

**Affect, Assemblage and Modes of Existence.  
Towards an Ethological Design-Driven Social Innovation**

Jamie Brassett

Reader in Philosophy, Design and Innovation  
Subject Leader and MA Course Leader, Innovation Management  
Central Saint Martins  
University of the Arts London  
j.brassett@csm.arts.ac.uk

**Abstract:** Since Viktor Papanek, at least, the ethics of designing has been organised according to moral imperatives: be authentic not phony, take notice of needs not wants . . . and so on. The social innovation that drives its creative urge from design practices appears not to have strayed far from Papanek's path. To rid itself of such reactive ideologies, and so to create other conditions for the possibility of its creativity, design-driven social innovation might do well not merely to pitch itself as a morality articulated by, or in the thrall of, a transcendent authority, but maybe even to be occupied with different account of ethics altogether. This paper will seek to elucidate such a different ethics as an ethology along the lines Spinoza proposed and Deleuze championed. That is, it will therefore call for an affective designing that deals in the creation of modes of existence, from whose assemblages emerge other social and communal apparatuses. This paper is constructed of several sections – looking at assemblages (via Deleuze and Guattari and De Landa), affects (via Spinoza and Deleuze), modes of existence (via Souriau and Latour) – each of which is its own moment in this call with its own value and agenda, but with points of collision with the others. This paper will conclude by gesturing towards the type of social/collective that might emerge from this discussion.

**Keywords:** affect; assemblages; designing; innovation; modes of existence

**Affect, Assemblage and Modes of Existence.**  
**Towards an Ethological Design-Driven Social Innovation**  
Jamie Brassett

‘The use of philosophy is to maintain an active novelty of fundamental ideas illuminating the social system.’

Alfred North Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, p. 174

## **1. Opening remarks**

Recent times have seen the discourses around the social function, social responsibility and social responsiveness of design and innovation flourish.<sup>1</sup> For social design and innovation theorists and practitioners Lorraine Gamman and Adam Thorpe (2011b), for example, the designation *responsiveness* is preferred to *responsibility* as it encompasses a more robust call to action in concert with the many stakeholders, shareholders and other actors involved in any act of social design and innovation. While their overall mission seems valid and even laudable, it is the concept of *responsiveness* that I would like to focus on at the outset of this piece, in order to provide the germ – or, rather, the irritant – from which this essay will emerge. With responsiveness, then, we have connotations of reaction, an action taken as an effect of something else happening, a response; active rather than passive, yes, but an act that places agency for itself somewhere else. Gilles Deleuze begins the chapter of *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (1962) that deals with Nietzsche’s concepts of active and reactive forces, by discussing Spinoza’s conception of the body. I will return to Spinoza, Deleuze and the body below, but the way in which Deleuze characterises active and reactive in these terms is helpful now; he writes: ‘In

---

<sup>1</sup> See, for example: Mulgan (2007); Murray (2009); and Howaldt and Schwartz (2010); and with a focus on design: Gamman and Thorpe (2011a and 2011b); Manzini (2014 and 2015); and Telalbasić (2014).

a body the superior or dominant forces are called *active*, and the inferior or dominated ones *reactive*. Active and reactive are precisely the original qualities that express the relationships between forces' (Deleuze, 1962, p. 45; my translation). More than 20 years after writing this, and this time in relation to the work of his friend Michel Foucault, Deleuze (1986) will discuss the same kinds of imbalance between forces in terms of 'power', which is important now because I question socially responsive design's relations to power. If the reactive stance is one that determines, and is determined by, one's position of inferiority it leaves dubious a design that calls itself responsive while seeking to make positive social impact. While I may not necessarily deny the impetus that moves design-driven innovation away from activities of exploitation towards other less parasitical acts in the name of the social, I urge proponents of socially responsive design-driven innovation to articulate their activities in ways that do not demand, at worst, acceptance of, or at best reaction to, dominating discourses of power and the imbalance of forces that power requires.<sup>2</sup> In what follows I will offer a way to think about design-driven innovation and the social that begins to reconstruct them in terms of active agents in affective relations; that is not to react but to set the conditions according to which social and design-driven innovation action can take place. It will be important in this reconstruction not only to provide another way of doing ethics – as an affective ethology, to use Spinoza's and Deleuze's preferred phrase – but also to highlight the ontological conditions and expressions that all of this demands. To do this I will

---

<sup>2</sup> Design and philosophy researcher Matt Kiem (2011) makes a similar point while critiquing from a social and political philosophy perspective a particular social design/social innovation project – Emerging User Demands (EMUDE) by well-respected practitioners and theorists in this field Ezio Manzini and Anna Meroni (2007) – finding that it 'still remains allied to the structural conditions that maintain hegemonic unsustainability' (Kiem, 2011, p. 211).

engage with three things: first and foremost, with affect, as it is for rethinking ethics that Spinoza discusses affect. I do note that this would, ideally, also encounter politics – the preceding mention of power highlights this perfectly. I will defer such an investigation to another time, however, for brevity's sake; but ask that the ways in which such connections might be made be not forgotten.<sup>3</sup> Next, the concept of assemblage: for as Spinoza's affective ethology generates complex networks of things working in impactful and intensive relations to each other, the emerging wholes as assemblages need theoretical location. Third, this piece will also examine the concept of modes of existence, as the things that affect, in assemblages, will exhibit ways of being that are neither homogenised by form, function or material (following Spinoza), nor unified under transcendent ideas. The lesson for design-driven innovation in all this, is that an engagement with affective, assemblages of modes of existence will offer new ways of creating ethical ways of being, in differently constituted social groups, not simply responding to hegemonies of power and control as they are currently constructed.

I have positioned this paper so far in terms of a critique of socially responsive design seen as reactive. Before I move on, it is worth highlighting the wealth of work engaging with activist opportunities for and of design (e.g. Fuad-Luke, 2009; Julier, 2013a and 2013b; Hroch, 2015) and in distinction to the reactive characteristic of socially responsive design innovation as discussed. Guy Julier notes, for example, the ways in which his concept of 'design culture' (2013c)

---

<sup>3</sup> The current essay has a companion piece which is still in progress, 'Creating Modes of Existence. Towards an Ethological Design' that focuses upon the work of Gilbert Simondon (1989, 2005, 2009), with some mention of Alfred North Whitehead, while examining the collision of ontology and ethics. A further piece on *dispositif* as a design political concept impacting the ontological and ethical ones mentioned already – with regard to Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben – is also in progress.

spawns the pragmatics of ‘design activism’ not only as a response to the politics of neoliberalism but also as design activism’s production is exacerbated by neoliberalism’s crises (Julier, 2013b). He highlights four themes of such a design activism, as follows:

intensification – which describes here a density of designerly intervention;  
co-articulation – which describes the marrying up of concerns or practices in a way that strengthens both; temporality – which describes the way that speed, slowness, or even open-endedness may be dealt with;  
territorialization – which describes the scale through which responsibility is conceived. (Julier, 2013b, p. 227)

Julier’s themes here emphasise some interesting concepts, many of which resonate with some of my own work on philosophy, design and innovation (Brassett, 2014; 2015; 2016), and others who draw upon some of the philosophers we will encounter below (see, for example: Grierson et al, 2015; O’Reilly, 2015; Marenko, 2015). While a more fulsome argument with these concepts will have to wait, I would like now to highlight Julier’s ‘temporality’ and ‘territorialisation’. His focus is obviously upon mapping ways in which design might practise as more resolutely activist, but the philosophically creative and pragmatic approach I will take here encounter similar concepts, and with similar urges. The creation of radical and oppositional temporalities will reappear below in terms of the speeds and slownesses of a thing’s constituent particles, the relations that are thus expressed and the values of the impacts they have on each other. Julier scales the spatiality inherent in

considerations of speed and slowness, giving the resultant complex a strongly ethical flavour (with the term ‘responsibility’). Taken together, all four of Julier’s themes chart a space and time for a creative intervention that accesses modes of action across social, political and ethical potentialities, that has as much to offer social innovation as it does design activism – as I hope to articulate in what follows. I would like to make one more connection from these concepts before moving on.

In ‘Control and Becoming’ (1995, p. 171) philosopher Gilles Deleuze reflects upon his and Félix Guattari’s characterisation of society in *A Thousand Plateaus* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) thus: ‘society is defined not so much by its contradictions as by its lines of flight, it flees all over the place’. We will see particles of different speeds and slownesses appear in Spinoza’s account of bodies. With Deleuze on society here, these speeds and slownesses lead to highly dynamic social forms. Add to this Spinoza’s other angle on bodies – that they are characterised by their affective capacities – and we have the stuff of society as both dynamic and mutually impactful: for Deleuze and Spinoza this makes them ethical, or rather ethological. But this is an ethology that is deeply entangled with ontology: where the conditions for being are also those of relating, both of which are also expressions of creativity. It is time to move into the first section, and examine affect.

## **2. The affects of designing innovating**

Writing of the ways in which matter is endowed with its own energy, its own *vibrancy*, and which it uses to form itself, political scientist Jane Bennett (2010, p. xii) aligns herself with a ‘Spinozist notion of affect, which refers broadly to the capacity of any body for activity and responsiveness’, thus already enlarging upon

the concept of a socially responsiveness as good enough. She then quotes from Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* (1988)<sup>4</sup> but it is in Spinoza's work that she recognises the concept of affect to be grounded. Similarly, Gregory Siegworth and Melissa Gregg, in the introductory essay to their collection *The Affect Theory Reader* (2010, p 3), describe as 'one of the most oft-cited quotations concerning affect', the following from Spinoza's *The Ethics* (1996, p. 71): 'No one has yet determined what the body can do'. There is much in this quotation – hence its characteristic as 'oft-cited' – but I will focus on the body in a sense that allows us to consider any designed thing (including images, garments, products, strategies and services) as a body.

In the larger of his books on Spinoza *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* Deleuze writes (1990, p. 218):

Spinoza can consider two fundamental questions as equivalent: *what is the structure (fabrica) of a body?* And: *what can a body do?* A body's structure is the composition of its relations. What a body can do corresponds to the nature and limits of its capacity to be affected. (Original emphases)

This highlights two points from Spinoza's definition of the body that interest Deleuze so much – its relational composition and its action – and does so in ways that seem to chime with a traditional understanding of design: *fabrica* and function. This will

---

<sup>4</sup> 'We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, [. . .] to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, [. . .] to exchange actions and passions with it or to join with in composing a more powerful body' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p. 257). Quoted by Bennett (2010, pp. xii–xiii).

soon be disrupted. In the *Ethics* Spinoza writes, ‘Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest, speed and slowness, and not by reason of substance’ (Spinoza, 1996, p. 41; ILL1); and later, ‘A body which moves or is at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another body, which has also been determined to motion or rest by another, and that again by another, and so on, to infinity’ (Spinoza, 1996, p. 41; ILL2). These will be the co-ordinates we will use in our encounter with Spinoza’s body.<sup>5</sup> Deleuze explains this further (1988, p. 123), relating the first as kinetic (and second as dynamic, as we will see in a moment):

Thus, the kinetic proposition tells us that a body is defined by relations of motion and rest, of slowness and speed between particles. That is, it is not defined by a form or by functions [ . . . ] One never commences; one never has a tabula rasa; one slips in, enters in the middle; one takes up or lays down rhythms.

The body is not alone but multiple; made up of a multitude of particles that are accelerating, decelerating, constant, or at rest; with each of these particles making and breaking connections with other particles, other bodies. Without its elementary particles swerving and colliding, causing ricochets, accelerating and coming to a halt, without all of this a body is nothing. It is neither the aim of all this commotion, nor is it contained in these things undergoing different processes. The body is more than the sum of these particles, and exceeds the local organisation into organs that

---

<sup>5</sup> I examine these same co-ordinates in another article on philosophy and design, with focus on speculation and technology (Brassett, 2016).



coalesce throughout the body. The body's organisation is multiple, multiply differentiated and always excessive of any particular format it engenders for itself. It has moments where it tends to chaotic discord and catastrophe, and others of 'miserable' territoriality (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984). As such the body, a body, bodies, are always in the middle<sup>6</sup> of the fields of potential which they both situate and create. The structure of a body, then, is kinetic, relational and multiplicitous, and so crossed and folded-over with many other things, both organic and non-organic, that it is often difficult to see where one thing begins and another ends (Bennett, 2010). Which brings us to the 'dynamic' proposition. Deleuze explains (1988, p. 123):

The second proposition concerning bodies refers us to the capacity for affecting or being affected. You will not define a body (or mind) by its form, nor by its organs or functions, and neither will you define it as a substance or a subject.

The determination of the 'affective capacity' of a body comes from the disruption of its ordinary connections within social, scientific, natural, cultural (or whatever) schema and the allowing of many different properties to be re-connected in other, creative ways. It is dynamic because it is kinetic. If the body's elements are multiple and moving at different rates, and these are colliding and ricocheting in different

---

<sup>6</sup> This 'in the middle' is key in Deleuze and Guattari's work, not least in the concept of 'becoming' that we will spend more time on later in this article. Being in the middle relates, too, to the concept of *milieu* (the medium, middle and space) that philosopher and design theorist John O'Reilly (2015) writes well about regarding Deleuze, Canguilhem and illustration. See also: Deleuze and Guattari (1988) and Canguilhem (2001).

directions, then the forces that these swerves and collisions express are the affective capacities. If bodies are kinetically described – if we take account of the speeds and slownesses of the rhythms of their connections to other bodies and things – then they cannot help but affect other bodies. The possibilities that arise from being so kinetic and dynamic should surpass those thought of otherwise. Further, the sets of power that affective capacities announce mean that any set of relationships can be articulated differently, even if they are between the same things in the same space at different times, or the same things across different spaces at the same time, and so on. The urge to sameness of experience that notions like identity have – in their need to shore up all boundaries against the impact of turbulence, discussed so poetically by Michel Serres in his work on the philosophical, scientific poetry of the 1st Century BCE Roman Lucretius – dismiss the creative possibilities that the complex opening onto chaotic energies might have for any system, let alone those that are themselves already multiple (Serres, 2000; Brassett, 2013, 2015a; Brassett and O'Reilly, in press).

This journey through Spinoza's body points to an utterly complex view of designing. If bodies are to be reconstructed according to the speeds and slownesses of their particles and the ways in which they affect each other, and not in relation to form, function and substance, then this should impact *all* bodies in space; especially designed ones, ones that have depended upon notions of form, function and material to ground both their own ontologies, and the power of those who benefit from such ontologies. And when this happens, when we realise that *all* designed things are multiplicitous conglomerations under different speeds and slownesses, each with a range of affective capacities, then designing must change.

And when we think that designing can affect an innovative reconstitution of what the social might be, and so what and how our connections and relationships might allow, then such a conception of the body as Spinoza's must make an impact here too; I will return to this later in this piece.

Design theorist Betti Marenko (2010, p. 136) notes a similar point, in a piece called 'Contagious Affectivity – the management of emotions in late-Capitalist design', writing that '*all* design has to do with intensities and affects circulating among the stakeholders: objects, designers, users, as well as contexts' (original emphasis). With this we re-encounter the forces of design activism and reaction noted at the outset of this piece, realising that the ethical/ethological and ontological forces announced by the coming together of these discussions are also political and economic ones. For Marenko it is as important for us to remember that capitalism accesses and profits from the affective capacities of designer bodies, as the fact of design affectivity itself. A 'positive' affective perspective versus a 'negative' capitalist one is neither Marenko's argument nor that of the current essay. Rather, it is that when a social design is being created it might do better to move away from a reactive, resentful urge which nevertheless fails to challenge the hegemonies of capitalist machine, and engage instead in an active disruption of the very intensities and affective capacities upon which such a machine operates.<sup>7</sup>

Similar transpositions of creative philosophies of the many potentialities of being onto designing have already been undertaken, with particular focus on the

---

<sup>7</sup> Such a political discussion is somewhat outside the remit of this current paper. However, it would be worth consulting: Agamben (2009); Bennett (2010); Connolly (2011, 2013); who all engage many similar concepts to the ones presented here, with focus upon issues of politics. See also: Brassett (2015).

critique of hylomorphism.<sup>8</sup> For example, Matthew Kearnes in an essay on design (2006), nanotechnology, chaos, control, Deleuze and philosopher of technics Gilbert Simondon, highlights how Simondon's vehement attack on hylomorphism allows us to construct a new ontology of designing that focuses upon its (designing's) participation in the processes of creation that matter and energy are already, always, undergoing. There must be another level of impact from this onto ethics, not least because for Spinoza and Deleuze any ontology will have ethical consequences. In fact, in the terms we have been using, any characterisation of bodies into speeds and slownesses of particles and the affective capacities that ensue will be both ethics and ontology. Which was Spinoza's point. That when we (designers and innovators, as well as philosophers) partake in the construction of ontological opportunities – or, indeed, closing them down – this is an immensely ethical concern. We will take care to address how we do this, by dealing not only with the particular speeds and slownesses and affective capacities of things, but also the affects that these things experience, produce or block in the multitude of relations in which these designed things sit.

What have we collected so far on this philosophical journey through some moments of recent importance in ontology and ethics? Via Spinoza and Deleuze we find that bodies are networks of multiplicitous parts whose parts are speedy, slow or still, and that these parts and the wholes that emerge in their relations have affective

---

<sup>8</sup> Hylomorphism is the philosophical theory that posits that matter is inert and that it takes form only through the imposition of energy from an outside source, for example God, or a designer. See Aristotle's *De Anima* (2012) for his account of hylomorphism in relation to his approach to psychology and mind-body problem. See Simondon's work (1989, 2005, 2009) for its critique and the positing of a self-forming, energetic matter in terms of onto- and morphogenesis. Bennett (2010) takes this further in a book that engages the philosophies of Deleuze and especially Spinoza. For a discussion of hylomorphism and morphogenesis in relation to the same philosophers and design, see also: Marenko (2015), Hales (2015) and Brassett and O'Reilly (2015).

consequences. If we imagine bodies as agglomerations of particles under different speeds and slownesses, with different ways of affecting and being affected, and that these collections, these networks, can come together in many different ways, it would be good to examine a little the particular ways that this can occur. It is with this in mind that we move now to examine the concept of the assemblage.

### **3. Assemblages/Agencements**

In the shorter of his books on Spinoza, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* Deleuze (1988, p. 23) writes that ethics is 'a typology of immanent modes of existence'. With this way of imagining ethics come concepts of immanence and modes of existence, announced in terms of a word dear to design, 'typology'. 'Typology' would appear an odd word for Deleuze to use, as it seems either to draw elements together in relation to common forms or features, or to homogenise via a totalisation of form. Its use in design might reinforce this, where typology can stand for an ideal form of something (in a Platonic sense), or a unified set of formal codes according to which things (products, images, services and so on) can be designed in order to be understood. Deleuze however is taking this concept of typology elsewhere, neither idealising nor homogenising, but becoming through continuous creative collision, connection and deviation – an activity also known as productive of assemblages. A concept that cuts across many of the works of Deleuze and Guattari (1984, 1986, 1988; see also Guattari, 1984, 1989, 1995), it is worth focussing on 'assemblage' a little as it will play a part in what follows. I will do so first in relation to its use by Manuel De Landa in *A New Philosophy of Society. Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity* (2006), because he deploys it in a way to construct a whole new way of

doing philosophy and sociology, while also recognising some other discussions (Philips, 2006; Venn, 2006), as this concept has taken flight and soared in recent years. I recognise that I will only be able to provide a snapshot of a much larger set of discourses on the concept of assemblage, but will do so in order to draw out important aspects for the current discussion. In effect, Spinoza's view of bodies as kinetic and dynamic collections of relatively impactful particles has already brought us close to the concept of assemblage to be discussed. However, we will find nuances so far untouched.

For De Landa (2006) assemblage is closely aligned to his ontological approach to the social. That is, to the question 'why does society exist in one way rather than another?' he answers 'because it is an assemblage'. His introduction of the concept of the assemblage is therefore 'to elucidate the proper ontological status of the entities that are invoked by sociologists and other social scientists' (De Landa, 2006, p. 8). In a way that ranks alongside a similar effort – Bruno Latour's (2005) *Reassembling the Social. An introduction to Actor-Network Theory* – De Landa proposes to consider the conditions for the existence of the social as always already being constituted of things in networked relations with each other. De Landa's account of assemblages, following the work of Deleuze and Guattari, is that they are 'wholes characterized by *relations of exteriority*' (De Landa, 2006, p. 10; original emphasis). Antagonistic both to totalities and essences, assemblages in De Landa's account offer whole-part relationships that are emergent and 'contingently obligatory' (De Landa, 2006, p. 10) rather than logically necessary. For him, the most important aspect of an assemblage is that the 'component parts enter into relations of exteriority' (De Landa, 2006, p. 45); that is, evoking a phrase used by Deleuze and

quoted above, the parts ‘flee all over the place.’ While De Landa’s assemblage as emergent whole of such relative components is resolutely nonreductionist (as he emphasises throughout), and though he argues against seeing assemblages as totalising, he does valorise the holistic final form that the assemblage takes – even if these are moments on the way to others, or crossing over others – as they retain ‘a relative autonomy’ at ‘each level of scale’ and ‘can therefore be a legitimate unit of analysis’ (De Landa, 2006, p. 119). What is missing from De Landa’s account – important as it is in any evaluation of the social or other organisational forms – is an investigation of the nature of the relations upon which they rely; that is, the opening up of assemblages to the relations of affect that situate both the component parts and the emergent wholes. We have encountered already an important conception of relationality in discussing affect: with Spinoza and Deleuze highlighting that bodies, and their composing parts, are ontologically valorised through their impacts upon each other. In one way, then, an assemblage is anything that emerges from the intensive relations upon which it is formed. But it is worth taking a moment to highlight another aspect of assemblage that is often overlooked in its current usage, escaping as it does from English translations of the work of Deleuze and Guattari; that is, the conceptual link to agency that is evident in their French term *agencement*. An exception to this is in the work of John Phillips’s wonderfully rich, short piece called ‘*Agencement/Assemblage*’ (2006).<sup>9</sup>

In this piece, Phillips teases out both the overlaps and discrepancies in meaning between the French and the English concepts. Highlighting *agencement*’s

---

<sup>9</sup> See also the introductory chapter to Eric Alliez and Andrew Goffey’s collection *The Guattari Effect* (2011; especially pp. 10–11).

relations to other of Deleuze's concepts – sense, event and becoming – he notes especially the underlying notion of 'in connection with' that is accentuated more in the French than the English translation.<sup>10</sup> Where the English term's tendency is to give prominence to the concrete 'state of affairs' of any collection – as with De Landa – the French has a greater fluidity in its focus upon the relations of connection between the parts that are now collected. Phillips (2006, p. 108) writes: '*Agencement* designates the priority of neither the state of affairs nor the statement but of their connection, which implies the production of a sense that exceeds them and of which, transformed, they now form parts'. More everyday French usage pitches *agencement* into distinctly design and innovation territories, with connotations of layout, planning or arrangement. Michel Callon – one of the originators of Actor Network Theory – makes a similar point in an essay (2006) on performativity and economics. He writes:

The term *agencement* is a French word that has no exact English counterpart. In French its meaning is very close to 'arrangement' (or 'assemblage'). It conveys the idea of a combination of heterogeneous elements that have been carefully adjusted one another. But arrangements (as well as assemblages) could imply a sort of divide between human agents (those who arrange or assemble) and things that have been arranged. This is why Deleuze and Guattari (1998) proposed the notion of *agencement*.

*Agencement* has the same root as agency: *agencements* are arrangements

---

<sup>10</sup> Though it is worth noting that Guattari uses *agencement* in the senses discussed here before Deleuze, and that this is one of the many creative impacts that Deleuze has from his encounter with Guattari.



endowed with the capacity of acting in different ways depending on their configuration. This means that there is nothing left outside *agencements*: there is no need for further explanation, because the construction of its meaning is part of an *agencement*. A socio-technical *agencement* includes the statement[s] pointing to it, and it is because the former includes the latter that the *agencement* acts in line with the statement, just as the operating instructions are part of the device and participate in making it work. (Callon, 2006, p. 13)

Here Callon brings us back to the important, but somewhat overlooked, role agency has in *agencement/assemblage*. Agency is thus founded upon an ability to arrange, to act, to design and innovate, to make connections between things in creative ways whose affective potentials then exceed the possibilities of the designer or innovator, and which excesses then are folded back into and enrich further opportunities for impactful creative production. In the 'Introduction' to *Deleuze and Design* (Brassett and Marenko, 2015, pp. 5–6), the authors note Deleuze and Guattari's use of the reflexive verb '*se dessiner*' in describing Kafka's work. 'Two problems enthrall Kafka,' Deleuze and Guattari write, '*when can one say that a statement is new? [. . .] and when can one say that a new assemblage is coming into view?*' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p. 83; original emphasis). 'Coming into view' is the translators' choice to render '*se dessine*',<sup>11</sup> which can also be translated as 'emerges', and more literally 'designs itself'. The argument that I have been setting up here is one in

---

<sup>11</sup> This whole 'second problem' is as follows in the original: '*quand peut-on dire qu'un nouvel agencement se dessine?*' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, p. 149).

which the social, ethical and ontological considerations of life, of a life thought individually and collectively, design themselves. Assemblages, *agencements* emerge, stand out, come into view not passively, but actively. This is not only what design *does*, but also what it *is*: it is constituted by its actions of emergent assemblage production. Therefore, the focus of any design upon the ontological – upon the creation of modes of existence, as I will discuss next – is also an engagement with the socio-ethical; and, even, the political. Design designs our ontological possibilities, distributing them across fields of potential in affective relationships. The emerging ethics constitutes both a social design and a political design, and those of us interested in using such philosophical and designerly concepts in driving social innovation should take heed. This is why Kafka, as told by Deleuze and Guattari, was interested in how a new *agencement se dessine*: in how the capacities for action so key to any form of agency are given the ability to emerge, to self-arrange, to design themselves. For Kafka, of course, such agency is often exemplified in its absence, removal, or blockage. It serves those of us involved in designing and innovating (in all cases, not just socially focused), then, to consider how it is that our work encourages the emergence and creative self-proliferation of ontological, social, ethical and political *agencements*. To ensure, as I will argue next, that our designing-innovating creates potential and pluralities of modes of existence, the milieus in which they proliferate, the connections that take them constantly out of themselves, and the assemblages of agency that emerge.

It serves us now turn to modes of existence understood particularly in relation to the work of one philosopher, Étienne Souriau, in order to argue that an ethological designing, ontologically considered as affective, and participating in the

production of *agencements*, will be concerned with the creation of modes of existence.

#### 4. Modes of Existence

Étienne Souriau (1892–1979) was a philosopher renowned for his work on aesthetics, holding a chair in this at the Sorbonne, Paris and serving as editor of the *Revue d'esthétique*. The work I will be focusing upon in this section is *Les différents modes d'existence*<sup>12</sup> originally published in 1943 and recently republished (2009) with an extensive preface by philosophers of science Isabelle Stengers and Bruno Latour. But why turn to this work – the work of a mostly forgotten philosopher? Quite simply, because the ontological demand that reconsidering being in terms of the more multiplicitous 'modes of existence' offers much, albeit as a rather 'abyssal thought' (as Nietzsche described his thinking of the eternal return in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*): a thought with deep and serious consequences for metaphysics and epistemology as well as ontology. Consequences also for designing and innovating especially, as I hope to show here.

Souriau describes his ontology thus:

It is a matter of inventing (as one 'invents' a treasure), of discovering positive modes of existence, coming to meet us with their palm fronds, to greet our hopes, our aspirations, or our problematic speculations, in order to gather them in and comfort them. All other research is metaphysical famine.

(Souriau, 2009, pp. 142–3)

---

<sup>12</sup> All translations from this text, including from Stengers and Latour's preface, are my own.

The greeting, welcoming, opening towards that describes an act of creating *instauration* not only the work but also our modes of existence. This *instauration* – inception, establishment – is an important concept for Souriau as it takes the creative act away from being the imposition of form onto inert matter by an energetic genius, so beloved of any designer. To work as an artist, or a philosopher, or even a designer without engaging in such *instauration* is, he emphasises, ‘metaphysical famine’. An important issue here is the immanence of the thing created and the creator. The very act of creation opens up opportunities – ontological opportunities especially – for the whole creating/created milieu. And just as many things can be *instaurated*, so can such an act bring forth, welcome, myriad modes of existence. Stengers and Latour – in their prefatory essay to Souriau’s book – add their own exposition in terms that are heavily reliant upon the examples of creative practice that are so important to Souriau: ‘To say of a work of art that it is “instaurated”, is to prepare oneself to make of the potter one who welcomes, collects, prepares, explores and invents – as one invents a treasure – the form of the work’ (Stengers and Latour, 2009, pp. 10–11). Being *instaurated*, a work of creativity emerges from an entanglement of different forces – some channelled through the human, others from a multitude of other directions – and allows for the variety of beings that coalesce along the way their own inception.<sup>13</sup> Piece by piece, moment by moment, collision by collision, creative works are discovered and invented by

---

<sup>13</sup> In *Genesis* (1995, p. 57) Michel Serres explains: ‘instauration is a Greek word meaning fork, meaning bifurcation, which sketches a cross or a dovetail. In the beginning is the crossroads’. The emphasis here is on the break, or change of direction, of a flow. For a questioning note about Serres’s etymology here, see Brassett and O’Reilly (2017 forthcoming).

those for whom their very beings are in reciprocal processes of discovery and invention (Souriau, 2009, p. 108–9).

For Souriau, to focus upon modes of existence is to recognise that being is multiplicitous, dynamic, changing and creative, more than single, simple and identifiable, and always yet to come.<sup>14</sup> Such modes are already affective speedy, slow and still *agencements*. In an essay on the ways in which Souriau’s concept of *instauration* and Simondon’s approach to individuation collide, Alice Haumont explains that both philosophers ‘build a thought that embraces *modes of existence*, between which human life is woven’ (Haumont, 2002, p. 70; original emphasis; my translation). Human life is not situated in any special being human, but erupts in between the creations in which it is implicated and explicated, across many different modes. She writes further: ‘[the human] can *become human* only on the condition of opening itself up to these ways of being that surpass it on all sides’ (Haumont, 2002, p. 70; original emphasis; my translation).<sup>15</sup> The human is the basis for its possible modes of existence (‘these ways of being’), without being their cause, and if it is ‘opened up’ to them can find many new ways of being; that is, it can engage in an active and creative becoming. Haumont’s human is opening up into its very own crevices, and finding that its own interstitial moments offer opportunities for

---

<sup>14</sup> Alfred North Whitehead (whom Souriau references positively throughout the work under discussion) shares an approach to being that prioritises its process of becoming rather than its transcendent unity: ‘*how* an actual entity *becomes* constitutes *what* that actual entity is; so that the two descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. Its “being” is constituted by its “becoming”. This is the “principle of process”’ (Whitehead, 1978, p. 23; original emphases). See also Connolly (2011). It is important, also, to note here an important concept in Souriau’s text, one that Stengers and Latour focus upon heavily: that of the ‘work to come’. I will leave a full examination of this to another time, suffice to say that existence considered as a ‘work to come’ will be oriented externally (as De Landa says of assemblages), developing new relations and opportunities for affecting and being affected, forever proliferating its different modes of being as becoming.

<sup>15</sup> I engage with issues of modes of existence, design and ethology in relation to Simondon in a companion piece to the current essay. See n. 3 above.

ontological development. But for her, as she follows Simondon and Souriau, the human is not a unifying or totalising factor bringing all these things under control, but the name of a particular set of material tendencies that assemble and affect and launch in directions of which these very tendencies are unaware.

It is with Latour's reading (2011, 2013) that many of the design-related issues emerge, though this is not necessarily a novel evaluation of Souriau's work interested as Souriau was in aesthetics.<sup>16</sup> Both regard the bringing into being of a work of art, or science (or, we might add, a work of design) as an act of devotion, an act of *instauration* that encourages the work on its trajectory of becoming at the same time as it provides the material upon which an artist's, scientist's, designer's, and so on, modes of being are conceived. Souriau explains:

But one can also exist by the force of others. There are certain things – poems, symphonies or homelands – that do not possess access to existence by themselves. Man has to devote himself to their being; and perhaps in this devotion he might, incidentally, find a real existence. In any case, this act of existence designates and takes note of this success (of being or its support) insofar as it is achieved. (Souriau, 2009, p. 110)

There are things whose participation in existence is mediated and modulated through human creative action, Souriau explains here. At the same time this action

---

<sup>16</sup> It is worth remembering the affective nature of the original Greek for this term, *aisthetikos*, which relates to sensation. Souriau gathers this in a marvellous line about things: 'Sensations are in a way the roar of phenomena' (Souriau, 2009, p. 117). For a fuller discussion of the affective import of design's *aisthetikos* swerved through the question of the role of style in designing and innovating the future, see: Brassett and O'Reilly (2015).

allows for human existential journeys to flow, indeed these are engendered by what had seemed like a one-way creative inception. The success of Souriau's *instauration* is evident not only *in* multiplicitous existences that it produces, but as multiplicitous too. The thoroughly intertwined ontological generation of creator and created in any act of creation shifts existential locus from any one mode of being across a whole field of possibility. Just as Spinoza distributes of ethical import across a network of variously intensive and related elements, so here Souriau undoes any reliance upon actual or transcendent unity of being, favouring instead a collection of modes in ever-churning dynamism. To design things, then, is that process in which the designer devotes herself to the possibilities of her own being; and the things, the multi-modal opportunities that are *instaured* in any act of creation, open-up at least as many directions for her being to become. This is further intensified as the existential modalities offered to those who encounter this work are themselves opened up to new possibilities (or closed down into a straight-jacketed single mode of being in ways that Deleuze and Guattari (1984) term 'miserable totalities').

The 'roar' of phenomena giving rise to sensations (Souriau, 2009, p. 113) is an affect of the multimodal bringing into being undertaken not only by individual creatives but by the multiple and complex web of relations in which their existence is entailed. Humans' modes of existence and the works that they produce are in relationships that are either reciprocally supportive or damaging. 'Each mode [of existence] alone', Souriau (2009, p. 111) writes, 'is itself an art of existence'. It seems irrelevant whether the modes of existence that emerge from the relations between humans, matter, technologies, things, and so on, belong to any one of those categories (human, matter, technology, things, and so on), so utterly

intertwined are they in each other's existences. And to draw each one, any one, of them out is an art, a skill, a fiction, a fabulation, a design. I will return later to the consequences this has for a designed social innovation, but say briefly that this offers an ontological account for designing that must address the emergent possibilities that occur at different orders of magnitude throughout the variety of assemblages that any affective relationality must develop. Any acts of designing will simultaneously allow for, or deny, a range of ontological opportunities at levels that go from the micro-modal to the macro-social. One does not simply design social systems of smartphones, but ways of being and becoming whose inter-affects will allow better or worse relations between human-human, human-thing, thing-social, human-thing-social, and so on.

Design theorist Betti Marenko (2015) highlights the morphogenic qualities of the modern smartphone in her essay titled 'Digital Materiality, Morphogenesis and the Intelligence of the Technodigital Object'. No longer a simple object the smartphone, Marenko posits, becomes whatever 'app, programme, stream of data' it runs at any moment, converging a 'highly immersive, sensory and somatic experience' becoming 'a new assemblage of multiple material intelligences, not necessarily and not exclusively human' (Marenko, 2015, p. 107). For Marenko the liquidity of ontological positions adoptable by such a technological 'device' puts into question those of the 'humans' supposedly 'using' them. As the materialising and dematerialising nature of the phone remodulates its own existential opportunities in relation to the particular contingencies according to which its software and hardware interact (with, it should be said the various assemblages of power, mapping, locating and control that designate contemporary portable devices),



Marenko offers, so it also does for 'us'. Such a platform – all hardware (Kittler 1992; see also Marenko, 2015; Hales, 2015 and 2016) – is a plane of possible existences modulating and remodulating: *instauration*.

Souriau's position gives us another perspective on relations between designers and things than those that privilege the designer as the godlike giver of form to inert matter. We have encountered an ontology of designed things that locates not in simple isolation according to form, function and substance, but as affective assemblages/*agencements*, which move at different rates. They (designers) are involved in processes of *instauration* developing multiple modes of existence that should also be seen as producing them. Latour emphasises that 'each [mode of existence] should be granted the capacity to produce, in its own way, the assemblage of ontological categories that are its very own' (Latour, 2011, p. 316). With things and bodies becoming assemblages – along with artists and designers, scientists and the rest of us too, pitching into worlds of assemblages of modes of existence each with their own vectors of production impacting creatively on everything else, and so on . . . – it seems Spinoza's characterisation of complex networks of kinetic and dynamic constructs is the most coherent. Designers, innovators, all of those who create, things and bodies, and all, all are multimodal, multi-affective assemblages, speeding up, decelerating and grinding to a halt in ever more complex concoctions.

Latour brings us back to the ethics of all this, writing (2011, p. 329) that the 'only worthwhile question (in theology as much as in art and science) concerns what it is *good* to fabricate' (original emphasis). This might be the only worthwhile question to ask of designing and innovating too: what is it good to fabricate, to

*instauration*, to allow to emerge from the many different forces, materials and relations that gather together at any one moment, under specific conditions? What, also, are the many modes of existence that are enabled and disabled, connected and blocked through such an *instauration*? An ethological account of this ‘good’ is one that maps and measures the affective impacts of the relationships of the many modes of existence brought into the open by designing and innovating. These modes are the collective *agencements/assemblages* fabricated as the networked particles of Spinoza’s bodies. As we have seen they – modes and particles – are many, dynamic, and can dissipate as soon as they form. I would add – to Latour’s and Souriau’s takes on modes of existence – that these modes can scale up to various sizes of collective depending upon the relative perspective one is taking. Modes of existence can take shape as social networks and cultural forms, fashion tendencies and political actions, and so many other things, each with its own speeds and slownesses, affective capacities and character as assemblage.

## **5. Towards an ethological design-driven innovation**

At the opening of a book containing a collection of lectures given in the mid-/late-1930s after his retirement, philosopher and mathematician Alfred North Whitehead writes the following: ‘[philosophy’s] primary stage can be termed *assemblage*’ (1966, p. 2; original emphasis). It is a small reference, but beckons much. Ranged against ‘systematisation’ – a totalising and closed grouping of ideas – Whitehead values ‘assemblage’ as an open-ended gathering together of matters-of-fact and matters-of-importance. Which recalls Latour’s discussion of design in his Keynote address at the Design History Society’s Annual Conference, ‘Networks of Design’ (2008; pp. 2–

10), wherein he describes design as moving beyond dealing in ‘matters of fact’ and more with ‘matters of concern’<sup>17</sup>. For Latour designing is that which constructs assemblages of affective importance from interconnected things in the production of ‘matters of concern’. These assemblages move us away from mythologies or ideologies of totalisation through mastery, towards those that value openness, connection and dynamic evolution. Latour highlights this through his use of the word ‘thing’: from an Old English (from Old Norse) word that captured not only the discussion of matters of concern, but the spaces in which these took place. The creative production of a thing, anything designed, innovated (and all), is the assembling of a number of different concerns at a moment in time, as well as the assembling in an immanent fashion of the conditions for such an assemblage to take place. This recalls Deleuze’s depiction of ethics (1988, p. 23; quoted above) as the ‘typology of immanent modes of existence’. These creative conditions generating novel modes of existence are not only ontological and spatial – and so personal, social and political – but ethological too.

We have seen above how Spinoza’s concept of affect helps reconstitute bodies in space as things with a multitude of sensational and emotional impacts. That terms such as ‘subject’ and ‘object’ have been avoided is telling. Subjects and objects, such as they are, are the outcomes of the many interconnected things and the opening up, or closing down, of possibilities that ensues, not the primary grounds of the production of anything. What this essay’s journey through affect,

---

<sup>17</sup> Whitehead (1966, p. 167) mentions ‘concern’ – ‘in the Quaker sense of that term’ – towards the end of *Modes of Thought*. This Quaker term is interesting as it is ‘an imperative to action’, a divinely inspired ‘obligatory call to action’ (Hall, 2013), which is partly encompassed in Latour’s use here. I would also note that along with desire, interest and worry, a ‘going concern’ characterises a business and so is of primary importance to innovators.

assemblage and modes of existence offers is: 1) that things are connected and influential across those connections; 2) that different assemblages can emerge from these connections; and 3) that these affective assemblages can provide the stuff from which modes of existence can be produced, and can be generated by such modes too. In all of these cases designing and innovating play a key role. This is highlighted by Stengers in her 'free and wild' conceptual 'adventure' with the work of Whitehead, where she writes:

Far from constituting a 'defining characteristic', my feeling of being 'me', continuously, in a heterogeneous world in which my attention never ceases to vary, which the mutations of my interests, the permanent transformations of the 'here' of my perception, never cease to recompose, is thus in itself an 'exploit' requiring that the 'chains of reiteration of the past' be constantly forged, tinkered with, and improvised. (Stengers, 2011, pp. 325–6)

For Stengers here the act of making us *us*, of giving us a sense of continuity in flux, over changing, heterogeneous times and spaces, is an act of *innovation*: life is an exploit of transformation, recomposition, variance and mutation, 'constantly forged, tinkered with, and improvised.' We are in a constant process of being designed. This is also an activity of never-ending, production and *agencement*/assemblage-making of inter-affecting modes of existence. As such, when the affective capacities of these creative assemblages of modes of existence are accounted for, then these acts become innovation characterised as both social and ethical. An innovation that seeks to design, redesign, disrupt or even respond to the social and political must

engage these ontological and ethical consideration. Which is one of the points of this piece and need unpacking a little further.

Once designing-innovating – again all, not simply that which articulates itself as social – recognises its character as affective, assembling and allowing for many modes of existence across a multiplicity of planes, then it should realise that these ontologies operate at different scales throughout such multiplicitous planes. This approach is not privileging one type of existence over another. Collections of things, people, societies, powers and processes are still affective and assembled, modal and existential; and ethical. A social innovation driven by design, then, is one that maps and mobilises such affective assemblages of modes of existence, deliberately and actively. It is one that recognises it is deploying ethological and ontological powers, and that by so doing it reinforces or disavows the various agential possibilities of the modes, and clusters of modes, of existence that emerge. This is not a reactive choice, but an important, active and at the same time deeply committed one, which should have ramifications for all types of creative practice.

**Acknowledgements** Thanks to Juliette and Rose who helped me when my French let me down; to my friends and colleagues for discussions on these topics, notably Lucy Kimbell (University of the Arts London), Betti Marenko (Central Saint Martins), Ida Telalbasić (Loughborough University London), Cameron Tonkinwise (Carnegie Mellon University) and Duncan Fairfax (Goldsmiths); John O'Reilly (Central Saint Martins) is a fine philosophical friend and editor; and my colleagues and students on MA Innovation Management, who never stop providing a 'zest for life' (Whitehead).

## References

Agamben, G. [2006] (2009) *What is an Apparatus? And other essays*, trans. D. Kishik and S. Pedatella, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press

Alliez, E. and Goffey, A. (eds) (2011) *The Guattari Effect*, London and New York: Continuum

Aristotle [4th Century BCE] (2016) *De Anima*, trans. C. Shields, Oxford: Clarendon Press

Bennett, J. (2010) *Vibrant matter: A political ecology of things*, Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press

Brassett, J. (2016) Speculative machines and technical mentalities: a philosophical approach to designing the future, *Digital Creativity*, Special Section: Speculative Hardware, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 163–76

Brassett, J. (2015) Poised and Complex. The Becoming Each Other of Philosophy, Design and Innovation, in B. Marenko and J. Brassett (eds), *Deleuze and Design*, 'Deleuze Connections' Series, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 31–57

Brassett, J. (2013) Networks: Open, Closed or Complex. Connecting Philosophy, Design and Innovation, in J. Cai, T. Lockwood, C. Wang, G. Tong and J. Liu (eds),

*Design-Driven Business Innovation. 2013 IEEE-Tsinghua International Design Management Symposium Proceedings*, Beijing: IEEE, pp. 1–11

Brassett, J. and Marenko, B. (2015) Introduction, in B. Marenko and J. Brassett (eds), *Deleuze and Design*, 'Deleuze Connections' Series, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 1–30

Brassett, J. and O'Reilly, J. (in press) Collisions, Design and The Swerve, in P. Vermaas and S. Vial (eds), *Advancements in Philosophy of Design*, Springer

Brassett, J. and O'Reilly, J. (2015) Styling the Future. A philosophical approach to design and scenarios, *Futures*, vol. 74, Special Issue: 'Scenarios and Design', pp. 37–48

Callon, M. (2006) What Does it Mean to Say that Economics is Performative?, *CSI WORKING PAPERS SERIES 005*. Available from: <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00091596>

Canguilhem, G. [1952] (2001) *The Living and Its Milieu*, trans. J. Savage, *Grey Room*, 3, pp. 6–31

Connolly, W.E. (2013) *The Fragility of Things*, Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press

Connolly, W.E. (2011) *A World of Becoming*, Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press

De Landa, M. (2006) *A New Philosophy of Society. Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity*, London: Continuum

Deleuze, G. [1968] (1990) *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, trans. M. Joughin, New York: Zone Books

Deleuze, G. [1970] (1988) *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. R. Hurley, San Francisco, CA: City Lights

Deleuze, G. (1986) *Foucault*, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit

Deleuze, G. (1962) *Nietzsche et la philosophie*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France

Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. [1980] (1988) *A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia 2*, trans. B. Massumi, London: Athlone

Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1986) *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, trans. D. Polan, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press



Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. [1972] (1984) *Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia 1*, trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem and H. Lane, London: Athlone

Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1975) *Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure*, Paris: Éditions de Minuit

Fuad-Luke, A. (2009) *Design Activism: Beautiful Strangeness for a Sustainable World*, Abingdon and New York: Earthscan

Gamman, L. and Thorpe, A. (2011a) Editorial, *CoDesign*, vol. 7, nos. 3–4, pp. 139–41

Gamman, L. and Thorpe, A. (2011b) Design with society: why socially responsive design is good enough, *CoDesign*, vol. 7, nos. 3–4, pp. 217–30

Grierson, E., Edquist, H. and Frichot, H. (eds) (2015) *De-signing Design. Cartographies of theory and practice*, London: Lexington Books

Guattari, F. (1995 [1992]) *Chaosmosis. An ethico-aesthetic paradigm*, trans. P. Bains and J. Pefanis, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press

Guattari, F. (1989) *Les trois écologies*, collection 'L'Éspace Critique', Paris: Éditions Galilée

Guattari, F. (1984) *Molecular Revolution. Psychiatry and Politics*, London: Peregrine Books

Hales, D. (2016) A certain breakthrough, *Digital Creativity*, Special Section: 'Speculative Hardware', vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 132–42

Hales, D. (2015) Re-designing the Objectile, in Marenko, B. and Brassett, J. (eds), *Deleuze and Design*, 'Deleuze Connections' Series, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 139–73

Hall, J. (2013) Thought for the Week: What is a Quaker Concern? *The Friend* (12 September). Available at: <https://thefriend.org/article/thought-for-the-week-what-is-a-quaker-concern> (accessed: 29 June 2016)

Hroch, P. (2015) Sustainable Design Activism: Affirmative politics and fruitful futures, in Marenko, B. and Brassett, J. (eds), *Deleuze and Design*, 'Deleuze Connections' Series, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 219–46

Julier, G. (2013a) Introduction. Material preference and design activism, *Design and Culture*, vol. 5, no. 2, pp.145–50

Julier, G. (2013b) From Design Culture to Design Activism, *Design and Culture*, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 215–36

Julier, G. (2013c) *The Culture of Design*, 3rd edition, London: Sage

Kiem, M. (2011) Designing the Social, and the Politics of Social Innovation,' *Design Philosophy Papers*, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 207–16

Kittler, F.A. (1992) There is no Software, *Stanford Literature Review*, vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring), pp. 81 – 90

Latour, B. (2013) Biography of an Inquiry: On a book about modes of existence, *Social Studies of Science*, 43(2), pp. 287–301

Latour, B. (2011) Reflections on Etienne Souriau's *Les différents modes d'existence*, in Harman, G., Bryant, L. and Srnicek, N. (eds), *The Speculative Turn. Continental Materialism and Realism*, Melbourne: re.press, pp. 304–333

Latour, B. (2005) *Reassembling the Social. An introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Manzini, E. (2015) *Design, When Everybody Designs. An Introduction to Design for Social Innovation*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press

Manzini, E. (2014) Making Things Happen: Social Innovation and Design, *Design Issues*, vol. 30 no. 1, pp. 57–65

Manzini, E. and Meroni, A. (2007) Emerging User Demands for Sustainable Solutions, EMUDE, in R. Michel (ed.), *Design Research Now. Essays and selected projects*, Birkhäuser Verlag AG, pp. 157–79

Marenko, B. (2015) Digital Materiality, Morphogenesis and the Intelligence of the Technodigital object, in Marenko, B. and Brassett, J. (eds), *Deleuze and Design*, 'Deleuze Connections' Series, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 107–38

Marenko, B. (2010) Contagious Affectivity – The Management of Emotions in Late Capitalist Design, in *Proceedings of the Swiss Design Network Conference 2010*, pp. 134–49

Murray, R. (2009) *Danger and Opportunity. Crisis and the new social economy*, London: NESTA. Available at:  
[http://www.nesta.org.uk/library/documents/Danger\\_and\\_Opportunityv2.pdf](http://www.nesta.org.uk/library/documents/Danger_and_Opportunityv2.pdf)  
(Accessed 13 January 2016)

O'Reilly, J. (2015) Milieu and the Creation of the Illustrator: Chris Ware and Saul Steinberg, in Marenko, B. and Brassett, J. (eds), *Deleuze and Design*, 'Deleuze Connections' Series, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 191–218

Phillips, J. (2006) *Agencement/Assemblage*, *Theory Culture and Society*, vol. 23, nos. 2–3, pp. 108–109

Serres, M. [1977] (2000) *The Birth of Physics*, ed. D. Webb, trans. J. Hawkes,  
Manchester: Clinamen Press

Siegworth, G. J. and Gregg, M. (eds) (2010) *The Affect Theory Reader*, Duke  
University Press

Simondon, G. (2009) The Position of the Problem of Ontogenesis, trans G. Flinders,  
*Parrhesia*, no. 7, pp. 4–16

Simondon, G. [1964/1989] (2005) *L'individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et  
d'information*, Paris: Éditions Jérôme Millon

Simondon, G. [1958] (1989) *Du modes d'existence des objets techniques*, Paris:  
Aubier

Souriau, E. [1943] (2009) *Les différents modes d'existence*, Paris: Presses  
Universitaires de France

Spinoza, B. [1677] (1996) *Ethics*, trans. E. Curley, London: Penguin Classics

Stengers, I. [2002] (2011) *Thinking With Whitehead. A Free and Wild Creation of  
Concepts*, trans. M. Chase, Boston, MA: Harvard University Press

Stengers, I. and Latour, B. (2009) La sphinx de l'oeuvre, in E. Souriau, *Les différents modes d'existence*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 1–75

Telalbasić, I. (2014) Design in a Time of Crisis: Social Innovation in Product-Service-Systems. Interconnections Between Existing Developing and Developed Economic Models Towards Social Innovation, in D. Fassi (ed.), *Emerging Practices: Inquiry into the Developing*, Shanghai: Tongji University Press, pp. 107–119

Venn, C. (2006) A Note on Assemblage, *Theory Culture and Society*, vol. 23, nos. 2–3, pp. 107–8

Whitehead, A.N. [1927–8] (1978) *Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology*, Corrected Edition, D.R. Griffin and D.W. Sherburne (eds), New York: The Free Press

Whitehead, A.N. [1938] (1966) *Modes of Thought*, New York: The Free Press