards concepts of self as dual, reciprocal or shared. Describing perception, their work tends towards concepts that are cross-modal, motive and reciprocal. These tendencies often result in a further heuristic tendency to identify self-consciousness with social signification, and perception with physical embodiment.

It can be argued that other theorists take contradictory approaches in conceiving self-consciousness and perception, particularly identifying knowledge with archetypes (Chomsky 1975, Levi-Strauss 1978) and experience with systems of signification (Peirce 1934, Saussure 1983).

Although these approaches might appear to be antithetical to theoretical conceptions based in mutual reciprocity, one tendency does not cancel out the other. Rather, the identification of archetypes and systems are ways of describing other levels of experience underwritten by self-consciousness and perception. Schütz describes this as a level on which the self is mediated in social relationships, in which he includes typifications and symbols (Schütz 1972: 90). According to Schütz, it is a semic level rather than an ontological one. These approaches have a bearing on this study in so much as they extrapolate theories of knowledge and communication from conceptions of self-consciousness and perception, but they are parallel to the field of study in which these conceptions are theorised in themselves.

Concepts of self-consciousness develop from concepts of consciousness. Self-consciousness implies a relationship with conscious experience that exists as a distinct type of experience itself. The possible implications for conceptions of consciousness that constitute this relationship are central to theories of intersubjectivity.

In 'The Phenomenology of Spirit' Georg Hegel describes consciousness as a series of types of sensate condition, each encompassed by the next (Hegel 1979:11). In all conscious species, he argues, consciousness is constituted by sensation, perception and cognition. However, these aggregate a type of consciousness that is unable to make

any distinction between itself and the objects of experience. At these levels, consciousness is not conscious of mediating between self and the world.

Hegel goes on to describe two further levels of consciousness, the last of which defines self-consciousness for him. Beyond sensation, perception and cognition, consciousness is constituted by desire. Hegel identifies desire as a type of consciousness encompassing the other types, in that it is defined by experiences of lack at these levels. Lack of food produces the experience of hunger, which is the desire for food, for example. For Hegel, the experience of lack constitutes a type of self-consciousness in that it is a dual consciousness. Through desire, a distinction emerges between consciousness as sensation, perception and cognition and consciousness itself, or the experience of lack.

Superseding sensation, perception, cognition and desire, Hegel defines a uniquely human capacity in a particular experience of lack: the desire for the desire of others. This type of desire arises from the distinction between consciousness (sensation, perception and cognition) and self-consciousness (consciousness of consciousness or the experience of lack), and subsumes them. Hegel describes this capacity as the desire for recognition, or the capacity for being conscious of self through consciousness of others.

Hegel identifies the desire for recognition as a mutual human capacity. Being self-conscious in our desire for recognition, he argues, we experience our own consciousness as an object in the experience of others.

In doing this, Hegel describes human consciousness as a dynamic relationship. The self is experienced as consciousness of consciousness,

motivated by the desire for recognition, which requires that we experience ourselves as others experience us.

For Hegel, this model of human consciousness explains the development of human relationships at every level, from co-presence to social institution. As such, human consciousness has an ethical dimension and a historical dimension. It is also necessarily embodied. The desire for recognition transforms sensation, perception, cognition and desire into the fabric of human society, making physical activity meaningful.

This shift from individual to social, in describing human consciousness, is a cause for debate amongst Hegel's commentators because of the ambiguity of his language (Kojève 1969, Honneth 1995). Hegel describes the ways in which his model of human consciousness is the basis for social relationships as a 'fight to the death' resulting in 'master/slave' relationships.

Hegel's fight to the death is an extrapolation of the ethical dimension of the desire for recognition, describing the human subject in relation to human consciousness. Only by embodying the desire for recognition in ethical relationships with others do human subjects emerge, he argues. He outlines three conditions for the creation of this subjectivity. First, individual desire for recognition is made pre-eminent among all other desires and this pre-eminence is represented to others through mutual display. Second, Hegel argues that the individual must be prepared to risk a loss of self in order for this to occur, even to the point of dying, establishing the ethical value that the individual places upon this pre-eminence. Third, this process, creating relative value judgements, represents a struggle for recognition, motivated by the

desire for recognition. This struggle, which is continual, dynamic and often combative, creates social relationships at every level.

Having described the relationship between human self-consciousness and the social realm as a definition of the human subject, Hegel describes its historic aspect. Motivated by self-consciousness (the desire for recognition), the struggle for recognition generates both subjectivity and social relationships through degrees of relative domination of other people or submission to them. This is the 'master/slave' relationship.

Hegel discusses this relationship in detail, discussing classes of people relative to each other in terms of domination and recognition. His discussion is essentially a social theory seeking to describe the ways in which societies are structured, evolve and manage their status relationships and their relationships with natural and human resources. As such, the 'master/slave' relationship only has bearing upon his description of self-consciousness in so much as it establishes its historical aspect. We are born with the desire for recognition and join the struggle for recognition immediately, as part of a human history of struggle.

In the 'master/slave relationship, however, Hegel also argues that any meanings that we ascribe to objects, including the consciousness of others, is mediated by the struggle for recognition. This idea emerges in the work of other theorists of self-consciousness and perception: the idea that the world is an instrumental arena in which this struggle takes place.

Edmund Husserl also describes self-consciousness in describing human consciousness. The relationship between consciousness, self-

consciousness and the consciousness of others is a major part of 'Cartesian Meditations' (Husserl 1991).

Husserl argues that because human consciousness entirely mediates our experience of the world, it is not possible to conjecture an objective world beyond it. Further, he defines human consciousness as self-consciousness. Consciousness always has an object, even if that object is unavailable to experience except in consciousness.

Husserl is not interested in proving or disproving the existence of the objects of consciousness. He is not interested in the world, per se. Rather he is interested in describing our consciousness of the world.

'Cartesian Meditations' follows a train of thought derived from the work of Réne Descartes (Descartes 1996), in which self-consciousness is described as the only possible epistemological fact. Descartes concludes with scepticism as to the world's existence, but does not describe how unembodied self-consciousness exists.

Husserl describes a relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness in which self-consciousness ascribes meaning to consciousness, For Husserl, it does not signify that the objects of consciousness may or may not exist because self-consciousness can only ascribe meaning to consciousness. He argues that the only consciousness that we are aware of is a consciousness of meaningful things.

The ways in which self-consciousness ascribes meaning, in effect constituting the objects of consciousness, also creates subjectivity as an object of consciousness. The self is constituted through the meaningful

relationship of self-consciousness to the objects of consciousness that it generates.

Husserl recognises solipsism in his description, which also exists in Hegel's. Although self-consciousness is a reflective consciousness, reflection alone allows a single type of epistemological relationship with other people. Whilst self is relative to consciousness or its objects, creating agency, other people remain a type of object (Husserl 1991:89).

For Husserl, this is an ethical problem, as objects have no agency, making independent action and social collaboration impossible. Neither do objects have ethical value. In answer to this problem, Husserl joins Hegel in proposing mutual consciousness of other people as having self-consciousness. Even if it is not verifiable outside consciousness, the experience of other people is a type of consciousness in which we assume mutual self-consciousness.

Husserl calls this type of consciousness 'empathic intentionality', constituted by three types of experience. First, Husserl argues that other people are experienced as a unique type of object. Second, as a category of object, other people are experienced as having reciprocal experiences: we assume that they are conscious of us, as we are conscious of them. Third, our experience of every other object of consciousness is determined by consciousness that others are also conscious, so that we experience the world as a world experienced by others.

Husserl describes how 'empathic intentionality' creates consciousness of other people as self-conscious. That is, as a particular type of object of

consciousness. He argues that 'empathic intentionality' occurs in two ways, through processes he calls 'apperception' and 'pairing'.

'Apperception' is consciousness made meaningful by prior experience. Our own self-consciousness allows us consciousness of objects as other self-conscious subjects. Apperception means that we are conscious of others as conscious because we are self-conscious.

'Pairing' describes the way in which we attribute like qualities to things that are alike. Being conscious of our own agency and subjectivity, we attribute similar agency and subjectivity to people as specific types of objects of consciousness.

Reflecting upon the relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness, Husserl argues that we are conscious of others both as types of objects and as self-conscious subjects. Husserl describes this identification as consciousness of relative points of view, facilitating social relationships. 'Pairing' and 'apperception' then become functions of subjectivity and our consciousness of others becomes a constituent of self-consciousness.

A number of issues arise out of Hegel's and Husserl's descriptions of self-consciousness. Pre-eminent is the issue of solipsism. Husserl focuses exclusively on the constitution of individual consciousness, even as he describes processes of mutual awareness. Other people remain creations of the individual consciousness, empathy notwithstanding.

This isolation of the self in relation to objects of consciousness is underwritten by an emphasis on observation rather than interaction with others. It describes a private rather than shared consciousness. Further, Husserl's description of self-consciousness does not identify a role for

individual distinctiveness or alterity. There is no discussion of subjective demarcation in the processes of 'apperception' and 'pairing'. despite the fact that people can be as meaningfully un-alike as they can be meaningfully alike.

Therefore, the isolation of individual consciousness also has implications for perception and communication. Husserl does not describe how individual consciousness and self-consciousness affect the semic level. He does not discuss verbal language, for example. The description of 'pairing' in particular is not detailed enough to account for the fact that perception, action and sense are quite different types of objects of consciousness: an individual's experience of pain is utterly different to the sight of another person in pain, for example. To touch is quite a different type of object of consciousness than to be touched. They might reflect each other, but Husserl does not describe how this occurs

Hegel's description of self-consciousness also raises the issue of solipsism. He argues that self-consciousness is only achieved relative to others (in the desire for recognition), implying the existence of the world and others in the world as independent agents as well as objects of consciousness. As an object of consciousness, this world is an instrumental arena. However, the desire for recognition itself is a process of individual consciousness, only played out as human subjectivity in the struggle for recognition that ensues with others.

Although the struggle for recognition defines both individual consciousness and the social realm as mutually relative, contradicting solipsism, this relationship is always antagonistic. As a type of interaction, struggle, rather than cooperation, communication or any other of the

numerous ways in which people interact, characterises self-consciousness as a consciousness of others, for Hegel.

The ways in which both Hegel and Husserl discuss solipsism lead from concepts of self-consciousness to concepts of perception. Both Husserl's description of 'empathic intentionality' and Hegel's struggle for recognition identify types of human involvement in which self-consciousness produces a subject in relation to other people.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred Schütz and George Mead describe the processes by which this involvement occurs in detail. In particular, they develop Hegel's concept of an instrumental arena in which the struggle for recognition takes place, and Husserl's concepts of 'apperception' and 'pairing'. Together, these developments constitute a description of intersubjectivity.

According to Merleau-Ponty, consciousness (described with Hegel as sensation, perception and cognition) is an engagement with its objects, rather than an awareness of them. He argues that engagement is the particular type of human involvement that creates both self-consciousness and society Engagement replaces struggle in Hegel's instrumental arena, retaining its physical aspect. It allows Merleau-Ponty to extrapolate a role for the physical body in consciousness, conflating sensation and cognition with perception. The physical body then provides the basis for the relationships between consciousness and self-consciousness, promoting consciousness as perspective, or the distinction between self and other/object.

The concept of engagement also reframes the problem of solipsism as one of perception. Rather than approaching self-consciousness

epistemologically, arriving at the problem of solipsism facing Hegel and Husserl, Merleau-Ponty approaches self-consciousness by describing perception as an engagement with objects of consciousness (Merleau-Ponty 1968a:142).

In 'The Visible and the Invisible', (Merleau-Ponty 1968a), he discusses the idea of perception as a stimulus to consciousness and the idea of perception as a judgement which we make about that stimulus. He argues against both ideas. He argues against the idea of perception as stimulus on the grounds that it is atemporal and general: there is no place for meaningful discrimination between stimuli on the grounds of either prior experience or relative significance. As a result, self-consciousness is impossible. He also argues against the idea of perception as a post hoc judgement of stimulus. This concept of perception, he argues, relies upon a definition of conscious judgement that neither accounts for perceptual error, nor describes the relationship between physical stimulus and adjudicating mind.

For Merleau-Ponty, neither stimulus nor judgement account for perception. Rather, he describes perception as an engagement with otherness sought in physical forms (Merleau-Ponty 1962:53). As a result, sensation becomes meaningful because perception provides mutual perspective as a physical engagement with other subjects. Engagement does not allow for private representations of either these subjects or other objects of consciousness (Merleau-Ponty 1968a:269).

Merleau-Ponty argues that engagement, as the process of perception, provides the basis on which our own faculties can be accorded to the self-consciousness of others. Physical engagement repudiates Schütz's objection

to 'pairing'. Physical actions generate responsive actions in others, so that action and response constitute a matrix of mutual experiences. Seeing is not being seen, but the experiencing of both in our engagement with others is the basis of self-consciousness as mutual differentiation.

Merleau-Ponty points out that this mutual action and response is not necessarily egalitarian, but neither is it only antagonistic, as Hegel describes. Its ethical dimension arises out of mutual engagement, but this ethical dimension does not govern the creation of self-consciousness. Merleau-Ponty describes this model as encompassing both ethical and unethical actions, individuals, institutions and society.

Finally, Merleau-Ponty highlights the significance of motion to his description of perception as engagement. Motion introduces a temporal aspect to the description, which reflects Hegel's inclusion of history in the creation of the social structures arising from the struggle for recognition. He defines perception as dynamic.

Merleau-Ponty's description of perception constitutes a system of human actions made relative to each other, without objectification. In this system, human subjects are not reducible to individuals and physical actions are mutually responsive. (Merleau-Ponty 1962:354). Accordingly, cognitive events are always embodied actions and self-consciousness is only perceived through physical action in mutual, that is, social performance. This description refines and extends descriptions made by Husserl and Hegel. It describes intersubjectivity in so much as its processes define human subjects as both irreducible to individual consciousness and mutually embodied.

However, an issue remains in Merleau-Ponty's outline of the precise processes by which engagement allows self-conscious subjects to perceive human action and response as mutually informed. In 'The Phenomenology of the Social World' (Schütz 1972), Schütz addresses this issue in detail, describing the different levels on which perception occurs through engagement.

Schütz makes a distinction between two aspects of engagement, in which the motives and possibilities of action are circumscribed in different ways. An individual's actions represent self-consciousness because they physically represent the motives of the individual to the person making them. However, the same actions might represent quite different motives to another person as they engage with them. The same physical action has different meanings for the person acting and for people responding. For example, whereas an observer might think of an activity as 'drawing a comic strip', the person drawing might think of it as 'relaxing after a hard day at the office'. Therefore, engagement has two aspects, representing at least two states of consciousness and at least two subjects.

Schütz is careful to point out that this distinction is not the same as intention and interpretation, because the person acting in each case might be acting unintentionally. Rather, the distinction lies in the different ways in which physical actions represent themselves to consciousness and in the different meaning that they are perceived to have.

Schütz argues physical action is only meaningful because it represents others' motivation. However, those motives are not themselves perceived in the action by respondents. For them, meaning lies in an interpretation of the

action according to their own motives. The person acting and the person responding cannot share meaning. Rather, their engagement with each other constitutes an interworld in which physical action is made meaningful by engagement itself. Because each person engages with different motives underwritten by self-consciousness, this interworld is generated as relative perception. Subjects' motives are irreducible to any individual consciousness, like subjectivity itself.

Engagement is then underwritten by a shared assumption that action is meaningful, even if perception of motives cannot itself be shared. Schütz calls this assumption 'affecting-the-other'. It is achieved through physical actions as an embodiment of the agreement that actions are motivated by an intention 'to affect'. Schütz defines this shared assumption as a social relationship, arguing that it is applicable to every type of social structure. As in Merleau-Ponty's description, Schütz connects the processes of self-consciousness and perception with the structure of society at every level.

However, Schütz argues that four types of social relationship emerge from engagement and the shared assumption of intention to affect. These are co-present relationships, relationships with contemporaries beyond co-presence, relationships with predecessors and relationships with successors. Every subject perpetually acts within all of these relationships.

Co-presence, is of greatest interest to Schütz. He describes the ways in which co-present engagement occurs as the foundation for all other social relationships. It occurs between intersubjects whose lives continually generate mutual perception through physical proximity, who are self-conscious and 'other-affecting'. In co-presence, subjective differences, such as perceived

motive and individual history are agreed to be irrelevant to social collaborations (such as communication) if they do not adversely affect them. Even if actions are antagonistic, co-present engagement involves these types of mutual agreement. In cases of conflict, for example, subjects are not only acting to inflict or avoid harm, they are undertaking social roles that represent these motives differently. Conflict, the task in hand, is unaffected.

Schütz describes the operation of co-presence as typification. This results from the co-present agreement to accept the other's perspective as a self-conscious subject, whilst simultaneously making subjective interpretations of their actions. Typification is a practical corollary of the process of co-present engagement, allowing each subject to be both a type of person and an individual. In co-presence, self-consciousness is a way of acting in relation to typifications shared with others. Then co-present engagement is self-consciousness framed as an instrumental objectification of other subjects and self, through typification, alongside a mutual recognition of consciousness.

At the level of self-consciousness, Schütz's typification reflects Mead's description of the subject in 'Mind, Self' Society' (Mead 1967). Mead describes two aspects of consciousness that produce subjectivity: 'I' and 'Me'. 'I' equates to consciousness alone, whereas 'Me' describes consciousness's image of itself. However, Mead does not follow Husserl in an epistemological description of self-consciousness. Rather, he agrees with Schütz and Merleau-Ponty in according engaged perception a mediating role in our consciousness of the world. 'I' and 'Me' are only perceptible in physical terms. Mead's 'Me' resembles Schütz's typification. It results from a process of engagement with a differentiated other (initially 'I') on the basis of an

agreement of 'intention to affect'. In this way, Mead argues, the relationship between 'I' and 'Me' accounts for reflection and social collaboration, reproducing the structure of self-consciousness (Goffman 1968).

Finally, Schütz argues, symbolic representations of these conditions of co-presence constitute descriptions of group identity and social status derived from participants' agreement to the completeness of each typification.

The three other types of social relationship that Schütz describes are modifications and derivations of co-presence. Relationships with contemporaries beyond co-presence are mediated by technology. Schütz describes technology as types of agent other than co-present human agents, encompassing every type of sign, every semic level and every physical trace. He argues that these technologies are reducible to the subjects and subject histories from which they derive. They are only meaningful relative to the subjects they represent.

Relationships with predecessors and successors occur through physical traces of co-present and contemporary engagement, either generated in current action and oriented towards some future perception or modified from the past.

Schütz's descriptions of relationships with contemporaries beyond co-presence, relationships with predecessors and with successors, take Merleau-Ponty's insistence on the significance of physical embodiment further. Schütz argues that every form of technology represents the particular remote engagement between individuals and social groups. Not only does the embodiment of intersubjective relationships include the body, following Merleau-Ponty, but also the physical transformation of the environment

through technological mediation, the objects of that mediation and their traces. Schütz argues that these traces are significant only in so much as they are reducible to the co-present subjects that generate them.

Considered together, descriptions of self-consciousness and perception by Hegel, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Schütz and Mead construct a nuanced and sometimes contradictory definition of intersubjectivity. They share points of insight, arrived at by quite different methods and different points of origin.

Crossley refers to many of these insights in order to describe intersubjectivity itself. His description remains based in the concepts of self-consciousness and concepts of perception described by these theorists. He outlines two levels of intersubjectivity, one arising from the other. He distinguishes between 'radical' and 'egological' levels (Crossley 1996).

'Egological' intersubjectivity includes the capacity for reflection as a type of perceptual engagement. Crossley bases his 'radical' level in descriptions made by Hegel and Husserl. He utilises insights made by Merleau-Ponty and Schütz to reconcile these descriptions. The 'egological' level subsumes the 'radical' level'. However, his description of the 'radical' level, he explains, also relies upon his cross-reading of these theorists and others. In particular, the ideas of Schütz are more clearly discernible in his 'radical' description than the ideas of Husserl.

Crossley arrives at four conditions that define 'radical' intersubjectivity:

First, he writes: "... that human subjectivity is not... a private inner world; which is divorced from the outer (material) world;... it consists in the worldly praxes of sensuous, embodied beings and... is therefore public..."

Second, he writes: "...that subjectivity consists in a pre-reflexive... engagement with alterity, rather than in an... objectification of it..."

Third, he writes: "...that human action,.. necessarily assumes a socially instituted form and that this form is essential to its meaningfulness,.."

Finally, he concludes that "...human action... arises out of dialogical situations... that are irreducible to individual human subjects." (Crossley 1996:26).

These conditions of intersubjectivity reflect a group of underlying principles: the processes of engaged perception mitigate against solipsism; consciousness of the physical body is the basis for consensual misapprehension; perception is embodied and hence dynamic; human subjects are irreducible to individual consciousness and the physical traces of human actions are only meaningful in so much as they reflect relationships between subjects.

There are many possible objections to these conditions and the principles underlying them, as an approach to describing self-consciousness and perception and, consequently, as an approach to describing forms of communication. In particular, the idea that forms of communication embody intersubjective relationships from which they derive meaning, described by Schütz, can be contradicted by the idea that these forms are either neutral vehicles and by the idea that they are objects that mediate meaning in themselves.

However, these contradictions are not irreconcilable. It is possible to designate and analyse structures of objective forms, and their development, without deducing either that these forms mediate meaning independently of

self-consciousness or that self-consciousness requires a monadic ego. For example, in seeking to describe the relationship between consciousness and the objects of experience, Husserl's logical scepticism leads him to conflate the two. For Husserl, consciousness of the consciousness that we have of the world, constitutes our total experience of the world. Consequently, the designation and analysis of the structures of objective forms is also the designation and analysis of the processes of self-consciousness. Schütz's theories develop this idea in detail, identifying different structures of objective form with different intersubjective processes and different levels of social interaction (Schütz 1970).

Following Schütz, Crossley's collated conditions of intersubjectivity constitute a set of instrumental terms for analysing social production, relative to the processes of self-consciousness. They turn intersubjective descriptions of self-consciousness and perception towards specific physical situations.

In this study, I refer to a number of theorists of social production who approach their own interests by analysing objective forms in terms of the processes of self-consciousness. In particular, I refer to literary theorist Valentin Vološinov's analytical method for "...tracing the social life of the...sign." (Vološinov 1929/1973:21), film and comics theorist Martin Barker's principles for the "...application of the dialogical approach to cultural forms." (Barker 1989:275) and linguists Douglas Biber and Susan Conrad's method of "...register analysis." (Biber and Conrad 2009:47).

These theorists' approaches share and develop Crossley's conditions of intersubjectivity, connecting their ideas to the concepts of self-consciousness and perception that underpin these conditions. I apply them to

comics theory, use them to analyse existing comic strips and to frame the theoretical problems that I attempt to address through practice.

Having discussed and outlined definitions of intersubjectivity, arising from descriptions of self-consciousness and perception, I will continue by describing the ways in which emotions are communicated through physical transformations of the body. Emotion generates a mutually comprehensible field of objective forms, which are equated with highly subjective experiences. It is an area of human experience that is both pervasive and focussed, both intimate and public and acknowledged as shared.

For Merleau-Ponty, emotion is not a configuration of physical sensations, it is rather the contextual significance of sensation. As such, it provides a plausible topic through which to approach relationships between subject, self, objects and society intersubjectively (Merleau-Ponty 1968).

I will correlate different types of physical transformation to specific emotional conditions, outlining a range of ways in which the communication of emotion occurs. This is an overview of the objective forms that emotion takes. I make selective use of results of current experimental research in cognitive science, in order to obviate a series of descriptions of the processes of physical transformation through which we experience, communicate and understand emotion.

My approach to using this information from the field of cognitive science simply substantiates my descriptions of the physical processes and objective forms that emotional expression takes. These descriptions aim to outline the ways in which emotion is embodied. I argue that these processes and forms exemplify physical relationships between self-consciousness and

perception, encompassing Schütz's levels of social interaction and his claims about the meaning of technology.

This approach is not to be confused with the recently emerged theoretical programme of 'neuroaesthetics' (Zeki 2008, Onians 2008). Neuroasthetics seeks to equate the experience of beauty with particular neurophysiological brain functions. Although there is much empirical evidence connecting the experience of many types of pleasure with particular brain functions (Bozarth 1994), the entire premise of neuroaesthetics is contradicted by the idea that experiences of beauty are culturally rather than physiologically determined. Unlike experiences of pleasure, the experience of beauty is not shared. Rather, it is culturally distinct. Because the experience of beauty has only relative cultural meaning, the search for a physiologically empirical experience of beauty is tautological.

I will sometimes refer to the range of physical transformations that occur in emotional expression as 'body techniques' and 'resources' after cognitive scientist Jack Katz (Katz 1999) and psychologist Marcel Mauss (Mauss 1950). This choice of words identifies these transformations as instrumental. Physical transformations communicate but do not constitute emotion. In addition, I will discuss in some detail the motive, sensual, temporal and social basis of these transformations, arguing that they constitute the specific conditions of embodiment. I will propose that these conditions underpin a series of relationships that allow a narrative model of subjectivity. I will outline this model at the end of the Chapter.

The conditions of emotional expression

Our emotions are our own, as a perpetual subjective condition, but they are beyond our complete cognitive control. As a sensual constituent of subjectivity, our emotions can take us unawares and overcome us. When we communicate emotion, our bodies change so as to transform the world in which we live, even as our cognition acts to evaluate it. Klaus Scherer describes these physical changes as a way in which we make subjective sense of our place in the world by sensually transforming it, embodying our selves thoughtlessly (Scherer 1984:296).

If emotional expression describes our subjectivity through physical transformation, then these forms of expression must be continually mobile. Our bodies are never still, even when we are completely at rest. Motion, rather than stillness, is their characteristic condition. According to Sheets-Johnstone, the way in which each of us moves is not only an aspect of the way in which we transform physically, but one of the ways in which we recognise and communicate our particular subjectivity. Whilst we share a broad range of physiological possibilities for movement with other human beings, our own movements are always uniquely our own. They are a set of physical habits, competencies and possibilities that contributes to our own and others' sense of whom we are.

She also argues that this kinesthetic singularity is one of the ways in which our subjectivity is defined and understood by others (Sheets-Johnstone 1999). Our emotions do not make these sensual transformations in subjective isolation. Richard Lazarus describes the transformations that express our emotions as "... not only embodied, but also essentially social in

character..." He continues: "...emotion is best regarded not as an 'inner being' but as a 'relational process." (Lazarus 1984:230). In a world we share with other people, emotional expression defines our subjectivity for others as well as for ourselves.

An assumption that many of us share is that how a person behaves emotionally contributes greatly to who they are. Kai Ericson (Ericson 1957) and Erving Goffman (Goffman 1971:340) use this definition. For them, subjectivity comprises our own sense of our emotional conduct with others (the 'self') and the identity we understand by other people's behaviour in respect to us. Similarly, Jack Katz argues that, "...one is always in society in a active manner, anticipating how one's actions will be seen by another; and one is also always already in society in a tacitly embodied manner in one respect or another unreflectively assuming the external stance from which on will view one's own conduct." (Katz 1999:143).

Verbal language and emotional expression

Emotional communication is sensual, physically transformative, social and mobile. Verbal language is not one of its prerequisites. I will use the term 'verbal language' to indicate languages comprised of words. Of course, there are also non-verbal languages with systematic semantic and lexical structures. For example, British Sign Language correlates the syntax and grammar of verbal language with visual signs. The system of touch bargaining used by spice traders in Cochin, India, has developed specifically so that individual negotiations can be undertaken without anyone else being able to either see or hear the process. However, both verbal and or other

forms of language share few of the conditions that characterise the physical changes we utilise to embody our emotions.

The physical transformations that emotional expressions create are not possible through verbalisation. In as much as emotions create forms of expression by physically transforming the world, these forms express experiences that are incommunicable in the physical form of verbal language. Neither do we require verbal language in order to interpret them. Expressions of emotion, according to artist Gary Fagin, 'need no label.' (Fagin 1990:14).

In the context of emotional subjectivity, verbal language is only one expressive possibility in a much broader range of the sensually expressive possibilities of the body. According to Katz, verbal language "...might... be seen as a particular application of a broader aesthetic knowledge, an application of a more general technology of the communicative, socially-interactive body that lies behind both talking and non-talking... conduct." (Katz 1999:178).

An example of the 'broader aesthetic knowledge' is provided in the physical transformations brought about by crying. Crying as a physical expression of sadness, joy, anger or fear emerges when the expressive options in verbal language are too limited to physically transform ourselves and the world around us. Crying physically changes the world in ways that verbal language cannot.

In a related demonstration of the physical limitations of verbal language, I made two drawings in 2009. The first is a depiction of my own face expressing six emotions: sadness, anger, joy, fear, disgust and surprise (Illustration 01, Page 109). The second is a depiction of my own body

expressing the same set of emotions. (Illustration 02, Page 110). Arranged as spreads of two nine-panel pages, these drawings match each expression of emotion to one of three textual representations of spoken words: 'You're fired.' 'I love you.' and 'Destroy them.'

The effect of the drawings relies upon two things: the consistent nature of both the images and the text as the juxtapositions between them are shuffled, and the opportunity to simultaneously view the eighteen cells containing all of the possible juxtapositions in each drawing. The meaning in each cell is clear to the extent that text and image are fully co-expressive, but this co-expressivity in undermined when the same text or the same image take on different meanings as a result of a different pairing.

We then experience the text and image independently from each other. At this moment, the different physical limits of both text and image as resources of expression are revealed. The comparisons we are able to make spontaneously between cells also reveal the duality that fully co-expressive meaning obliterates. The drawing was inspired by a drawing Will Eisner made (Illustration 03, Page 111), which he described as a "...demonstration of the effects of a commonly understood set of facial postures... which give meaning to a parallel set of statements." (Eisner 1985:110).

My two drawings are depictive and textual representations of a series of situations in which I physically express a range of emotions whilst simultaneously verbalising information. As representations, they are not communicative in the same ways as the situations themselves. However, this is not significant for the purpose of demonstrating differences between the

forms of verbal and non-verbal expression and the effects of co-expression on the overall meaning of each situation.

Verbal language is a single type of physical resource among the many physical resources that we use to communicate emotion. It is limited as a resource for emotional expression not because of what it cannot say *about* emotional experience, but because of its limited power to bring about direct transformations of the body.

Of course, the shout and the whisper are verbalisations, but they owe their transformative power to processes of embodiment rather than to verbal language itself. Verbal language has singular transformative powers unsuited to transforming the widest range of subjective conditions, and this unsuitability is demonstrated in the expression of emotion in particular.

However, when we cry, expressing physically what verbal language cannot, we are not selecting one communicative method over another in order to communicate a discrete, independent message about our emotional self. This is not how emotional expression functions. Such an idea constitutes what Carolyn Abbate calls 'miming mode'. It is idea in music theory that music is simply a vehicle for expressing a non-musical idea or event. In 'miming mode', "... the composer invents a musical work that acts out or expresses psychological or physical events in a sonic miming. But in this model, music is nothing *but* the pro-musical objects that it echoes in sound." (Abbate 1996:27). Indeed, we are making the same error if this model is applied to any form of communication.

Rather than 'miming' a message about emotion with the limited physical resources provided by verbal language, in emotional expression we

physically transform ourselves and the world around us. For example, in demonstrating the different communicative possibilities of verbal language and physical transformation, Illustrations 02, 03 and 04 substantiate the idea that what cannot be communicated in verbal language cannot be communicated because verbal language lacks the physical characteristics with which to achieve this goal.

Jack Katz argues "In emotional behaviour, the metaphoric vehicle of the self itself changes. It is not just that the *message* the person tries to convey becomes different. And it is not *the responses of others*, realised or anticipated that change. It is also the locus of the grounding of action that changes." (Katz 1999:299). Verbal language is simply one type of manifestation of the body. It is a limited embodiment in a physical environment offering many other possible means of embodiment.

We can find a further example of the physical characteristics of verbal language when we listen to someone expressing emotion through verbal language alone. When this occurs, we often understand the opposite of what they are saying. We hear what is said verbally, but we understand the whole communication through changes in their body.

Vocalised-only emotions remain within verbal language's limited frame of embodiment and contrast the semantic content of what is said with simultaneously embodied forms of expression that contradict it. For example, consider a simple vocal-only laugh, 'Ha, ha,' made without physical laughter's transformation of the body. This voice-only 'Ha, ha' communicates not joy but cynicism. Not being fully embodied, the laughter that is only vocalised seems false. Such a vocal-only laugh is commonly known as hollow laughter

because it is physically inappropriate: it has no meaningful body (Katz 1999:116).

Sometimes, we intentionally match the content of verbal language with body forms that contradict what is being said. Such mis-matching is also one of the expressive resources available to us. This is how we communicate irony, for example. However, we should not consider the meaning of this intentional mismatching as a reason for according a wider range of physical possibilities to verbal language itself. Even in the case of intentional mis-matching, verbal language requires the form of a physically transformed body to adequately express what is meant.

Verbal language only develops along a single dimension of time, word by word, whereas the range of other physical resources available through the body provide varying, specific temporal relationships in each moment of action with others. Verbal language compartmentalises meaning and arranges it hierarchically. Unlike verbal language, the other physical resources of the body are syncretic, so that a single expressive form can combine many different meanings.

Taking part in our own emotional expression

As we become more or less conscious of our emotions, we engage with particular aspects of our wider experience in relation to the ways in which our body is transformed. In each transformation, our bodies draw on different types of physical resources in order to communicate. We also utilise different regions of the body in order to behave in ways that communicate specific emotions. These behaviours are subjective attempts to transform

ourselves and transform the world around us. They are also shared tropes that are innate in human evolutionary biology, underlining the intersubjective function of emotional communication. Fagin, after Darwin writes "... most researchers conclude there are certain universal expressions,.. the same six categories of expression: sadness, anger, joy, fear, disgust, surprise." (Fagin 1990:126. Darwin 1872/1998).

There is a difference between these emotional expressions and sensual expressions that are the direct product of physiological states such as pain, drowsiness or exertion. While never emotionally neutral, these expressions do not describe emotions in themselves. For example, it is quite possible to feel joy and pain, anger and pain or sadness and pain simultaneously. The emotion is not tied to the physiological condition. Physiological states such as these are not social, sensual and mobile in the same way as subjective emotional expression. They are not socially reflexive, do not generate subjective self-consciousness and do not bring about transformations of the body in the same ways.

In this context, self-consciousness is our faculty to both have experiences and to experience that we are having experiences. It is not a faculty that we direct cognitively, in the sense that we mean when we say that we are 'feeling self-conscious.' It is not a cognitive function alone, but is a function of all of our senses (Gibbs 2005:21).

The repertoire of physical changes that we make in order to communicate emotions, on the other hand, are visible embodiments of subjective conditions that we share with other people, "... creatively mining the resources (we) find at hand in order to shape the impressions that others

take of (our) emotions." (Katz 1999: 6). This repertoire of physical changes is only meaningful in relation to our experience of other people. It is specific to each emotional moment., It is physiologically shared and requires self-consciousness.

The physical transformations occurring when we communicate emotion connect the physical with the social aspects of the situations in which we become emotional. We take part physically in our own expression, precipitating changes in our social world as well as our subjectivity.

Katz describes a number of examples of the way in which we take part in our own emotional expression. He claims that when we are angry, we position and re-position ourselves physically in embodied roles in a developing drama. He argues that this the way in which the expression of anger transforms our body (Katz 1999:186/190).

For example, expressing the particular type of anger known as road rage, we might physically embody a number of roles in the course of our emotional expression. First, we might embody the role of specific victim, expressing a sense of loss; then we might adopt the attitude of a general victim in a stereotypical drama, embodying transcendence; then we might take the posture of an avenging hero, embodying equilibrium regained. When we are angry, we act in extraordinary and irrational ways, in an attempt to reach self-consciousness through physical transformation. We try to regain what we feel that we have lost (Katz 1999:186/190).

With tears of sadness, Katz continues, "... crying is not simply a part of the loss itself, but a part of a process of transcending loss through representing it in the dramatics of a crying body...(S)ad crying expresses a

dialectical narrative in that it *re*-presents loss." (Katz 1999:186/190). Each facial, gestural, audible and active form of emotional communication transforms the body in a distinctive way, creating a unique physical vehicle that is specific to the moment and shared with other people.

Self consciousness and emotional expression

Routinely, we do not pay attention to our emotional selves because we take them for granted as part of the habitual course of our lives. We rely implicitly upon the physiological and social functioning of our bodies moment by moment, involuntarily blinking and breathing and unself-consciously speaking and moving so as to physically orient us to other people, activities and things.

It is only when particular episodes disrupt this routine that this unself-consciousness is overridden. Our emotional selves then call on the range of our physical resources, communicating emotion by changing the habitual forms of our bodies and the their relationships with the world.

However, the overall course of our emotional lives is not bifurcated when we make these physical transformations. We do not step outside ourselves when we express emotions physically. Instead, our emotions shift us from unself-conscious being to self-conscious expression. Fagin calls this movement from one condition to another 'the human drama' (Fagin 1990:17). In this way, Katz writes, "... emotions give dramatically new and emphatically visible forms to... themes that have been less visibly present in social life." (Katz 1999:332).

Because physical self-consciousness is a prerequisite of these transformations, we are also conscious that they are meaningful for other people. We become aware of the way in which our body changes as we express emotion. Hence we become aware that other people are also experiencing this change in us. Because of this reciprocity, emotions are ways in which we experience the self in the way in which we perceive others to be experiencing us. When we communicate our emotions, this subjective self-consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the physical transformations that we undergo.

The repertoire of physical gestures

The physical transformations that we use to communicate emotion are multidimentional, like emotions themselves. McNeill refers to this multidimensionality when he describes gestures as "... global, in that the whole is not composed out of separately meaningful parts. Rather the parts gain meaning because of he whole," (McNeill 1992:20).

There is also no formal difference between action and meaning, form and content, in expressive gestures. Rather, meaning is immediately embodied, so that the physical forms of the changes that we make to our bodies are meaningful in themselves. Neither are these physical forms a single level of communication among others, in the way that audible words are only one level among other levels of verbal language. The forms that we make with our bodies are not emblems or substitutes for words. Instead, they are comprehensively meaningful. According to McNeill, they "... exhibit meanings in their own right." (McNeill 1992:22,105).

We share characteristic expressive body techniques with each other because we share physiology. However, this does not suggest the existence of a grammar of expressive body forms. These expressive forms do not requiring syntacticical arrangement in order to communicate. The expressive forms made by different people "... can present the same meaning, but do so in quite different forms. Moreover, the gestures of people speaking different languages no more different than the gestures of people speaking the same language." (McNeill 1992:22,105).

For example, according to the expressive needs of the moment, we might use our bodies to represent someone else's body or part of a body. Or we might use them to represent a specific object, or a relationship in space, a directional force, a temporal change or our particular point of view in relation to others. Often, within the course of such an expressive embodiment, we transform our bodies in order to represent a number of different things consecutively. These physical forms are able to express an infinitely wide range of physically embodied meanings.

The expressive forms that we make with our bodies also allow us a subjective understanding of abstract ideas and reveal to us previously unformed processes of thought. (Talmy 1988, 2000). Because they are spontaneously meaningful, we accumulate a repertoire of meaningful forms ontologically, by simply being.

This repertoire is a sophisticated way of manipulating the physical resources of our bodies through the unself-conscious accumulation of embodied images, known in cognitive science as 'image schema' (Gibbs 2005:90). As a repertoire, image schema extend and animate our own sense

of who we are whilst we employ them in physical communication. We employ image schema to express complex and abstract personal knowledge, such as emotional states, by spontaneously correlating that knowedge with knowledge from another domain, such as our experience of the physical changes we make to our bodies.

Therefore, image schema are metaphorical representations of abstract, subjective knowledge communicated through transformations of our bodies. More precisely, the key characteristic of this function is mixed-metaphorical rather than metaphorical, because it makes representations of one type of knowledge by utilising another.

In Greek rhetoric, there is a term for this function. Rhetorically, 'catechresis' is the use of an existing word in a new way to describe something for which no other word exists. Catechresis uses words to break lexical rules so as to communicate something beyond the lexicon. (Smyth1920: 677). This is exactly how image schema function.

Image schema employ physical body forms to stand for a physically felt but abstract sense. They can represent our experience of others, of physical activities, of the apprehension of movement and time, of our use of objects and our understanding of space (Johnson 1987, Lakoff 1987, Talmy 1988, 2000).

Where no adequate expressive form exists to embody what is felt, forms are unselfconsciously taken from another domain as representations produced actively by the body. For example, we might splay our fingers around and away from our heads to indicate our sense of wonder through an embodied image of invisible emanation or aura. When we are angry, we might

employ our arms as representations of a hammer. In grief we fold our bodies to create an image of physical defeat.

Through a process of catechretic embodiment, image schema create homologies between sensations, ideas and images. Certain types of physical form appear more readily to embody some cognitive or emotional senses than others. We often form kinesic images with our bodies in order to represent abstract senses of movement, for example. Similarly, sociologist Geoffrey Beattie has noticed that dramatically mobile bodies communicate abstract knowledge about direction, speed and action more clearly than bodies visibly at rest (Beattie 2004:117).

The homologies created by image schema through catechresis conform to the constraints of causality in the physical world. Although they are images that we produce and develop within the constraints of this world, our bodies appear to create the possibility of any image at any scale in any time or place. This brings subjectivity and imagination together to make any representation of any situation, narrative, emotion or sense possible.

Image schema provide vivid, recognisable representations of the practical topology of physical expression. These schema can represent both images of objects and images of types of space. They conform to the conditions of emotional expression in that they are physical, motive and require self-consciousness. When we employ each type of schema, we also establish a physical relationship with the image that locates us in relation to it and to other people.

McNeill names five types of image schema identified by cognitive scientists: *Iconic* images create a distinction between our physical body and

an abstract condition of the body's transformation. *Metaphoric* body images present abstract sense through direct depiction. *Dietic* images identify an abstraction with a particular physical place beyond our body and hence position the body very precisely in the world. *Cohesive* images produce the same action of the body repeatedly, to indicate narrative continuity . *Beat* images are representations of pauses in the progress of physical transformation (McNeill 1992:12,16).

In particular, these homological types of gesture reveal our processes of catechretic representation as direct manifestations of our emotional and cognitive selves in a world of fully represented spaces, times, people and things. This world is transformed by the body, demonstrating our capacity to experience the world not only both physically made meaningful by subjective abstract content in relation to others. As Katz writes: "Emotions in everyday social interaction live and die in contextually-situated metaphors. By changing the metaphor that describes the course of his or her relations with others, a person can transform the very body of his or her experience (Katz 1999:69).

There are other possible types of physical transformation through which the body communicates. Sociologist Adam Kendon identifies a scale of homologies that stretches from gestures that communicate unself-consciousness at one extreme (Illustration 04, Page 112) to gestures that are only meaningful in conforming to grammars such as the hand gestures of British Sign Language or of Indian classical dance (Illustration 05, Page 113) (Kendon 2004:99).

The material transformations that we make with our bodies also spontaneously generate a series of points of view. These are positions we adopt in the process of producing each image. They are specific in time and place. These points of view are obvious in each physical transformation that we make. They can be as straightforward as the creation of an image in which we form either the centre or the periphery, looking out from our own actions or looking in.

McNeill describes body transformations that place us at the centre of the image we create as showing 'character viewpoint'. He describes transformations that place us at the periphery of the image as showing 'observer viewpoint'. The actions of our transforming bodies are located in different places depending on the image (McNeil 1992). A character viewpoint image includes our bodies in the substance of the image, whereas in an observer viewpoint image, our body is excluded.

This distinction is a formal characteristic of each physical form as we create it. These physical forms are not media carrying messages, but are directly meaningful in themselves. As a result, the network of different points of view explicitly communicated in the creation of each image also describes a network of relationships with other people and things in the physical world.

Beattie writes "... iconic gestures which were generated from a character viewpoint were significantly more communicative than those generated from an observer viewpoint." because they employ a direct channel of communication from one person to another. A narrow focus is described between body and body, making a clear distinction between what is

communicated and what is occurring in a wider environment (Beattie 2004:129).

He also argues that, when produced with speech, images with different character viewpoints have strong correlations with different types of verb. Character viewpoint images are associated with transitive clauses (those that require a direct subject and an object or objects, 'You lifted the bags' for example), whilst observer viewpoint images are associated with intransitive clauses (those that do not require an object, for example, 'You sleep.') (Beattie 2004).

Observer viewpoint images are more complex. Our body simultaneously creates the communicative image and stands outside it, regarding the image from other people's point of view. Observer viewpoint images are more reflective and less communicative of movement than character viewpoint images. The types of body transformations they involve are co-expressive, so that as we join others' point of view in making them, we also invite others to join us in viewing.

Because the physical forms of expression are reciprocal, affecting both other people and us, their production has an effect upon our subjective understanding of the world. For example, we derive as much understanding as others do about a personal loss from our own embodied image of crying. Our hands, embodying a specific sensation or relative point of view, communicate as fully to us as to others.

Therefore, self-consciousness and self-influencing are as much constituents of subjectivity as the effects we have on others and others' effects upon us. When we express ourselves physically in gesture, we create

visual metaphors that communicate processes of memory, sensation, emotion and (Jarvella and Klein 1982). Forming our subjectivity for ourselves as well as others, the embodied forms of expression ground our subjectivity, allowing us to feel about our own feeling and view our own view.

The boundaries of the body

When we express ourselves by spontaneously transforming our bodies, we adopt either an' emic' position or an 'etic' position. These are anthropological terms. When our gestures display 'observer viewpoint' we are joining the social sphere to perceive our own communication from the positions of other people. This is an emic position. On the other hand, when we display 'character viewpoint' in our gestures, we establish social distance from other people, creating a single position that we inhabit and from which we view others. This is an etic position (Pike 1996).

The anthropological naming of these two distinct positions underlines the connection between the social and physical aspects of communication, confirming the conditions of emotional expression. We understand the world by drawing inferences from our experience of other people and their bodies. Katz argues "... as people act, there is no gap between taking the standpoint of others and responding... One's perception of others and one's response are of a piece." (Katz 1999:316).

Consequently, emic and etic positions also define the boundaries of our bodies as constantly re-made in relation to the physical and social circumstances in which we exist, rather than as biological objects. Bateson

cites the example of a blind man who literally feels that the tip of his white cane is the somatic outer reach of his body (Bateson 1972).

This is also what is occurring in those situations where amputees still feel the removed parts of their bodies as sensate, even though "... there is nothing in the physiology of an amputated leg that gives some patients the feel of their real legs before they were amputated. Instead, the missing limb remains part of... the body that continues shape how that person moves and feels." (Gallagher 1995).

In these instances, physiological changes shift the boundary of our body subjectively, rather than along clinical lines. In the case of the blind man's cane and an amputated limb, an area of the world is experienced as within the boundary of the body that is usually experienced beyond it.

These examples show not only an unusual extension of a bounded body, but a socially meaningful change effected by these people on others. Meeting the blind man, we perceive his cane as the furthest reach of his touch in the same way that he does. As much as the boundaries of our bodies are continually in a state of physical contingency, the world is also.

We achieve this continual redefinition of our body's boundaries through the same process of catechresis that we employ with gestural image schema. In the case of the blind man, his cane is not only an instrument that enables him to receive remote vibrations. It is a physical image of his seeing into the world. In making this image, he endows one faculty with the characteristics of another. Consequently, we see him feeling, not as we feel, but as we see.

Such substitutions are habitual in our perception of the world, as well as in communication. For example, as cognitive scientist Jonathan Cole observes, our visual sense often substitutes directly for muscle sense (Cole 1995). We infer weight from images of objects being lifted or carried (Valenti and Costall 1997) and assume dynamic information about movement when perceiving static shapes (Babcock and Freyd 1988). These are not examples of mis-perception. They represent the catechretic substitution of one set of sensations for another in order to enhance our knowledge of what, where and who we are.

Similarly, Vivian Sobchack describes a man with increasingly severe Parkinsonism who makes his own furniture. Finding his personal world changed by the disease, he re-designs and makes items that objectify his physical relationships with others. He "... designs and makes furniture in the Parkensonian mode'– but this description subtends both (him) and his furniture. That is, it describes the specific and embodied materiality of both subjectivity and objectivity and their complex relationship." (Sobchack 2004:291).

Proprioception

The definition of the boundaries of our bodies is a function of the body sense known as proprioception. In purely physiological terms, the motive, positional and spatial sense that we have of the own bodies constantly underpins our own terms of embodiment. However, proprioception is more than our sense of our biologically-bounded body in motion and space. The spaces and motions of our bodies are subjectively and socially

meaningful, as well as sensual and cognitive. They operate within a physiology shared with others.

Our proprioceptive sense ties our physiological motor functions to perception. It draws the interoceptive senses, such as pain and cold, exterospective senses, such as balance, hearing, touch, smell, taste and sight and our cognition together when we expressively transform our bodies. It is the faculty that we have for feeling in ourselves the physical forms that we utilise to communicate.

For example, when we contract the muscles around our eyes because we are angry, we feel the contraction to be stressful and compressive. When we contract these muscles in the same way because we are laughing, they feel generative and radiantly energetic (Fagin 1990:77). It is our proprioceptive sense that forms this connection, because our subjective feeling "... is central to how we conceive of the relation between ourselves and our bodies. We do not feel subjective experiences to be specific brain states but sensations of our bodies in action." (Gibbs 2005:27).

Psychologist Benny Shannon describes the functions of proprioception as 'enactment'. This is our capacity to feel our own actions as distinct embodiment, as though we perceived them in others. In other words, it is our capacity to connect physical sensation with perception so that we feel in the same way that we perceive (Shannon 1997).

Cognitive scientists T. Beardsworth and T. Buckner argue that we recognise light displays derived directly from the movements of our own bodies more accurately than we can identify similar displays derived from the

movements of others, despite the fact that we see our own complete bodies in motion very rarely (Beardsworth and Buckner 1981).

Enactment is a physiological mimicking in our own bodies of the actions of others, or of representations of our selves. This is not a cognitive process, but a mobile, physiological response in which people's "... imagistic abilities are dependent on their subjective modelling of the tasks that mediate motor action and the environmental consequences of that action, and how they can transfer that understanding to new situations." (Gibbs 2005:127). We use our bodies both to gain knowledge about and to represent the physical actions that we perceive in other people and the physical properties that we perceive in the world around us.

Author Michael Polanyi describes this process when he claims that we become the pen when we write, feeling the action of the motivated nib as the course of communication. According to Polanyi, this is the dominant sensation of writing, rather than a cognitive sense of forming of each letter according to language. For him, motor sense replaces cognitive sense in an inter-modal exchange. In this way, enactment also employs catechretic embodiment in its process of generating expressive body images (Polanyi 1966).

Cognitive scientists Botvinik and Cohen's enquiries into correlations between vision and the sense of touch indicate the same inter-modal process. In a 1998 experiment, they had participants "... seated with the left arm resting on a small table. A study screen was positioned beside the arm to hide it from the subject's view and a life-size rubber model of the left hand and arm was placed on the table directly in front of the subject. The

participants sat with eyes fixed on the artificial hand while we used two small paintbrushes to stroke the rubber hand and the subjects hidden hand, synchronising the timing of the brushing." Participants quickly developed the feeling that they sense the stroking in the rubber hand in view and not their own hand, out of view. (Botvinik and Cohen 1998:766).

A visually perceived touch is still a direct physiological touch in proprioception, because vision is an embodied sense. Sight is only comprehensible to us in the context of our total physiology. A heard rhythm is similarly embodied as directly perceived motion. This movement is perceived physically even if our own bodies do not move in the same ways. According to Todd and Kourtzi and Kanhisher, the same areas of the brain that perceive motion are activated when we perceive both actual and implied motion (Todd, 1999. Kourtzi and Kanwisher 2000).

The physiological base for cross-modal, enacted embodiment lies in a particular neurological process of the brain. The same neurons are activated when we sense for ourselves and when we perceive others sensing. This process is called 'mirroring' in cognitive science and the neurons that undertake it are called 'mirror neurons' (Hutchinson, Davis, Lozano, Troby and Dostrovsky 1999).

There are two aspects to the function of mirror neurons. In one function, they activate the same physiological response in the person acting as the response felt by a person perceiving their actions, so that our own body transformations make us feel as others feel in relation to us. This physiological mirroring is known as 'Mead's Loop', after G. H Mead.

Mead sets out the conditions under which images produced through physical transformation become communicative. They "... implicitly arouse in an individual making them the same response which they explicitly arouse in other individuals." (Mead 1982). Gibbs argues "Mead's Loop plays a role in the ability to take the perspective of others. Perspective is the core component of grounding in Herbert Clark's sense (Clark 1992) and is crucial in general to the ability to tailor messages to recipients." (McNeill 2005: 252).

In their other function, mirror neurons also play this role in creating a matching but converse set of relationships. Our own physiological response to the actions of others reproduces in ourselves the neurological activity of the physical actions we perceive. This type of mirroring is known as the 'As-if-body', in a term first used by cognitive scientist Antonio Damasio. He writes that the perception of "... imagery is accompanied by sensorimotor sensations, or whole 'body loops', which give imagistic experience its rich phenomenological quality." (Gibbs 2005:138, Damasio 1994).

The "As-if-body' function connects our own subjective embodiment to the perception of others' experiences, so that we feel as we perceive other's feeling. 'Mead's Loop' allows us to perceive our own felt actions in the way others feel them. Both of these functions of proprioception create an empathic understanding of other people's experiences and our own sensual experiences in relation to them. Through these physiological relationships, we fully understand that other people are embodied subjects like ourselves. Gibbs argues "Through the functions of our proprioceptive sense, ...shared representations of perceptions and actions underlie social

cognition and intersubjectivity," (Gibbs 2005:35, Gergely and Watson 1999, Rochet 2001, Trevarthen 1977).

Proprioception makes our subjective, embodied communication directly meaningful through shared physiological functions. These functions underpin our relationships with other people in general, but they are always specific people engaged with us in relationships that have specific meanings in the moment. Expressive embodiment is never embodiment in general. Within the constraints of physiology, our relationships with others are characterised by continual change, but these changes position us absolutely, physiologically, emotionally, cognitively and socially.

We are meaningful to others in particular, as they are meaningful to us. Katz argues 'The different bodies that are attended to... in emotional and social interaction are... different ways of three-dimensional being, different vehicles for conduct' writes Katz (1999:341). Gibbs concludes "Empathy is deeply grounded in the experience of our lived bodies, and the experience enables us to directly recognise others, not as bodies endowed with minds, but as persons like us." (Gibbs 2005:36, Gallese, Ferari and Umilta 2002).

Correlating the conditions of expression and intersubjectivity

Our emotional communication is a way in which we make our subjectivity physical, changing other people, the world and ourselves. Through its processes, we create a repertoire of physical transformations that exploit all the physical opportunities that our bodies provide. We become self-conscious. This self-consciousness allows us to empathise with other people

and to track the changing boundaries of our own bodies. We share this process physiologically with others.

Crossley identifies three concepts that connect emotional function to intersubjectivity, according to Merleau-Ponty. He writes: "First, emotions are not inner states. They manifest in the way in which we act and they are,.. publicly and intersubjectively definable states. Second, emotion is defined as a way of relating... We are joined to others by emotion. Third,.. emotion must therefore be dialogically constituted:.. it shapes and is shaped by our interactions with others." (Crossley 1998:46). These concepts of emotion correlate to his 'radical' conditions of intersubjectivity. He writes: "We are intersubjects. Our actions and thoughts aren't reducible to us alone. They are moves in a game that has many players, responses to a call to action that is expressed in every gesture of the other. And this significance is precisely constituted through their place in that game," and "Human beings are embodied beings and this is crucial to their intersubjectivity. Moreover, their intersubjective relations take place within and include material environments." (Crossley 1996:173,174).

To recall these terms, Crossley defines the conditions of intersubjectivity a) "... human subjectivity is not... a private inner world; which is divorced from the outer (material) world; that it consists in the worldly praxes of sensuous, embodied beings and that it is therefore public...", b) "...that subjectivity consists in a pre-reflexive... engagement with alterity, rather than in an... objectification of it...", c) "...that human action,.. necessarily assumes a socially instituted form and that this form is essential to its meaningfulness,.." and that d) "...human action... arises out of dialogical

situations... that are irreducible to individual human subjects." (Crossley 1996:26).

In this view of emotion as socially-based embodiment utilising the resources of the sensual body, Gibbs argues "proprioceptive information... couples neural systems to bodily and environmental resources in a way that creates a larger dynamical system.' (Gibbs 2005:53). This places the physical forms of expression at an 'ecological' level of perception. For Gibbs, this ecology is constituted in spontaneously understanding the causal relationships between the things we perceive, so that "... the listener does not merely hear the sound of a galloping horse or of a bowing violin; rather the listener hears a horse galloping and violin bowing." (Repp1995:59).

In other words, when we communicate through physical transformation, our embodiment is meaningful to us and to other people because we physically join in a dynamic, social environment where perception is a "... kind of empathic embodied cognition of physical cause and effect," according to Clarke (Clarke 2001).

This perception of physical cause and effect arises out of our sense of ourselves going through physical changes and perceiving that other people do the same. As a result, our comprehension of the sensual world is derived directly from the complex range of physical and social opportunities that the world affords each of us.

James Gibson coined the word 'affordances' to describes this complex range of physical and social opportunities that the world offers to each of us (Gibson1966,1979). For Gibson, each affordance has specific properties both as information and as physical stimulus. These properties are

the result of physical cause and effect. We perceive that each acts upon the other in a way that conforms to Gibbs' 'ecological' level of perception.

The specific range of properties available to us individually positions each of us in the world, by allowing us some opportunities for action and disallowing others. We are each constrained by a set of physical possibilities, within which we act to express ourselves and comprehend others through embodiment, by effecting physical changes. According to historian Hayden White, every action we make within the possible range of actions available to us represents our subjectivity. This is who we are for ourselves and who we are in relation to other people (White 1999).

Crossley writes: "Assuming the presence of others gives us a sense of ourselves, including a sense of our body and what we should do with it," (Crossley 1996:95). Our perception of cause and effect within a physical ecology comprised of specific things, places, people, emotions and sensations is the basis for our intersubjectivity. Our relationships with other people are also affordances in the world in that they contribute to and limit our own thoughts and actions. Collins argues "... social order must necessarily be physical and local." (Collins 1981: 995). . M. L. Lyon and J. M. Barbalet also claim "Emotion is precisely the means whereby human bodies achieve a social ontology through which institutions are created." (Lyon and Barbalet 1994:56).

When we express ourselves physically, our subjectivity is defined and communicated through the transformation of our bodies. Our subjectivity is defined relative to other people within a network of distinct subjective positions. We have experiences and simultaneously perceive that we have

them. This self-consciousness provides us with a sense of ourselves from our own and from other people's point of view. Based on our shared physiology, we share this capacity with other people. Katz describes this reciprocal self-consciousness as a 'two-fold narrative'. By using the term 'two-fold' he identifies our capacity to take a position relative to other people as a prerequisite of subjectivity. He writes "The two-fold sense-making project *emerges* in emotional moments,.. in the sensual form of metamorphosis: the subject's ongoing narrative work becomes visible to self, to others... as a distinctive incorporation of conduct." (Katz 1999:324).

Ontological changes are also social changes, and vice versa. We do not experience our own and others' bodies in their biologically circumscribed, individual form, but as part of a network of physical and social relationships in the larger world. In a world of affordances, our bodies are communicative resources that we share with other people. Viewing the world in this way, none of our actions are private because our every action is significant. That is also to say, all of our actions are expressive.

Narrative

Sociologist Paul Cobley claims that this capacity for perceiving our own actions as though they were the actions of other people is a primary condition of narrative, enabling us to establish a subjective identity in relation to others (Cobley 2001).

Narratologist Gerald Prince writes "... narrative... underlines the contract between narrator and narratee; that contract on which the very existence of narrative depends." He defines narrative as "The representation

(as product and process, object and act, structure and structuration) of one or more real or fictive events communicated by one.., or several (people)... to one.., or several (other people)..." Prince lists other definitors that typify narrative content, such as sequence and continuity, as well as specific media, such as vocal language, considered by some narratologists to be prerequisites of narrative itself (Genette 1980).

However, in Prince's opinion, definitions of narrative made through content and media are all contingent upon the single definitive relationship between the person producing an expression and the person receiving it (Prince 1989:60).

This is a very broad definition that does not distinguish narrative from "... representations of a random series of situations and events,.." (Prince 1989:58). Nor does this definition exclude any from of representation made by one person in relation to another. Arguably, narrative encompasses every form of representation according to this view. How, then, can this definition allow distinctions between different media or between types of content?

In Prince's definition, these questions are subsidiary because neither media nor content define narrative. Any medium for representation and any content can become narrative. Narrative is distinct from other ways in which communication is structured and understood. Uniquely amongst forms of expression, narrative encompasses the context in which communication takes place as an indivisible aspect of the meaning of what is communicated.

This context is the subjective relationship between people who communicate with each other, represented in the physical form in which they

communicate. In terms of intersubjectivity, this defines narrative as much by the relationship between the people who make the situation in which it occurs, as in the content of what is represented.

We utilise narrative when we make spontaneous catechretic representations in order to communicate directly through our bodies. This is particularly true when the body generates images of space in order to communicate relative points of view. These representations belong to the metaphorical world that is depicted, as part of the meaningful content that is communicated.

Narrative also structures our relationships with other people in the world outside the world of representation. For example, visual mages of specific spaces in image schema bear a relationship to spaces articulated by our bodies in the physical world. The represented space is generated spontaneously as part of our own body's expressive transformation, immediately placing us in relation to others. In this way, narrative comprises both a resource for communication through the body and also underpins the way in which our relationships with others are formed.

The physical techniques that we use to express ourselves mirror the structure of what we express (McNeill 1992:183). The form and the content of our expression exist under the same physical conditions. We know that what we express makes sense to other people because we perceive our own expression from their point of view. This occurs because we share the both the same physiology and a world of specific affordances.

In the case of narrative drawing, or example, cognitive scientist Gregory Bateson argues that the brush that an artist uses to draw becomes

the artist's body. Both the form of the expression and its content are perceived by artist and viewer alike as motivated by a particular body, in the same way as we perceive crying as an image of physical defeat, or understand a complex space in an image made by our hands (Bateson 1972).

The physical process of expression is perceived as the process of what is expressed. This description applies without modification to all narrative, whatever the particular physical form of its expression. The accumulated technological traces of other bodies do not contradict this. In the case of comics, these are the traces of the processes of manual and mechanical reproduction.

Neither is physical co-presence required for us to enter into these specific relationships. The 'Mead's Loop' function applies to every trace of the physical transformations through which we communicate. The proprioceptive connection between saying and hearing, showing and being shown, seeing and being seen is maintained however it might be mediated by technology or by distances of place and time. Prince's definition of narrative does not proscribe any form of representation. It focuses instead upon subjective positions relative to each other and upon transformation as prerequisites. He argues "... narrative is not only a product but a process, not merely an object but also an act..." (Prince 1989:59).

Therefore, the physical traces left by the actions of other people can also be expressive, even when those people are no longer present, even in memory. We enter into relationships with other people by means of every affordance that retains their slightest physical trace. For example, we even infer the presence of other people, and make inferences about the types of

people they are in relation to ourselves, when viewing a clear sky recently traversed by a now-vanished airplane.

With these conditions in view, it is possible to model the ways in which narrative creates a structure for our communications with each other. Doing this makes explicit that each relative component in this model can be described as a distinct temporal component, a distinct subjective identity and a distinct social situation in which communication takes place.

Narrative's different subjects

In everyday speech, when we speak of any form of narrative expression, we invariably mean a 'plot', which is the expressive content rather than the expressive form. When we speak in this way, we mean that narrative sense is derived entirely from what is being told rather than from the situation or form of its telling.

Consequently, we make an habitual assumption that conflates the structure of plot with the structure of narrative. We take the sequential and linear structure of plots as the defining principle of narrative itself. When we do this, we describe narrative erroneously as "... just a sequence that starts and moves inexorably to its end." (Cobley 2001: 9).

However, as Frank Kermode rightly points out: "... sequence goes nowhere without its doppelganger, causality." (Mitchell 1981:80). With stories told through direct expressive embodiment, this habitual confusion is less likely to occur. We perceive the form of embodiment itself as directly meaningful. We grasp immediately that we are part of a subjective exchange with another person that generates a number of relative positions in time and

space, even if we understand the content of what is being expressed as a linear, sequential plot (Ricoeur 1990:71).

In fact, the linear and sequential time we expect of a plot is only one of the possible temporal conditions contributing to the way in which narrative structures communication. Narrative is structured by a number of different, co-existing times, always in attendance, which act in particular ways to create a network of intersubjective relationships between people and their specific expressive actions and expressions (Abbate 1996:14).

To identify these different times requires keeping motive and embodied subjects always in view. We must resist our tendency in everyday speech to simply conflate narrative with types of content and thus fall into the error of objectifying it. Rather, we must follow Prince's definition of narrative as a situation in which subjective relationships themselves bring meaning to communications. These subjective relationships are neither linear nor sequential but created through the emergence of different temporal events and "... the imputation of causality." in E. M. Forster's opinion (Forster 1927/1955:86). Karen Parna writes "...– the very definition of narrative is dependent on temporality." (Baetens and Ribière 2001:32).

For example, when we communicate with another person, the content of our representation inhabits a distinct time. This 'content time' is created from everything that is explicitly represented. In verbal language, this content is everything that we are explicitly told. It is the time of the plot (Lacey 2000:16).

Causally, this time exists in a wider frame of other temporal events, because every action and affordance occurring in the time of the plot

also has both implied antecedents and an implied future, even though these remain untold or unrepresented. As Nelson Goodman writes: "A picture of a forest tells implicitly of trees growing from seedlings and shedding leaves...": (Mitchell 1981:111).

The people depicted in comics, as much as they are fictional, create coherent positions in the time of the plot that require a past and future. Although this past and future are not represented, they are as specific as the content on the page. This necessary causality creates a different time from that of the plot. This time is constituted of all the unrepresented events and affordances of the world in which the time of the plot takes place.

Linguist Èmile Benveniste groups all of these unrepresented past and future events together and calls them the 'story' (Benveniste 1971:208). The time of the story cannot be described as linear or sequential, as it is not represented. We cannot assume that causality (the reason for the story's existence), is necessarily linear either, simply because it is effective. The unrepresented story required by the plot is not another plot.

Whereas the world of the plot is absolutely fixed through the process of representation, the world of the story is multidimentional, motive and unconstrained. It is the world of all possibilities, communicative resources or affordances, anchored alone by the causal requirements of the plot. The wide range of possibilities of the world of the story also contributes to the habitual confusion that is made between the structure of plot and the structure of narrative itself, in everyday speech.

Because the situation in which we communicate with other people, the forms that we use and the content of our communication appear

simultaneously, there is a danger of confusing one with the other. Their synchronicity might imply that the means by which content is expressed are part of the content itself, or even that the person communicating forms part of the same temporal event as content in the act of communication. Causally, this cannot be the case.

Characters in comics do not see the world in which they act as a world made of ink and paper, but as a complete world of affordances. In the same way, characters in an opera do not hear the music through which they communicate to an audience, or even their own singing, because "... music is not produced by or within the stage-world, but emanates from other loci... for our ears alone." (Abbate 1996:199).

This is the case even with meta-narratives, where the characters in the plot refer to either the medium in which the expression is formed, or to situations outside the plot itself, pulling these situations into the plot. Plot remains plot relative the other positions that constitute narrative, even when the content of the plot explicitly refers to these other positions.

This causal coherence is known as the 'verisimilitude' of the represented world. "(V)erisimilitude is a principle of textual coherence rather than... an area in which there exists some relation between the fictional and the real world." (Cobley 2001:219). Though not described, either in the plot or in the means of telling, the times of the story are not causally random. They have verisimilitude as the plot has verisimilitude, for which the specific affordances of the plot act as anchor. The story's temporal world is implied, and so always generating untold possibilities, but these possibilities are always causal (Todorov 1977, Ricoeur 1990, Abbate 1996),

There are also instances where the act of telling is explicitly brought into the plot. These are sometimes described as a shift of narrative position or 'metafiction' (Waugh 1984). For example, a fictional character in a plot refers to the expressive means by which the plot is told. Rather than being a shift in narrative position or a rupture in the structure of narrative, as Cobley argues, metafiction is simply another affordance in the world of the plot. Metafiction does not conflate the time of the plot with the time of telling, even though the act of telling has been referred to in the plot (Cobley 2001:173).

In this model of narrative, occurrences in the times of the story and plot take place in the past, relative to the time in which they are expressed. Although the story causally holds a future for the plot, the very telling of the plot makes it a world of the past, not within the time of the events that occur within it (which might be set at any time), but in relation to the act of telling itself. The plot and its story are always 'recently told'.

This locating of the story and plot in the past, by comparison with the present time in which each communication is made, creates one of the central relationships that structure narrative. This is the identification of a subjective narrator relative to what the narrator communicates as content.

The word narrator also conforms to Prince's definition of narrative. It does not imply any definitive type of content or expressive medium in particular. Instead, the word narrator simply identifies the person who is making the expression, distinct from that they express. Musicologist Carolyn Abbate describes this relationship between the time in which someone communicates and 'content time' as a relationship between subjects. She

writes "... the notion of a subject's distancing reformulation, the 'voice' is the basic criteria for narrative – as the ordering and re-ordering discourse of a subject-voice..." (Abbate 1996: 27).

In relation to the past time of the story and plot, the narrator's time always exists in the present, in the immediate time in which communication takes place. It is characterised by the specific enunciative techniques used by the narrator in order to communicate. These techniques constitute the physical and material forms of expression. They are the wide range of media that we employ to make ourselves understood, from co-present embodiment on one hand to emails on the other. Therefore, the time of the narrator is defined entirely by the affordances of the narrator's world.

In examples of expressive embodiment, this time is predicated upon the physical body, which we make use of as our primary resource for communication. Directly embodied expression takes place in the time of the body. The expressive forms of the body are shared with other people, co-present in the same time, so that discourse between you and I, in embodied communication, is entirely synchronous. For example, I see you crying as you cry, and I hear you sing as you are singing. The time of the person communicating and the time of the person receiving that communication are defined by their shared physiologies, so that the body dictates the time as well as the means of telling. The crying stops and the singing dies away.

This does not occur if the physical form of expression is not comprised of the body. This is the case with any technology that shifts the form of communication away from direct expressive embodiment and relocates the communicative means to the traces of the body's actions. Comic

albums are one such technology, as are all expressive media that communicate by producing new affordances in the world that trace a body no longer present.

In this type of communication, the narrator's subjectivity reflects the technological characteristics of the medium in which the expression was made. Rather than communicating directly with the body, the narrator communicates with the traces of the body's past actions. Still occupying a single temporal position in the narrative structure, the narrator's trace might have been made by many people as by a single person. The narrator is no longer necessarily identified with the body of a single person, nor with a single person's subjective identity. Rather, the physical characteristics of each trace define the narrator's subjectivity. When we open a comic, we are more likely than not holding the traces of many bodies made through a combination of media. All of them, communicating solely through the material we have to hand, represent a unique subjective narrator existing in a particular time, defined as a subject by the physical form of the book.

These traces of a body or bodies no longer present represent a subjective narrator existing in narrator time. They communicate when the bodies of the people who made them are no longer present. All that they require to do this is for a person to perceive that they carry meaningful content. That person is also a subject and occupies a distinct temporal position in the structure of narrative relationships, as the receiver of meaning. In comics, this person is the reader.

Specific physical resources characterise the reader as well as the narrator. The reader's resource is the technological trace left by the body or

bodies of the narrator. This trace provides the only way in which the reader can know about the narrator as a subject. In the case of comics, this is the comic strip itself. The subjectivity of the reader is created, moment-by-moment, by the infinite techniques of reading. The traces of others people's actions, traced in the physical medium of the comic, are subsumed in an infinite variety of ways into the world of the reader. The time of reading subsumes all of the other times in the structure of narrative (Abbate 1996:123), so that the content of what is read becomes an affordance in the lived experience of the reader (Ricoeur 1990).

There is a final temporal position in this causal model of narrative. The narrator is defined by the telling of the story, regardless of whether the story is expressed directly though the body or in a technological trace made by one person or many. The narrator's role obscures the final position in this model of narrative structure. This is the the position of a subjective author.

The author and the narrator are not the same, unless their distinct identities and the times in which they exist are entirely synchronised in a direct act of embodied expression, in co-presence with other people. Author and narrator have different causal relationships to the other temporal positions in the narrative, and these appear more clearly in types of communication made through technological trace.

With comics, we know that an author exists because we have in our hands a comic where a single person, or maybe two or three, are explicitly named as being responsible for the production. These statements of authorship are made regardless of how many people contributed to the production of the trace and to getting it into our hands, including paper

manufacturers, printers, distributors, booksellers, advertising agents etc. Authors are still frequently identified as sole omniscient motivators of the physical traces of their own and others' bodies. They are announced as "... creative minds whom we assume to have made the work as a whole... all it's utterances are heard as emanating from a single... subject" as Abbate writes (Abbate 1996:11).

When we communicate directly through expressive embodiment, the times in which the author and narrator exist *are* the same, because we are directly using the resources of our own bodies in their unique time, to tell a story. But this cannot be the case with the traces of bodies no longer present. The causal relationship between 'content time' and the time in which the narrator communicates creates a subjective narrator, even when there is nobody directly present.

In the case of communication through trace, the subjective author appears as the absent body of the narrator. It is impossible to know anything about the author's subjectivity and temporal location other than it exists. As Gérard Genette writes: "... behind the explicit image of that narrator I construct, as well as I can the image... of the author." (Genette 1988:141).

Attempting to identify the author according to biographical principles is also impossible. To do so would be assume that "... the identity of a text's producer is to be found almost unmediated within the text itself and that the text's production therefore takes place within a transmission model," which, in the same way as the 'miming model', previously mentioned, is causally incorrect (Cobley 2001:118). The relative position of the author is only perceived by readers through the subjectivity of the narrator.

The constituent parts of the model of narrative that I have described can be thought of as a series of inclusive, overlapping or exclusive effects. Illustration 06 (Page 114) visually represents the relationship of these areas in the form of a Venn diagram (Venn 1880), showing the relationship between each subjective position in the model.

In this diagram, plot is wholly subsumed by story. The time of the former cannot take place outside the time of the latter, although they represent distinct subjective positions. The time of the narrator is constituted by the medium of expression, which is the physical means by which representation is achieved. The time in which the narrator exists encompasses both plot and story. However, the story also lies outside the time of the narrator because it remains untold. Both the subjective time of the author and the subjective time of the reader overlap with narrator time. They are only related by the medium of expression.

This model provides a structure for temporal relationships that also represent different subjects. These subjects can be both fictional, appearing as part of the content of what is represented, and actual: the people in communication with each other..

Other models of narrative

This narrative model outlining relative subjective positions is described in part by Èmile Benveniste. He placed the story and plot in a distinct realm of time which he called histoire or what is told (in my translation) and the narrator, author and reader in another realm of time, which he called discours or telling to (in my translation).

In Benveniste's model, the realm of story exists in the past and the realm of telling to exists in the present. However, Benveniste's telling to makes no distinction between the temporal positions, physical expressions and communicative traces of absent bodies that I have described (Benveniste 1971).

Seymore Chatman developed his structure further, with the addition of what Chatman describes as 'background information' to the structure of telling to, in the present. Chatman describes this background information as everything that the reader brings to the situation in which they read, apart from the communicative trace itself (Chatman 1978).

These narrative analysts argue that causal distinctions between types of embodied time are the structuring principle of narrative. They also define narrative as representing the context in which communication takes place as an indivisible aspect of the meaning of what is communicated. Unlike Prince, they do not make explicit the network of causal events that lead from these positions to the creation of different subjects.

The analysis of narrative, or narratology, historically falls into two distinct areas of study that might be broadly called the 'study of telling' and the 'study of what is told'. Although these areas impact upon one another, they reflect two distinct approaches to defining narrative itself. Because the word 'narrative' means both the activity of telling and the content of what is told it is important to bear this distinction in mind.

Narratology as the study of what is told has the longer history. It focuses on the relationship between text and **histoire**: on the form and content of the enunciation. According to this tradition, Genette also maintains

that narrative is defined by verbal language alone, as a subset of linguistics, although this is by no means a majority view (Genette 1982, Prince 1989:66).

Alternatively, narratology as the study of telling to, considers enunciator, enunciatee, context and medium as topics affecting both the form and content of what is expressed, unconstrained by medium. The study of telling to opens itself to the analysis of the relationships between story, form and enunciative context, defining narratology broadly as the study of these relationships and defining narrative as these relationships themselves (Todorov 1977, 1981).

Narratology, defined as the study of what is told, seeks to establish and develop the structural principles of *histoire*. For example, Gustav Freytag identifies the structure necessary for the creation of types of emotional intensity, such as suspense, in dramatic narrative through an analysis of fictional tragedy, which he outlines as a pyramid (Freytag 1984).

Highly complex descriptions of *histoire* have developed according to this approach. Viktor Shklovski has identified categorical distinctions between types of time in the emergence of *histoire*, describing a chronological sequence of events (which he calls the 'fabula') that provide the source material for the plot, but which remain unknown except in the organisation of the *histoire* through which they appear (which organisation he calls' sjuzet') Fabula and sjuzet are not analogous to 'what is told' and 'telling'. Nor is any relationship outside *histoire* implied. The fabula is a structural function of the story only (Shklovski 1965).

Developing the idea of an untold sequence of events that encompasses and precedes the *histoire*, Hayden White's identification of

'anticipation' as a structural function of history narratives alludes to a relationship between telling and what is told, without breaking its theoretical bounds. In the case of the telling of history, it is simply the case that the fabula is constituted of experiences that actually occurred, according to White (White 1987:122).

Mikhail Bakhtin ascribes the structural potential for multiple voices to the *histoire*. These voices, he argues, particularly in the narrative genre of the novel, are the products of many possible sequences of events, which are only partially represented through the sjuzet. Bakhtin describes how the entire narrative voice, as well as the sequence and time of the *histoire*, is structured by the relationships between these fictional voices (Bakhtin 1981).

Gerard Genette also ascribes multiple relative voices to the *histoire* in the concept of focalisation. These voices establish points of view relative to each other. For example, an omniscient narrator is described as representing 'zero' focalisation, remaining unconstrained by the verisimilitude of the narrative itself. 'Internal' and 'external' focalisations represent types of constraints derived from the position of voices relative to others within the *histoire* (Genette 1982).

A narratological focus on what is told has also been adapted to analysis of visual and polysemic media. Writing about comic strips, Groensteen describes types of voice in the text/image *histoire* of comics as types of knowledge rather than relative points of view. Comics' polysemicism constitutes a unique type of *histoire*, he argues, structured around three voices and three types of knowledge in the form of narrator, monstrator and recitant. Because he identifies narrative voice with the physical characteristics

of the medium itself, writing and drawing, Groensteen's description of the structure of what is told in comics edges towards the broader field of the analysis of telling (Groensteen 2010).

The identification of explicit and implicit time, points of view and multiple voices in descriptions of the structure of *histoire* have allowed theorists who focus on what is told to also describe ways in which enunciatees impact upon it.

In particular, Roland Barthes and Tzvetan Todorov describe types of structure in *histoire* that exist in relation to types pf reception, and the *histoire* is only comprehensible in their terms. In novels, for example, Barthes' identifies 'codes', or a system of social norms, in terms of which the *histoire* appears. These include linear sequence, character traits, disclosure and equivocation, delay and binary oppositions. These codes derive from *discours*, but they aim to describe the structure of *histoire* and do not in themselves represent an analysis of *discours* or a description of the wider relationships implicit in telling relative to what is told (Barthes 1974).

Similarly, Todorov's description of verisimilitude outlines a relationship between enunciator and enunciatee as the way in which genres are structured, but this relationship is an instrument for textual comprehension rather than a description of *discours*. Narrative verisimilitude is an effect of *discours*, but only as a principle of coherence in the *histoire* rather than a relationship between the real and related worlds (Todorov 1977:87).

An older tradition in the study of what is told belongs to social anthropology. Vladimir Propp describes an invariable number of motifs that structure every *histoire*. These motifs can have different relative functions in

specific uses, but they retain their identities. The combination of these motifs, Propp argues, constitutes a 'deep' or invariable structure of *histoire*, consistent across cultures and historical periods (Propp 1968).

Similarly, Claude Levi-Strauss, Claude Bremond and A. J. Greimas describe structural homologies among *histoires* from different cultures and historical times. Levi-Strauss describes a small and unchanging number of relationships between structural components such as 'phenomes': the smallest meaningful elements of verbal language; 'mythemes': repeated situations, events, actions and relationships; and cognitive 'principles' represented by verbal language, such as antonyms. He argues that this structure of *histoire* provides a general definition the human condition, in a sense defining *discours* absolutely in *histoire* (Greimas 1970, Levi-Strauss 1977:230, Bremond 1982).

The identification of 'deep' structures in what is told establishes a relationship between *histoire* and *discours* described by Ferdinand de Saussure. For de Saussure, the deep structure of *histoire* derives from verbal language, and governs every unique narrative expression in *discours*. Sussure's description is analogous with the 'deep' and 'surface' structures described by Greimas and Levi-Strauss, turning the relationship between the two into a matter of performance and giving it a historical aspect. De Saussure's 'deep' verbal language structure, which he calls 'langue', has the characteristic of being changed over time by the accumulation of habits and innovations made at the level of 'surface' structures, which he calls 'parole'. Over time, present *discours* meaningfully changes the 'deep' structure of *histoire*.

The study of telling to constitutes narratology that analyses *discours*, *histoire* and the relationships between the two. A shared feature in descriptions of narrative that follow this approach is the concept of dialogue. It is the relationships between either participants or between structural aspects of the whole situation of story-telling that define narrative in this view.

Indicative is Paul Ricoeur's description of narrative as a hermeneutic process of understanding action, through the interpretative functions of anticipation and memory. For Ricoeur, narrative represents time as the mediation between 'objective time', which is the theoretical time of the universe, according to Ricoeur, and 'subjective time', which is constituted by subjective experience.

For Ricoeur, narrative mediates past experience, through memory, and anticipation of future events, by providing a structure for referring to both. There is no also distinction between experience and representation in the structure of narrative. Enunciators and enunciatees agree to treat representation for experience. Rocoeur defines narrative as a transformation of intention (or orientation towards the future) to action, creating the axis around which memory of past events and anticipation of this transformation take place (Ricoeur 1984-6, 1981:170).

Therefore, narrative is not reducible to component parts (such as *histoire* and *discours*, or discrete elements that structure either), but is the process by which one mutually transforms the other. Neither what is told about, nor telling to, can be categorised as fact or fiction in this sense. What is told about is not a fictional realm, but is a method of interpreting action in both real and fictive worlds.

Because Ricoeur describes narrative as a process of transformation, for him it is a function of self-consciousness that allows human beings to experience representations of time (one's own and others' past and anticipated actions), as socially and historically coherent (Ricoeur 1981:181).

Similarly, a conception of narrative as an irreducibly reciprocal relationship between what is told and telling to, informs descriptions by Roman Jakobson, Wolfgang Iser, Schlomith Rimmon-Kenan, Stanley Fish and Valentin Vološinov.

Jakobson describes the structure of telling to and what is told with six components, non of which are reducible to either *discours* or *histoire*, and in which the relationships between the components constitutes the meaningful function. For example, what he calls the 'referent', (or what the narrative is about), cannot appear without the mediating effect of the 'code', by which he means the socially agreed form of expression, unsaid in the plot but explicit in the 'message' (which I call plot and story) and the 'contact' or the physical form of expression. At the same time, these aspects have an effect on both enunciator and enunciatee (which he calls an 'emotive function' and a 'conative function'). All of these aspects are required to function simultaneously for narrative to exist, encompassing real and fictive worlds (Jakobson 1960).

Iser structures narrative around the type of relationships that are socially possible between enunciator and enunciatee. He describes the roles of unseen and unvoiced subjects, which he calls the 'implied reader' and the 'implied author', the existence of which represent the mutual expectation of intentionality or the impact of *discours* on *histoire*. The enunciator expects the

enunciatee to understand what is told and the enunciatee expects to find meaning. Following one of Schütz's descriptions of communication, Iser argues that what is told is constituted in the form of an agreed mutual misunderstanding (Iser 1989:31). This relationship between enunciator, implied author, enunciatee and implied reader is developed by Rimmon-Kenan as a structure of narrative. There is no functional boundary between histoire and discours. They are mutually affecting (Rimmon-Kenan 1983), Fish and Vološinov also reflect this idea. Fish argues that the reception activities of the enunciatee transform what is told into affordances in the real world (Fish 1980, Cobley 2001). Vološinov describes the reciprocal relationship between telling to and what is told as a mutual mediation of the experience of enunciator and enunciatee expressed in physical form. What is told mediates telling to, and telling to mediates what is told. For Vološinov, distinguishing between fact and fiction is not a structural aspect of narrative in this sense, because narrative is defined as *discours* encompassing *histoire* (Vološinov 1929/1973).

The analysis of narrative as what is told (including telling to), both distinguishes narratology from linguistics and suggests sociological interpretations that bring alterity to bear on the semic analysis of structure. In the context of this study, this way of approaching narrative suggests an intersubjective description of the relationships required to make a story. Narrative actions defined as telling, including what it told, are types of actions that conform to Crossley's conditions of intersubjectivity, for example. Approaching stories in this way, non-verbal and polysemic media, real and fictional actions and representations, social milieux and the physical forms of

expression can be considered relative to each other, bringing descriptions of embodiment, cross-modality and relative subjectivity together.

Naming the narrative model

The narrative model conforms to a definition of the word diegesis used by Plato in Book III of 'Republic' (Artistotle 1974). 'Diegesis' is frequently used as a neologism for the world of the story and plot (that is, only what is told about and its causal environment). For example, Pascal Lefèvre describes diegesis as "... the fictive space in which the characters live and act... versus the extradiegetic space, visualised versus non-visualised space,.." (Heer and Worcester 2009:157), and this is a typical contemporary distinction.

However, Plato defines diegesis as a mode of communication that includes both narrator and story, so that the act of telling itself is a prerequiste of the definition, alongside what is told. Nothing can be told that is not told by someone. The presence of the narrator is a prerequisite of telling and vice versa. As Martin Barker writes, it is as though the story occupies, for both author and reader, "... a place in a parallel world with our own, always near at hand, yet requiring special means to gain access. Reaching it, *you don't leave behind what you were*." (my italics, Barker 1989: 81).

Because it includes the act of telling as well as what is told about, diegesis is a description of a structured relationship between different subjects, not a description of fictional content. It describes the structure of narrative as the whole situation in which expression occurs, bringing what is

told into a relationship with the physical means of expression and the subjectivity of the people in communication.

Another mode of expression described in 'Republic' is mimesis. Mimesis is typically described as a mode where communication occurs through simulation rather than narrative. Lacking a structure of different subjective positions, simulation takes place entirely in the present. It obscures its origin as a trace of the expressive actions of other bodies in other times (Abbate 1996: 54). Mimesis is the mode of the icon, the commodity and the object as an asocial category of time (Baudrillard 1996).

Genette's discussion of the use of both the terms diegesis and mimesis describes the range of different inflections that the words have taken on and the contradictions that they represent. He writes that for Plato, "*Diégésis* is pure narrative (without dialogue), in contrast to the *mimésis* of dramatic representation and to everything that creeps into narrative along with dialogue... the French and Greek words unfortunately neutralise each other in the single English term *diegesis*." so that "(t)he pair *diégésis/mimesis* is therefore unbalanced, unless we decide as Plato did, to read *mimesis* as an equivalent to dialogue, with the sense not of imitation, but of transcription, or... quotation. This is obviously not what the Greek word (*mimesis*) connotes for us,... In narrative, there are only *rhesis* and *diegesis* – or,.. the characters' discourse and the narrator's discourse." He concludes: "... the only acceptable equivalence for *diégésis/mimesis* is *narrative/dialogue*.., which absolutely cannot be translated as *telling/showing*, for 'showing' can hardly be applied to legitimately to a quotation..." (Genette 1988:18,43,45).

Genette summarises both the departure of the contemporary uses of the words from their Greek origin and the range of different uses. The contemporary confusion over the word requires new definitions based in the logic of narrative itself. The narrative model I have outlined is one such definition.

Therefore, I will call the model of the subjective relationships required in narrative 'diegesis'. This encompasses the whole situation of narrative, including narrators, authors and readers. It is a subjective situation made explicit in the physical forms of expression and their traces. It is characterised in each case by the types of intersubjective relationships it represents.

It is not an abstraction in so far as it structures specific types of causal relationships between people. Whenever we express ourselves, creating shared meaning through the processes of proprioception, "... we share in social situations, which have a material and ideological history." (Barker 1989:269,271).

That history is acknowledged and embodied in the rules that structure successful communication, so that "... in speaking to you, I am not only trying to get you to orient to the meaning of my words. I am also trying to get your agreement to establish a certain social relation between us – and thus, by implication, reorganising your relationship with others." (Barker 1989:269,271). Meaningful distinctions that each of make about the physical forms of our own and others' expression, as we communicate intersubjectively, are made directly in relation to the people whose trace they represent.

Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have correlated a narrative model with some of the physical conditions of intersubjectivity. I have described the relationships between subjects as limitations of cause and effect. This has required these subjects to occupy temporal positions, to conform to constraints on action and to the physical limitations of expression. It has also allowed subjects to be either flesh and blood people or fictional characters, either participants in communication, the physical forms of expression or its content.

Finally, these subjective positions are the originators of unique physical traces and specific partners in intersubjective relationships. I have brought time, place, expressive form and people into a relationship which is described as a narrative model. To do this, I have self-consciously conflated the physical expression of emotion with all forms of expression, technological trace with catechretic embodiment and visual representation with plot.



Illustration 01 *Grennan, S. (2009)*

Illustration 02 *Grennan, S. (2009)*

Illustration 03 *Eisner, W. (1985:110)*



Illustration 04 *Grennan, S. (2009)*



Illustration 05 *Grennan, S. (2006:16)*



Illustration 06 *Grennan, S.* Diegesis Diagram *(2009)*

Chapter 02:

The 'mediagenius' of comic strips, Intersubjectivity and a first practical demonstration with narrative drawing

The model of narrative that I propose results from an extrapolation of causal relationships between people, linking *histoire* to *discours*. It is embodied in a number of different subjective positions, solely in the physical forms of expression. These forms always encompass the situation in which that expression is made.

As a condition of this model, communication is based exclusively in the specific physical and temporal conditions derived from all intersubjective relationships and which constitute their ontological field. Bakhtin argues that each expressive act, is "...a single but complex event that we might call the work in the totality of all its events, including the external material givenness of the work, and its texts, and the world represented in the text, and the author-creator and the listener or reader." (Bakhtin 1981:255).

This 'material givenness', Bakhtin continues, is "...the world that *creates* the text, for all its aspects – the reality reflected in the text, the authors creating the text, the performers of the text...and finally the listeners or readers who... review the text – participate equally in the creation of the represented world..." (Bakhtin 1981:253).

Another necessity of the physical basis for expression is motion. Diegesis is never motionless, because motionlessness is a theoretical condition that is physically antithetical to embodiment. The relative positions that constitute the narrative model are also revealed in the motive character of the events and

things being expressed (the plot), and their untold but necessary histories and future possibilities (the story).

As much as the content of expression is motivated by sequence it is also motivated by the act of expressing in itself. The forms of expression are mobile, as well as the contents of expression. Bakhtin writes "Those things that are static in space cannot be statically described, but must rather be incorporated into the temporal sequence of represented events and into the story's own representational field." (Bakhtin 1981:251).

Depictive drawing

Consider these two conditions of the narrative model in relation to depictive drawing. The word 'depictive' is defined by Maynard. "..,not only are we to imagine, *on* seeing the depiction, that we are seeing its subject matter, we are also to imagine *of* the former seeing that it is the latter act of seeing." (Maynard 2005:117).

The continual motion represented in expression is particularly explicit in drawing, because the trace of the body's movement in the form of expression itself depicts motion, when we made a mark on a page. The perceived correlation between actual body motion and depicted motion is much less with other depictive technologies, such as film, although it is never absent.

Philosopher Philip Rawson writes: "A stroke, even a dot, takes time to make and so shows the spectator its beginning and end. Herein lies the vital unique quality of drawing.., its expression of time, movement and change." (Rawson 1987:24), so that "...movement is the fundamental nature of drawing.

Therefore, in comprehending depictive drawings ",.. one has to be continuously aware of the sequences (of action) which went into their composition." (Maynard 2005:190). Drawing evidences its sequence of production and particular motivation in a way that is materially different to say, a printed literary text, film or song. It is particularly capable of employing this physical correlation in order to depict a situation that is also moving. As philosopher Michael Podro writes: "... (in drawing)...line relates itself to figure twice over, once by its shape and once by its apparent impulse... We recognise a figure in the lines of a drawing, and when it is a figure in movement we may... imagine the impulse of the line." (Podro 1998:9).

As people are always in motion, then people depicted by drawing are motivated both through the recognition of the sequence of the production of their drawn images and through the recognition that they are people being depicted.

A number of theorists, including Patrick Maynard, Ernst Gombrich (Gombrich 1960) and Kendall Walton (Walton 1990) have defined depictive drawing as this physical congruence of the trace of a body and the consciousness that an embodied world is what is being depicted.

Depiction, writes Maynard, "...is not... a matter of one thing resembling another; it is a matter of our own activities of seeing the one being like our activities of seeing the other." (Maynard 2005:15), so that "..,we are dealing with *two*... situations: the situation set out by the drawing and a wider situation that includes it but also includes our activities of perceiving. " (Maynard 2005:90).

Kendon Walton also describes these two positions, seeing and being conscious that we see, as conditions of depiction: "... seeing and imagining (seeing) are inseparably bound together... They must be thus integrated if the

picture is to qualify as a depiction rather than as something like a map or a chart." (Walton 1990:224).

There might seem to be a contradiction here between the claim that all depictive drawing represents movement on one hand and the distinction between diegesis and mimesis on the other. Not all depictive drawing is narrative drawing. On the contrary, some drawings would appear to be mimetic. Either the distinction between mimetic and diegetic forms of expression contradicts the representation of motion as a condition of depiction, or the distinction between diegesis and mimesis is itself an error.

However, this is not the case. It is possible to argue without contradicting either definition that *all* drawings have stories, but *only* narrative drawings have plots, or the course of action told about. Depictive drawings that show a single scene or fragment of a scene alone fall into this category of plot-less depiction. They still physically express movement. The trace of their production embodies the movement that made them and we perceive that this trace motivates the moment depicted.

With drawings that depict single scenes, we still recognise ourselves in an act of looking and recognise someone in the act of drawing. But drawings of this sort are not narrative, because they have no plot. Being plot-less, they appear to have no teller. However, if the narrative model is applied to mimetic drawings and the subjective relationships outside plot and story are included as aspects of the form of expression, then mimesis can be described as a type of plot-less telling.

Certainly, mimesis is also characterised by an insistence that expressive content carries its own meaning regardless of context, unuttered and

timeless. The absence of a plot represents a self-erasure of context. It communicates that everything except the depicted moment is meaningless, even as it emerges from the broader situation of expression in order to communicate this. By this logic, our existing definitions of depictive drawing, diegesis and mimesis survive.

Baetens' discussion of comic strips' 'mediagenius'

The self-consciousness that is a condition of depictive drawing bears upon a theory of narrative drawing in comics discussed by Jan Baetens in 'Revealing Traces: A New Theory of Graphic Enunciation' (Varnum and Gibbons 2001: 145-155).

This theory is unusual as a narratological description because it approaches the particular characteristics of the comic strip medium as **discours** relative to **histoire** (to recall Benveniste's distinction between 'telling to' and 'what is told'). The narratology of comics frequently displays an analytical bias towards **histoire** alone, following the older tradition in narratology. Consequently, this approach is often troubled by the polysemic condition of comic strips. The study of histoire then focusses on describing the structural relationships between image and text rather than considering **discours** as a wider field of action and experience relative to what is told (Legrady 2000, Magnussen 2000, Kannenberg 2001, Groensteen 2007, 2010, Lefèvre 2009).

Alternatively, accepting as indivisible the **discours** constituting the medium of comic strips (as text with image, produced and read), this theory ties what is told to telling to, by categorising the medium as a unique type of physical trace.

Baetens' discussion is an extrapolation of the narratological work of Phillipe Marion, describing the types of physical trace specific to the medium of comic strips as expressions of a series of embodied subjective relationships, dependent upon self-consciousness (Varnum and Gibbons 2001:145, Groensteen 2010:04). It describes a dialogic approach to the analysis of narrative in comic strips, similar to the approach taken by Martin Barker, but otherwise undeveloped in comics scholarship in English.

It is also possible to compare the theory to conditions of intersubjectivity described by Crossley and others. These comparisons both support a narrative description of intersubjectivity and introduce the possibility of making practical demonstrations in response to specific questions raised by the comparisons, by drawing new comic strips,

For the purpose of discussion, Baetens accepts all of the specifically visual elements of comics as indivisible. These visual elements constitute the comic strip rather than the whole situation in which a comic is produced and read. They are described as a "... 'trace', that is, a reflection, a symptom, an index, of the subjectivity of a narrator,.." who can only be known as a subject relative to a reader, through the physical trace itself (Varnum and Gibbons 2001:146).

This group of comics-specific elements is underwritten by elements which are shared with other media, but which contribute to the specific trace of comic strips. These represent the possible ways in which **histoire** is structured. They are the semic structures shared with **histoire** in other narrative media, although the comic strip medium is not reducible to them.

The neologism 'mediagenius' is used to describe this combination of media specific and shared elements. 'Mediagenius' describes the way in which

any type of narrative is made specific though the interaction of trace and reader by means of what Baetens calls 'style', 'storytelling' and 'medium'. Therefore, comic strips have a specific 'mediagenius', which is quite distinct from the 'mediagenius' (the 'style', 'storytelling' and 'medium') of other narrative media, such as film or literature.

Comic strips are drawn narratives. As such, there is a unique form of expression at the heart of the 'mediagenius' of comics, involving a technical mix of language, drawing and writing. Physical trace is the emanation of a particular type of narrating subject that is not only a teller, but is also a draughtsperson and a calligrapher.

Consistent with the function of 'mediagenius', a second neologism describes comics' polysemic form. 'Graphiation' constitutes comics' unique physical form of expression, including text and image, and its enunciator is therefore a 'graphiateur.' The 'graphiateur' isn't directly observable in the physical form of expression, but is rather a causal pre-requisite of the 'mediagenius' of comic strips: the idea that a producer is necessary for the trace.

According to this description, the style of facture of a comic strip represents individual intentionality. Although the 'graphiateur' is not directly observable in the physical trace of drawing and writing, the 'graphiateur's' intention is perceived more clearly by a reader in types of drawing that are immediate, spontaneous and unmediated by revision.

Thus, 'graphiation' represents a relationships between *discours* and *histoire* that is unique to comic strips: the performance of an active subject (in the realm of *discourse*) represented in drawn trace (in the *histoire*), with more rather

than less spontaneity in the performance of drawing being equal to less mediation between reader and the subject 'graphiateur.'

Readers are also instrumental in the relationship that constitutes 'graphiation', although their role is relative to 'mediagenius' rather then constitutive. Reflecting the action of the motivating 'graphiateur', the reader's perception of the subject in the trace mirrors the subjects' performance in tracing. Readers are only engaged in *discours* according to the intentionality of the 'graphiateur', whose performance is traced in the physical form of the comic strip. Readers are not described as intentioned themselves.

Rather, the reader is defined in an innate identification with the productive moves of the 'graphiateur', achieved by recalling memories of childhood experiences shared by social convention with the author and embedded in the psyche (Varnum and Gibbons 2001:150).

Although this description of the structure of narrative in comic strips centres on the relationship between *histoire* and *discours*, there is a danger of confusing the subjective 'graphiateur' and the author of the work, Baetens argues. This confusion would conflate authorial biography with both intentionality and with the physical form of expression, whereas the 'graphiatuer' is a theoretical subject whose appearance represents the relationship between performance and trace.

There is also the possibility of wrongly considering the 'graphiateur' a 'complete author' or a single motivating subject responsible for the whole trace. As a conception of drawing style, this would erroneously identify graphic expression with a specific author, whereas Baetens considers 'graphiation' to be a "...socialised act involving many codes and constraints." (Varnum and Gibbons 2001:152).

Baetens identifies no contradiction between the introduction of a psychic, rather than embodied, theorisation of the relationship between 'graphiateur' and reader in the structure of comics' 'mediagenius'. But he highlights a problem with the concept of identification, which requires the reader to subsume their subjectivity in that of the 'graphiateur' with the necessary erasure of self and loss of control that that entails.

In this, Baetens is in accord with Martin Barker. Barker has been particularly critical of the idea of identification, for exactly the same reasons as Baetens. Barker describes the "...implication that 'identification' has – vulnerability to messages, loss of our own identity, submergence in the identity of the media character, with a residue of influence,.." (Barker 1989:96).

For Baetens, 'identification' erroneously implies a passive reader, for whom reading is a psychic recall of forgotten shared experiences under the direction of a dominant or even dominating subject (the 'graphiateur'), whereas, he argues, "...we don't read to remember or express ourselves, but to transform ourselves." (Varnum and Gibbons 2001:155).

These two issues reveal the objectification of both the reader and the 'graphiateur' in the context of 'mediagenius'. First, the possibility of confusion between the 'graphiateur' and author biography leads towards a conception of complete intentionality. Second, a psychic description of the process of communication as 'identification' places the reader beyond the relationship between **discours** and **histoire** that constitutes 'mediagenius', effectively objectifying it.

Hans-Christian Christiansen and Anne Magnussen also objectify narrators and readers in their commentary on the concept of 'mediagenius',

misunderstanding the physical form of expression as a direct index of an author. They write "A proximity to the absent artist is triggered through the graphic trace." (Christiansen and Magnussen 2000:16).

The idea is a re-statement of a dualism between physical form and expression. But Barker refutes this when he writes "...a narrative is never made of anything other than functions: in varying degrees, everything in it signifies... everything has a meaning or nothing has." (Barker 1989:124). Comics theorist Neil Cohn also misconstrues trace for complete intentionality in his essay on time in comic strips. He argues for the communicative comprehensiveness of the image, so that depiction occurs in its 'conceptualising' (that is, in viewing depictions entire, as viewed depictions). (Cohn 2010).

Rather, the concept of 'mediagenius' itself ought to suggest what Baetens call the 'socialised' act of reading. This 'socialised' act requires a reader whose subjectivity is relative to the expressive traces of other people on one hand and the situation in which reading takes place on the other. In other words: in an intersubjective relationship.

Similarly, the conflating of relative degrees of spontaneity or mediation in facture with degrees of 'expressiveness' is a result of an objectification of the 'graphiateur'. Groensteen makes a similar objectification of authors and readers when he writes: "With a drawn image,... it is the particular style of the illustrator that determines the image's degree of precision." (Groensteen 2007:123). By 'degree of precision' Groensteen means the level of information provided in a drawing, equivalent to the thing being depicted.

But depiction does not function in this way. The information provided in any depictive drawing is always complete and precise in every case. It is our

cognisance of our own act of seeing that determines depiction, not the relative visibility or invisibility of any depicted pinhead or finely cross-hatched shadow. (Walton 1990).

Crossley's conditions of intersubjectivity also contradict the idea of relative 'expressiveness'. Communication is achieved in the subjective relationships experienced in the physical forms of expression. It is not derived from other, immaterial realms of intention. As Vološinov writes: "Every ideological product bears the imprint of the individuality of its creator or creators, but even this imprint is just as social as are all other properties and attributes of ideological phenomena." (Vološinov 1929/1973:34).

Christiansen and Magnussen's mis-reading cannot be traced back entirely the objectification of biographical authors in 'mediagenius' and readers who 'identify'. Both the concepts of 'mediagenius' and 'graphiation' are attempts to describe comics' specific communicative situation: how subjective relationships are created in the physical forms of expression. These attempts point to a dialogic conception of subjects who participate in communicative situations.

The theory Baetens extrapolates in 'Revealing Traces' is a partial description of a network of relationships that embody relative subjectivity in the physical forms of expression. As such, it approaches an intersubjective description of communication. However, It fails to fully describe the causal relationships between embodied subjects and the physical forms of expression. Instead, it proposes a psychic relationship between objectified agents such as a biographical author and reader, who are 'activated' by the particular 'stimulus' which constitutes comics' 'mediagenius'.

Comic strips' 'mediagenius' and intersubjectivity

Keeping two conditions in mind, inconsistencies in the narratological description of comic strips represented by the concepts of 'mediagenius', 'graphiateur' and 'identification' can be explored in more detail. These derive from Crossley's conditions of 'radical' intersubjectivity. First, that communication only occurs by means of physical transformations produced and perceived by people in relation to each other. Second, as such, that narrative is based in movement, underwritten by embodiment.

Baetens discusses 'mediagenius' as a complete description of the physical forms of expression unique to comics. This definition includes two things that do not characteristically contribute to definitions of objects: the subjectivity of a narrator (the 'graphiateur') and the non-media-specific conditions of story-telling (which Baetens calls 'external' conditions [Varnum and Gibbons 2001:146]). 'Mediagenius' describes an indivisible relationship between the physical form of expression and subjectivity. The creation of a new word fulfils this function.

However, if we apply conditions of intersubjectivity to 'mediagenius', the relationship between *discours* and *histoire* it describes lacks a causally integral constituent: the reader. 'Mediagenius' dictates that the physical history of an expressive form makes the form meaningful as the trace of a particular subject. If this is the case, here is no logic in placing the reader beyond this relationship, as a retrospective 'activator' of meaning.

Having moved towards an intersubjective description of communication, 'mediagenius' falls short by making a distinction between forms of expression which are perceived as intentioned (through 'graphiation') and a reader who is only intentioned through 'identification'. Because 'mediagenius' does not

include an intentioned reader, except through the process of 'identification', psychoanalytic theory is utilised in order to describe the relationship between 'mediagenius' and reading.

This is a self-contradictory model that causally connects the historic time of production with the physical form of expression on one hand and then describes psychic relationships between these forms and the reader on the other hand.

In terms of the motive aspect of narrative, this contradiction has several corollaries. The theory cannot describe the function of different times generated by narrative, which play a necessary part in establishing relative subjectivity. It describes the time of the reader as both all encompassing ('activating' the material) and directed by the time of the author (identified-with). Rather, the time of the reader is continually revised as a series of new temporal relationships in the act of reading.

Evidence of this is found in the description of drawing, which is defined as an objectified record of past actions fixing the subjectivity of the 'graphiateur', rather than as a motive force amongst relative motive forces embodied in the times of production, the narrative and the situation in which reading takes place.

The idea that spontaneous drawing is more expressive than revised drawing further evidences this objectification of time and motion. It reinforces the idea of an unmediated psychic connection, or 'transmission', between reader and 'graphiateur' that also results from the contradictory shift from 'mediagenius' to psychoanalytic function. This objectification re-establishes the bifurcation in the situation of reading that 'mediagenius' was meant to repudiate.

However, considered without the psychic description of the reading relationship, 'mediagenius' makes its central conceit the generation of subjectivity through the production history unique to the form of comic strips.

Setting aside the utilisation of specifically psychic functions, as types of relationship beyond 'mediagenius', the concept alone can be considered as a description of relative subjectivity to be compared with other descriptions.

The descriptions of intersubjectivity utilised in this study are based in conceptions of self-consciousness and perception. Psychoanalytical conceptions of subjectivity, on the other hand, describe our relationships with others and with our wider experience as motivated in part by cognitive process not fully revealed to us. Although these approaches might appear to be contradictory, one approach does not cancel out the other. Rather, the identification of subconscious functions of subjectivity is a way of describing other levels of experience underwritten by self-consciousness and perception.

Following this, justification for setting aside these functions in order to compare 'mediagenius' to other descriptions of intersubjectivity, extrapolated from conceptions of self-consciousness and perception themselves, is provided by Vološinov. He writes "What is the reality that pertains to the subjective psyche? The reality of the inner psyche is the same reality as that of the sign. Outside the material of signs, there is no psyche: there are psychological processes, processes in the nervous system, but no subjective psyche as a special existential quality." and "...psychology in fact is not located anywhere within,..but entirely and completely without – in the word, the gesture, the act. There is nothing left unexpressed in it, nothing "inner" about it – it is wholly on the outside, wholly

brought out in exchanges, wholly taken up in material, above all in the material of the world." (Vološinov 1929/1973:26,19).

Focussing exclusively on 'mediagenius', we can consider the relationships between physical traces and subjects that it describes in light of a number of other descriptions of intersubjectivity.

Again, recalling Crossley's conditions of intersubjectivity, we can see that the 'mediagenius' corresponds to them in particular ways. Describing these particularities illuminates 'mediagenius' as a partial model of relative subjectivity and substantiates its central conceit.

Crossley's conditions of intersubjectivity state a) "...that human subjectivity is not... a private inner world; which is divorced from the outer (material) world; that it consists in the worldly praxes of sensuous, embodied beings and that it is therefore public...", b) "...that subjectivity consists in a pre-reflexive... engagement with alterity, rather than in an... objectification of it...", c) "...that human action,.. necessarily assumes a socially instituted form and that this form is essential to its meaningfulness,.." and that d) "...human action... arises out of dialogical situations... that are irreducible to individual human subjects." (Crossley 1996:26).

In these terms, 'mediagenius' does not fully describe the relative subjective relationships that constitute communication. The objectification of trace, which also places the reader outside 'mediagenius', reveals an objectification of alterity rather than an engagement with it. Similarly, the possible conflation of biography and physical trace conjures an objectified author out of a situation of relative subjects. However, 'mediagenius' does describe the physical form of expression as a relationship between enunciator and enunciatee, coinciding with

Crossley's 'worldly praxes'. Also, the media-specificity of the 'external' elements (Varnum and Gibbons 2001:146) of comic strips is synonymous with the 'socially instituted form... essential to meaningfulness' that Crossley lists.

In Crossley's terms, 'mediagenius' is an incomplete description of the relationship between one person and another that constitutes relative subjectivity. Even setting aside the location of the reader in a purely private realm, the subjects in 'mediagenius' are not fully subjects in Crossley's terms. Their relative status lies in an imposed series of subject/object dualisms which embodiment disallows.

Alongside Crossley's conditions of intersubjectivity, we can compare three further descriptions that reflect upon the types of subjectivity expressed in 'mediagenius'. These are Vološinov's analytical method for "...tracing the social life of the...sign." (Vološinov 1929/1973:21), Barker's principles for the "...application of the dialogical approach to cultural forms." (Barker 1989:275) and Biber and Conrad's method of "..register analysis." (Biber and Conrad 2009:47).

Vološinov's method has three prerequisites, which can be used to discuss 'mediagenius'. He writes: "1. Ideology may not be divorced from the material reality of the sign (i.e. by locating it in the "consciousness" or other vague and elusive region); 2. The sign may not be divorced from the concrete forms of social intercourse (seeing that the sign is part of organised social intercourse and cannot exist, as such , outside it, reverting to a mere physical artefact); 3. Communication and the forms of communication may not be divorced from the material basis." (Vološinov 1929/1973:21).

In this context we must be careful to define Vološinov's word 'sign' as 'expression'. He doesn't explain his use of the word and his sense may be

tautological, particularly as he insists that meaning is solely generated in social interactions (Vološinov 1929/1973).

Vološinov's method frames the types of subjective relationships in 'mediagenius' in ways that are very similar to Crossley's, with broadly similar points of dissimilarity. They are congruent in terms of identifying the physical forms of expression alone as meaningful. 'Mediagenius' connects physical trace to the history of production in the creation of the 'graphiateur'. Crossley lists 'material praxes' and Vološinov insists that the 'material basis' is a prerequisite for any analysis of communication.

However, 'Mediagenius' is incongruent with Vološinov's analytical method in the following ways. Although physical trace is defined in 'mediagenius' as the entire work, this does not include the reader and hence is "...divorced from the concrete forms of social intercourse..." (Vološinov 1929/1973:86). According to Vološinov, the reader is a constituent part of the 'entire work. In this sense, Vološinov's communicative subjects are intersubjects, whereas those required by 'mediagenius' are not. Vološinov's subjects are formed only in relation to others, even as they are formed in the situation in which reading takes place as relative readers, so that the subject "... taken from within, so to speak, turns out to be wholly a product of social interrelations. Not only its outward expression but also its inner experience are social territory." (Vološinov 1929/1973:86).

Alongside Crossley's conditions of intersubjectivity and Vološinov's method, Barker's principles for the "...application of the dialogical approach to cultural forms..." provide an opportunity to consider the aspects of 'mediagenius' that generate the reader's subjectivity in particular.

Barker outlines his principles: "1. Form in a cultural object is understood as a proposal to a typical kind of imaginative projection. 2. Any such form sediments within itself some typified social experience... 3. All forms are produced out of determinate production histories... 4. In investigating form,.. we need to investigate... regularities of transformation; and the ways in which such regularities constrain what actual characters, settings problems etc can appear,... 5. To study readers,.. (we) have to discover both who are likely to be willing and able to orient themselves to the dialogue proposed, and what transformations they are thereby involved in. 6. Responses other than those of the 'natural' readers themselves represent socially-typified orientations." (Barker 1989:275)

Again, 'mediagenius' formulates the subjectivity of the 'graphiateur' along similar lines to Barker's principles, in relation to the physical forms of expression. Again 'mediagenius' differs from Barker as it differs from Vološinov and Crossley, in excluding the reader from any relationship with physical trace except as an object.

However, Barker is more forthcoming about the particular relationship between reading subjects, producers and the physical forms of expression than either Crossley or Vološinov. Barker's principles number five and six add detail to Crossley's "..socially instituted form..." and Vološinov's "...forms of social intercourse..." Barker writes that the reader orients him or herself towards the physical forms of expression through the function of one or other set of social conventions. These could be said to equate to, but are not included in the physical trace described in 'mediagenius'. They ought to contribute to the 'external' elements identified by Baetens

According to Barker, the 'proposition' that the physical forms of expression make to the reader, is one in which the reader finds meaning through subjective self-transformation. For Barker, readers might or might not be the 'natural' audience for a type of expression but they can be communicated with nonetheless, and hence transformed. They may or may not respond to a particular physical form of expression in a single typical way, but instead might reform their subjectivity through dissent, rejection or avoidance. All of these positions constitute 'reading' for Barker. Intentionality on the part of readers constitutes being willing and able to orient themselves to the dialogue proposed.

A similar description of reading as an intersubjective relationship is found in the work of linguists Biber and Conrad, as part of their methodology for studying language genres. Biber and Conrad distinguish between 'register' which "(c)haracterises the typical linguistic features of text varieties and connects those features functionally to the situation context...", genre and style in the use of language. (Biber and Conrad 2009:16). They provide a summary of a method for analysing register that contains a similar formulation of reading as an intersubjective activity, particularly in terms of social conventions.

As with Barker, Conrad and Biber identify the "...three major components of register analysis: (1) describing the situational characteristics of the register; (2) analysing the typical linguistic characteristics of the register and (3) identifying the functional forces that help to explain why those linguistic features tend to be associated with those situational characteristics." (Biber and Conrad 2009:47).

They argue that the situation in which reading takes place comprises 'functional forces' that make the physical forms of expression meaningful, rather

than the other way around. Their method of register analysis requires the identification of these' forces' in order to understand what is being expressed at all.

These 'forces' are always people relative to each other, although they do not necessarily exist in the same times and are not objectified. It is these people's subjectivity that is in play. Subjectivity constitutes the functional force in the situation in which reading takes place, creating meaning. The reader is transformed in the situation as much as the physical trace generates the 'graphiateur' in the case of 'mediagenius'. This transformation is brought about as the reader comes into a dynamic relationship with all of the other participants in communication.

According to Biber and Conrad, Barker, Vološinov and Crossley, the reader is a constituent part of the entire work or the physical situation in which communication occurs. Contrary to 'mediagenius', the physical form of expression is not an emanation of the situation in which expression was produced, distinct from reading. It is only an aspect of the reader's participation in the intersubjective situation in which the reading subject is also transformed.

Self-consciousness and subjectivity

Crossley maintains we experience the world intersubjectively, in the sense that we experience it as a world experienced by others. He writes "... we experience others as subjects who experience and know the world and who experience and know us as part of that world." (Crossley 1996:04).

Crossley considers "... how the different positions of our body, relative to the other,.. facilitates a sense of otherness, (in that) we perceive the other as 'there' in relation to our 'here';.. and thus recogise both that they have a distinct

point of view in the world and that the world can be seen from different points of view and under different perspectives." (Crossley 1996:06), so that, according to Schütz "... each agent recognises (and assumes that their other recognises) that their 'here' is the other's 'there' and vice versa." (Crossley 1996:85).

These relative subjective positions, the 'here' and 'there', are a metonym of Mead's 'Loop'. Mead writes: "In reflecting upon himself, the agent is both a reflecting subject (I) and an object of reflection (me)." (Mead 1967:174). In this reciprocal perception, 'here' is 'I' and 'there' is not only other people, but the perception that other people perceive. This is self and self-consciousness, or the 'me' that Mead describes.

As literary theorist Steven Connor writes: "...giving voice is the process which simultaneously produces articulate sound and produces self, as a self-producing being." so that "(w)hat a voice,.. always says is this: this, here, this voice, is not merely a... particular aggregation of tones and timbres; it is voice, or voicing itself. Listen, says a voice; some being is giving voice." (Connor 2000:03, 04).

This self-consciousness (perceived as the point of view of another person) is one of the conditions of intersubjectivity. Crossley writes "For Mead, self is a socially instituted and temporally mediated reflexive process. It involves the subject turning back upon themselves (through time) to view themselves... as another would view them." (Crossley 1996:55). Cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett argues "That is what it is for there to be an observer in the world, a something it is like something to be." (Dennett 1991:137).

Mead's inclusion of time in the process of self-consciousness concurs with embodiment. It points to the physical grounding of communication, making

self-consciousness an intersubjective faculty through the generation of two subjective positions relative to each other: the 'I' and 'me' and 'here' and 'there'. Nothing is communicated outside the physical forms of expression. Although it might seem self-contradictory, this must also include self-consciousness.

What is the physical form of expression in self-consciouness? The answer lies in the causal structure of the narrative model. 'Telling', 'told about' and 'being told' are relative subjective positions that occupy entirely different times, even in the creation of a single subject. Dennett writes: "...the space and time of the representing is one frame of reference; the space and time of what (is) represented is another." (Dennett 1991:137).

The physical form of expression in self-consciousness, therefore, is time. More specifically, it is different times, because time is only the name for different embodied experiences. There is no problem conflating expression and self-consciousness in the context of the self because self (I) and self-perception (me) are embodied conditions occupying different times. The consciousness of self, achieved by the self, can never be produced as an expression of the body known to other people: the other in the case of self-consciousness is the self.

As narratologist Roy Schafer writes: "...we are forever telling stories about ourselves. In telling these self-stories to others we may,.. be said to be performing narrative actions. In saying that we also tell them to ourselves, however, we are enclosing one story within another... On this view, the self is a telling," (Mitchell 1981:31). Crossley writes: "...the me is often housed in an autobiographical narrative. Our sense of ourselves is based in stories we tell about ourselves... to ourselves and to others." (Crossley 1996:59). Dennett agrees with Crossley. He writes: "We... are constantly engaged in presenting ourselves to

others... and ourselves – in language and gesture, external and internal." (Dennett 1991:147).

Dennett's theoretically neutral subject

The relationship between these temporally-distinct, embodied and physically distinct self-representations is described by Dennett in his book 'Consciousness Explained'. He attempts to create a 'neutral' model of what it is to be a subject in the subjects own terms. In the book, Dennett attempts to construct a model of consciousness. Intersubjectivity poses a number of methodological barriers to directly analysing other people's consciousness. The problem is that he cannot stand outside the reciprocal subjective relationships that generate his own subjectivity. To theorise a direct (that is, 'neutral') position from which to make his analysis, he describes self-consciousness as a theoretical fiction, drawing upon the structure of narrative in exactly the way this study has done.

This self-consciousness is a theoretical condition that he calls heterophenomenology. Because it is fiction, he can place it in its own ontological domain and approach it directly, whilst at the same time theorising it as a subject. In fact, Dennett has created a subject theoretically independent of intersubjectivity (Dennett 1991:80).

Dennett writes that this theoretical self-consciousness offers a "...method for investigating and describing phenomenology,.. extracting and purifying *texts* and using those texts to generate a theorists fiction, the subject's *heterophenomenological world.*" which is "...a world determined by fiat of the text..; our experimenter, the heterophenomenologist, lets the subject's text *constitute* that subject's *heterophenomenological world.*" He concludes: "the subject's

heterophenomenological world will be a stable, intersubjectively confirmable theoretical posit, having the same status as, say, Sherlock Holmes' London..." so that "(m)aximally extended, it is a... portrayal of exactly what it is like to be that subject – in the subject's own terms." (Dennett 1991:80,81,98).

Dennett creates his theoretical fiction for purposes far outside the scope of this study. However, he describes subjectivity as a relationship between self and self-consciousness, structured as narrative. The physical and temporal aspects of this narrative allow him to position the subject as both a self and a self-expression. They allow him to make use of a theoretical position himself. This position is his relationship to a 'neutral' subject. It is not the theoretical subject that is rendered neutral in his model, but the analyst's relationship to it.

Dennett's fiction, however, also provides an actual description of self-consciousness. It represents a functional description of the narrative structure of subjectivity. Walton utilises a similar description of self-consciousness in his solution to the subject/object problem at the heart of visual depiction "...not only imagining something and imagining seeing it, but also imagining something about our own perceptual actions." (Walton 1990:224). The physical forms of expression do not directly affect the subject, except through self-consciousness.

Terms of Drawing Demonstration One

Novelist Patricia Hampl writes "Every story has a story,.." although she contradicts herself by adding: "This secret story which has little chance of getting told is the history of its creation. Maybe the "story of the story" can never be told, for a finished work consumes its own history, renders it obsolete, a husk." (Hampl 1989:37). Every story has a story, in the sense that everything that is told also

communicates the story of its telling, but Hempl is wrong in her qualification. In fact, what is told, telling and telling-to all constitute what she calls the 'story.'

If this is the case, then it should admit of some practical demonstration. For instance, what changes in meaning will occur if we select any narrative and change one or other of the subjective conditions under which it is expressed? To use Hempl's words, if we change the story of the story, then the story itself should change. If "(m)eaning is the *effect of interaction between speaker and listener produced via the material...*" as Vološinov argues, then making a change in these conditions should produce an entirely new form of expression as part of an entirely new intersubjective situation (Vološinov 1929/1973:102).

The general terms of a demonstration that aims to interrogate intersubjective relationships in story telling are provided by Bakhtin. He writes: "...(V)ariants on the theme of another's discourse are widespread in all areas of creative, ideological activity,... such an exposition is always a free stylistic variation on an another's discourse, *it expounds another's thought in the style of that thought*, even while applying it to new material, to another way of posing the problem; it conducts experiments and gets solutions in the language of another's discourse." (Bakhtin 1981:347, my italics).

These terms are met every time we express ourselves. Each expression is a demonstration of the relationships that make it meaningful. Bakhtin was not writing the general terms of an actual experiment so much as describing the way in which the particular form of each expression comes.

However, if we take these terms in just that way, an outline of a practical demonstration in intersubjectivity begins to take shape. Bakhtin continues

"...there is no external imitation, no simple act of reproduction, but rather a further, creative development of another's... discourse in a new context and under new conditions." (Bakhtin 1981:347). Such a demonstration would interrogate what happens if we 'expound another's thought in the style of that thought, even as applying it to new material', so that 'a further creative development of another's discourse' occurs.

In the demonstration, we cannot simply reproduce the physical form of an existing expression and the subjective relationships it represents. Such an exercise would be retrospective. Retrospectively, it would confirm the relative subjectivity embodied in its constituent narrative positions. It would only produce a new situation of reading. To copy the form of an expression is to place oneself in a characteristic relationship with it. Although this might be interesting in itself, it does not fulfil Bakhtin's terms. These terms require that the demonstration produce a new expression in the form of someone else's expression. This is to be achieved by substituting one subject for another in the narrative model, in order to gauge the effect this change might have on the meaning of the expression itself.

The aim of such a demonstration will be to attempt to self-consciously adopt another person's forms of expression in order to communicate something new. This will bring about new subjective relationships focussed entirely on expressing, and observing oneself express, the other's subjectivity. The demonstration will require the adoption of another person's self-consciousness by the only means possible: in the production of a new form of expression that appears to make their physical trace rather than one's own.

This is a complex aim. It is simply not possible to be someone else. But being someone else isn't the aim. The aim is to attempt to adopt another

person's forms of expression in order to communicate something new. It's complexity and ultimate plausibility lie in the subjective relationships that we have with each other that are represented in the physical forms of expression.

If we adopt Bakhtin again and take the 'internally persuasive word' for this other person's self-expression, then "(a) few changes in orientation and the internally persuasive word easily becomes an object of representation." (Bakhtin 1981:347). Of course, we can no more produce another person's forms of expression than we can become someone else. But we can familiarise ourselves with the physical forms of another's expressions and perceive *completely* the whole of our own diegetic relationship with them. Because it is our own perception, it does not require external verification of any kind.

From the position of a reader, we can use our own subjectivity and our self-consciousness as a complete guide to another person's. Then we can produce expressions that allow us to scrutinise and self-consciously comment upon the particular diegesis itself. In doing this, we will index "...the variety of alien voices (which) enter into the struggle for influence within an individual's consciousness (just as they struggle with one another in surrounding social reality) All this creat(es) fertile soil for experimentally objectifying another's discourse." (Bakhtin 1981:348).

There is an immediate problem. There is no theoretically constructed neutral position with which to benchmark results. Such a demonstration has no control. If we adopt another person's forms of self-expression in order to express something new, we are in danger of a procedural elision. As soon as we select them, we are in a reading, listening and viewing relationship with the other

person's forms of expression. These forms are the only way in which we know them.

The other's self-expression and our reading are in danger of appearing to be the same. This cannot be the case, but it might appear to be the case. This results from the fact that everything we can know about the other person whose forms of self-expression we aim to adopt is derived from our reading alone. This problem is a version of Dennett's problem in 'Consciousness Explained'. How do we examine a network of relationships of which we are already a constituent part?

Dennett responds by creating a fictional self-consciousness. In the case of our possible demonstration, the physical basis of communication provides an answer. The form of every expression has multiple physical aspects, some of which we can retain as control by designating them theoretically neutral.

For this demonstration, I have in mind comics as a particular form of expression. I intend to select other people whose self-expression I will attempt to adopt from the ranks of contemporary anglophone comic artists.

Rawson writes "(I)mplicit in every drawing style is a visual ontology," (Rawson 2005:221). It is this ontology that the demonstration will seek to change. This choice is not medium-specific. The aim and general terms of the demonstration could be applied to any physical form of expression.

The choice of comic artists' self-expression as the practical focus for the experiment is specific only to their works in relation to me, subjectively. The demonstration could be conducted with poetry, casual conversation at a bus stop, newspaper journalism or a National Constitution. It would produce results both specific to those forms of expression and theoretically admissible to comparison across the range of every form of expression. Connor writes "To say that we

produce ourselves in voice is to say that we stage... the setting in which the voice can resound." (Connor 2000:06).

However, there are practical considerations that frame the method of my demonstration that belong uniquely to comics. The written verbal language/image combination unique to comics provides the source of a neutral control. The demonstration will aim to make new expressions in the form of the pages of comics. It will take as control a script that directs the final form of expression but is only an oblique part of the form of expression itself.

A comic script is an abstract plan of a comic. It is utilised in the process of producing the final expression. It bears no other relation to the expression itself. Such a script could exist for the purpose of the demonstration for any form of expression where a degree of planning anticipates the expression itself, such as musical scores, choreography, architects plans and film scripts, for example.

As particular forms of expression, comics are usually the work of multiple authors including printers, ink and paper manufacturers and distributors as well as comic artists. We must not confuse the attempt to adopt another person's forms of expression with an objectified or biographically verifiable author. The script for a comic is already a form of expression. It is already an embodied, communicative form reflecting its own unique diegesis. It is utterly distinguishable from the comic that it prefigures. This demonstration will designate it theoretically neutral. The script will be an objective function of the demonstration itself.

A script will be used as a control for the new expressions I intend to produce. The choice of script lies within the frame of the demonstration, even if its own expressive form, designated neutral, does not. The demonstration begins with

the choice of script, and with the theoretical designation of the script as neutral. The field of comics production and consumption is characterised by the institutionalised reformation of properties across many different productions. Characters, plots and stories are reworked in very different situations, producing very different forms of expression. It is usual for a script-writer or artist to adopt an existing character, set of paradigms, place or publication history.

As a result, there is no contradiction between a new expression and the choice of aspects of existing material with which to direct it. To begin the demonstration it is simply a question of selecting material: a script from which to take direction and a subject whose forms of expression I will aim to adopt. I could make this choice from any script, plot or extrapolated fragment and choose any comic artist. Considering the field of comics, this seems both historically justifiable and theoretically appropriate.

It has the advantage of rendering the control provided by a script infinitely richer as information in terms of comparative analyses. As part of a final analysis of each new expression, it admits the possibility of comparisons with the work from which the script is derived. The theoretically neutral script will have both its own expressive form, discounted in order to allow the demonstration to function, and will bring with it other utterances made by other people in the times related to it, even as they are placed outside it for the purpose of the demonstration with which to compare it as control with the demonstration's results.

Drawing Demonstration One

Demonstration One comprises three distinct strands. Methodologically, these strands are identical in that they repeat the same process, but they are distinct in that this process in undertaken with three different sets of material. I will call these three strands One(a), One(b) and One(c). I undertook three methodological repetitions with different material in order to self-consciously regulate both my production and my reading of what I produced. Working on three drawings focused my attention on the process rather than on a specific form of expression, which might have been the case if I had undertaken only one new drawing. It also allowed me to compare the final drawings I produced with each other.

Demonstration One followed this method: in each, I selected a double page spread from an existing comic and extrapolated a written script from it, within the constraints of the form of Anglophone comic strip scripts (Talon 2003:13).

I discarded the double page spread from which the script was derived, only returning to it as part of a comparative analysis. I then selected a person whose forms of self-expression I would adopt. In each case, this was another Anglophone comic artist known to me only through their comics.

My reading of the selected artists' comics was comprehensive. It aimed to provide me with a complete subjective sense of the characteristic forms of the artist's expression in as much detail and depth as possible. Fortunately, in terms of time, comic strips have characteristic forms shared by different artists. As a result, I was able to arrange my reading according to these forms. These forms included the page size, the structure of page layouts, the colour palette, types of line, calligraphy, drawing technology and the distribution of text. They also

included narrative and depictive characteristics such as story, plot and narrator, including characterisation, point of view, focalisation, pace and dramaturgy.

Having undertaken this comprehensive reading, I attempted in each case to make a new series of pages based on the script, such that the new set of pages appeared to me to conform utterly to the characteristic forms of expression of the selected artist. To do this, I followed a practical studio process that I share with many other comic artists. This follows a process from script to page layout, to storyboard, to rough drawing, to final drawing, lettering and colouring.

When a drawing technology visible in the artists' works was available to me, I used it. When it was either not visible, incomprehensible to me or outside my technical capacity, I substituted it for another, which I understood or could master. Finally, I read the new pages I had made and compared them with the pages from which their script had been extrapolated as a theoretically neutral control.

To summarise my method in Demonstration One [One(a), One(b) and One(c)], I attempted to draw a double page spread by one comic artist in the style of another. This description has the advantage of being short and carrying with it an immediate sense of the technical difficulty of the activity, but it is not accurate. It admits the possibility of a definition of style that disconnects the meaning of physical trace from the intersubjective relationships that frame it. Style becomes a quality distinct from its physical form, implying either some ineffable cause or a biographical one, both equally in error.

Drawing Demonstration One(a) method

To begin Demonstration One(a) I chose pages six and seven from 'Teen Witch', produced by Jim Medway in 2007 (Medway 2007:06–07 [Illustration 07, Page 179]). From these two pages, I extrapolated the following script:

Demonstration One(a) Script: 'Teen Witch Pages 06 and 07. Jim Medway.

Cell 01:

ZOE, PERLA, PERLA'S MOTHER AND FATHER.

PRESENT DAY. INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT.

ZOE IS SERVING A DISH OF LOBSTER TO PERLA AND HER PARENTS.

Narrative: Five minutes later –

Zoe (to Perla): Your lobster, Madam.

Perla (loudly): LOOK OUT! It's the world's clumsiest waitress!

Perla's Mother: HA HA!

Cell 2:

PERLA.

PRESENT DAY. INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT.

Perla (to Zoe): I don't want it any more. Bring me the dessert menu instead – carefully! HA HA!

Cell 3:

ZOE.

PRESENT DAY.

INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT.

ZOE IS HOLDING THE DISH OF LOBSTER.

Zoe (to Perla): Right away madam.

Cell 4:

ZOE.

PRESENT DAY.

INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT.

Zoe (to herself): GRR! THAT'S IT! I'VE HAD ENOUGH!... and I know just the thing...

Cell 5:

ZOE.

PRESENT DAY.

INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT.

ZOE IS WRITING ON THE PORTABLE DESSERT MENU BOARD.

Zoe (to herself): ...now what was that spell?

Page 7

Cell 1:

ZOE.

PRESENT DAY.

INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT.

ZOE IS WRITING ON THE PORTABLE DESSERT MENU BOARD.

Zoe (to herself): This will be a REAL special dessert!

Cell 2:

ZOE, PERLA, PERLA'S MOTHER.

PRESENT DAY.

INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT.

ZOE IS SHOWING PERLA AND PERLA'S MOTHER THE PORTABLE DESSERT MENU BOARD.

Zoe (to Perla): Anything take your fancy Madam?

Perla: Let me see – ice cream NO. Cake NO.

Cell 3:

PERLA.

PRESENT DAY.

INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT.

PERLA IS CHOOSING FROM THE PORTABLE DESSERT MENU BOARD.

Perla: Ooh! Now what's this very expensive one?...

Cell 4:

PERLA

PRESENT DAY.

INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT.

AS PERLA READS THE NAME OF THE DESSERT (A SPELL), SHE CHANGES INTO A SEALION.

Perla: "Praline Truffle Triple Cho Chic – By the Sword of the Cyclops, Zing, Zing, Zip!"

Sound Effect: KA ZAM!

Cell 5:

ZOE, PERLA, PERLA'S MOTHER AND FATHER.

PRESENT DAY.

INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT.

THE SEALION PERLA (STILL RECOGNISABLE) BOUNCES ON THE TABLE TO THE HORROR OF HER MOTHER AND FATHER. ZOE LOOKS ON, SMILING.

Perla's mother (to Perla): Ooh Princess! You've turned into a – a – SEALION!

Perla: YELP Yelp!

Perla's father: How embarrassing!

Zoe (thinks): Hee Hee! My spell worked!

End Page 7 End Script.

Having extrapolated this script, I set aside Jim Medway's work and attempted to make a drawing from it, adopting comic artist Mike Mignola's forms of self-expression. I read the six comics that Mignola had created, written and drawn to date as complete works or collections of works (Mignola 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2006). The drawings Mignola makes for other authors, his writing for other artists, his novels and film productions are aspects of the forms of expression in these albums , but they are not practically relevant to this Demonstration.

Illustration 08 (Page 180) is an indicative example of a double page spread by Mignola from 'Box Full of Evil', a story in the compilation 'The Right Hand of Doom' (Mignola 2000). Through reading, I compiled a list of

technical specifications that typify Mignola's story-telling across all of this albums. His pages are always 167mm x 257mm. The layout of cells on each page (of which there is a wide variety of sizes and densities) is anchored by an invariable template grid of nine panels of 47mm x 74mm with internal gutters of 2mm. Page margins change according to whether the page is on the right or the left (so that the right hand page margins are 10mm inside, 17mm outside and 12mm top and bottom. The left hand pages reverse the outside and inside margins of the right hand pages).

The line Mignola uses is invariably 5 pixels wide, including the line that outlines cells, speech balloons, thought bubbles and narration, when it is seen. The colour palette comprises a long list of print Pantones and process colours that changes very little across all six albums. In the 1996 album, the background to cells is black. In the other albums, it is white. Speech balloons and thought bubbles contain black calligraphy on white. Narration contains black calligraphy on cream (C:0,M0, Y20, K0). The calligraphy is hand-drawn.

So much for a list of specifications understood from close reading. There are many, many others, all of which contribute to typify Mignola's expressions. To borrow Baetens' words again, these specifications are both internal (such as the plot, story and narrator and ways of depicting through drawing) and external (such as paper and print details, distribution, consensually recognised genre and type of reader).

These technical specifications informed my division of the script into scenes depicted in each cell. This was the start of a transition from written to visual story telling. Each specification provided an underlying condition of the others. Taken as a group, the specifications were mutually conditioning,

with the effect of constraining my actions in visualising the narrative at every stage.

By conforming to formal specifications, I was able to create a visual drama characteristic of Mignola's self-expression, including characterisation, story and plot through scene division, cell layout on the page and final drawing, calligraphy and colour. My division of the script into scenes depicted in cells was produced as a planned layout of the plot on two pages (Illustration 09, Page 181). In conforming to 'Mignola' specifications, this division into scenes did not follow the division of scenes in the script, which belong to Medway.

The layout of pages was almost the conclusion of my new visual structuring of the plot and was also the moment for me to visualise the possible relationship between speech balloons and scenes (Illustration 10, Page 182). Mignola has been vocal about his work on this point, commenting: "You're manipulating the background to put in these word balloons, rather than just pretend that these things are not there." (Talon 2003:82).

From the layout of pages I was able to create a storyboard (Illustration 11, Page 183). The development of the storyboard was much more complex than either the extrapolation of a script or the creation of the visual structure of the narrative in the layout. Although I was able to specify such constants as line width, colour, calligraphy and types of balloon, bubble and narrative box, the plot and story and the characters, places, times and things that comprise them were much more difficult to quantify.

However, according to the general terms of the Demonstration, my own perception was compete guide to adopting Mignola's forms of self-

expression, because everything I know about him is communicated in the physical form of his expression. In visualising the world of the plot and story in these two new pages in the way that Mignola might, I had only to decide *for myself* if my choices, actions and expressive traces were like the choices, and actions communicated *to me* in Mignola's physical traces.

Rather than compiling technical specifications in order to achieve the types of places and people who might be active in the whole story, I looked for models derived from Mignola's own comics and made use of them to visualise the story in detail. In doing this, I also looked for ways in which light, gravity, temperature, time of day, point of view, smell, sound and movement appear as aspects of character as well as aspects of narrative, including more distant genre conventions and echoes of other expressions.

For example, throughout his work, Mignola uses a verbal language for magic that is derived directly from the work of H. P. Lovecraft (Airaksinen 1999). It made sense to use this language for the spell that Zoe tricks Perla into reciting, rather than replicating the spell in the script, the language of which is uniquely Medway's. The use of this language informs Perla as a character as well as contributing to the plot.

For Zoe, the teenage waitress witch, I imagined a character in appearance, age and temperament like Mignola's Kate Corrigan. For Perla, the snobbish and petulant daughter, I imagined a character like Mignola's Annie Hatch; for Perla's mother (an older version of Perla), Ilona Kakosy (all Mignola 1998); for her father (a long-suffering and hence silent family man), Adam Frost (Mignola 2000).

I based the overall scene where the action takes place on the interiors of nineteenth century buildings that appear in all but the most recent of Mignola's albums, and specifically on the interiors in the story 'Christmas Underground' which appears in the album 'The Chained Coffin And Others' (Mignola 1998:41–61).

This identification of models represented almost entirely my visualisation of the narrative in the two new pages, by which I mean the adoption of a specific type of world inhabited by specific types of people, where some things are possible and some impossible. This is a coherent fictional world of cause and effect, with a past and hence an associated story, and a plausible number of possible futures.

After completing the detailed storyboard, my only criteria in deciding that the final drawings, calligraphy and colouring of the two pages were complete was on the basis of degrees of similarity with other forms of self-expression made by Mignola. (Illustration 12, Page 184). I made this adjudication of degrees of similarity as a reader. I stopped work as soon as I considered myself able to read the two new pages in the way I read any pages by Mignola, and able to access Mignola's fictional world in the two new pages as I feel I access Mignola's worlds in his other work.

This was the most difficult phase of the work. In order to feel that the pages had successfully adopted the forms of Mignola's self-expression rather than remaining my own, I had to become a habitual reader again, feeling that I was reading pages by Mignola, rather than a reader with the production of a demonstration in mind, which is an entirely different sensation altogether.

Drawing Demonstration One(a) analysis

When I had completed these tasks, I opened Jim Medway's 'Teen Witch' again. Let us recall Patricia Hampl's 'story of the story' and my aim to change the story by changing the story of the story. The aim of the Drawing Demonstration One was to adopt another person's forms of self-expression in order to express something new.

Let us also recall that the script extrapolated from Medway's script acts as a neutral control in the Demonstration, allowing us to produce a new subjectivity through the use of another person's self-expression without falling into tautology.

The script in Medway's drawing and my new 'Mignola' drawing is very similar. Described simply as a series of actions undertaken by named characters in a unified time and place, the two *plots* are identical. In the script, only differences of language and in the grouping of actions appear. But my 'Mignola' pages and Medway's pages depict entirely different fictional worlds, despite the identical plot. They communicate entirely different things involving different authors, producers and reading milieu.

There is a great deal of difference between the two new pages drawn in Demonstration One(a) and pages six and seven of 'Teen Witch' from which they are derived. In Medway's fictional world, human beings are always anthropomorphised cats. Curiously, this signature trait becomes less and less significant in reading Medway, until it becomes completely insignificant. Medway's anthropomorphism is general, so that we understand that this is simply the way that Medway always depicts human beings of all types. In general, it might render his characters innocent, simple or infantilised, but in

fact, it is a device which enables him to depict a wide variety of human emotions and actions very simply, even if these are always in some way finally benign.

Medway's plot develops in the very recent past. It is set in the north west of England. Both of these facts are evidenced by the dress of the characters, among other things: the hairstyles and clothes are information rich and completely specific to this time and place and no other.

There is a coincidence that has an effect on the outcome of Demonstration One(a). I chose Medway's pages without thinking them typical or untypical of Medway's work. It was Mignola's self-expression that I aimed to typify. In utilising a script derived from these pages as the basis for drawing new pages in the manner of Mignola, I hadn't realised how untypical of Medway these pages are, for the simple reason that their plot contains magic.

This inclusion of magic is unique in Medway's output. So 'Teen Witch' pages six and seven are uncharacteristic Medway pages in this way. Magic is one of the things that does not occur in the contemporary north west of England as depicted by Medway, even in a community of people who look like cats.

The overall social tone of Medway's pages is gentle and comedic, so there doesn't feel like there will be lasting harm in the spell that Zoe has tricked Perla into reciting. This concurs with all of the actions in Medway's drawings. On the other hand, magic is a staple ingredient of Mignola's fictional world, as is the possibility of harm.

My new 'Mignola' pages also take place in the recent past, but the part of the world in which the action takes place is difficult to establish with

certainty. It could be taking place in an eastern European castle or a long-established restaurant in New York. These differences between Medway and Mignola are partly differences of genre. They are consensually agreed forms of expression that are pervasive even as they allow specific examples of work within them to have their own individual characteristics.

The traditions of supernatural narrative across media are contributed to by Mignola's fictional world, represented by Lovecraft's magic language and visual hints of ancestral lineages, wealth and tenebrous histories as much as the actual magic transformation itself.

On the other hand, Medway contributes to the tradition of comedic visual anthropomorphism by bringing it into specific social currency in the present day, with hairstyles and clothes. Both a possible setting of a castle and an 'old New York' restaurant are plausible Mignola locations, as a high street restaurant in Greater Manchester is not, and vice versa in the work of Medway.

These generic differences are reflected in the ways in which each world is depicted. Medway's three-colourway and moiré dot half-tones establish a codified way of depicting the atmosphere, light and shade of his world which refers overtly to old (and hence now demeaned) print technology and its past use in cheap production. This technology is now a focus for sentimentalism and commodification as nostalgia.

Alternatively, Mignola's world is built of high contrasts of light and shade, representing drama, heightened emotion and psychological extremes. These are represented on the page as graphic patterns of silhouette and flashes of acid colour, arranged one on top of the other in layers of tightly-

managed space, dense with ink. My Mignola pages in Drawing Demonstration One(a) follow these prescriptions completely.

In describing the different characteristics of trace that I have highlighted in Medway's pages and my new pages, I have freely mixed aspects of depiction, production technology and the social consensus that contribute to the physical form of Mignola's self-expression (with terms such as 'silhouette', 'flashes of acid colour', 'moire', 'dense with ink' 'north west of England' and 'Lovecraft'). I have utilised aspects of both the 'story' and 'the story of the story' to describe the 'story', without contradiction or inadmissible change of mode.

The narrative in both Medway's pages and my new 'Mignola' pages, although the same in terms of a script, is different as a whole because it is comprised of all of its accumulated forms of expression. Individual aspects of trace are identifiable within this accumulation of forms, but they are not divisible.

There is a single good example of this in the possible different readings of Perla's mother's exclamation, which is the same in both drawings "Oh princess, you've turned into a sealion!" In Medway's drawing, the word 'princess' is a term of familial endearment in a mother/daughter relationship, similar in use to the word 'darling'. It is impossible to read the word 'princess' literally, as the Greater Manchester that Medway depicts does not contain princesses.

However, in my new 'Mignola' pages, the word 'princess' could easily be taken literally, because the whole form of Mignola's typical self-expression includes the possibility of such a reading. Princesses are to be

found therein, as are 'old New York' restaurants and eastern European castles, black shadows and Lovecraft's magic words. As Vološinov writes: "The speaker's subjective consciousness does not... operate with language as a system of normatively identical forms (but is)... brought about in line with the particular, concrete utterance,.. the centre of gravity lies not in the identity of the form but in that new and concrete meaning it acquires in the particular context." (Vološinov 1929/1973:67).

Drawing Demonstration One(b) method and analysis

Demonstration One(b) and Demonstration One(c) followed exactly the same method as Demonstration One(a): I chose a double page spread by a comic artist. I extrapolated a script and chose another comic artist the form of whose self-expression I was to adopt. I undertook a comprehensive reading of that artist's work in order to compile a detailed list of specifications describing the typical formal characteristics of their expression. I drew a new set of pages based on the script utilising these characteristics and undertook a comparative reading with the pages from which the script was derived.

I shall not duplicate my descriptions of method in the case of each of the strands of the Drawing Demonstration One. Some details of specification, such as page sizes, grid structures and colour palettes, I will omit here altogether. They can be read directly in the illustrations provided. Others, such as the extrapolated scripts in each case and lists of characteristic works, I will include.

To begin Demonstration One(b) I chose pages one hundred and forty four and one hundred and forty five from the story 'Almost Colossus' included in

the anthology 'The Chained Coffin and Others, produced by Mike Mignola in 1998 (Mignola 1998:144–145 [Illustration 13, Page 185]). From these two pages, I extrapolated the following script:

Demonstration One(b) Script: 'Almost Colossus' Pages 144 and 145.

Mike Mignola.

Cell 01:

HOMUNCULUS, HOMUNCULUS' BROTHER, KATE, SLAVE.

RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA.

THE SLAVE IS PRESENTING THE ROPE-TIED KATE CORRIGAN TO HOMUNCULUS' BROTHER AND HOMUNCULUS.

Slave (to Homunculus' brother): Master...?

Homunculus' brother (to slave): What have you got there, slave? A living human? Shall we use her to christen the work?

Homunculus: You cannot!

Homunculus' brother: Quiet brother.

Cell 2:

HOMUNCULUS

RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA.

HOMUNCULUS HEAD AND TORSO ONLY.

Homunculous' brother (voice off, to Homunculus): Remember what I told you. WE are the greater. These humans should be ours to do with as we please...

Cell 3:

ZOE.

KATE

RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA.

KATE HEAD ONLY.

Homunculous' borther (voice off, to Homunculus): ...raw materials...

Cell 4:

LIZ.

AT THE SAME MOMENT AS CELL 3. . INTERIOR. HOSPITAL ISOLATION WARD, THE WAUER INSTITUTE, TIRGOVISTE, ROMANIA.

LIZ CLOSE UP, EYES FULL OF ENERGY.

Homunculous' borther (voice off, to Homunculus): ...ours to use...

Cell 5:

HOMUNCULUS' BROTHER.

RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA.

Homunculous' brother: ...and to DESTROY. Remember that brother.

Homunculous' brother (to the slave, off): put her in the hole.

Cell 6

HOMUNCULUS, SLAVE, KATE CORRIGAN, HOMUNCULUS' BROTHER.

RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA.

THE SLAVE IS LIFTING KATE CORRIGAN TOWARDS A BOILING VAT OF FAT.

Kate: Hey! Stop it!

Slave: Another onion for the soup.

Homunculus' brother (to slave): DO IT NOW!

Cell 7

HOMUNCULUS.

RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA.

CLOSE UP OF HOMUNCULOUS' EYES, FILLED WITH ENERGY.

Cell 8

KATE

RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA.

KATE EMITS A SMALL CHARGE OF ENERGY FROM HER HAND.

Kate: No.

Cell 9

HOMUNCULUS.

RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA.

Homunculus: No.

End Page 144

Page 145

Cell 1:

HOMUNCULUS.

RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA.

HOMUNCULUS STRIKES THE SLAVE AWAY FROM KATE CORRIGAN WITH A BUST OF ENERGY.

Homunculus: NO!

Sound effect: WOK

Cell 2:

HOMUNCULUS, KATE

RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA.

HOMUNCULUS IS STEADYING KATE.

Homunculus (to Kate): Are you unharmed?

Kate (to Homunculus):I...I'm okay.

Homunculus (to Kate): I will not let him harm you.

Cell 3:

HOMUNCULUS, KATE

RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA.

A THROWN ROCK HITS HOMUNCULUS ON THE HEAD.

Kate: !

Cell 4:

KATE, HELLBOY.

RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA.

HELLBOY APPEARS THROUGH A HOLE IN THE LABORATORY WALL.

KATE IS STILL TIED. HOMUNCULUS LIES KNOCKED OUT.

Kate: HELLBOY! I don't think you had to do that – – and what took you so long?

Hellboy: The stairs were a tight fit, and some smart-ass bricked up the door at this end. You okay? Is that our guy?

Cell 5:

HOMUNCULUS' BROTHER.

RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA.

SHOUTING.

Homunculus' brother: WHAT IS THIS!? My brother turns against me and now my laboratory is INVADED?! YOU FOOLS!

End Page 145

Setting aside Mignola's pages, I chose comic artist Chris Ware as the subject the forms of whose self-expression I would attempt to adopt. In this case, I read the following works by Ware: 'The ACME Novelty Library No. 1 – 15 (Ware 1993 – 2010), 'Jimmy Corrigan, The Smartest Kid on Earth' (Ware 2000: 320 – 321 [Illustration 14, Page 186]) and 'Quimby the Mouse' (Ware 2003).

As guides, I modelled the visual appearance of characters in the script on characters in 'Jimmy Corrigan'. For Kate, us adapted Jimmy's grandfather's boyhood girl friend; for the homunculus and his brother, Jimmy's great grandfather; for Hellboy, the Italian toymaker and for the Slave, the toymaker's son.

The page layout (Illustration 15, Page 187) and storyboard (Illustration 16, Page 188) are indicative rather than illustrative. They are taxonomy rather than visualisation. This was due to my realisation of Ware's characteristic use of single points of view cropped and repeated. I only had to visualise two changes of scene (one axonometric view and one elevation), within which only changes of scale and frame needed to be made. I constrained the actions of characters within scenes in the same way through scale and cropping, producing Ware's characteristic repetition, evenness of pace and particular sense of space as a result.

My final two pages are shown as Illustration 17 (Page 189). Mignola's pages are set in the present, but are grounded in a tradition of supernatural story telling that is so well understood that it appears timeless. This genre admits generational changes, but the actions of the characters within it are both eternal and ever-present. In the genre, a spooky house in a

novel of 1900 is the same as a spooky house in a novel of 2010. The narrative could be set in any present day, past or present, with only changes in technology to indicate which generation the protagonists represent, and these details are unimportant.

I have set my new 'Ware' pages in the early twentieth century. This setting refers some of the depicted actions in the plot to real horrors and real psychoses that are utterly impossible in Mignola's narratives. These include re-mediated images of serial killing, terrorism and extermination camps. Ware's fictional world is full of banality and violence, both casual and purposeful, made part of that world through recognition on a reader's part of other specific places and times in the real world.

As such, Ware's work conforms to a kind of contemporary Realism, in which the characters and places have the status of subjects in a documentary. Not so Mignola's fictional world. There are no supernatural constants in Ware's work, only dreams and fantasies of the supernatural, bearing the same relationship to their subjects as do dreams and fantasies in everyday life.

In my new 'Ware' pages, Hellboy (the red demon hero in Mignola's work) is a man of strange appearance. He's coloured red all over, including his face, clothes and hair, with horns and a pointed moustache. Nonetheless, he is a man. Perhaps his adventures prior to his appearance in the plot have required him to dress like that, as a showman or a devil. Has he been to a fancy-dress party? Is his appearance a disguise put on in order to gain entry to the building and rescue Kate? Whatever makes him appear like that, it is definitely not the fact that he is a demon.

Drawing Demonstration One(c) method and analysis

For Demonstration One(c), I chose pages one hundred and forty four and one hundred and forty five from 'The Complete Maus' by Art Spiegelman, compiled in 1996 after appearing as a series (Spiegelman 1996:144 – 145 [Illustration 18, Page 190]). From these two pages, I extrapolated the following script:

Demonstration One(c) Script: 'The Complete Maus' Pages 144 and 145. Art Spiegelman.

Cell 01:

VLADEK, ANJA, MRS MOTONOWA, MRS MOTONOWA'S SON

1940S. IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE. ANJA PLAYS 'CAT'S CRADLE' WITH STRING WITH MRS MOTONOWA'S SON.

Vladek (voice over): We had here a little comfortable... we had where to sit.

Anja (to Mrs Motonowa's son): Remember, little one – never tell anybody (bold) there are Jews here. They'll shoot us all!

Mrs Motonowa's son (to Anja): Yes, Aunt Anja.

Vladek (voice over): the little boy was very smart and he loved very much Anja.

Cell 2:

ART, VLADEK

1980S. IN THE GARDEN AT VLADEK'S HOME.

Art (to Vladek): You had to pay (bold) Mrs Motonova to keep you, right?

Vladek (out of cell, hand-only visible. To Art): Of course I paid... and well (bold) I paid.

Cell 3:

VLADEK

1980S. IN THE GARDEN AT VLADEK'S HOME.

Vladek: ...what you think? Someone will risk their life for nothing?

Cell 4:

ART, VLADEK

1980S. IN THE GARDEN AT VLADEK'S HOME.

Vladek (to Art): ...I paid also for the food what she gave us from her smuggling business.

Cell 5:

ART, VLADEK

1980S. IN THE GARDEN AT VLADEK'S HOME.

Vladek: But one time I missed a few coins to the bread...

Cell 6:

VLADEK, MRS MOTONOWA

1940S. IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE

Vladek (to Mrs Motonowa): I'll pay you the rest tomorrow, after I go out and cash some valuables.

Cell 7:

VLADEK, MRS MOTONOWA

1940S. A MOMENT LATER, SAME SCENE AS CELL 6.

Mrs Motonowa (to Vladek): Sorry, I wasn't able to find (bold) any bread today.

Vladek (voice over): Always (bold) she got bread, so I didn't believe... But, still, she was a good woman.

Cell 8:

ANJA, MRS MOTONOWA'S SON

1940S. IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE. ANJA AND MRS MOTONOWA'S SON SHARE A BOOK.

Vladek (voice over): In his school the boy was very bad a German. So Anja tutored to him.

Mrs Motonowa's son (reading): Ich bin... Du bist... Er ist...

Vladek (voice over): She knew German like an expert.

Cell 9:

VLADEK, ANJA, MRS MOTONOWA, MRS MOTONOWA'S SON.

1940S. IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE. THE ADULTS ARE DISMAYED.

Mrs Motonowa's son (to Anja, Vladek and Mrs Motonowa): My teacher asked me how I improved so much...

Cell 10:

VLADEK, ANJA, MRS MOTONOWA, MRS MOTONOWA'S SON.

1940S. A MOMENT LATER. SAME SCENE AS CELL 9. THE ADULTS ARE RELIEVED.

Mrs Motonowa's son (to Anja, Vladek and Mrs Motonowa): So I told him my mother (bold) was helping me.

Anja (exhales): Whew

Vladek (voice over): He was really a clever boy.

End Page 144

Page 145

Cell 1:

MRS MOTONOWA, ANJA, VLADEK.

1940S. GROUND FLOOR IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE, WITH A VIEW OUT OF THE WINDOW.

Vladek (voice over): But it was a few small things here not so good... Her home was very small and it was on the ground floor...

Mrs Monotowa (to Anja and Vladek, indiacting the window): Be sure to keep away from the window – you might be seen!

Cell 2:

MRS MOTONOWA, ANJA, VLADEK.

1940S. GROUND FLOOR IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE, INSIDE THE FRONT DOOR.

Sound effect: Nok nok (bold)

Mrs Motonowa (to the door): One Minute! (bold)/(to Anja and Vladek): (Quick – get in the closet!)

Cell 3:

POSTMAN, MRS MOTONOWA, ANJA, VLADEK.

1940S. GROUND FLOOR IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE, POSTMAN AND MRS MOTONOWA ARE INSIDE THE OPEN FRONT DOOR. ANJA AND VLADEK ARE IN THE CLOSET, SEEN CUT-AWAY.

Postman (to Mrs Motonowa): A letter from your husband, Mrs Motonowa.

Mrs Motonowa (to the Postman): Thanks.

Cell 4:

ANJA, VLADEK.

1940'S. INSIDE THE CLOSET IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE, A MOMENT AFTER CELL 3.

Vladek (voice over): But I had something allergic in the closet...

Vladek (starts to sneeze): Aah (bold)

Cell 5:

ANJA, VLADEK.

1940'S. INSIDE THE CLOSET IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE, A MOMENT AFTER CELL 4.

Vladek (voice over): Or maybe it was a cold – I can't remember...

Vladek (stifles the sneeze): –chmf

Vladek (voice over): But always I had to sneeze.

Cell 6:

MRS MOTONOWA, VLADEK, ANJA.

1940S. IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE. MRS MOTONOWA HAS JUST COME IN.

Vladek (voice over): Still, everything here was fine, until one Saturday Motonowa ran very early back from her black market work...

Mrs Motonowa (to Anja and Vladek): This is terrible! (bold) The Gestapo just searched me – they took all my goods!

Cell 7:

MRS MOTONOWA, VLADEK, ANJA.

1940S. IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE. A MOMENT AFTER CELL 6.

Mrs Motonowa (to Anja and Vladek): They may come search here any minute! You've got to leave! (bold)

Vladek (to Mrs Motonowa): What! (bold)

Anja (to Mrs Motonowa): But where can we go?

Cell 8:

MRS MOTONOWA, VLADEK, ANJA.

1940S. IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE. A MOMENT AFTER CELL 7.

Mrs Motonowa (to Anja and Vladek): I don't know. But you must get out now! (bold)

Anja (to Vladek): Oh my God... This is the end! (bold)

Vladek (voice over): Anja started to cry... But we had not a choice.

End Page 145

I decided to use the script extrapolated from the work of Spiegelman to draw new pages as Jim Medway might characteristically draw

them (see Illustration 08). The page layout, storyboards and final pages can be seen in Illustrations 19, 20 and 21 (Pages 191 – 193).

Spiegelman's 'Maus' is one of the most celebrated contemporary comics in English. The series of cross-generational relationships and the narratives of reminiscence, confession and compassion through which it describes the continuing experiences of the Nazi genocide make it a deeply serious and emotive work.

Its central depictive device is an extended visual metaphor in which race and nationality are correlated to people anthropomorphised as different animals. German nationals appear as cats, Polish nationals as pigs, Jewish people as mice. Jewish people disguised as Polish nationals appear as anthropomorphised mice wearing pig masks and so on.

The donning of masks is a key rhetorical trope in the visual drama, which unfolds with the inevitability of tragedy. It is a story of human suffering in which the conclusion is seen in the beginning, through reversals of fortune, and it is the turns in the course of events that are important, as the outcomes are already familiar. Spiegelman's anthropomorphism is strongly directed towards this sense.

Medway's anthropomorphism and Spiegelman's couldn't be more different. In my new 'Medway' drawing, the characters feel as though they are in greater control of their personal destinies than in Spiegelman's. This entirely changes the narrative. Spiegelman's characters appear to be driven by events, even as they contribute to them, and this is an aspect of their (and our) tragedy. Personal happiness, health and life itself are at the whim of history, abstracted and annihilating, against which they have no choice but to

struggle to live, or die in the effort. The animal features that they wear contribute to this sense.

My new 'Medway' pages are less monumental than Spiegelman's and the characters in them are more open to opportunity. There is no sense of unfolding tragedy, only of deadly peril, difficulty and struggle. Survival seems, possible, at least, and the story's end is not yet known.

Drawing Demonstration One conclusion

In Drawing Demonstration One, to what extent have I managed to manipulate the physical traces of another's self-expression in order to change 'the story of the story' and hence change the 'story'? To what extent have I simply made my own trace and hence failed in some degree? The Demonstration will have been successful if it produced a unique, self-consciously-made visualisation of another's self-expression in each case. This will have occurred if I have created a visual narrative from each script that appears to have been made by the three comic artists in view (Mignola, Ware and Medway). This would involve perceiving each drawing as their self-expression. Crucially, success depends on the degree to which we also understand each of these physical traces as manipulations of the situation of reading, made by someone other than the artists.

The Demonstration's relative success will derive from the degree of my re-subjectivisation in each case. Although I have made each drawing, each drawing must appear as though the artist has made it. In the Demonstration, I have made the physical trace of another person and seen how convincingly that trace represents them rather than me. The point at

which the drawings become convincing is the point at which the story of the story is changed, revealing the way in which relative subjectivity comes about. The three strands of the Experiment appear to create distinct subjective voices, not just disembodied emblems of objects already recognised. These pages by 'Mignola', 'Ware' and 'Medway' are new.

I selected the particular comic artists' work for the Demonstration based on the possibility of this distinctiveness, in the sense that the comics from which the scripts were derived and the artists the forms of whose self-expression I attempted to adopt are very different from each other in emotional tone, production techniques and genre. They each have longstanding, deep and wide-reaching networks of associations invested in their forms of self-expression.

Conversely, the degree to which I might have failed is expressed in the reverse. In each case it would be revealed in the appearance of my own self-expression, establishing and entrenching my own subjectivity outside the characteristic traces of the other artists. If this is the case, we will be more or less able to identify the particularities of trace that index me, rather then indexing others.

Finally, I am able to position myself as a reader in relation to the new drawings, making my own perception of them their entire effect. Reading, I can take my 'Ware' drawing and my 'Medway' drawing as plausibly by Ware and Medway. I don't think that is quite the case with my Mignola drawing. Mignola's unerring mastery over the spaces he depicts is achieved by manipulating contrast. In his fictional world no-one is ever unsure as to where everyone and everything is. My new 'Mignola' drawing contains areas of

spacial vagueness that, whilst not entirely expressing my subjective presence over Mignola's, makes the drawing not by Mignola.

I am dis-habituated by these drawings, whereas reading actual Ware, Mignola or Medway drawings, I feel habituated to them. The subjective tropes of drawings made by these artists are invisible to me, whereas my own remain visible to me, as hard as I have tried to destabilise and conceal them.

This dis-habituation occurs on the level of a comparison between the experience that I have when reading an drawing by Ware, Mignola or Medway and my experience of these new drawings. This difference might be simply a result of the experimental frame, which requires me to know both what I have done and to read it as another person's self-expression. I know more about the production and reading of these drawings than either a producer or a reader alone usually can. If this dis-habituation is caused by knowledge, it is the result of theoretically doubling my subjectivity in order to undertake the Demonstration. It is intersubjective jetlag.

However, I think that there is more to my dis-habituation. I have only compared existing and new sets of drawings very briefly, highlighting some aspects of the changed 'story' in each case. I read a doubling of motives in the drawings themselves, compared with the existing bodies of work to which they contribute.

It is not possible for me to be someone else, to make someone else's trace or to be in someone else's situation. The series of subjective relationships embodied in the new drawings in the Demonstration are specific to me, communicated through the physical form of *this* expression, the

situation of which I'm a part. When Mignola, Ware or Medway express themselves, it is always their self-expression and always their physical trace.

When I had completed Demonstration One, in 2010 I asked Jim Medway to make a drawing from the script I had extrapolated from Spiegelman's work, with no other guide. I asked him to do what I had done, excepting the fact that he draws in his own manner and I was trying to adopt that manner for the sake of the Demonstration. The new drawing by Medway to this brief is shown in Illustration 22 (Page 194).

Medway's new drawing is untypical of Medway's work as a whole and less characteristic of his work than the drawing that I had made. However, Medway's drawing is literally Medway's self-expression, whereas my new 'Medway' drawing is an adoption of the forms of that self-expression, with all of the inequivocal differences in situation and subjects that implies.

My dis-habituation is a result of this difference. It is an effect of the deep social empathy that readers are capable of developing for the other participants in diegesis. This empathy is represented literally in the physical forms of expression themselves, in the specific traces of story telling, drawing and production.

I am particularly dis-habituated to my new 'Ware' and new 'Medway' drawings. In the case of the 'Ware' drawing because Ware's trace is so strongly identified, biographically, with the presumed character of the author. In the case of the new 'Medway' drawing, this unease derives from the fact that Spiegelman's work (from which I derived the script for the Medway drawings) now carries the social distinction of high literature. Commentary on the subject of Spiegelman's work by extrapolating a script for a drawing

demonstration in intsersubjectivity feels constrained by social taboo. This also contributed to dis-habituation.

Testing the relative subjectivity of others by adopting their forms of self-expression is an activity that risks the imputation of either rhetorical or unscrupulous motives (as in the case of deceptions by forgery, for example). It institutionalises the scrutinising of social equilibrium. Such scrutiny can feel both personally and socially invasive and aggressive. It reveals the status relationships between people and also exposes to view the mutable subjectivity of the social institutions by which we exist.

In Chapter Three, I shall discuss the self-conscious manipulation of social equilibrium in relation to a number of cultural strategies that have aimed to utilise subjectivity radically. In terms of Drawing Demonstration One, however, I claim a rhetorical motive for self-consciously adopting others' forms of expression . Some justification for this is provided by the terms of the Demonstration itself. I also lay claim to Demonstration One being more than less successful. This is evidenced both by the plausibility of the physical traces it produced and the dis-habituation with which I finally read them.

Illustration 07 *Medway, J.* (2007:7,8)

Illustration 08 *Mignola, M.* (2000:144.145)





Illustration 09 *Grennan, S. (2009)*

Medway – Muguda A (09/08/09



Illustration 10 *Grennan, S. (2009)*

Page A

Page B





Illustration 11 *Grennan, S. (2009)*

Illustration 12 *Grennan, S.* Medway as Mignola *(2009)*



Illustration 13 *Mignola, M.* (1998:145, 146)



Illustration 14 *Ware, C. (2000:320, 321)*



Illustration 15 *Grennan, S. (2009)*



Illustration 16 *Grennan, S. (2009)*

Illustration 17 *Grennan, S.* Mignola as Ware *(2009)*

Illustration 18 *Spiegelman, A.* (1996:144, 145)

Layout Spiegelman → Medway (27/05/09

Page 1 - 4 cells

Page 2 - 3 cells

Page 3 - 4 cells.

average 3.6 cells

Page 1 -



Page 2



Page 3



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

Illustration 19 *Grennan, S.* (2009)

Medway left (A)
Spiegelman p144-145 as Medway

Medway Right (B)
Spiegelman p144-145 as Medway

Medway left (C)
Spiegelman p144-145 as Medway



Illustration 20 *Grennan, S. (2009)*



Illustration 21 *Grennan, S.* Spiegelman as Medway *(2009)*

144

145

Illustration 22 *Medway, J.* Untitled *(2010)*

Chapter 03:

Time, self-observation and a second Drawing Demonstration

Time

Defining communication in terms of intersubjective relationships has implications for the way in which we perceive time.

To reiterate, the meaning of any form of expression is produced by the whole physical situation in which it takes place. This situation is not reducible to any of its component parts. As Bakhtin writes: "When we select a particular type of (utterance), we do so not for the (utterance) itself, but out of consideration for what we wish to express... We select...from the standpoint of the *whole* utterance." (Bakhtin 1952/1983:Duff 2000:92).

This whole situation comprises the physical forms of expression. These are the traces of the situation in which it was made, plus the situation in which it is comprehended. According to the narrative model, this moment of comprehension in a unique moment of co-production, structured by causal relationships between subjects, so that "...*experience exists even for the people undergoing it, only in the material of signs.* Outside that material there is no experience as such. In this sense, *any experience is expressible*, ie is potential *person* expression..." (Vološinov 1929/1973:28). The structure physically embodies different relationships between subjects.

Because we perceive these relationships between different subjects through physical forms of expression, each represented subject in the structure occupies a distinct historical time. The time in which a form of expression is produced is distinct from the time of the content of expression, because the time in

which the self exists is distinct from the time in which we are self-conscious. These times are also distinct from the time in which other people comprehend what is being expressed. These distinct times are not abstractions, but highly specific characteristics of the situation in which expression takes place.

The particular production traces of each form of expression index the historic moments in which they occurred, fixing the expression in a precise temporal relationship with the act of comprehension. The relative temporal positions of addresser and addressee in relation to each other and the form of utterance are historically determined.

The time in which an addressee comprehends what is expressed is characterised by their subjectivity relative to the past production of forms of expression and the time of what is expressed. We comprehend these times as sensual, motive, embodied and intersubjective. The narrative model requires not only those people who tell, are told about and listen or read, but also their own times of action as subjects. This identification of relative times as aspects of the relative subjective positions is an intersubjective historicising of the 'story of the story'.

Borges' character Pierre Menard's project

This generation of relative times is the focus of Jorge Luis Borges short story 'Pierre Menard, author of the Quixote', published in 1939. The story is framed as an obituary, written around 1900. The fictional protagonist Pierre Menard attempts to write his own texts so that they match word for word fragments of the text of Manuel de Cervantes' seventeenth century novel 'The Ingenious Hidalgo Don Quixote of La Mancha'. Borges' narrator tells us that "(t)o compose

Don Quixote at the beginning of the seventeenth century was a reasonable, necessary and perhaps inevitable undertaking; at the beginning of the twentieth century it is almost impossible. It is not in vain that three hundred years have passed, charged with the most complex happenings..." (Borges 2000).

When Menard succeeds in writing sentences of his own that match word for word sentences in 'Don Quixote', the narrator is says that "The text of Cervantes and that of Menard are verbally identical, but the second is almost infinitely richer," (Borges 2000). He critiques the two identical fragments as historical documents whose meaning is entirely relative to the time of their production:

> "It is a revelation to compare Menard's *Don Quixote* with Cervantes'. The latter, for example, wrote (part one, chapter nine): '...truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and adviser to the present, and the future's counselor.' Written in the seventeenth century, written by the "lay genius" Cervantes, this enumeration is a mere rhetorical praise of history. Menard, on the other hand, writes: '...truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and adviser to the present, and the future's counselor.' History, the *mother* of truth: the idea is astounding. Menard, a contemporary of William James, does not define history as an inquiry into reality but as its origin. Historical truth, for him, is not what has happened; it is what we judge to have happened. The final phrases—*exemplar and adviser to the present, and the future's counselor*—are brazenly pragmatic. The contrast in style is also vivid. The archaic style of Menard—quite

foreign, after all—suffers from a certain affectation. Not so that of his forerunner, who handles with ease the current Spanish of his time." (Borges 2000).

To make sense of Borges' story, it is possible to imaginatively substitute the activity of reading for Menard's activity of writing. In this case, the story establishes reading as a function of writing. As a consequence, the story becomes a parable of reading. This is imprecise. The idea ignores the wider implications of Menard's project, which is not to re-write Cervantes' text, but to write a new text that is identical. Menard wants to change the situation in which the form of expression is produced and thus change the meaning of words, even if they appear to sit identically on a page made yesterday and a page made three hundred years previously by someone else.

Menard's project is not a way of reading. It is not even an analogy of reading. Rather it is a practical demonstration of the causal effects of time upon meaning. Borges locates Menard precisely in time. Without doing so, he wouldn't be able to have the narrator conduct such a precise analysis of Menard's text. Only in relation to Menard's moment in time can the narrator arrive at an time in which he forms his expression to be part of a network of causal relationships with others people.

In analysing Menard's text, Borges' narrator reflects Vološinov's analytical method. He argues "Should we miss...situational factors, we would be as little able to understand an utterance as if we were to miss its most important words." (Vološinov 1929/1973:100).

Menard's project is not re-writing. This would be to adopt the subjectivity of Cervantes – a method Menard rejects. Nor is Menard's project

simply a reading. This would find meaning in the text from his own point of view, and hence affirm his own subjectivity.

Dennett describes a method of adopting the position of another person. It is very close to the method Menard rejects. Dennett outlines the possibility of trying to listening to a Bach chorale in the way that a seventeenth century Leipziger might have listened. "If we want to imagine what it was like to be a Leipzig Bach-hearer, it is not enough for us to hear the same tones on the same instruments in the same order: we must also prepare ourselves somehow to respond to those tones with the same heartaches, thrills and waves of nostalgia... A music scholar who carefully avoided all contact with post 1725 music and familiarised himself intensively with the traditional music of that period would be a good approximation." (Dennett 1991:387).

Rather, Menard's project aims to demonstrate that forms of expression are only meaningful if the situation in which they occur is recognised as part of the expression itself. This makes the recognition of relative historical times a constituent of communication. Without this recognition, nothing has meaning. This temporal specificity is a prerequisite of intersubjectivity. It is not possible to separate the subjective historical moment and the physical form of expression. The sense of subjective displacement produced by Borges' story derives from just this indivisibility of people, times and traces.

The story feels like a parlour game of misattribution or misappellation. Is it a trick involving a hidden agenda or motivating intent? Is it a joke, clashing together different social modes of language or behaviour?. Menard's project is impossible and so the solemnity with which his project is described and his extreme effort are ridiculous. He wants to write his own words in his own time and

have them attest to the performance of a miracle – that they are exactly the same words as another writer's, three hundred years dead.

Motivating our own sense of displacement in the story is a realisation that words themselves are incomprehensible beyond the forms that represent our relative subjectivity. As Vološinov argues, "(any) current curse word can become a word of praise, and any current truth must inevitably sound to many other people as the greatest lie... accentuating yesterday's truth as to make it appear today's." (Vološinov 1929/1973:23).

The duck/rabbit drawing discussed by Wittgenstein (Kripke 1982 [Illustration 23, Page 241]) is a parlour game in the same way as Menard's project. Looked at in one way, it is a depiction of the head of a rabbit. Looked at in another, it is the head of a duck, pointing in the opposite direction. Ears become beak. Our own orientation to the image reveals either a depiction of a duck or a depiction of a rabbit to us, but never both at the same time.

Similarly, Menard's text is either Menard's or Cervantes', but never both at the same time. Even though we fully understand that the drawing is a trick built upon the tipping point in the biological re-visioning process of visual perception, our time-of-the-rabbit and our time-of-the-duck remain entirely distinct. Crossley writes: "Such phenomena strongly challenge the idea that the object is determinate,.. The visual meaning...changes without a change in what empiricists would identify as the stimulus." (Crossley 1996:26).

In the duck/rabbit drawing, the sense of displacement is generated in the sensation of moving from one meaning to another, which is to say, whilst recognising that the 'empirical stimulus' remains the same. We do not expect our

subjectivity to be so easily exposed as contingent, nor the relative nature of our own sense of time so self-consciously embodied by such a simple visual trick.

Dennett proposes that the forms of expression are revised by each new situation. Their meaning is perpetually contingent upon context (Dennett 1991:111). The uniqueness of each situation in which the forms of expression appear substantiates the fact that these forms are only meaningful as a whole situation. Bakhtin writes "...dialogical relations are profoundly unique and can only [represented by] complete utterances.., behind which stand (and in which are *expressed*) real... subjects, authors of the given utterances." (Bakhtin 1975/1986: 124).

Each expression is a unique bundle of relative times. Our individual sense of time is built upon an accumulation of these relationships, in which we have a causal part and in which we find meaning. Vološinov writes: "Every stage in the development of a society has its own special and restricted circle of items, which alone have access to that society's attention and which are endowed with evaluative accentuation by that attention. In order for any for any item,.. to enter the social purview of the group,.. it must be associated with the vital socioeconomic prerequisites of the particular group's existence... (A)ll ideological accents,... are social accents, ones with claim to social recognition and only thanks to that recognition are made outward use of..." (Vološinov 1925/1973:22).

Identical forms take on different meanings as the situations in which they are made change. These changes explicitly reveal the temporal positions that constitute each situation. Our relationship to any temporal measure is our comprehension of the physical traces of the times in which other people communicate with us. Bakhtin writes "...(T)wo externally similar forms may appear

at different stages,.. endowed with different meanings – like a pair of homonyms." (Duff 2000:Bakhtin 1952/1983:119). Literary theorist Ireneusz Opaki writes "Every (communication)... has underlying it certain defined socio-historic factors, which... bring with them the creation of... an ensemble of means of expression, which... carry in them historically-specific meanings and functions." (Duff 2000:Opaki1963/1987:119).

Seth, Arno and Brown

A visible example of this can be found by comparing works by two contemporary comic strip artists: 'Clyde Fans Book One', by Seth (Gregory Gallant), published in 2004 (Seth 2004 [Illustration 24, Page 242]) and 'Louis Riel: A Comic-Strip Biography' by Chester Brown, published in 2003. (Brown 2003 [Illustration 25, Page 243]).

'Clyde Fans Book One' is a comic strip strongly influenced by the work of American magazine cartoonists and illustrators of the post-War period, particularly those associated with The New Yorker Magazine, such as Peter Arno. It centres around the reminiscence of an electric fan salesman. (Arno 1946 [Illustration 26, Page 244]). Its production style is an overt attempt to give the impression that the historical time of the plot and the time in which the book was made are similar (that is, post-War), even though it is obvious that this is not the case.

'Louis Riel' tells the story of the struggle for self-determination of a group of settlers on Canada's north-west frontier in the late nineteenth century, framed by the life of their charismatic leader, Louis Riel. Its methods of production are entirely twenty-first century in appearance. Although Brown has discussed the

influence of the drawings of Harold Gray (creator of the 'Little Orphan Annie' strips, which began in 1924) on the drawing of 'Louis Riel', the book is utterly contemporary (Arnold 2003). Drawings by Gray, made in the twentieth century, do not constrain the drawings made by Brown of the twenty-first.

Seth's relationship with the past is more complex. Seth never includes anything in 'Clyde Fans' that either derives from the past post-1955 or that is not American. This visibly self-conscious self-positioning is managed so well by Seth that, like Wittgenstein's duck/rabbit, Seth's self-expression is made both in the present and also appears to have been made before1955.

As readers of 'Clyde Fans', our own position in relation to Seth is also defined by our knowledge of both forms of expression that communicate 'America, pre-1955' and forms of expression made by comic strip artists and their collaborative producers in the present. Literary theorist Yury Tynyanov writes "...each period selects the material it needs, but the way in which this material is used characterises only the period itself." (Duff 2000:Tynyanov 1924/1977:35). The 'period' he describes is the contemporaneous social relations of any group of people and the theorised times of their interaction.

In the case of 'Clyde Fans', the plot and story time and the time in which the book is read all take positions relative to types of past expression ('America, pre-1955'). This takes place in terms of their physical form – the rich and clearly defined network of intersubjective experiences and expressions that they trace, that we know from that period and place. At the same time, it takes place in terms of our contemporary relationship with them, reading 'Clyde Fans' in the present. We know that 'Clyde Fan's was drawn and produced by Seth only a few years ago, but the physical form of expression that structures our relationship

with him and his fictional characters has the appearance of a specific type of past expressive form with which we still have that relationship ('America, pre-1955').

Seth uses a history of specific past forms of expression to self-consciously form his own. Our own reading of Seth's book parallels this adoption of past forms. We participate alongside Seth in taking a position to orient ourselves to a specific past. In taking that position, we place ourselves in relation to the people whose physical forms of expression we experience in Seth's time and their own. This characteristic use of past forms lies in making a group of past actions an occasion for self-consciousness.

Seth's project in 'Clyde Fans Book One' is unlike Menard's fictional project or my attempt to draw new comic strip spreads by adopting the forms of Chris Ware, Mike Mignola and Jim Medway. Menard wanted to write three hundred year old words in his own time. Seth wants to self-consciously ignore his own experience of any situation that has occurred outside of a definitive group of American situations pre-1955. He aims to represent a subject removed from the effects of any experience of living after 1955. My Drawing Demonstration One aimed to self-consciously adopt another person's forms of self-expression in order to express something new.

These three projects in intersubjectivity all constitute specific physical forms of expression in which different times reveal themselves within the relative subjective positions of the diegetic participants in each case.

The projects demonstrate two general principles. First, cultural theorist Guy Debord echoes Bakhtin, Vološinov and Dennett when he argues "(u)ltimately, any sign or word is susceptible to being converted into something else, even into it's opposite." (Debord 1956/1981). Second, the intersubjective relationships

represented in such changes of meaning reveal what Schütz calls the 'idealisation of the interchangibility of standpoints'. Crossley defines this as "...the presupposition... that it is only their different positions in the world that might lead them to experience it differently." (Crossley 1996:85).

Both of these principles only make sense with their corollaries in time. In light of them, we can consider two further practical projects that self-consciously aim to reveal other types of intersubjective relationships. The first project is loosely termed 'appropriation'. It was used with radical purpose in the context of American fine art practice, the art market and civic culture in the late 1970s and 1980s (Evans 2009). The second project is my Drawing Demonstration Two, which I undertook in order to scrutinise a question about genre as a form of intersubjective relationship.

Appropriation

Appropriation cannot be described as a project per se. Unlike Seth's project, Menard's project or my Drawing Demonstration One, it has no agreed beginning or end, or definitive forms of expression, only forms that are members of a still-disputed set. Examples are found in the work of a number of artists, in a body of theory and criticism which continues in the present, and in a putative historical frame. This is not the place to summarise a history of appropriation theory or practice. Instead, we can make use of a number of the appropriation project's aims listed by cultural theorist Benjamin Buchloh. These will limit analysis to a small number of artworks, theories and criticism made by an even smaller number of appropriation's practitioners and observers.

They comprise fragments of the theory and criticism of Buchloh (Buchloh 1982:28–35), Debord (Debord 1956/1981), Isabelle Graw (Baker 2004:59), Johanna Burton (Burton 2004), Richard Prince (Halley 1984) and Barbara Kruger (Stephenson 1987:55–59). Alongside this theoretical writing, I will include a single visual work by artist Sherrie Levine made in 1979 in relation to an artwork by Walker Evans, made in 1936.

This selection is necessary in order to focus directly upon those aspects of the appropriation project that provide further insight into intersubjectivity. These works represent three of appropriations aims. First, the self-conscious attempt to re-embody a range of reciprocally antagonistic subjects; second, self-transformation and third, the radical representation of intersubjective relationships created through an objectified history.

In 'Parody and Appropriation in Francis Picabia, Pop and Sigmar Polke', Buchloh outlines two theoretical aims that he considers underpin the approach to practice of visual artists Sherrie Levine and Barbara Kruger "(A)ppropriation," he writes, "... may result from an authentic desire to question the historic validity of a local, contemporary code by linking it to a different set of codes..." This adopted code might derive from other historical models and "... may be motivated by a desire to establish... tradition... and a fiction of identity." For Buchloh, these two aims also involve "...appropriation as a strategy of commodity innovation..: to grant a semblance of historical identity through ritualised consumption. Each act of appropriation is a promise of transformation..." (Buchloh 1982:28–35).

According to Buchloh's list, appropriation's theoretical aims are achieved in some measure in both Seth's 'Clyde Fans Book One', the fictional

project of Pierre Menard and my own Drawing Experiment One. These projects bring about changes in the meaning of various forms of expression by changing the situation in which the expression occurs. In Buchloh's terms, these changes act to question historical validity. They substitute one set of contemporary codes for another. In these three projects, this comes about through a revision of the subjectivity, times and relative diegetic positions that each form of expression entails. Each project either establishes a new self-identity or creates the possibility of one.

In Buchloh's terms, to question the validity of a contemporary code is to reform the intersubjective relationships it represents, revising the subject, shifting all of the temporal indices and changing the meaning of the situation. This is achieved in Drawing Demonstration One and in Pierre Menard's project. To 'adopt historical models' is to revise one's self according to a fixed definition of other times, people and situations, as a way of revising one's relationship to them. This is what Seth achieves in 'Clyde Fans'.

These descriptions of the aims of appropriation reflect Debord's 1956 use of the term 'détournement' ('hijacking') to describe the possibilities of shifts in relative subjectivity. His descriptions of methods of hijack fulfil Buchloh's aims. He describes three methods: hijacking by re-contextualisation, hijacking by addition and hijacking by radical re-naming.

Hijacking by re-contextualisation involves "...the détournement of an intrinsically significant element which derives a different scope from a new context" (Debord 1956/1981).

He provides and example of hijacking by addition: "Griffith's *Birth of a Nation* is one of the most important films in the history of cinema... On the one

hand it is a racist film and therefore does not merit being shown in the present form... It would be better to détourn it as a whole.., by adding a soundtrack that made a powerful denumciation of... the activities of the Ku Klux Klan... Such a détournement is in the final analysis nothing more than the moral equivalent of the restoration of old paintings in museums." (Debord 1956/1981)

He also provides an example of hijacking by radical re-naming: "In music a title always exerts a great influence, yet the choice of one is quite arbitrary. Thus it wouldn't be a bad idea to make a final correction to the title of the 'Eroica Symphony' by changing it, for example, to the 'Lenin Symphony'." (Debord 1956/1981).

Hijacking also achieves exactly the aim ascribed by Kruger to her own visual work. She argues that " In most work, received images and words are arranged and aligned to produce assigned meanings. I am engaged in re-arranging and re-aligning these dominant assignments." and that "...in order to take part in a systematic critique rather than a merely substitutional one, one should work to foreground the relations and hierarchies that constitute power,.." (Stephanson 1987:55–59).

Kruger's theoretical strategy of bringing about a shift in subjectivity through a radical change in context provides the particular flavour of overt struggle and social antagonism that underlies Buchloh's descriptions of the aims of appropriation. "In the 1980's, appropriation came to be seen as one particularly effective means to reveal the working mechanisms of various cultural, social and psychic institutions – and thus considerations of subjectivity and identity necessarily surfaced..." (Burton 2004).

Levine and Evans

The appropriationists' critical antagonism represents a particular approach to intersubjective relationships evidenced in Sherrie Levine's photograph 'Untitled: After Walker Evans' (Illustration 27, Page 245), made in 1979.

Levine photographed a lithographic reproduction in a book of a photograph made by Walker Evans (Evans 1978). Evans' photograph depicts Alabama sharecropper Allie Mae Burroughs (Illustration 28, Page 246). Levine's photograph appears to be identical to Evans' photograph. Art historian Gerald Marzolati writes "By literally taking the pictures she did, and then showing them as hers, (Levine) wanted it understood that she was flatly questioning... those most hallowed principles of art in the modern era: originality, intention, expression." (Marzolati 1986:91).

The principles of art that Marzolati lists: originality, intention and expression require socially stable relationships between subjects. In making 'Untitled: After Walker Evans' Levine's project aimed to bring about a change in relative subjectivity in order to reveal that subjectivity through the change itself. The project takes Debord's methods of hijack at face value, as re-attribution, although this isn't precisely what occurs in Levine's image.

Levine does not take the subjective position occupied by Evans, although she 'takes' Evans' image (to use Marzolati's word). The title of her work itself describes a relationship to Evans' photograph. This alone distinguishes it from Evans' photograph, although the image appears to be the same.

When we see Levine's photograph, Levine has already seen Evan's photograph. It forms part of the canon of twentieth century American photography.

It is already a physical form of expression. Because of this, Levine's photograph is an image of a photograph by Evans, made by Levine. We don't mistake it for the photograph by Evans itself. If we do, the meaning of Levine's image disappears, Levine's subjectivity disappears and we are simply back with Evans' photograph.

However, we don't have the choice of not having seen Evans' photograph. Seeing either image, we don't decide between authors. There are always two images and two authors in Levine's image. Evan's photograph exists as an image. Levine's photograph is an image of that image. It is an image by Levine of an image by Walker Evans.

Levine doesn't adopt Evans' subjective position in relation to his own photograph. Her re-attribution is not really a re-attribution at all, because she doesn't do what Evans did. Evans made a new Evans. Levine does not re-constitute Evans' subjectivity, she simply uses Evans' image to embody and reify her own. We know this because we know Evans' image already, It is part of the story of Levine's image, the past of that image's creation and the series of subjective relationships it represents.

Levine's image only relates Evans' subjective position in the form of commentary. Levine's photograph is one artwork commenting on another artwork. It comments on Evan's social position, as a critique of one subjective position from another, categorically dissimilar one.

Levine's work entrenches rather than shifts her position within the intersubjective relationship of which Evans' image is a part. Her photograph communicates her specific subjectivity rather than transforming it. Although it makes visible the structure of the relations that position both her subjectivity and

Evans' subjectivity, the project does not fulfill Kruger's aim of systematic, reforming critique. Levine's photograph reveals the relationship between her and Evans, but they both remain as they were.

The approach to subjectivity expressed in Levine's work is characteristic of the small number of writers and artists' work that I have drawn upon. It contrasts with the reformations of self attempted in Seth's work, in Borges' story or my Drawing Experiment One. Buchloh characterises appropriation as a posture of radical subjectivity rather than an effective project. For him, appropriation reveals the subjective relationships that exist between people whilst leaving them unchanged (Buchloh 1982:28–35).

The language used by appropriation artists and writers to describe what they were doing makes this clear. Appropriation is a process of consolidating rather than changing established subjective positions. Marzolati, Graw, and Debord describe the subject as a property to be stolen, confiscated, dispossessed or hijacked ((Marzolati 1986:91, Graw 2004:59, Debord 1956/1981). Buchloh describes the subject as a quality (authority) to be usurped (Buchloh 1982:28–35). Kruger and Richard Prince aim to silence the subject and speak on its behalf through ventriloquism and play-acting (Stephenson 1987:55–59, Halley 1984).

The use of these words requires that the protagonists remain who they are in each case. Each word represents an assault on one subject by another. The identity of these subjects does not change as a result of this assault. This is what occurs in the case of Levine's 'taking' of Evan's image.

In this sense, all of these words describe types of commentary. A thief does not gain ownership of a property through the act of stealing. Neither does an

actor become the fictional character whose part they play. Nor does a ventriloquist become a god. Rather, one subjective position is reinforced in relation to the other through the adoption of the appearance of that through which it aims to transform itself. A thief remains a thief through the act of stealing.

Alternatively, Seth seeks to transform himself *as himself* by self-consciously delimiting the possibilities of his reading. Pierre Menard seeks self-transformation through writing, *himself*, another's text. Levine's photograph comments on Evans' photograph and she remains who she is. This is what Bakhtin means when he writes "...stylising discourse by attributing it to another person often becomes parodic,.. since another's word, having been at an earlier stage internally persuasive,.. frequently begins to sound with no parodic overtones at all." (Bakhtin 1981:348)

Bakhtin's commentary anticipates Buchloh's ultimate criticism of the appropriation project. "Parodistic appropriation reveals the divided situation of the individual in contemporary artistic practice. The individual must claim the constitution of the self in original primary utterances, while being painfully aware of the degree of determination necessary to inscribe the utterance into dominant conventions and rules of codification:... Parodistic appropriation anticipates the failure of any attempt to subvert the ruling codification and allies itself, in advance, with the powers that will ultimately turn its deconstructive efforts into cultural success," (Buchloh 1982:28–35).

The 'double bind' that Buchloh describes is an unequal struggle that creates the sense of social antagonism in appropriation. It ultimately entrenches the subject in relation to the stolen, hijacked and ventriloquised subjectivity of others.

Self-observation and social consensus

Levine's 'Untitled: After Walker Evans' can be described as commentary because it remains within a stable structure of social relationships, even if it seeks to destabilise that structure. The photograph does not change what Bakhtin calls the 'horizon of expectations' (Duff 2000:Bakhtin 1952/1983:131) but appears entirely within them.

For Bakhtin, these horizons of expectation are the socially agreed functions of any form of expression. I. R. Titunik writes that these consensually agreed horizons of expectation are not "... defined by the components of a work... but by sets of... works which, in effect define them." (Vološinov 1929/1973:184). Bakhtin writes: "...each... genre within an epoch or trend, is typified by its own special sense and understanding of the reader, listener, public or people... (I)n addition to those real meanings and ideas of one's addressee... there are also conventional... images of substitute authors, editors and various kinds of narrators (included in each genre)...", which are views of others constrained by convention, so that "... genres cannot be deduced or defined but only historically determined, delimited and described." (Duff 2000:Bakhtin 1952/1983:131).

Every subject exists within specific intersubjective constraints that appear as social conventions. Bakhtin continues "If one follows the fundamental rule of the historicisation of the concept of form, and sees the history of... genres as a temporal process of the continual founding and altering of horizons, then the metaphorics of the courses of development, function and decay can be replaced by the nonteleological concept of the playing out of a limited number of possibilities." (Duff 2000:Bakhtin 1952/1983:132).

Therefore, social conventions derive from self-observation as a way of defining ourselves in relation to other people. The horizon of expectation in any situation describes both a self-constraint and a social mandate.

We should understand that self-observation is distinct from self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is our capacity both to be subjects and to know that we are subjects. Self-observation is our capacity to scrutinise and constrain our subjectivity by adopting a socially agreed point of view.

This distinction is the basis for Buchloh's criticism of appropriation. Appropriation fails to change the intersubjective relationships that make the physical forms of expression meaningful. As a result, it re-enforces those relationships, even if it reveals what they are. The horizon of expectation remains the same in each case. Although Levine and Kruger aimed to change the social milieu in which Walker Evans' photograph is a valuable masterpiece, their activities simply conformed to the social constraints upon which that milieu is based, turning their works into valuable masterpieces also.

Crossley writes that self-observation is "... achieved by way of the mediation of practices which are,.. diffused within and derived from a collective... Viewing ourselves from the perspective of others is part of a process whereby certain impulses and actions are inhibited or controlled." (Crossley 2006:10). He continues "..much of what seems personal and natural, because it has become part of us, derives from the social world." (Crossley 2006: 03).

We do not habitually recognise the social constraints that constitute self-observation. They manifest social equilibrium, only becoming visible when that equilibrium is disturbed in some type of social crisis or when we depart from

socially agreed ways of acting. Kruger describes this invisible equilibrium as 'power's self-effacement', meaning the social relationships that locate power [Stephanson 1987:55–59]).

As Douglas Wolk writes "(social conventions)...operate at a level so deeply entrenched that they can be hard to notice or can be taken for granted." (Wolk 2007:21). For Mead, this intersubjective equilibrium constitutes society, the genre of genres (Mead 1967). It is the mediation of self in relation to others, through the constraining function of self-observation. Crossley also describes self-observation as a definition of citizenship. It is the faculty for recognising one's subjectivity in relation to others as part of a group. Society is the body of consensus represented by constrained forms of expression, as a 'generalised other' as Mead puts it (Crossley 1996:65–66).

The relationships between members of a group are predicated upon the relative authority of the participants within the constraints generated by self-observation. Mead argues that each subject seeks recognition and validation from others through self-observation. This subjective search for distinction is socialised in power relations, which carry relative moral weights, good and bad. According to sociologist Erving Goffman, every self-observation is constrained by convention, so that"...our intersubjective situations are governed by rules of interaction... (A) sustainable sense of self is intimately bound to these rules. We must abide by... such rules... if a (socially normative) sense of self is to be preserved." (Goffman 1968).

Matt Madden's exercises with drawing style

Comic strip artist Matt Madden aims to explore the constraining function of self-observation in '99 Ways to Tell a Story: Exercises in Style', published in 2006. Madden's book follows Raymond Queneau's literary experiment 'Exercises in Style' of 1947, in which Queneau tells the same short story ninety-nine times, each in a different literary style, mode or genre. (Queneau 1947).

Madden extrapolates this model as visual narrative, providing a 'template' or originating story of one page in length and then ninety-nine versions of that story in different visual narrative styles, modes or genres. (Madden 2006). Madden's exercises reveal how completely dominant, subtle and comprehensive the effects of self-observation are.

Madden's ninety-nine visual narratives are almost entirely unsuccessful. Each of them is more or less unsuccessful for a wide range of practical reasons particular to each. Douglas Wolk identifies the underlying reason for the failure of Madden's exercises. He writes: "Almost all the book's examples look like Matt Madden drawings, with his characteristic line and visual tone." (Wolk 2007:49).

This reason covers a great deal of ground very succinctly. Madden aims to tell a single story in a number of visual narrative production styles. All of these re-tellings look like his own narrative drawings. Rather than manipulate the agreed forms of expression that represent subjective self-observation, Madden remains unselfconsciously in their sway. Wolk only sees Madden's subjectivity in each drawing, even though the aim of each exercise is to draw each page within a different generic constraint.

Madden's aim in each exercise is similar to my aim in Drawing Demonstration One. He aims to make a new expression by adopting another subject's forms of self-expression. However, Madden's exercises differ from Drawing Demonstration One in a number of ways.

In some of his exercises, he aims to adopt the forms of expression of a named narrator, as I did in Drawing Demonstration One with Medway, Mignola and Ware. In other exercises, he aims to adopt forms of expression that belong to a socially agreed horizon of expectation. These exercises aim to adopt socially agreed forms belonging to genres rather than particular artists. In each case, these socially agreed forms represent a 'generalised other'. In these exercises, Madden draws pages according to self-observation, aiming to submit to generic constraints and draw in generic styles as a result.

We can take three of Madden's drawings as examples. I will not undertake the kind of comparative formal analysis of examples of the genres in which Madden aims to draw, as I did with the work of the artists I included in Drawing Demonstration One. It is relatively easy to catalogue a long list of comparative dissimilarities between Madden's drawings and existing examples from each genre. It is enough to identify one or two formal phenomena that communicate Madden's subjectivity very clearly, making his drawings uncharacteristic of the genres in which they are supposed to appear.

First, consider the template story (Maddon 2006: 03 [Illustration 28, Page 246). Then consider the story titled 'Ligne Claire' (Clear Line) (Maddon 2006: 91 [Illustration 29, Page 247]). The term 'clear line' describes a whole school of largely Belgian comic production in the post-War period, exemplified by Edgar P. Jacobs and Hergé (Georges Remi).

However, Madden's page specifically refers to the times, situations and characteristics of Hergé's most famous character, Tintin. This drawing can be considered to be in the style of Hergé, rather than simply as a 'clear line' drawing. Madden's character even wears plus-four trousers and straight-laced Oxford shoes, imitating Tintin's appearance and acting in part to establish a historical time for the plot. Madden's character could be in fancy dress, of course, but no-one works at their desk at home in fancy dress, particularly not in the context of a drawing exercise like this.

Two physical aspects of the drawing mitigate against reading it as a new drawing by Hergé, instead telling us that it is a drawing by Madden. First, the palette of colours used in the drawing is contemporary, although the local colours of things in the plot refer to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, the colours above and below the dado rail follow a recognisably pre-War institutional form, even as the colours themselves do not. These colours appear to be Madden's rather than Hergé's because of the specific light and air depicted in the plot. I only derive this information from the palette in this case.

One of the major signifiers of 'clear line' is the distinct quality of light and air, which always belongs to the time of the plot, which is always contemporaneous with the time of production, and which is now entirely understood as belonging to the period 1945 – 1960. This is not the light or air in Madden's drawing, because his colours are not 'clear line' colours. Instead, they seem inexpertly chosen in the present. This is not a judgement of value, but a result of a comparison between a below-the-dado colour of the 1940s as depicted by Hergé and the colour chosen by Madden. If we look at an example of a page

drawn by Hergé, the comparison between different types of light and air in the two drawings is very clear (Hergé 1947:07 [Illustration 30, Page 248]).

The spiral staircase provides a more straightforward anachronism. It is not that Hergé never told a story featuring a spiral staircase. I cannot be entirely sure that that is true, even if I were a Hergé scholar, but if Hergé had, it would not have looked like Madden's spiral staircase. It is the manner of depiction that is anachronistic, more than the depicted object.

Consider two further exercises by Madden: 'Fantasy' (Madden 2006:49 [Illustration 31, Page 249]) and 'Exercises in Love' (Madden 2006:47). 'Fantasy' and 'Exercises in Love' are drawings in identifiable genres of comics production rather than in a form associated with a particular author. The subjectivity they embody is no less profoundly specific for that. Both of these drawings aim to embody a generalised other as a constraint on the from in which they are expressed.

In the case of 'Fantasy', the incoherence of the story is enough to represent Madden's subjectivity, immediately contradicting the genre. In my narrative model, the story is identified as everything required causally by the plot, but not told about in the plot itself. For example, when we meet Madden's character in the template story for the first time, he is a young man. But we know that to be a young man when we first encounter him, he needs to have been a younger man, a child and a baby, to have a mother and father, to have grown up, and so forth to the point we meet him, even though non of this information appears in the plot.

The fantasy genre relies particularly on the presence of as complete a story as possible, due to the fact that the fictional worlds it creates are very distinct

from our own. We cannot apply any of the rules of our world to the 'Fantasy' genre's fictional worlds.

Within fantasy stories, physical laws as well as cultural conventions have to be built entirely from scratch. However, Madden's 'Fantasy' exercise does not take this prescription seriously, even though it is a central characteristic of the genre. As a result, despite the appearance of swords, false runes and specific visual references to other accomplished works of the genre, Madden's drawing makes no sense.

If we compare it to an actual fantasy page, the importance of the story to the plausibility of the plot and to the genre itself is identifiable in the way that fictional place names, locations and relative historical times are used (Windsor-Smith 1972:15 [Illustration 32, Page 250]). In Madden's drawing, character names Ma'at Madiin, Rolgan and Silverchime and place names Astar Ga'al, Oun-Al and Necrothania have no causal function in the plot. Neither do the false runes, swords and ash trees. Although they occupy the functional positions of names that should represent a coherent, complex past, they do not in fact refer to anything, except the moment on the page in which they appear. As a consequence, they have only a tenuous relationship to the plot and its future.

In contrast, if we consider the names in Windsor-Smith's drawing, the names used are immediately part of an imagined larger history, interrelated in clear and specific ways, even when the plot only provides an obvious fragment of a much larger whole. In a single page of Windsor-Smith, the history of the world of Conan is made particular. In Madden's drawing, the name Ma'at Madiin is a joke outside the plot. It has no history, no story, no world of cause and effect. It derives from Madden's world as a metatextual pun on Matt Madden.

'Exercises in Love', (Illustration 33, Page 251) attempts to tell the template story as it might have been told by any of the (usually anonymous, male) comic strip artists working on comics for teenagers and young people in the American 1940s and 1950s. As historian Jenny Millar has written: "Their protagonists were almost always working women, and their problems were often quite realistic. Workplace power struggles between the sexes, out-of-wedlock children, marital infidelity, and divorce were tackled between stories of pure escapist fantasy. In this manner, romance comics responded to needs that were historically significant: young, working women saw representations of themselves as intelligent, modern people – people who valued love and dreamt of romance, but who also negotiated life in the real world." (Millar 2010).

In this exercise, Madden's character, male throughout the rest of his exercises, is a woman. Similarly with Madden's 'Fantasy' drawing, this change in gender appears to have no story. There appears to be no reason why Madden's character is a woman and the protagonist a man. There is no emotional relationship with the other protagonist in the plot. This is obvious comparing 'Exercises in Love' to the template story, in which Madden's relationship with the woman upstairs appears specific. In 'Exercises in Love', Madden adopts the slightest generic forms and expects them to constitute the genre. They do not.

Formally, "Exercises in Love', with its lack of contrast in particular, depicts environmental and emotional conditions that are antithetical to the Romance genre. Romance is typified through the depiction of strong shadows, tenebrous light and polished and glossy surfaces. These contribute to the appearance of the air as thick, plastic and luminous. The underlying emotional

tone of the plot is dramatic, passionate, barely controlled and holding the possibility of violence.

The light in 'Exercises in Love' is, by contrast, thin. The emotional tone is one of ambivalence and detachment. These differences are the result of Madden's depictive techniques, compared to the depictive techniques typical of the genre. They contribute to the sense that the drawing is not an expression formed under the constraint of self-observation, within a genre, so much as it is Madden's own drawing. The difference in light is entirely the result of how the drawing is made. It defines the types of materials, physical bodies and gravitational pull in the depicted world. Madden's bodies are thinner than they should be in genre. The clothes his characters wear are less weighty and layered, his spaces are shallower, his objects lighter, the colours are less precisely defined by period and less dark in tone. This is communicated specifically through the weight, density and action of Madden's drawn marks.

Consider an example of an anonymously drawn page from a Romance comic from the period when they were at their most popular. The differences of production and the profound effect on the plot that these differences make communicate Madden's confirmed subjectivity. They lie outside the genre within which he aims to (Anonymous 1956:06 [Illustration 34, Page 252]).

Reading '99 Ways to Tell a Story' as a whole, we gain a sense of a unified narrative voice. The exercises accumulate and the differences between them become increasingly inconsequential. Inversely, the sense of an accumulation of different narrative voices in the book decreases. These voices reach a point of implausibility as the characters and situations that represent them become less specific. They appear casually objectified by Madden. They are

simply emblems standing for the constrained forms of expression that each exercise is supposed to adopt.

Had '99 Ways to Tell a Story' been successful, it would have been a unique, self-consciously-made representation of the constraining effect of self-observation. It would have presented ninety-nine drawings that re-told the template story as though socially constrained in ninety-nine different ways. These social constraints would have made specific physical traces representatives of ninety-nine generalised others. We would have understood each of these embodiments as a manipulation of the situation of our reading by Madden. The project would have brought about a change in Madden's relative subjectivity and at the same time revealed the function of self-observation as a social constraint.

Drawing Demonstration Two

Appropriation and constraining self-observation provides an introduction to Drawing Demonstration Two. This Demonstration is designed to explore further some of the ways in which social consensus and self-observation constrain subjectivity. The general terms that framed Drawing Demonstration One can also be applied to this experiment.

To reiterate these terms, Bakhtin writes "...(V)ariants on the theme of another's discourse are widespread in all areas of creative, ideological activity,... such an exposition is always a free stylistic variation on an another's discourse, it expounds another's thought in the style of that thought, even while applying it to new material, to another way of posing the problem; it conducts experiments and gets solutions in the language of another's discourse (my italics), ...there is no external imitation, no simple act of reproduction, but rather a further, creative

development of another's... discourse in a new context and under new conditions." (Bakhtin 1981:347),

Drawing Demonstration Two presents the same problems as Drawing Demonstration One. These problems submit to the same solutions. These problems are: the self-conscious recognition of my own subjectivity and the unique situation of my utterance; the adoption of another's written script as control in the production of new visual narrative utterances and the recognition of that choice of script as part of the material form of the utterance. Accepting these terms, Drawing Demonstration Two aims to focus on the consensual aspect of self-observation, the social constraint that functions to mediate the self.

In Drawing Demonstration One I adopted another person's forms of self-expression in order to make a new expression. In Drawing Demonstration Two I will aim to make a series of new drawings under the constraints of a recognised horizon of expectation by scrutinising my own actions. In effect, this theoretical self-positioning views both social constraint and self in a contradictory situation based upon an impossible premise. As with Drawing Demonstration One, however, the unavoidable nature of this self-conscious subjectivity is one of the accepted terms of the Demonstration. From the position of a reader, I can employ my subjectivity as a complete guide.

In Drawing Demonstration Two, I will not attempt to adopt the forms of other people's self-expression, as I did with Chris Ware, Mike Mignola and Jim Medway. The generalised others of social consensus are only typified. That is the definition of the horizon of expectation. For example, the work of the most typical superhero comic strip artist is never entirely representative of the superhero genre

nor does the genre ever entirely describe the work of the artist, although the genre itself is fully describable in very great detail.

In Drawing Demonstration Two, I will adopt the forms of expression of a group of people constrained by social consensus and whose forms of expression I read through that constraint. These people are the formal exponents of genres. I perceive the constraint under which they have expressed themselves as typification. They constitute a generalised other.

It is these constraints that Drawing Demonstration Two will seek to visualise. I can only approach the forms of expression that create a genre as typified forms of expression.

There is a distinction between the aim of Drawing Demonstration Two and Seth's aim to draw as though the experiences of America post-1955 did not exist. Seth's project is not to submit to the social constraints dictated by a generalised other, but rather to constrain his own self-expression as a tool of that self-expression. Seth's work never actually appears as though it was made before 1955 (when a comic strip like 'Clyde Fans Book One'didn't exist). Seth's work utilises and presents typification as a resource, but this utilisation never contradicts or overrides the constraints under which Seth himself works as a contemporary subject. Seth's adoption of a particular constraint is never anything but a characteristic of the time and place of Seth's own self-observation and Seth's own self-expression.

Drawing Demonstration Two method

In Drawing Demonstration Two I took a script from a source album and made use of it as the plot of three new drawings. I used the same script and

source as control for each drawing. The three drawings all aimed to be constrained by generalisations relative to each other. They are three examples of the same type of form of expression. All three are generic.

I used the script from Jim Medway's 'Teen Witch', extrapolated, discussed and illustrated in the last Chapter (Illustration 08, Page 180). I aimed to use as much of the script as possible to draw a page that might have been drawn by a Romance or Romance/Action genre comic artist in (a) the 1950s, (b) the 1960s and (c) the 1970s. I shall call these Demonstration Two(1950s), Two(1960s) and Two(1970s).

Rather than focus on the work of a single named artist, my reading of works from each decade in the genre sought to establish different types of specification than those used in Demonstration One. These were generalisations. In attempting to make drawings within formal generic constraints, I attempted to place myself in a characteristic relationship with the material and to visualise that relationship.

To begin Demonstration Two(1950s), I read works by comic artists Johnny Craig, Will Eisner (Illustration 35, Page 253), Milton Caniff (Illustration 36, Page 254), Harvey Kurtzman, Wallace Wood and Frank Hampson.

For Demonstration Two(1960s), I read works by Kurt Schaffenburger, Luis Garcia (Illustration 37, Page 255), Curt Swan and the anonymous artists of pages in 1960s editions of 'Jackie', the British weekly paper for teenage girls (Illustration 38, Page 256).

For Demonstration Two(1970s), I read works by Martin Ashbury, Purita Campos, Frank Langford and also the anonymous artists of pages in 1970s editions of 'Jackie' (Illustration 39, Page 257).

These artists' works are highly distinctive, but they share characteristics that I identified as specifications in each historic period. These were similarities in their forms of expression. I identified similarities of structure in each period, such as the layout of pages, grid templates, type-faces and drawing technology. I also identified general similarities of production, in methods of depiction, similarities of plot (the types of actions and the types of people undertaking them, as well as the light, smell and material of the depicted worlds) and of story (the social, environmental and economic histories of the protagonists in the plots).

In compiling these specifications I was guided by my reading alone. The specifications provided a general description of the historic period in each case. I used my own perception as a *complete* guide, in that distinctions that I made about the forms of expression could only be made according to their relation to me. This was much more difficult in this Demonstration, as the field of possibilities is vast. It constitutes the whole body of forms of expression of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.

Any distinction that I made I was able to contradict immediately. For example, for every comic page made in the 1950s in the Romance or Adventure/Romance genre with a nine panel grid template, there is one with a twelve panel grid template. Both forms are characteristic of the decade. Fortunately, this difficulty represents the method of Drawing Demonstration Two: making subjective distinctions about types of form and submitting to these distinctions as constraints.

As an aid to doing this with comic pages in each period, I attempted briefly to identify similar typical forms in films, literature, fashions for women and

alcoholic drinks in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Taking my own experience of these things as a complete taxonomy, I noted simply what came to mind. In the 1950s in film, the work of Welles. In literature, the work of Hemingway. In fashion, the work of Balenciaga. I could not identify a typical alcoholic drink of the 1950s.

In the 1960s in film, the work of Antonioni came to mind. In literature, Spark. In fashion, Quant. The vodka martini provided the typical drink of the 1960s. In the 1970s in film, I thought of the work of Polanski. In literature, Drabble. In fashion, C&A. Campari was the drink that sprang to mind for the 1970s.

Although frivolous, this exercise was not methodologically flawed. It was useful in affirming that the list of specifications that I was aiming to compile in order to make generic drawings in each case were less a matter of historical record and more a subjective sense of relative possibilities and impossibilities. The criteria for selection rested entirely with me.

In this exercise with film, literature, fashion and drinks, I spontaneously produced names with which to identify generalities. Typification was embodied immediately as a particular author, auteur or brand. I used the name to indicate not only these people's own forms of expression, but typify whole cultural sectors in each decade.

Returning to my comics reading for Drawing Demonstration Two, I identified general formal differences between each of the three periods of production. Individual differences in page sizes over thirty years in the genre were insignificant, around a general size of 25cm high x 21cm wide. Grid templates in the 1950s were more likely to be made of nine panels, changing in the 1960s and 1970s to much more dense grids of up to thirty panels.

Page layout became more complex over thirty years. From scenes in the 1950s being viewed comprehensively through the frame of each cell, by the 1970s, cells and gutters no longer appear as elements in themselves and the boundaries of each scene are created by elements in each scene itself, relative to other scenes on the page.

Use of points of view in each scene also changes, with greater use of extreme juxtapositions in scale in the 1970s, allied to the disappearance of cells and gutters. Text in speech balloons, thought bubbles and narration spaces became increasingly small and in the 1960s and 1970s was mechanically produced, as opposed to the hand-inked text of the 1950s.

Pages were still black and white. They were still produced by teams of people with the penciller and inker increasingly becoming the same artist in the 1960s and 1970s. The production of drawings is very different in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The use of ink and brush in the 1950s depicts glossy and dense materials viewed in a thick and luminous atmosphere.

Ink and brush builds high contrasts and deep modelling. Subsequent variations in the physical attack of a nib as well as a brush in the 1960s creates a depictive protocol where thick lines define silhouettes and thin lines define interior details, almost without other contrasts. This creates a world of bright, even light and plain material surfaces. In the 1970s, there is an increased range of types of attack with nib and brush, utilising much more rapidly made marks to depict varied textures, patterns and details in a fretwork of different lights and material conditions.

Alongside these technical specifications were others, equally important. I chose the script extrapolated from Medway's work because its main

protagonists are women. The Romance/Adventure Romance genre in the period in view differs from pre-World War Two Romance in that it was increasingly made for young women only and not for young women and young men: stories about young women for young women to read.

In the 1970s in particular, this trend towards young women-centred stories for young women found another, perhaps coincidental, corollary in the increased number of women artists drawing these comics who emerged from the business of fashion illustration (Gibson 2000). The appearance of a waitress with a secret identity as a witch (and the magic itself) in the script supports more than it contradicts specifications for the genre across all three periods.

The types of women who appear in each period also change. The activities of dining and waitressing seem more adult in the 1950s than in the other two periods. In the 1950s there is no distinction made in terms of appearance and behaviour between a woman of eighteen years of age and one of forty. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the women seem younger, their behaviour less formal and the distinction between them and older people more definite and between themselves less definite. The social distinction between Zoe (as waitress) and Perla (as diner) is less pronounced in the 1960s ad 1970s. Distinction is a matter of personality rather than status. Perla's behaviour is entirely personally bad in the 1970s particularly, rather than institutionally bad, as it is in the 1950s.

With these specifications in mind, I established grid templates for each drawing. These comprised a nine panel grid for the 1950s (three by three), and a thirty panel for the 1960s and 1970s (five across and six down). I made page layouts and storyboards for each drawing from the script (Illustrations 40–42,

Pages 258–260) and completed the three final drawings (Illustrations 43–45, Pages 261–263).

Drawing Demonstration Two analysis

Looking at these drawings, I feel none of the unease that I felt looking at the final drawings in Drawing Demonstration One. I think this is due to the fact that there is no doubling of the subject in the case of these drawings. There is no theoretical pretension to telling the story of a specific subject's self-expression. That was not the aim of this Demonstration.

Rather, I have subjectively embodied three types of social constraint, and attempted to visualise that constraint in the form of a generic drawing. To some degree, we do this every time we express ourselves. We represent the effects of the constraint of self-observation, dictated by knowledge of generalised others. In Drawing Demonstration One, here is no doubling of the subject. I embodied my own subjectivity in making these drawings, albeit in a self-conscious way and with a specific aim. The degree to which Drawing Demonstration Two succeeds or fails is indicated by the degree to which I have recognised and submitted to specific constraints, allowing my self-observation to dominate my drawings

If we recall Buchloh's description of the dominance of self-observation in relation to Drawing Demonstration Two, it is possible to see how consensus not only creates authority, but how the functioning of that consensus in self-observation is authoritarian.

Bakhtin describes the relationship of the subject to consensus, achieved through self-observation, as "(t)he tendency to assimilate other's

discourse (which) takes on a deeper and more basic significance in an individual's ideological becoming,... (A)nother's discourse performs here no longer as information, directions, rules, models and do forth – but strives rather to determine the very bases of our ideological interrelations with the world, the very basis of our behaviour:.. it performs here as *authoritarian discourse* and an *internally persuasive discourse...*" (Bakhtin 1981:342).

He concludes that every form of expression constitutes a relationship of relative constraints. Every relationship reflects the relative authority of its participants, derived from the intersubjective effect of self-observation in relation to the generalised other. He writes "(t)he degree to which (an utterance) may be conjoined with authority... is what determines its specific demarcation and individuation..." ..." (Bakhtin 1981:343). The production of agreed forms of other people's expression in a situation that is both self-observed and socially recognised represents the authority of the generalised other in the relationship to self.

In classical rhetoric, this identification with the authority of a consensually-created 'other' was used to project that authority as one's own. This was called 'prosopopoeia' or the formalised act of speaking as another subject. It is not a simple device. It requires the manipulation of the relative subjective positions that generate the complex intersubjectivity of any form of expression. It is described by Roman rhetorician Quintillian. He writes that it is utilised to "..display the thoughts of our opponents, as they themselves would do in soliloquy,..", It is not imitation, in which the speaker remains fully an embodied subject recognisably adopting another's subjective position. It is self-conscious identification, with its consequent loss of identity.

The plausibility of the adoption is part of the authority of the rhetorical act. Quintillian continues: "...our inventions of that sort will meet with credit only so far as we represent people saying what it is not unreasonable to suppose that they may have meditated;.." (Quintillian 1920). This plausibility is founded in self-scrutiny and social convention.

Utilising prosopopoeia, any authoritative position can be identified-with and spoken from as long as it is a generic position "...to bring down the the gods from heaven, evoke the dead and give voices to cities and states." (Quintillian 1920). Connor notes the authoritarian character of ventriloquism, which is a type of propopoeia, in which the self-observed self dominates as a "...violence towards the one that is ventriloquised or reduced to the condition of a dummy,.." so that "(t)he ventriloquist... generously blended his life into the lives he borrowed..." This generosity is the capacity to subsume our subjectivity in genre and submit to self-observation without a struggle.

Conclusion

This study argues that the experience of reading comics is comprehensible as a series of intersubjective relationships represented in physical form. Considering concepts of self-consciousness, perception, embodiment and social experience, it develops a narrative model that brings the physical forms of self-expression into a series of relationships generated and made meaningful to embodied subjects.

To make and substantiate this argument, I refer to, analyse and seek to develop the theoretical work of a minority of comics narratologists. In particular, theorists that have made the relationship between content, form and enunciative context, rather than focussing on the study of enunciation alone.

By doing this, I have developed an argument that runs in some ways counter to the dominant tendency in the field of contemporary English language comics narratology.

My argument is built on the assumption that the field of comics narratology is so small that comic narratologists cannot afford to neglect the work of scholars who take diverse approaches. This is particularly so in cases where this theoretical work begs questions that establish clear directions for further study. I believe that this has been the case with Barker's approach in 'Comics: ideology, power and the critics' in relation to the current dominant approach in the field. This study addresses this state of affairs.

Inspired by Barker, I approach the experience of making and reading comic strips as a relationship between *histoire* and *discours*, understanding *discours* to be the social context in which enunciation takes

place as well as the form of enunciation itself. Also following Barker, I adopt a cross-disciplinary method in terms of theory, where cross-discplinarity is defined as the study of the relationship between the ideas, forms and methods of one discipline and another.

However, I adopt an interdisciplinary method in two practical Drawing Demonstrations. I make instrumental use of the forms and methods of studio practice to solve two theoretical problems posed as questions. To do this, I argue for practice-based research as problem solving rather than reporting, or post-hoc theorisation.

My argument has a main axis: readings of philosophical descriptions of self-consciousness and perception on one hand, and readings of the work of narratologists who focus on the relationship between *histoire* and *discours*, on the other. The work of the theorists I consider shares a dialogic approach to their individual studies, ultimately grounded in different ways of describing the relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness.

From these readings, I argue for physical embodiment as the arbiter of intersubjectivity both in co-presence and through technological trace. In this sense, the narrative model I construct maps the relationship between subjects and physical expressions. My naming of this narrative model repudiates models that study narrative as *histoire*, following both Ricoeur and Schütz, as do the practical outcomes of my two Demonstrations with narrative drawing.

Originality

Arising out of the minority approach that I take to comics narratology, my argument contains a number of points of originality in the field. Although my general approach has predecessors in the work of Barker, Baetens and Madden, my argument establishes a wider set of theoretical predecessors in works that I bring together for the first time.

Barker is unique in discussing in detail the experience of comics in relation to the ideas of Vološinov. Following Barkers approach, I frame the experience of making and reading comics relative to the ideas of theorists who share a dialogic approach across disciplines. This constitutes a new set of ideas from which my argument derives.

In selecting this new set, I also establish and describe original relationships between them. This is an advantage of cross-disciplinarity. Because the focus of cross-disciplinary study is the relationship between ideas, forms and methods from different disciplines, the selection of a set of these constitutes a point of view. In the case of my argument, this selection has not been made before in English language comics narratology.

The model of narrative that I describe is also original. Although it also has predecessors in the work of a number of narratologists and is repudiated by the approaches of others, the model is original in describing a specific reciprocal relationship that causally links *histoire* to the broadest field of *discours*, connecting enunciation, production and subjects. This reflects the relationship between self-consciousness and consciousness described by Merleau-Ponty and Schütz on one hand and Crossley's conditions of 'radical' intersubjectivity on the other.

My argument also includes two original analyses. The first of these is the comparison I make between the theory of comics strips' specific 'mediagenius' and conditions of intersubjectivity described by a number of theorists. This has not been undertaken before.

The second of these is my analysis of the Madden's work in terms of concepts of self-observation expressed as social constraint. Madden's work has not been considered in terms of the idea of 'horizons of expectation' or the idea of the 'generalised other' before.

Finally, my two Drawing Demonstrations provide a new example of interdisciplinarity. The methods they employ provide an original model of practice-based research following problem-solving approach. Constituted of both the framing of two theoretical problems and the demonstration of their solutions by the practical means of narrative drawing, they are original in the field of narratology.

Significance for the field

In a number of ways, my study holds the possibility of significance for the consideration of past work in the field of comics narratology and for future approaches to the field by others.

Principal amongst these is my development of Barker's approach and aspects of Barker's argument. In approaching comics narratology as a relationship between *histoire* and *discours*, this study adopts Barker's approach. In exploring the wider implications of the relationship between Vološinov's ideas and the experience of making and reading comics, which Barker describes, my argument augments and develops Barker's.

Because of this, my study provides opportunities for other comics narratologists to revisit 'Comics: ideology, power and the critics' and to consider how the application of both the approach and the ideas that it represents, can broaden the narratological study of comics further.

My study's debt to Barker provides two other possibilities of future significance for the field. First, the set of theorists work that my study establishes implies a new theoretical point of view in comics narratology. Second, as part of this new set, I explicitly link works by comics narratologists that have not necessarily been linked before: Barker, Baetens and Madden. This connection also provides a significant point of view for consideration.

My Drawing Demonstrations also hold the possibility of significance. They apply the problem-solving paradigm of practice-based research to a field that already contains a significant minority of practical theorists. This paradigm has never been made use of, or theorised, in the field before. The significance of these Demonstrations for the field lies in their methodology. Other practical theorisations have either utilised the medium of comics in order to communicate theoretical ideas as content (such as McCloud's), or presented practical work independent of an explicit theoretical frame (such as Madden's and Sikoryak's), opening them to non-theoretical readings. Uniquely, my Demonstrations provide a model that specifically frames theoretical problems in order to allow practical solutions.

For the field, my introduction of drawing as a reproducible method of also opens the practical work of other theorists to review. It may be significant in itself that my study approaches Madden's work as theoretical work, for example.

Relative to this is the possible significance of my Drawing Demonstrations for theories of production and drawing style. I argue broadly that self-consciousness constitutes intersubjectivity relative to the physical forms of expression, including technological trace. This argument reframes definitions of style and provides an opportunity for reading both comic strips themselves and narratological theories of comics in other ways.

Finally, my study is significant in that it develops a minority approach to comics narratology and this approach can be evaluated relative to majority alternatives. Broadly, in approaching *histoire* relative to *discours*, my argument represents an alternative to the dominant approach to *histoire*. Its significance lies in presenting the opportunity to further consider the relationship between the two approaches in the field.

Further research

The broad significance of my study lies in the development of a specific approach to comics narratology, and in the corollaries of that approach: it brings together a new set of works, connects works not connected before and focuses attention on specific predecessors.

So it is the approach itself that first begs questions in relation to other approaches in the field, as a topic for further study.

I identify my approach as the study of the relationships between *histoire* and *discours*. To what extent this description remains shorthand for more detailed distinctions is debateable (between approaches that consider wider contexts and those that consider medium and message).

For example, I correlate self-consciousness with intersibjectivity, and embodiment with the forms of expression. Narratologists who approach enunciation as medium and message might argue that media are embodied without any correlations with intersubjectivity. In other words, that they are objective. This is a significant topic for further study in the field.

My argument also provides three specific areas for further study. First, the model of narrative that I propose might be used instrumentally to analyse other experiences of reading comic strips. Further research would then constitute applying the model across a number of situations in order to establish what types of descriptions of intersubjective relationships it reveals.

Related to the instrumental application of the model, is the further application of Schütz theories to the making and reading of comics. Such an application suggests a detailed analysis of the levels on which intersubjects are represented in specific social situations, such as the production and consumption of comic strips, and the complex relationships between trace and subjects in social environments.

Finally, my argument implies a narratological reframing of theoretical discussions about drawing style, or the ways in which the physical marks on the page, produced by hand and machine, remain unique as narrative depiction, as index and as trace. Walton's identification of self-consciousness relative to trace, as the condition of depictive drawing, can be taken further when what is depicted is not a view, but a story.



Illustration 23 *Kripke, S. (1982)*

99

Illustration 24 *Seth* (2004:99)



Illustration 25 *Brown, C.* (2006:104)



Illustration 26 *Arno, P.* (1941)





Illustration 27 *Levine, S.* (1979) *and Evans, W.* (1936)

Illustration 28 *Madden, M.* (2007:3)

Illustration 29 *Madden, M.* (2007:91)



Illustration 30 *Herge* (1947:7)

Illustration 31 *Madden, M.* (2007:49)

Illustration 32 *Windsor-Smith, B.* (1972:15)

Illustration 33 *Madden, M.* (2007:47)

Illustration 34 *Anonymous (1956)*

Illustration 35 *Eisner, W.* (1949)

Illustration 36 *Caniff, M.* (1952)

Illustration 37 *Garcia, L.* (1964)



Illustration 38 *Anonymous* (1966)

Illustration 39 *Anonymous* (1975)



Illustration 40 *Grennan, S. (2010)*



Illustration 41 *Grennan, S. (2010)*



Illustration 42 Grennan, S. (2010)

Illustration 43 *Grennan, S.* As the 1950s *(2010)*



Illustration 44 *Grennan, S.* As the 1960s *(2010)*



Illustration 45 *Grennan, S.* As the 1970s *(2010)*

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